The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra
A Mahāyāna Text
The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra
Laṅkāvatāra-Mahāyāna-Sūtra.
The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra
The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra
A Mahāyāna Text
Laṅkāvatāra-Mahāyāna-Sūtra.
The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra
The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra
A Mahāyāna Text
Laṅkāvatāra-Mahāyāna-Sūtra.
The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra
The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra
A Mahāyāna Text
Translated for the first
time from
the original Sanskrit by
Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki
Translated for the first time from
Laṅkāvatāra-Mahāyāna-Sūtra.
The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra
A Mahāyāna Text
Translated for the first time from
the original Sanskrit by
Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki
PREFACE
It is more than seven years now since I began
the study of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra quite seriously, but owing to various
interruptions I have not been able to carry out my plan as speedily as I
wished. My friends in different fields of life have been kind and generous in
various ways, and I now send out to the perusal of the English-reading public
this humble work of mine. There are yet many difficult and obscure passages in
the Sutra, which I have been unable to unravel to my own satisfaction. All such
imperfections are to be corrected by competent scholars. I shall be fully
content if I have made the understanding of this significant Mahayana text easier
than before, even though this may be only to a very slight degree. In China
Buddhist scholars profoundly learned and endowed with spiritual insights made
three or four attempts extending over a period of about two hundred and fifty
years to give an intelligible rendering of the Laṅkāvatāra. It goes without
saying that these have helped immensely the present translator. May his also
prove a stepping board however feeble towards a fuller interpretation of the
Sutra!
The present English translation is based on the
Sanskrit edition of Bunyu Nanjo's published by the Otani University Press in
1923.
I am most grateful to Mr Dwight Goddard of
Thetford, Vermont, U. S. A., who again helped me by typing the entire
manuscript of the present book. To Assist me in this way was indeed part of the
object of his third visit to this side of the Pacific. Says Confucius, "Is
it not delightful to have a friend come from afar?" The saying applies
most appropriately, to this case.
It was fortunate for the writer that he could
secure the support and help of the Keimeikwai, a corporation organised to help
research work of scholars in various fields of culture; for without it his work
might have dragged on yet for some time to come. There is so much to be
accomplished before he has to appear at the court of Emma Daiwo, to whom he
could say, "Here is my work; humble though it is, I have tried to do my
part to the full extent of my power." The writer renders his grateful
acknowledgment here to all the advisers of the Society who kindly voted for the
speedy culmination of this literary task—a task which he tenderly wishes would
do something towards a better appreciation by the West of the sources of
Eastern life and culture.
Whatever literary work the present author is
able to put before the reader, he cannot pass on without mentioning in it the
name of his good, unselfish, public-minded Buddhist friend, Yakichi Ataka, who
is always willing to help him in every possible way. If not for him, the author
could never have carried out his plans to the extent he has so far
accomplished. Materially, no visible results can be expected of this kind of
undertaking, and yet a scholar has his worldly needs to meet. Unless we create
one of these fine days an ideal community in which every member of it can put
forth all his or her natural endowments and moral energies in the direction
best fitted to develop them and in the way most useful to all other members
generally and individually, many obstacles are sure to bar the passage of those
who would attempt things of no commercial value. Until then, Bodhisattvas of
all kinds are sorely needed everywhere. And is this not the teaching of the
Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, which in its English garb now lies before his friend as well
as all other readers?
Thanks are also due to the writer's wife who
went over the whole manuscript to give it whatever literary improvement it
possesses, to Mr Hokei Idzumi who gave helpful suggestions in the reading of
the original text, and to Professor Yenga Teramoto for his ungrudging
cooperation along the line of Tibetan knowledge.
Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki
Kyoto, November, 1931 (the sixth year of Showa)
INTRODUCTION
For those who have already read my Studies in
the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra1, no special words are needed here. But to those who are
not yet quite familiar with the teachings of Mahayana Buddhism an expository
introduction to the principal theses of the Laṅkā may be welcome. Without
something of preliminary knowledge as to what the Sutra proposes to teach, it
will be difficult to comprehend the text intelligently. For thoughts of deep
signification are presented in a most unsystematic manner. As I said in my Studies,
the Laṅkā is a memorandum kept by a Mahayana master, in which he put down
perhaps all the teachings of importance accepted by the Mahayana followers of
his day. He apparently did not try to give them any order, and it is possible
that the later redactors were not very careful in keeping faithfully whatever
order there was in the beginning, thus giving the text a still more disorderly
appearance. The introduction that follows may also serve as one to Mahayana
Buddhism generally.
I
The Classification of Beings
From the Mahayana point of view, beings are
divisible into two heads: those that are enlightened and those that are
ignorant. The former are called Buddhas including also Bodhisattvas, Arhats,
and Pratyekabuddhas while the latter comprise all the rest of beings under the
general designation of bāla or bālapṛithagjana—bala meaning
"undeveloped", "puerile", or "ignorant", and
pṛithagjana "people different" from the enlightened, that is, the
multitudes, or people of ordinary type, whose minds are found engrossed in the
pursuit of egotistic pleasures and unawakened to the meaning of life. This
class is also known as Sarvasattva, "all beings" or sentient beings.
The Buddha wants to help the ignorant, hence the Buddhist teaching and
discipline.
1 Published by George Routledge and Sons,
London. 1930. Pp. xxxii+464.
The Buddha
All the Buddhist teachings unfold themselves
around the conception of Buddhahood. When this is adequately grasped, Buddhist
philosophy with all its complications and superadditions will become luminous.
What is the Buddha?
According to Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva, who is the interlocutor of the Buddha in the Laṅkā, the
Buddha is endowed with transcendental knowledge (prajñā) and a great
compassionate heart (karuṇā). With the former he realises that this world of
particulars has no reality, is devoid of an ego-substance (anātman) and that in
this sense it resembles Māyā or a visionary flower in the air. As thus it is
above the category of being and non-being, it is declared to be pure (viśuddha)
and absolute (vivikta) and free from conditions (animitta). But the Buddha's
transcendental wisdom is not always abiding in this high altitude, because
being instigated by an irresistible power which innerly pushes him back into a
region of birth and death, he comes down among us and lives with us, who are
ignorant and lost in the darkness of the passions (kleśa). Nirvana is not the
ultimate abode of Buddhahood, nor is enlightenment. Love and compassion is what
essentially constitutes the self-nature of the All-knowing One (sarvajña).
The Buddha as Love
The Buddha's love is not something ego-centered.
It is a will-force which desires and acts in the realm of twofold egolessness,
it is above the dualism of being and non-being, it rises from a heart of
non-discrimination, it manifests itself in the conduct of purposelessness
(anābhogacaryā). It is the Tathagata's great love (mahākaruṇā) of all beings,
which never ceases until everyone of them is happily led to the final asylum of
Nirvana; for he refuses as long as there is a single unsaved soul to enjoy the
bliss of Samādhi to which he is entitled by his long spiritual discipline. The
Tathagata is indeed the one who, endowed with a heart of all-embracing love and
compassion, regards all beings as if they were his only child. If he himself
enters into Nirvana, no work will be done in the world where discrimination
(vtkalpa) goes on and multitudinousness (vicitratā) prevails. For this reason,
he refuses to leave this world of relativity, all his thoughts are directed
towards the ignorant and suffering masses of beings, for whom he is willing to
sacrifice his enjoyment of absolute reality and self-absorption
(samādhi-sukhabhūtakoṭyā vinivārya).
Skilful Means
The essential nature of love is to devise, to
create, to accommodate itself to varying changing circumstances, and to this
the Buddha's love is no exception. He is ever devising for the enlightenment
and emancipation of all sentient beings. This is technically known as the
working of Skilful Means (upāyakauśalya). Upāya is the outcome of Prajñā and
Karuṇā. When Love worries itself over the destiny of the ignorant, Wisdom, so
to speak, weaves a net of Skilful Means whereby to catch them up from the
depths of the ocean called Birth-and-Death (samsāra). By Upāya thus the oneness
of reality wherein the Buddha's enlightened mind abides transforms itself into
the manifoldness of particular existences.
There is a gem known as Maṇi which is perfectly
transparent and colourless in itself, and just because of this characteristic
it reflects in it varieties of colours (vicitra-rūpa). In the same way the
Buddha is conceived by beings; in the same way his teaching is interpreted by
them; that is, each one recognises the Buddha and his teaching according to his
disposition (āśaya), understanding (citta), prejudice (anuśaya), propensity
(adhimukti), and circumstance (gati). Again, the Buddha treats his
fellow-beings as an expert physician treats his patients suffering from various
forms of illness. The ultimate aim is to cure them, but as ailments differ
medicines and treatments cannot be the same. For this reason it is said that
the Buddha speaks one language of enlightenment, which reverberates in the ears
of his hearers in all possible sounds. Upāya may thus be considered in a way
due to the infinite differentiation of individual characters rather than to the
deliberate contrivance of transcendental wisdom on the part of the Buddha.
One Buddha with Many Names
All the Buddhas are of one essence, they are the
same as far as their inner enlightenment, their Dharmakāya, and their being
furnished with the thirty-two major and the eighty minor marks of excellence
are concerned. But when they wish to train beings according to their
characters, they assume varieties of forms appearing differently to different
beings, and thus there are many titles and appellations of the Buddha as to be
beyond calculation (asaṁkhyeya).
One noteworthy fact about this—the Buddha's
assuming so many names, is that he is not only known in various personal names
but also given a number of abstract titles such as No-birth, Emptiness,
Suchness, Reality, Nirvana, Eternity, Sameness, Trueness, Cessation, etc. The
Buddha is thus personal as well as metaphysical.
The Laṅkā here does not forget to add that
though the Buddha is known by so many different names, he is thereby neither
fattened nor emaciated, as he is like the moon in water neither immersed nor
emerging. This simile is generally regarded as best describing the relation of
unity and multiplicity, of one absolute reality and this world of names and
forms.
Transformation-bodies of the Buddha
While the Trikāya dogma is not yet fully
developed in the Laṅkā, each member of the trinity is treaceable in such ideas
as Dharmatā-buddha, Vipāka-buddha, and Nirmāṇa-buddha. The notion of the
transformation-body inevitably follows from the Buddha's desire to save the
ignorant whose minds are not enlightened enough to see straightway into the
essence of Buddhahood. As they are not clear-sighted, something is to be
devised to lead them to the right path, and this something must be in accord
with their mentalities. If not, they are sure to go astray farther and farther.
If they are not capable of grasping Buddhatā as it is, let them have something
of it and gradually be developed. The theory of Upāya (skilful means) is also
the theory of Manomayakāya, will-body. As the incarnation of a great
compassionate heart, the Buddha ought to be able to take any form he wishes
when he sees the sufferings of sentient beings. The will-body is a part of the
Buddha's plan of world-salvation. This is one of the reasons why Buddhism is
often regarded as polytheistic and at the same time pantheistic.
The Bodhisattva and His Ten Vows
In Mahayana Buddhism the Buddha is not the only
agent who is engaged in the work of enlightening or saving the world. While he
is able to transform himself into as many forms as are required by sentient
beings, he is also assisted by his followers or "sons" (putra, suta,
or aurasa) as they are called in the Mahayana sutras. Bodhisattvas are thus the
sons of the Buddha and apply themselves most arduously and most assiduously to
the cause of Buddhism. In fact, the actual work of world-salvation, we can say,
is carried on by these spiritual soldiers under the leadership of the Buddha.
The latter is sometimes felt to be too remote, too serene, too superhuman, and
his sight is often lost in the midst of our worldly struggles. But the
Bodhisattva is always with us, and ever ready to be our confidant, for he is
felt by us to share the same passions, impulses, and aspirations which are such
great disturbing, though ennobling too, forces of our human life.
To state the truth, sentient beings are all
Bodhisattvas, however ignorant and ready to err they may be. They are all
Jinaputras, the sons of the Victorious, and harbour in themselves every
possibility of attaining enlightenment. The Bodhisattvas who have gone up
successively all the rungs of the Bhūmi ladder, and who are thus capable of
extending their help over us, are really our own brethren. Therefore, Mahāmati
of the Laṅkā opens his questions generally with this: "I and other
Bodhisattvas, etc." Mahāmati is our mouthpiece voicing our wants and
aspirations.
Thus is not the place to consider historically
how the conception evolved in Buddhism whose primitive object seems to have
consisted in the realisation of Arhatship. But we can state this that the
essence of Bodhisattvahood is an unequivocal affirmation of the social,
altruistic nature of humankind. Whatever enlightenment one gains, it must be
shared by one's fellow-beings. This idea is classically expressed in the
Mahayana by the so-called "Ten Vows of Samantabhadra". The
Bodhisattva is a man of "inexhaustible vows'' (daśanishṭhāpāda). Without
these he is not himself. To save the world, to bring all his fellow-beings up
to the same level of thought and feeling where he himself is, and not to rest,
not to enter into Nirvana until this is accomplished, how infinitely long and
how inexpressively arduous the task may be. This is the Bodhisattva. Vowing to
save all beings, which is technically known as Pūrva-praṇidhāna in Mahayana
terminology, cannot even for a moment be separated from the life of the
Bodhisattva.
The Buddha being surrounded by these
noble-minded sons cannot fail finally to release all beings from the bondage of
karma and ignorance and thirst for life. With this in view, he is always
inspiring the Bodhisattvas with his sovereign power (prabhāva) and sustaining
(adhishṭhāna) them in their efforts to bring enlightenment in the whole triple
world.
The Ignorant
Life as it is lived by most of us is a painful
business, for we have to endure much in various ways. Our desires are thwarted,
our wishes are crushed, and the worst is that we do not know how to get out of
this whirlpool of greed, anger, and infatuation. We are at the extreme end of
existence opposed to that of the Buddha. How can we leap over the abyss and
reach the other shore?
The Mahayana diagnosis of the conditions in
which all sentient beings are placed is that they are all nursed by desire
(tṛishṇā) as mother who is Accompanied by pleasure (nandī) and anger (rāga),
while ignorance (avidyā) is father. To be cured of the disease, therefore, they
must put an end to the continuous activities of this dualistic poisoning. When
this is done, there is a state called emancipation (vimoksha) which is full of
bliss. The Buddhist question is thus: "How is emancipation possible?"
And here rises the Mahayana system of philosophy.
The Turning back (parāvṛitti)
To this philosophy, a special paragraph is
devoted below. I wish here to say a few words concerning the important
psychological event known as Parāvṛitti in the Laṅkā and other Mahayana
literature. Parāvṛitti literally means "turning up" or "turning
back" or "change"; technically, it is a spiritual change or
transformation which takes place in the mind, especially suddenly, and I have
called it "revulsion" in my Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra, which, it
will be seen, somewhat corresponds to what is known as "conversion"
among the psychological students of religion.
It is significant that the Mahayana has been
insistent to urge its followers to experience this psychological transformation
in their practical life. A mere intellectual understanding of the truth is not
enough in the life of a Buddhist; the truth must be directly grasped,
personally experienced, intuitively penetrated into; for then it will be
distilled into life and determine its course.
This Parāvṛitti, according to the Laṅkā, takes
place in the Ālaya-vijñāna or All-conserving Mind, which is assumed to exist
behind our individual empirical consciousnesses. The Ālaya is a metaphysical
entity, and no psychological analysis can reach it. What we ordinarily know as
the Ālaya is its working through a relative mind The Mahayana calls this phase
of the Ālaya tainted or defiled (klishṭa) and tells us to be cleansed of it in
order to experience a Parāvṛitti for the attainment of ultimate reality.
Parāvṛitti in another sense, therefore, is
purification (viśuddhi). In Buddhism terms of colouring are much used, and
becoming pure, free from all pigment, means that the Ālaya is thoroughly washed
off its dualistic accretion or outflow (āsrava), that is, that the Tathagata
has effected his work of purification in the mind of a sentient being, which
has so far failed to perceive its own oneness and allness. Being pure is to
remain in its own selfhood or self-nature (svabhāva). While Parāvṛitti is
psychological, it still retains its intellectual flavour as most Buddhist terms
do.
Self-discipline and the Buddha's Power
As long as Parāvṛitti is an experience and not
mere understanding, it is evident that self-discipline plays an important role
in the Buddhist life. This is insisted upon in the Laṅkā as is illustrated in
the use of such phrases as "Do not rely on others" (aparapraṇeya);
"Strive yourselves" (śikshitavyam), etc. But at the same time we must
not forget the fact that the Laṅkā also emphasises the necessity of the
Buddha's power being added to the Bodhisattvas, in their upward course of
spiritual development and in the accomplishment of their great task of
world-salvation. If they were not thus so constantly sustained by the
miraculous power of the Buddha, they would speedily fall into the group of the
philosophers and Śrāvakas, and they would never be able to attain supreme
enlightenment and preach the doctrine of universal emancipation. Indeed, when
the Buddha so wishes, even such inanimate objects as mountains, woods, palaces,
etc. will resound with the voice of the Buddha; how much more the Bodhisattvas
who are his spiritual inheritors!
The doctrine of Adhishṭhāna gains all the more
significance when we consider the development of Mahayana Buddhism into the
doctrine of salvation by faith alone. The power of a Bodhisattva's original
vows may also be judged as being derived from the Buddha. If the possibility of
enlightenment is due to the Adhishṭhāna or Prabhāva of the Buddha, all the
wonders that are to take place by the strength of the enlightenment must be
inferred ultimately to issue from the fountain-head of Buddhahood itself.
At any rate the Mahayana idea of the Buddha
being able to impart his power to others marks one of those epoch-making deviations
which set off the Mahayana from so-called primitive or original Buddhism. When
the Buddha comes to be considered capable of Adhishṭhāna, the next step his
devotees are logically led to take would be the idea of vicarious suffering or
atonement. Giving power to another is a positive idea while suffering for
another may be said to be a negative one. Though this latter is strangely
absent in the Laṅkā, the Gaṇḍavyūha as well as the Prajñāpāramitā are quite
eloquent in elucidating the doctrine of vicarious suffering. According to this
doctrine, whatever suffering one is enduring may be transferred on to another
if the latter sincerely desires out of his unselfish and all-embracing love for
others, to take these sufferings upon himself so that the real sufferers may
not only be relieved of them but escape their evil consequences, thus enabling
him to advance more easily and successfully towards the attainment of the
blissful life. This goes quite against the idea of individual responsibility.
But really religious minds require this vicarious suffering for their spiritual
life.
To suffer or atone vicariously is still negative
and fails to entirely satisfy our spiritual needs. The latter demand that more
good must be done in order to suppress the evils which are found claiming this
world for their own glorification. So the Mahayanists accumulate stocks of
merit not only for the material of their own enlightenment but for the general
cultivation of merit which can be shared equally by their fellow-beings, animate
and inanimate. This is the true meaning of Pariṇāmana, that is, turning one's
merit over to others for their spiritual interest.
As I said elsewhere, this notion of Pariṇāmana
is not at all traceable in the Laṅkā, which is strange. The Laṅkā cannot be
imagined to have been compiled prior to the Prajñāpāramitā, nor to the
Gaṇḍavyūha or Avataṁsaka; if so, why this absence? How can this be explained?
Buddha the Enlightened and Sarvasattva the
Ignorant
To conclude this section, Buddhism is the story
of relationship between the two groups of beings: the one is called Buddha who
is the enlightened, the Tathagata, the Arhat, and the other is generally
designated as Sarvasattva, literally "all beings", who are ignorant,
greedy for worldly things, and therefore in perpetual torment. In spite of
their hankering for worldly enjoyments, they are conscious of their condition
and not at all satisfied with it; when they reflect they find themselves quite
forlorn inwardly, they long for real happiness, for ultimate reality, and
blissful enlightenment. They look upwards, where the Buddha sits rapt in his
meditation serenely regarding them with his transcendental wisdom. As he looks
down at his fellow-beings inexplicably tormented with their greed and ignorance
and egotism, he is disturbed, for he feels an inextinguishable feeling of love
stirring within himself—the feeling now perfectly purified of all the
defilements of selfishness, which embraces the whole world in pity though not
attached to it. The Buddha leaves his transcendental abode. He is seen among
sentient beings, each one of whom recognises him according to his own light.
Transcendental wisdom (prajñā) and a heart of
all-embracing love (mahākaruṇā) constitute the very reason of Buddhahood, while
the desire or thirst for life (tṛishṇa), and ignorance as to the meaning of
life (avidyā), and deeds (karma) following from the blind assertion of
life-impulse— these are the factors that enter into the nature of Sarvasattva,
all ignorant and infatuated ones. The one who is above, looking downward,
extends his arms to help; the other unable to extricate himself from
entanglements looks up in despair, and finding the helping arms stretches his
own to take hold of them. And from this scene the following narratives psychological,
logical, and ontological, unfold themselves to the Buddhist soul.
II
Psychology
What may be termed Buddhist psychology in the
Laṅkā consists in the analysis of mind, that is, in the classification of the
Vijñānas. To understand thus the psychology of Buddhism properly the knowledge
of these terms is necessary: citta, manas, vijñāna, manovijñāna, and
ālayavijñāna.
To begin with Vijñāna. Vijñāna is composed of
the prefix vi, meaning "to divide", and the root jñā which means
"to perceive", "to know". Thus, Vijñāna is the faculty of
distinguishing or discerning or judging. When an object is presented before the
eye, it is perceived and judged as a red apple or a piece of white linen; the
faculty of doing this is called eye-vijñāna. In the same way, there are
ear-vijñāna for sound, nose-vijñāna for odour, tongue-vijñāna for taste,
body-vijñāna for touch, and thought-vijñāna (manovijñāna) for ideas—altogether
six forms of Vijñāna for distinguishing the various aspects of world external
or internal.
Of these six Vijñānas, the Manojivñāna is the
most important as it is directly related to an inner faculty known as Manas.
Manas roughly corresponds to mind as an organ of thought, but in fact it is
more than that, for it is also a strong power of attaching itself to the result
of thinking. The latter may even be considered subordinate to this power of
attachment. The Manas first wills, then it discriminates to judge; to judge is
to divide, and this dividing ends in viewing existence dualistically. Hence the
Manas' tenacious attachment to the dualistic interpretation of existence.
Willing and thinking are inextricably woven into the texture of Manas.
Citta comes from the root cit, "to
think", but in the Laṅkā the derivation is made from the root ci, "to
pile up", "to arrange in order". The Citta is thus a storehouse
where the seeds of all thoughts and deeds are accumulated and stored up. The
Citta, however, has a double sense, general and specific. When it is used in
the general sense it means "mind", "mentation",
"ideas", including the activities of Manas and Manovijñāna, and also
of the Vijñānas; while specifically it is a synonym of Ālayavijñāna in its
relative aspects, and distinguishable from all the rest of the mental
faculties. When, however, it is used in the form of Citta-mātra, Mind-only, it
acquires still another connotation. We can say that Citta appears here in its
highest possible sense, for it is then neither simply mentation nor
intellection, nor perception as a function of consciousness. It is identifiable
with the Ālaya in its absolute aspect. This will become clearer later on.
Ālayavijñāna is ālaya+vijñāna, and ālaya is a
store where things are hoarded for future use. The Citta as a cumulative
faculty is thus identified with the Ālayavijñāna. Strictly speaking, the Ālaya
is not a Vijñāna, has no discerning power in it; it indiscriminately harbours
all that is poured into it through the channel of the Vijñānas. The Ālaya is
perfectly neutral, indifferent, and does not offer to give judgments.
Relation Between the Various Functions
Having explained what the various important
terms mean and what functions are indicated by them, let us proceed to see in
what relationship they stand to one another. The whole system of mental
functions is called in the Laṅkā Cittakalāpa or Vijñānakāya; Citta and Vijñāna
are here used synonymously. In this mental system eight modes of activity are
distinguished: Ālayavijñāna, Manas, Manovijñāna, and the five sense-Vijñānas.
When these eight Vijñānas are grouped together under two general heads, the one
group is known as Khyāti-Vijñāna (perceiving Vijñānas) and the other as
Vastuprativikalpa-vijñāna (object-discriminating Vijñāna). But in fact the
Vijñānas are not separable into these two groups, for perceiving is
discriminating. When an individual object is perceived as such, that is, as
solid, or as coloured, etc., discrimination has already taken place here;
indeed without the latter, the former is impossible and conversely. Every
Vijñāna performs these two functions simultaneously, which is to say, one
functioning is analysable into two ideas, perceiving and discriminating. But it
is to be observed that this double activity does not belong to the
Ālayavijñāna.
Another way of classifying the Vijñānas is
according to their Lakshaṇa or modes of being, of which three are
distinguishable as evolving (pravṛitti), as performing deeds (karma), and as
retaining their own original nature (jāti). From this viewpoint, all the
Vijñānas are evolving and deed-performing Vijñānas except the Ālaya which
always abides in its self-nature. For the Vijñānas may cease from evolving and
performing deeds for some reason, but the Ālaya ever remains itself.
The Ālaya, according to the Laṅkā, has two
aspects: the Ālaya as it is in itself, which is in the Sagāthakam called
Pāramālaya-vijñāna, and the Ālaya as mental representation called Vijñaptir
Ālaya. These two aspects are also known respectively as the Prabandha
(incessant) and the Lakshaṇa (manifested). The Ālaya is incessant because of
its uninterrupted existence; it is manifested because of its activity being
perceptible by the mind.
From this, we can see that the Ālaya is
conceived in the Laṅkā as being absolute in one respect and in the other as
being subject to "evolution" (pravṛitti). It is this evolving aspect
of the Ālaya that lends itself to the treacherous interpretation of Manas. As
long as the Ālaya remains in and by itself, it is beyond the grasp of an
individual, empirical consciousness, it is almost like Emptiness itself
although it ever lies behind all the Vijñāna-activities, for the latter will
cease working at once when the Ālaya is taken out of existence.
Manas is conscious of the presence behind itself
of the Ālaya and also of the latter's uninterrupted working on the entire
system of the Vijñānas. Reflecting on the Ālaya and imagining it to be an ego,
Manas clings to it as if it were reality and disposes of the reports of the six
Vijñānas accordingly. In other words, Manas is the individual will to live and
the principle of discrimination. The notion of an ego-substance is herein
established, and also the acceptance of a world external to itself and distinct
from itself.
The six Vijñānas function, as it were,
mechanically when the conditions are satisfied and are not conscious of their
own doings. They have no intelligence outside their respective fields of
activity. They are not organised in themselves and have no theory for their
existence and Doings. What they experience is reported to the headquarters with
no comment or interpretation. Manas sits at the headquarters and like a great
general gathers up all the information coming from the six Vijñānas. - For it
is he who shifts and arranges the reports and gives orders again to the
reporters according to his own will and intelligence. The orders are then
faithfully executed.
The Manas is a double-headed monster, the one
face looks towards the Ālaya and the other towards the Vijñānas. He does not
understand what the Ālaya really is. Discrimination being one of his
fundamental functions, he sees multitudinousness there and clings to it as
final. The clinging now binds him to a world of particulars. Thus, desire is
mother, and ignorance is father, and this existence takes its rise. But the
Manas is also a double-edged sword. When there takes place a
"turning-back" (parāvṛitti) in it, the entire arrangement of things
in the Vijñānakāya or Citta-kalāpa changes. With one swing of the sword the
pluralities are cut asunder and the Ālaya is seen in its native form
(svalakshaṇa), that is, as solitary reality (viviktadharma), which is from the
first beyond discrimination. The Manas is not of course an independent worker,
it is always depending on the Ālaya, without which it has no reason of being
itself; but at the same time the Ālaya is also depending on the Manas. The
Ālaya is absolutely one, but this oneness gains significance only when it is
realised by the Manas and recognised as its own supporter (ālamba). This
relationship is altogether too subtle to be perceived by ordinary minds that
are found choked with defilements and false ideas since beginningless time.
The Manas backed by the Ālaya has been the seat
of desire or thirst (tṛishṇā), karma, and ignorance. The seeds grow out of
them, and are deposited in the Ālaya. When the waves are stirred up in the
Ālaya-ocean by the wind of objectivity—so interpreted by the Manas—these seeds
give a constant supply to the uninterrupted flow of the Vijñāna-waters. In this
general turmoil in which we sentient beings are all living, the Ālaya is as
responsible as the Manas; for if the Ālaya refused to take the seeds in that
are sent up from the region of the Vijñāna, Manas may not have opportunities to
exercise its two fundamental functions, willing and discriminating. But at the
same time it is due to the Ālaya's self-purifying nature that there takes place
a great catastrophe in it known as "turning-back". With this
"turning-back" in the Ālaya, Manas so intimately in relation with it
also experiences a transformation in its fundamental attitude towards the
Vijñānas. The latter are no more regarded as reporters of an external world
which is characterised with individuality and manifoldness. This position is
now abandoned, the external world is no more adhered to as such, that is, as
reality; for it is no more than a mere reflection of the Ālaya. The Ālaya has
been looking at itself in the Manas' mirror. There has been from the very first
nothing other than itself. Hence the doctrine of Mind-only (cittamātra), or the
Ālaya-only.
The Religious Signification
The necessity of conceiving Ālaya in its double
aspect, (1) as absolute reality (viviktadharma) and (2) as subject to causation
(hetuka), comes from the Mahayana idea of Buddhahood (buddhatā). If Buddhahood
is something absolutely solitary, all the efforts put forward by sentient
beings to realise enlightenment would be of no avail whatever. In other words,
all that the Tathagata wants to do for sentient beings would never have its
opportunity to reach them. There must be something commonly shared by each so
that when a note is struck at one end a corresponding one will answer at the
other. The Ālaya is thus known on the one hand as Tathāgata-garbha, the womb of
Tathagatahood, and on the other hand imagined by the ignorant as an ego-soul
(pudgala or ātman).
The Tathāgata-garbha, therefore, whose
psychological name is Ālayavijñāna, is a reservoir of things good and bad, pure
and defiled. Expressed differently, the Tathāgata-garbha is originally, in its
self-nature, immaculate, but because of its external dirt (āgantukleśa) it is
soiled, and when soiled—which is the state generally found in all sentient
beings—an intuitive penetration (pratyaksha) is impossible. When this is
impossible as is the case with the philosophers and ignorant masses, the Garbha
is believed sometimes to be a creator (karaṇa) and sometimes to be an
ego-substance (ātman). As it is so believed, it allows itself to transmigrate
through the six paths of existence. Let there be, however, an intuitive
penetration into the primitive purity (prakṛitipuriśuddhi) of the
Tathāgata-garbha, and the whole system of the Vijñānas goes through a
revolution. If the Tathāgata-garbha or Ālaya-vijñāna were not a mysterious
mixture of purity and defilement, good and evil, this abrupt transformation
(parāvṛitti) of an entire personality would be an impossibility. That is to
say, if the Garbha or the Ālaya while absolutely neutral and colourless in
itself did not yet harbour in itself a certain irrationality, no sentient
beings would ever be a Buddha, no enlightenment would be experienced by any
human beings. Logicalness is to be transcended somewhere and somehow. And as
this illogical-ness is practically possible, the Mahayana establishes the
theory of Mind-only (cittamātra).
Ontology and the Twofold Egolessness
In considering the theory of Mind-only, we have
to be careful not to understand this term psychologically. Mind (citta) here
does not mean our individual mind which is subject to the law of causation
(hetupratyaya). Absolute Citta transcends the dualistic conception of
existence, it belongs neither to the Vijñāna-system nor to our objective world
(vishaya). Therefore, in the Laṅkā this Citta is frequently described in
ontological terms.
The most significant one is Vastu, which is
found coupled with Tathatā in one place (p. 147, line 6)) and with Ārya in
another place (p. 164, lines 9 and 10). In the first case, Vastu and Tathatā
are synonymously used; what is Tathatā, that is Vastu. Tathatā is to be
rendered either "suchness", or "thatness", which is a term
most frequently used in the Mahayana texts to designate the highest reality
ever approachable by Prajñā, transcendental wisdom; Vastu in Buddhism is
usually an individual object regarded as existing externally to the Vijñānas,
and so is it in most cases in the Laṅkā also. But evidently in this connection
where Vastu is Tathatā, it must mean the highest reality.
In the second case in which Ārya is affixed to
Vastu, the ārya must be a modifier here, that is, this reality is something to
be described as ārya, "noble", "holy", or
"worthy".
The highest reality is also called
"something that has been in existence since the very first"
(pūrvadharmasthititā, p. 241, 1. 14), or (paurāṇasthitidharmatā, p. 143, ll. 5
and 9). As it is the most ancient reality, its realisation means returning to
one's own original abode in which everything one sees around is an old familiar
object. In Zen Buddhism, therefore, the experience is compared to the visiting
one's native home and quietly getting settled (歸家穩坐, kuei-chia wen-tso).
The Buddhas, enlightened ones, are all abiding here as gold is embedded in the mine.
The ever-enduring reality (sthititā dharmatā) is above changes.
To be above changes means to remain in one's own
abode, not to move away from it, and for this reason reality is known as
"self-abiding" (svastha, p. 199, line 4), or "remaining in its own
abode" (svasthāne 'vatishṭhate, p. 178, 1. 15).1 To keep one's own abode
it to be single, solitary, absolute: hence Reality is Viviktadharma, a thing of
solitude; Bhūtakoṭi, limit of reality, which points to a similar mode of
thinking. It is again Ekāgra, the summit of oneness, and this summit or limit
(koṭi) is at the same time no-summit, no-limit, because this is gained only
when one makes a final leap beyond the manifoldness of things.
1 Cf. p. 124, line 1.
The more ordinary expressions given to the
highest reality known as Citta are Tathatā, "suchness" or
"thusness", Satyatā, "the state of being true", Bhūtatā,
"the state of being real", Dharmadhātu, "realm of truth",
Nirvana, the Permanent (nitya), Sameness (samatā), the One (advaya), Cessation
(nirodha), the Formless (animitta), Emptiness (śūnyatā), etc.
From these descriptions it is found natural for
Mahayanists psychologically to deny the existence of an ego-soul or
ego-substance in the Ālaya, and ontologically to insist that the tragedy of life
comes from believing in the substantiality or finality of an individual object.
The former is technically called the doctrine of Pudgalanairātmya, egolessness
of persons,1 and the latter that of Dharmanairātmya, egolessness of things; the
one denies the reality of an ego-soul and the other the ultimacy of an
individual object.
Superficially, this denial of an Ātman in
persons and individual objects sounds negative and productive of no moral
signification. But when one understands what is ultimately meant by Cittamātra
(Mind-only) or by Vivikta-dharma (the Solitary), the negations are on the plane
of relativity and intellection.
The term "the Middle" (madhyama),
meaning "the Middle Way'', does not occur in the Laṅkā proper except in
its Sagāthakam portion. But the idea that the truth is not found in the
dualistic way of interpreting existence, that it is beyond the category of
being and non-being, is everywhere emphasised in the Laṅkā. In fact, we can say
that one of the principal theses of the Laṅkā is to establish the Absolute
which makes a world of particulars possible but which is not to be grasped by
means of being and non-being (astinā-stitva). This Absolute is the Middle Way
of the Madhyamaka school.
1 The conception of the Tathāgata-garbha is not
to be confused with that of a Pudgala or Ātman. See § xxviii. For the
non-existence of a personal ego-soul and the non-reality of an individual
object, see especially pp. 01-62 of this translation.
Unobtainability
This going beyond all forms of dualism, however
differently it may be expressed, whether as being and non-being, or as oneness
and manyness, or as this and that, or as causation and no-causation, or as form
and no-form, or as assertion and negation, or as Saṁsāra and Nirvāṇa, or as
ignorance and knowledge, or as work and no-work, or as good and evil, or as
purity and defilement, or as ego and non-ego, or as worldly and super-worldly,
ad infinitum —this going beyond a world of oppositions and contrasts
constitutes one of the most significant thoughts of the Mahayana. There is
nothing real as long as we remain entangled in the skein of relativity, and our
sufferings will never come to an end. We must therefore endeavour to take hold
of reality, but this reality is not something altogether solitary. For in this
case no one of us will be able to have even a glimpse of it, and if we had, it
will turn into something standing in opposition to this world of relativity,
which means the loss of solitariness, that is, the solitary now forms part of
this world.
Thus, according to Buddhist philosophy, reality
must be grasped in this world and by this world, for it is that "Beyond
which is also Within". The Laṅkā compares it to the moon in water or a
flower in a mirror. It is within and yet outside, it is outside and yet within.
This aspect of reality is described as "unobtainable" or
"unattainable" (anupalabdha). And just because it is unobtainable in
a world of particulars, the latter from the point of view of reality is like a
dream, like a mirage, and so on. The subtlest relation of reality to the world
is beyond description, it yields its secrets only to him who has actually
realised it in himself by means of noble wisdom (āryajñāna or prajñā). This
realisation is also a kind of knowledge though different from what is generally
known by this name.
Epistemology
Without a theory of cognition, therefore,
Mahayana philosophy becomes incomprehensible. The Laṅkā is quite explicit in
assuming two forms of knowledge: the one for grasping the absolute or entering
into the realm of Mind-only, and the other for understanding existence in its
dualistic aspect in which logic prevails and the Vijñānas are active. The
latter is designated Discrimination (vikalpa) in the Laṅkā and the former
transcendental wisdom or knowledge (prajñā). To distinguish these two forms of
knowledge is most essential in Buddhist philosophy.
The Laṅkā is decidedly partial to the use of
Āryajñāna instead of Prajñā, although the latter has been in use since the
early days of Buddhism. Āryajñāna, noble wisdom, is generally coupled with
Pratyātma, inner self, showing that this noble, supreme wisdom is a mental
function operating in the depths of our being. As it is concerned with the
highest reality or the ultimate truth of things, it is no superficial knowledge
dealing with particular objects and their relations. It is an intuitive
understanding which, penetrating through the surface of existence, sees into
that which is the reason of everything logically and ontologically.
The Laṅkā is never tired of impressing upon its
readers the importance of this understanding in the attainment of spiritual
freedom; for this understanding is a fundamental intuition into the truth of
Mind-only and constitutes the Buddhist enlightenment with which truly starts
the religious life of a Bodhisattva.
This transcendental Jñāna is variously
designated in the Laṅkā. It is Pravicayabuddhi, that is, an insight fixed upon
the ultimate ground of existence. It is Svabuddhi, innate in oneself;
Nirābhāsa, or Anābhāsa (imagelessness), beyond all forms of tangibility;
Nirvikalpa, beyond discrimination, meaning direct empirical knowledge before
analysis starts in any form whatever; which therefore is not at all expressible
by means of words (vāc or ruta). The awaking of supreme knowledge
(anuttarasamyaksaṁbodhi) is the theme of the Prajñāpārṇmitā-sūtras, but in the
Laṅkā the weight of the discourse is placed upon the realisation by means of
Āryajñāna of ultimate reality which is Mind-only. This psychological emphasis
so distinctive of the Laṅkā makes this sutra occupy a unique position in
Mahayana literature.
The knowledge that stands contrasted to Prajñā
or Āryajñāna is Vikalpabuddhi, or simply Vikalpa, which I have translated
"discrimination". It is relative knowledge working on the plane of
dualism, it may be called the principle of dichotomy, whereby judgment is made
possible. By us existence is always divided into pairs of conception, thesis
and antithesis, that is, being and non-being, permanent and impermanent,
Nirvana and Samsara, birth and death, creating and created, this and that, Me
and not-Me, ad libitum. This is due to the working of Vikalpa. The Lakshaṇa
(form) of existence thus presented to us is not its real nature, it is our own
thought-construction (vijñapti); but our Buddhi which seeks after pluralities
fails to understand this fact and makes us cling to appearances as realities.
As the result, the world in which we now find ourselves living ceases to be
what it is in itself; for it is one we have constructed according to our own
ignorance and discrimination. Reality escapes us, truth slips off our grasp,
false views accumulate, wrong judgments go on adding complexities upon
complexities. The habit-energy (vāsanā) thus created takes complete hold on the
Ālayavijñāna, and Ālaya the Absolute is forever unable to extricate itself from
these encumbrances. Eternal transmigration to no purpose must be our destiny.
The Twofold Truth (satya)
The distinction between the highest truth
(paramārtha-satya) and conventional truth (samvṛiti-satya) is not explicitly held
in the Laṅkā, but allusions are occasionally made to them; and it is said that
false discrimination belongs to conventionalism (p. 131, 1. 3). Another word
for conventionalism is Vyavahāra, worldly experience, according to which we
talk of things being born and destroyed, and also of the how, what, where, etc.
of existence. This kind of knowledge does not help us to have an insight into
the depths of being.
The Three Svabhāvas
Another way of classifying knowledge is known as
three Svabhāvas in the Laṅkā. This is a generally recognised classification in
all the schools of Mahayana Buddhism. Svabhāva means "self-nature" or
"self-reality" or "self-substance '', the existence of which in
some form is popularly accepted. The first form of knowledge by which the
reality of things is assumed is called Parikalpita, "imagined", that
is, imagination in its ordinary sense. This is an illusion, for things are
imagined to exist really where in fact there are none. It is like seeing a
mirage which vanishes as one approaches. Imagined (parikalpita) objects have,
therefore, no objective reality.
The second form of knowledge by which we examine
existence is Paratantra, "depending upon another". This is a kind of
scientific knowledge based on analysis. Buddhists make use of this knowledge to
disprove the substantiality of individual objects, that is, the svabhāvatva of
things. According to them, there is nothing self-existing in the world,
everything is depending for its existence on something else, things are
universally mutually conditioned, endlessly related to one another. Dissect an
object considered final, and it dissolves itself into airy nothingness. Modern
scientists declare that existence is no more than mathematical formulae. The
Mahayanists would say that there is no Svabhāva in anything appealing as such
to the Vijñānas when it is examined from the Paratantra point of view.
The imagined view (parikalpita) of reality does
not give us a true knowledge of it, and the relativity view (paratantra)
reduces it into nothingness: if so, where does our boat of enlightenment get
anchored? The Laṅkā tells us that there is a third way of viewing existence,
called Parinishpanna, "perfected", which allows us to become truly
acquainted with reality as it is. It is this "perfected" knowledge
whereby we are enabled to see really into the nature of existence, to perceive
rightly what is meant by Svabhāva, and to declare that there is no Svabhāva as
is imagined by the ignorant and that all is empty (śūnya).
Perfect or "perfected" knowledge
issues from Prajñā, or Āryajñāna, or sometimes simply Jñāna, seeing into the
suchness of things. It perceives things as they are, because going beyond the
realm of being and non-being which belongs to discrimination, the principle of
dichotomisation, it dives into the abyss where there are no shadows (anābhāsa).
This is called self-realisation (svasiddhi). So states the Laṅkā that as the
wise see reality with their eye of Prajñā, they ascertain definitely what it
is, i. e. in its self-nature (bhāvasvabhāva) and not as is seen by the ignorant
whose eye is never raised beyond the horizon of relativity.
This is again called seeing into the emptiness
of things. Emptiness (śūnyatā), however, does not mean "relativity",
as is thought by some scholars. Relativity-emptiness is on the lower plane of
knowledge and does not reveal the real view of existence as it is. Emptiness
taught in the Mahayana texts goes far deeper into the matter. It is the object
of transcendental knowledge. As long as one stays in the world of relativity
where logic rules supreme, one cannot have even the remotest idea of true
emptiness or what is designated in the Prajñāpāramitā as Mahāśūnyatā. The Laṅkā
has also this kind of Śūnyatā mentioned as one of the seven Emptinesses (p. 94).
Relativity-emptiness so called corresponds to the first of the seven
Emptinesses, while the Mahayana Śūnyatā is Paramārtha-āryajñāna-mahāśūnyatā,
that is, the great void of noble wisdom which is the highest reality.
The Five Dharmas
Before concluding this section, we must not
forget to mention what is known as the Five Dharmas in the Laṅkā making up one
of the main topics of discourses. The Five Dharmas and the Three Svabhāvas are
different ways of classifying the same material. The Five are: Appearances (nimitta),
Names (nāma), Discrimination (saṁkalpa), Right Knowledge (samyagjñāna), and
Suchness (tathatā). The first three correspond to the two of the Three
Svabhāvas, Parikalpita and Paratantra, while the last two belong to the
Parinishpanna.
Our relative knowledge starts with perceiving
Appearances to which Names are given. Names are then thought real and
discrimination is carried on. We can say that discrimination has been with us
from the first even when what is called perception has not taken place. For
naming is impossible without some form of discrimination. Then the worst thing
comes upon us as we begin to persuade ourselves and think that by giving Names
existence has been successfully disposed of, and feel comfortable about the
problems of religion. Although without naming no knowledge is possible, Right
Knowledge (samyagjñāna) is not to be had here. For this is the inexpressible,
the unnamable, it is the meaning (artha) not to be grasped by words. In this
the Laṅkā permits no equivocation, it most emphatically advises us not to
attach ourselves to words.
The object of Right Knowledge is Suchness of
things as not conditioned by the category of being and non-being. It is in this
sense that ultimate reality is said to be like the moon in the water, it is not
immersed in it, nor is it outside it. We cannot say that the moon is in water,
for it is a mere reflection; but we cannot say that it is not there, for a
reflection though it may be it is really before us. Plurality of objects is not
real from the point of view of relativity as well as from the point of view of
Suchness. If some one declares such reality as maintained by the Mahayana is
too ethereal, too phantom-like, too unreal for our religious aspirations, the
Laṅkā will immediately retort, "You are still on the plane of
relativity." When the Āryajñāna is awakened, Tathatā is the most real
thing and a term most fittingly applied as far as our power of designation is
concerned.
III
The Message of the Laṅkā
There are many other thoughts of interest in the
Laṅkā which may be discussed in this Introduction. But as I have already given
up many pages to it and as the reader who wishes to know more about the Sutra
may go to my Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra, I will say just a few words about the
position of this Sutra among the general Mahayana Buddhist texts.
While we are still in the dark as to how
Mahayana Buddhism developed in India, we know that when it was introduced into
China by the missionaries from India and central Asia, it was already regarded
as directly coming from the Buddha's own golden mouth, and that what must have
developed during several hundred years after his death was taken in a wholesale
manner for a system fully matured in his life-time extending over a period of
about half a century after his Enlightenment. As the sutras were translated
into Chinese, the first of which appeared in 68 a. d., they profoundly stirred
the Chinese and then the Japanese mind awakening their religious consciousness
to its very depths. The following are the most important Mahayana texts that
thus served to move the religious feelings of the Far-eastern peoples and are
still continuing to do so.
(1) The Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra. One of the
main theses of this inspiring scripture is the announcement that the Buddha
never died, that he is forever living on the Mount of the Holy Vulture and
preaching to a group of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas, who
are no less beings than ourselves, and that the Buddha has just one vehicle
(yāna) for all beings. This must have been a revolutionary teaching at the time
when the Buddha was thought to be just as transient and mortal as ourselves,
and when the only thing that was left behind after his Nirvana was his Dharma,
in which his followers were asked to find their Master.
(2) The Avalokiteśvara-vikurvaṇa-nirdeśa. This
is commonly known as Kwannon-gyo in Japan and forms the twenty-fourth chapter of
the Sanskrit Saddharma-puṇḍarīka, but it will be better to treat it as a
separate document as it has quite an independent message and has been so
considered though not always consciously by its devotees. Avalokiteśvara is
here represented as a god of mercy who will help anybody who finds himself in
trouble spiritually as well as materially. In popular minds the god is no more
masculine than feminine; if anything, more feminine, because of mercy being
more reality associated with eternal femininity. That he can assume various
forms (vikurvaṇa) in order to achieve his ends appeals very much to the
religious imagination of the Eastern peoples. And this doctrine of
transformation is one of the characteristic features of Mahayana Buddhism.
(3) The Avataṁsaka-sūtra. This is an
encyclopedic sutra of which we find the Gaṇḍavyūha and the Deśabhūmika forming
a part. It is another Mahayana sutra that has influenced the Chinese and the
Japanese mind profoundly. The so-called Interpenetration which constitutes the
central thought of the sutra is symbolically and effectively treated in the
Chinese translations by Buddhabhadra (60 fas.), by Śikshānanda (80 fas.), and
by Prajñā (40 fas.). The sutra as we have it now contains many sutras which may
be considered independent though they no doubt belong to the same class of
literature. The reading may be tedious from the modern point of view as the
main theme is not so succinctly presented, and it takes some time before the
reader can get into the mood of the sutra itself. After a quiet and patient
pursuit of the text, however, he cannot help but be deeply impressed with its
underlying spirit whose grandeur of outlook almost surpasses human
comprehension. The huge rock-cut figure of Vairocana at Lung-men and the bronze
figure in Nara are respectively the Chinese and the Japanese artistic response
to the spiritual stimulation caused by the Avataṁsaka, or the Gaṇḍavyūha which
is the same thing.
Another profound effect produced by this sutra
on the Eastern mind is the conception of the Bodhisattva Samantabhadra with his
"ten inexhaustible vows." He would not enter into Nirvana, that
coveted object of all the Buddhists, because he would not have one single soul
unsaved behind him. And by this "soul" was meant not only human soul
but the soul of every being animate or inanimate. It was the vow of
Samantabhadra to release animals, plants, and even such inanimate existences as
mountains, waters, earths, etc., from the bondage of ignorance and karma. His
universe, moreover, was far wider and more spiritualistic than our ordinary one
(4) The Prajnā-pāramitā-sūtra. This is regarded
by most Mahayana scholars to have been one of the first Mahayana literature
that was declared against the hair-splitting scholastic philosophy of early
Buddhist doctors, gives us the doctrine of Emptiness or Void (śūnyatā), whereby
every possible straw of attachment is taken away from us. To be left alone in
the Void, even with this Void vanishing from around us, is the method of
perfect emancipation proposed by the Prajñā-pāramitā. This was quite a direct
straightforward proposition on the part of the Mahayanist. It appealed greatly
to intellectual minds as well as the mystical. While the Avataṁsaka filled the
universe with things of imagination even to its minutest particle, the
Prajñā-pāramitā swept everything away from the universe which now becomes a
vast Void indeed. And in six hundred fascicles of the sutra we are warned not
to be afraid of, not to be taken aback by this vast Void. If we stagger at this
gospel of absolute Emptiness, we are told by the Buddha that we cannot be good
followers of the Mahayana.
(5) The Vimalakīrti-sūtra. This is a
masterpiece, a drama with great literary merit, and because of this fact it is
read more generally than other Buddhist sutras by the laity. The signification
of this sutra lies in taking our soiled coat of attachment off our back which
we have been wearing ever since we became aware of an external existence.
Another significant feature of the sutra is that its chief figure of interest
is not the Buddha but a wealthy layman called Vimalakīrti. It is this crafty
old gentleman-philosopher who puts to shame all the Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas
coming to argue with him about the deepest truths of Buddhism, except Mañjuśrī,
the head of the Bodhisattvas. The latter proved a good match for the eloquence
of the lay-disciple of the Buddha. What we have to notice especially in this
Mahayana text is that Buddhism does not require us to lead a homeless life as a
Bhikshu in order to attain enlightenment, that is, the householder's life is as
good and pure as the mendicant's.
(6) In this respect the Śrimālā-sūtra is also
significant, for Śrimālā the queen inspired by the wisdom and power of the
Buddha delivers a great sermon on the Tathāgata-garbha. The Mahayana may be
said to be the revolt of laymen and laywomen against the ascetic spirit of
exclusion pervading among early advocates of Buddhism.
(7) The Sukhāvatī-vyūha-sūtra. The influence of
this sutra on Oriental people is quite different from that of the other sutras,
for it has awakened the faith-aspect of their religious consciousness, which is
established on the general basis of Mahayana philosophy. Superficially, the
faith of Amitābha looks very much like Christian faith in Christ, but the
underlying thoughts are not at all the same. The Jodo school could not take its
rise from any other soil than Mahayana Buddhism. In Japan this school has
achieved a unique development marking a spiritual epoch in the history of
religious faith in the East.
(8) The Parinirvāṇa-sūtra. This once formed the
foundation of the Nirvana school in the early history of Chinese Buddhism. Its
main assertion is that the Buddha-nature is present in every one of us. Before
the arrival of this sutra in China it was generally believed that there was a
class of people known as Icchanti who had no Buddha-nature in them and
therefore who were eternally barred from attaining enlightenment. This belief
was entirely expelled, however, when a statement to the contrary was found in
the sutra, saying that "There is something in all beings which is true, real,
eternal, self-governing, and forever unchanging—this is called Ego, though
quite different from what is generally known as such by the philosophers. This
Ego is the Tathāgata-garbha, Buddha-nature, which exists in every one of us,
and is characterised with such virtues as permanency, bliss, freedom, and
purity."
(9) All these and other sutras of Mahayana
Buddhism may seem to exhaust the many-sided aspects of this school, but another
is needed to tell us that mere understanding is not enough in the Buddhist life,
that without self-realisation all intellection amounts to nothing. To tell us
this is the office of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, and Bodhidharma, father of Zen
Buddhism, made use of the text quite effectively; for it was through him that a
special school of Buddhism under the title of Zen or Ch'an has come to develop
in China and in Japan. While Zen as we have it now is not the same in many
respects as Bodhidharma first proclaimed it about fifteen centuries ago, the
spirit itself flows quite unchanged in the East. And this is eloquently
embodied in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra. It is not, however, necessary here for us to
enter into details, for the point has been fully dwelt upon in my recent work,
Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Suffice it to touch lightly upon the
characteristic features of the Sutra, which constitute its special message as
distinguished from the other sutras already referred to.
There is no doubt that the Laṅkā is closely
connected in time as well as in doctrine with The Awakening of Faith in the
Mahāyāna generally ascribed to Aśvaghosha. While he may not have been the
author of this most important treatise of Mahayana philosophy, there was surely
a great Buddhist mind, who, inspired by the same spirit which pervades the
Laṅkā, the Avataṁsaka, the Parinirvāṇa, etc., poured out his thoughts in The
Awakening. Some scholars contend that The Awakening is a Chinese work, but this
is not well grounded.
In a way The Awakening is an attempt to
systematise the Laṅkā, for all the principal teachings of the latter are found
there developed in due order. As far as the theoretical side is concerned, both
teach the existence of the Garbha as ultimate reality. While this lies in
ordinary people defiled by the evil passions and does not shine out in its
native purity, we cannot deny its existence in them. When the external wrappage
of impurities is peeled off we all become Buddhas and Tathagatas. In fact, the
birth of a Tathagata is nowhere else than in this Garbha.
The Garbha is from the psychological point of view
the Ālayavijñāna, all-conserving mind, in which good and bad are mingled, and
the work of the Yogin, that is, one who seeks the truth by means of
self-discipline, is to separate the one from the other. Why is the Ālaya found
contaminated by evil thoughts and desires? What is the evil? How does it come
out in this world? How is the truth to be realised? These questions are
answered by postulating a system of Vijñānas and by the doctrine of
Discrimination (vikalpa), as has already been expounded above.
This is the point where the Laṅkā comes in
contact with the Yogācāra school. The Yogācāra is essentially psychological
standing in contrast in this respect to the Madhyamaka school which is
epistemological. But the Ālayavijñāna of the Yogācāra is not the same as that
of Laṅkā and the Awakening of Faith. The former conceives the Ālaya to be
purity itself with nothing defiled in it whereas the Laṅkā and the Awakening
make it the cause of purity and defilement. Further, the Yogācāra upholds the
theory of Vijñaptimātra and not that of Cittamātra, which belongs to the Laṅkā,
Avataṁsaka, and Awakening of Faith. The difference is this: According to the
Vijñaptimātra, the world is nothing but ideas, there are no realities behind
them; but the Cittamātra states that there is nothing but Citta, Mind, in the
world and that the world is the objectification of Mind. The one is pure
idealism and the other idealistic realism.
To realise the Cittamātra is the object of the
Laṅkā, and this is done when Discrimination is discarded, that is, when a state
of non-discrimination is attained in one's spiritual life. Discrimination is a
logical term and belongs to the intellect. Thus we see that the end of the
religious discipline is to go beyond intellectualism, for to discriminate, to
divide, is the function of the intellect. Logic does not lead one to
self-realisation. Hence Nāgārjuna's hair-splitting dialectics. His idea is to
prove the ineffectiveness of logic in the domain of our spiritual life. This is
where the Laṅkā joins hands with the Madhyamaka. The doctrine of the Void is
indeed the foundation of Mahayana philosophy. But this is not to be understood
in the manner of analytical reasoning. The Laṅkā is quite explicit and not to
be mistaken in this respect.
So far, the Laṅkā may seem to be only a
philosophical treatise with nothing religious in it, but the fact is that the
Sutra is deeply tinged with religious sentiments. For instance, the Bodhisattva
would not enter into Nirvana because of his vows to save all sentient beings,
and his vows are not limited in time and space, and for this reason they are
called "inexhaustible". Not only are his vows inexhaustible but the
"skilful means" he uses for the emancipation of all beings know no
limits. He knows how to make the best use of his inexhaustible resources
intellectual and practical for this single purpose. Here we may say that the
Bodhisattva Samantabhadra of the Avataṁsaka or the Gaṇḍavyūha is reflected.
In the Laṅkā all the most fundamental
conceptions of the Mahayana are thrown in without any attempt on the part of
the compiler or compilers to give them a system. This is left to the thoughtful
reader himself who will pick them up from the medley and string them into a
garland of pearls out of his own religious experience.
The one significant Mahayana thought, however,
which is not expressly touched upon in the Sutra is that of Pariṇāmana.
Pariṇāmana means to turn one's merit over to somebody else so as to expedite
the latter's attainment of Nirvana. If anybody does anything good, its merit is
sure to come back to the doer himself—this is the doctrine of Karma; but
according to the Mahayana the recipient need not always be the doer himself, he
may be anybody, he may be the whole world; merit being of universal character
can be transferred upon anything the doer wishes. This transferability is known
as the doctrine of Pariṇāmana, the turning over of one's good work to somebody
else. This idea comes from the philosophical teaching of Interpenetration as
upheld in the Avataṁsaka.
IV
The Date of the Laṅkā
As is the case with other Buddhist texts it is
quite impossible with our present knowledge of Indian history to decide the age
of the Laṅkā. The one thing that is certain is that it was compiled before 443
a. d. when the first Chinese translation is reported to have been attempted.
But this does not mean that the whole text as we have it now was then already
in existence, for we know that the later translations done in 513 and 700-704
contain the Dhāraṇī and the Sagāthakam section which are missing in the 443 one
(Sung). Further, the Meat-eating chapter also suffered certain modifications,
especially in the 513 (Wei) one.
Even with the text that was in existence before
443 a. d. we do not know how it developed, for it was not surely written from
the beginning as one complete piece of work as we write a book in these modern
days. Some parts of it must be older than others, since there is no doubt that
it has many layers of added passages.
To a certain extent, the contents may give a
clue to the age of the text, but because of the difficulty of separating one
part from another from the point of view of textual criticism, arguments from
the contents as to the date are of very doubtful character. As long as we have
practically no knowledge of historical circumstances in which the Buddhist
texts were produced one after another in India or somewhere else, all the
statements are more or less of the character of an ingenious surmise. All that
we can say is this that the Laṅkā is not a discourse directly given by the
founder of Buddhism, that it is a later composition than the Nikāyas or Āgamas
which also developed some time after the Buddha, that when Mahayana thoughts
began to crystallise in the Northern as well as in the Southern part of India
probably about the Christian era or even earlier, the compiler or compilers began
to collect passages as he or they came across in their study of the Mahayana,
which finally resulted in the Buddhist text now known under the title of
Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra.
Some Remarks Concerning the Text
Certain irregularities of the chapter-endings are
to be noticed in this connection. Generally these endings show that the
chapters are composite parts of a sutra and belong to it; but in the case of
the Laṅkā some endings are quite of an independent character, and their
relation to the text is not at all definite. For instance:
Chapter I—"Chapter One Known as
Rāvaṇa-invitation";
Chapter II—"Here Ends Chapter Two Known as
the Collection of All the Dharmas in the 36, 000 (śloka) Laṅkāvatāra";
Chapter III—"Here Ends Chapter Three on
Impermanency in the Laṅkāvatāra, a Mahāyāna Sūtra";
Chapter IV—"Here Ends Chapter Four on
Realisation";
Chapter V—"Here Ends Chapter Five on the
Permamency and Impermanency of the Tathagata";
Chapter VI—"Here Ends Chapter Six on
Momentariness";
Chapter VII—"Here Ends Chapter Seven on
Egolessness";
Chapter VIII—"Here Ends Chapter Eight on
Meat-eating from the Laṅkāvatāra which is the Essence of All the
Buddha-Teachings";
Chapter IX—"Here Ends Chapter Nine Known as
Dhāraṇī in the Laṅkāvatāra."
These irregularities, at least in one case, show
that there was a larger Laṅkā containing 36, 000 ślokas1 as referred to in
Fa-tsang's notices,2 and in another case that the Laṅkā was also known, or
contained, a chapter known as the "Essence of all the
Buddha-teachings" which is indeed a sort of subtitle given to the
four-volume Chinese Laṅkā by Guṇabhadra (Sung), 443 a. d.
1Suggested by Mr Hokei Idzumi.
2See my Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, p. 42.
The Gāthā section called "Sagāthakam"
presents peculiar difficulties. As the earliest Chinese translation by
Guṇabhadra does not contain it, it is highly probable that it was not then
included in the Laṅkā text. But the fact that both the Wei version and the
Sanskrit edition contain not only the verses properly belonging to the Sagāthakam
but those1 already appearing in the prose section, hints at the existence of a
larger or more complete text of the Laṅkā in which all these Sagāthakam verses
were incorporated in the prose section, which, therefore, must have been
naturally much fuller than the existing Laṅkā—perhaps something like the one
Containing 36, 000 ślokas. There are many verses in the Sagāthakam which are
too obscure to be intelligently interpreted without their corresponding prose
passages. The verses are generally meant for memorising the principal
doctrines, and they give sometimes no sense when they are separately
considered, for some watch-words only are rhythmically arranged to facilitate
the memory.
In the Sanskrit text, the Sagāthakam begins with
this stanza:
"Listen to the wonderful Mahayana doctrine,
Declared in this Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra,
Composed in verse-gems,
And destroying a net of the philosophical
views."
This may be understood to mean that this section
is that part of the Laṅkā which is made up with the verses, that is to say, the
verses taken from the entire text of the Laṅkā. The term sagāthakam also
suggests this, for it means the "one with verses." But in this case
the following questions may be asked:
If there were a larger Laṅkā containing all
these verses in the Sagāthakam in the body of the text, or if there were a
Laṅkā with the verses alone and as a separete text which was later on put
together with the present one, are all these verses as a whole to be regarded
as belonging to the same period? If so, what caused the disappearance of the
prose passages which accompanied the verses now retained in the Sagāthakam
only? Is there no possibility of some of the verses added later to the text
independently? There is some evidence of such additions as we can see, for
instance, in the conception of the Sambhogakāya (verse 384) and of the ninth
Vijñāna (verse 13), which are surely of later development. The solution of
these and some other possible questions is to be left to some future time when
all the circumstances leading to the production of the Buddhist sutras Mahayana
and Hinayana in various districts of India are ascertained.
1 These are systematically excluded in the
T'ang.
The best way of reading the Laṅkā, as I said in
my Studies, is to cut the whole text into as many pieces1 as the sense allows
and to regard each piece as completely expressing one chief thought in the
philosophy of Mahayana Buddhism. In some cases the pieces so severed may seem
to conflict with one another. In such cases a higher principle will be found
somewhere else that unifies the two contradictory notions harmoniously. For
after all there is but one highest truth in the Laṅkā, of which all others are
so many aspects viewed at various angles of thought.
I thought I would treat the Sagāthakam in a
similar manner, by dividing the whole portion into so many groups of verses,
each of which is presumably concerned with one theme. But the verses being too
concise and often merely mnemonic, one finds it too risky to cut them up into
groups and to take the latter as containing so many definite sets of thoughts.
As we notice in the cases of repetition occurring so frequently in the
Sagāthakam the verses are not solidly transferred from the text, that is, they
are not always found in the Sagāthakam in the same order as they are in the
text proper, nor are they complete. Sometimes one single verse is taken out of
the group where it belongs in the main text and inserted in an unexpected
connection. In these circumstances I thought it wise to leave the Sagāthakam as
it stands and not to arrange the verses into groups until we know more exactly
about the historical evolution of this portion of the Laṅkā.
1 This cutting is indicated in the following
translation by the Roman figures running consecutively through the entire text
except the Rāvaṇa, the Dhāraṇī, and the Meat-eating chapter, where no such
dividing is necessary.
In fact, the Sagāthakam is a curious mixture
where subjects not at all referred to in the prose section are in juxtaposition
with those that have to my view no proper bearing in the Laṅkā. Such subjects
are those historical narratives concerning Vyāsa, Kātyāyana, Nāgahvaya, etc.,
and those relating to the monastery life. And then there are some passages in
the Sagāthakam which may be regarded as later additions. For instance, when it
refers to eight or nine several Vijñānas (verse 13), two forms of Ālaya (v.
59), the triple body (v. 434), thirty-six Buddhas (v. 380), etc., they are
evidently later incorporations. The Sagāthakam requires more study from the
point of text criticism, and also from the point of doctrinal, literary, and
monachical history.
The Transmission History of the Laṅkā
In the book called 楞伽師資記, "Record of Master
and Disciple in [the Transmission of] the Laṅkā", which is one of the
Tung-huang findings, the transmission line of the Laṅkā is recorded. The author
淨覺,
Ching-chüeh, living probably early in the eighth century apparently identified
Zen Buddhism with the teaching of the Laṅkā, for his Fathers of the Laṅkā transmission
are also those of Zen Buddhism. He considers Guṇabhadra, the translator of the
Sung or four volume Laṅkā, the first Father of Zen in China, and not
Bodhidharma as is generally done by Zen historians. In this the author may be
in the right, for in his day there was yet no independent school which later
came to be known as "Zen", and whatever represented this movement at
the time was no more than the study of the Laṅkā. Moreover, Ching-chüeh
belonged to the school of Hsüan-tsê (玄賾) and Shên-hsiu (神秀) who upheld the Laṅkā
in opposition to their rival Hui-nêng's 慧能 Vajracchedīka. This
book is one of the most valuable documents for the historical students of early
Zen Buddhism in China.1 It contains so much information of definite character
concerning its Fathers whose sayings and teachings have so far been shrouded in
obscurity.
There is Another equally valuable history of Zen
Buddhism which was also discovered in the Tung-huang cave. It is entitled 歷代法寶記 "Record of the
Succession of the Dharma-treasure." This was evidently written to contend
the position of the 楞伽師資記, for it insists that the first Father of the
Laṅkā as representing the Dharma-treasure was Bodhidharma and not Guṇabhadra
who was mere translator and not the revealer of the inner meaning of the Sutra.
Therefore, the history of Zen Buddhism in China, which is the
"Dharma-treasure", should properly begin with Bodhidharma. The author
evidently belongs to the school of Hui-nêng.
The discovery of these two important historical
works on Zen, together with the Sayings of Shên-hui, 神會語錄, which was edited by 胡適, Professor Hu Hsi of
Peking University, 1930, with his able critical notes, sheds an abundance of
light on the early pages of Zen history in China. As a detailed discussion of
the subject does not belong here, I reserve it for my Essays in Zen Buddhism,
Series II.
The Present English Translation
As regards the English translation of the Sutra,
I have decided after much hesitation to send it out to the public with all its
many imperfections. It is a bold attempt on the part of the translator to try
to render some of the deepest thoughts that have been nourished in the East
into a language to which he was not born. But his idea is that if somebody did
not make a first attempt, however poor and defective, the precious stones may remain
buried unknown except to a few scholars, and this perhaps longer than
necessary. And then things develop. As it is illustrated in the long history of
the Chinese translations of the Buddhist texts, there must be several attempts
before the work assumes something of finality. There are at present three
Chinese translations and one Tibetan of the Laṅkā, and the first shows many
traces of immaturity when compared with the third. We can easily understand the
difficulties Chinese scholars encountered in trying to master the translations.
The T'ang version could not perhaps be so perfect as it is unless it had two or
three predecessors.
1 The book has been quite recently edited by Kin
Kyūkei, a librarian attached to Peking University and published in Peking. He
was able to do this helped by Professor Hu Hsi, who is the owner of the
photographic copies of the original Manuscripts of 楞伽師資記 preserved in the
British Museum and in the Bibliothèque Nationale. A collotype impression of the
London MS which is not so complete as the Paris MS, though it is very much more
legible than the latter, was published by Professor Keiki Yabuki of Japan, in
his collection of the Tun-huang MSS, entitled 嗚沙餘韻, "Echoes of the
Desert", 1930.
I have done all I could to make my translation
as intelligible as possible to my readers. If I tried to be too literal, it
would be quite unintelligible. The modes of expression are so different in the
Sanskrit. There are still many obscure passages which I failed to interpret
satisfactorily to myself. These obscurities are found more in the Sagāthakam,
because the verses presuppose much knowledge of the matter treated therein, and
this knowledge involves at present much more scholarship and intellectual
perspicuity than the present translator can command. The Sagāthakam has never
had any Chinese commentaries, and this fact adds more to the difficulties
already in existence. Chinese and Japanese scholars have chosen, probably for
brevity's sake, the four-volume text by Guṇabhadra for their study, and the
Sagāthakam has thus inevitably been left out.
The Sanskrit text itself as we have it is still
far from being perfect, and there is no doubt that Nanjo's edition requires
many corrections in order to yield a more intelligible reading. Even with it, however,
whatever shortcomings it may have, we are to be grateful to the editor who made
the text more accessible to the public than ever before.
I have not always followed Nanjo in the reading
of the text. I have used my own judgment in several cases when I thought the
sense became thereby clearer. In paragraphing too I have often disregarded
Nanjo. As I said in my Studies, the Laṅkā is a highly chaotic text, and there
are also some passages which have forced their way in wrong places where they
do not belong.
The T'ang version in this respect gives on the
whole the best rendering of the Laṅkā. While a first draft of the translation
was prepared by Śikshānanda, the finishing touch was given by Fa-tsang, the
great teacher of philosophy of the Avataṁsaka, with which the Laṅkā is in the
closest relationship. When difficulties were encountered in the course of my
English translation of the Sanskrit text, I have quite frequently followed the
T'ang reading, though the fact has not regularly been noted.
A special index to the Sutra is being prepared
and will be issued before long as a separate volume.
-----------------
(1)1 Om! Salutation to the Triple Treasure!
Salutation to all the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas!
Here is carefully written down the Laṅkāvatāra
Sūtra in which the Lord of the Dharma discourses on the egolessness of all
things.
Thus have I heard. The Blessed One once stayed
in the Castle of Laṅkā which is situated on the peak of Mount Malaya on the great
ocean, and which is adorned with flowers made of jewels of various kinds.2 He
was with a large assembly of Bhikshus and with a great multitude of
Bodhisattvas, who had come together from various Buddha-lands. The
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas, headed by the Bodhisattva Mahāmati, were all perfect
masters3 of the various Samādhis, the [tenfold] self-mastery, the [ten] powers,
and the [six] psychic faculties; they were anointed by the hands of all the
Buddhas; they all well understood the significance of the objective world as
the manifestation of their own Mind; (2) they knew how to maintain [various]
forms, teachings, and disciplinary measures, according to the various
mentalities and behaviours of beings; they were thoroughly versed in the five
Dharmas, the [three] Svabhāvas, the [eight] Vijñānas, and the twofold
Non-ātman.
1 These Gothic numerals in parentheses refer to
pages of the Sanskrit edition.
2 Much more fully described in Bodhiruci (Wei).
3 Literally, "sporting" (vikrīḍita).
At that time, the Blessed One who had been
preaching in the palace of the King of Sea-serpents came out at the expiration
of seven days and was greeted by an innumerable host of Nāgakanyās including
Śakra and Brahma, and looking at Laṅkā on Mount Malaya smiled and said, "By
the Tathagatas of the past, who were Arhats and Fully-Enlightened Ones, this
Truth was made the subject of their discourse, at that castle of Laṅkā on the
mountain-peak of Malaya, —the Truth realisable by noble wisdom in one's inmost
self, which is beyond the reasoning knowledge of the philosophers as well as
the state of consciousness of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas.1 I, too, would
now for the sake of Rāvaṇa, Overlord of the Yakshas, discourse on this Truth.”
[Inspired] by the spiritual power of the Tathagata,
Rāvaṇa, Lord of the Rākshasas, heard [his voice]. Indeed, the Blessed One,
surrounded and accompanied by an in-numerable host of Nāgakanyās including
Śakra and Brahma, came out of the palace of the King of Sea-serpents; and
looking at the waves of the ocean and also at the mental agitations going on in
those assembled, [he thought of] the ocean of the Ālayavijñāna where the
evolving Vijñānas [like the waves] are stirred by the wind of objectivity.
While he was standing there [thus absorbed in contemplation, Rāvaṇa saw him
and] uttered a joyous cry, saying: "I will go and request of the Blessed
One to enter into Laṅkā; for this long night he would probably profit, do good,
and gladden (3) the gods as well as human beings."
Thereupon, Rāvaṇa, Lord of the Rākshasas, with
his attendants, riding in his floral celestial chariot, came up where the
Blessed One was, and having arrived there he and his attendants came out of the
chariot. Walking around the Blessed One three times from left to right, they
played on a musical instrument, beating it with a stick of blue Indra
(saphire), and hanging the lute at one side, which was inlaid with the choicest
lapis lazuli and supported by [a ribbon of] priceless cloth, yellowish-white
like Priyaṅgu, they sang with various notes such as Saharshya, Rishabha,
Gāndhāra, Dhaivata, Nishāda. Madyama, and Kaiśika,2 which were melodiously
modulated in Grāma, Mūrchana, etc.; the voice in accompaniment with the flute
beautifully blended with the measure of the Gāthā.
1 The Sanskrit text is here certainly at fault;
there ought to be a negative particle somewhere in this passage, which is the
case in the Chinese translations.
2 Neither Bodhiruci nor Sikshānanda refers so
specifically to these various notes.
1. "The truth-treasure whose principle is
the self-nature of Mind, has no selfhood (nairātmyam), stands above all
reasoning, and is free from impurities; it points to the knowledge attained in
one's inmost self; Lord, show me here the way leading to the Truth.
2. "The Sugata is the body in whom are
stored immaculate virtues; in him are manifested [bodies] trans-forming and
transformed; he enjoys the Truth realised in his inmost self; may he visit
Laṅkā. Now is the time, Muni!
3. (4) "This Laṅkā was inhabited by the
Buddhas of the past, and [they were] accompanied by their sons who were owners
of many forms. Lord, show me now the highest Truth, and the Yakshas who are
endowed with many forms will listen.”
Thereupon, Rāvaṇa, the Lord of Laṅkā, further
adapting the Totaka rhythm sang this in the measure of the Gāthā.
4. After seven nights, the Blessed One leaving
the ocean which is the abode of the Makara, the palace of the sea-king, now
stands on the shore.
5. Just as the Buddha rises, Rāvaṇa, accompanied
by the Apsaras and Yakshas numerous, by Śuka, Sārana, and learned men,
6. Miraculously goes over to the place where the
Lord is standing. Alighting from the floral vehicle, he greets the Tathagata
reverentially, makes him offerings, tells him who he is, and stands by the
Lord.
7. "I who have come here, am called Rāvaṇa,
the ten-headed king of the Rākshasas, mayest thou graciously receive me with
Laṅkā and all its residents.
8. "In this city, the inmost state of
consciousness realised, indeed, by the Enlightened Ones of the past (5) was
disclosed on this peak studded with precious stones.
9. "Let the Blessed One, too. surrounded by
sons of the Victorious One, now disclose the Truth immaculate on this peak
embellished with precious stones; we, together with the residents of Laṅkā,
desire to listen.
10. "The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra which is praised
by the Buddhas of the past [discloses] the inmost state of consciousness
realised by them, which is not founded on any system of doctrine.
11. "I recollect the Buddhas of the past
surrounded by sons of the Victorious One recite this Sutra; the Blessed One,
too, will speak.
12. "In the time to come, there will be
Buddhas and Buddha-Sons pitying the Yakshas; the Leaders will discourse on this
magnificent doctrine on the peak adorned with precious stones.
13. "This magnificent city of Laṅkā is
adorned with varieties of precious stones, [surrounded] by peaks, refresh-ing
and beautiful and canopied by a net of jewels.
14. "Blessed One, here are the Yakshas who
are free from faults of greed, reflecting on [the Truth] realised in one's
inmost self and making offerings to the Buddhas of the past; they are believers
in the teaching of the Mahāyāna and intent on disciplining one another.
15. “There are younger Yakshas, girls and boys,
desiring to know the Mahāyāna. Come, Blessed One, who art our Teacher, come to
Laṅkā on Mount Malaya.
16. (6) "The Rākshasas, with Kumbhakarṇa at
their head, who are residing in the city, wish, as they are devoted to the
Mahāyāna, to hear about this inmost realisation.
17. "They have made offerings assiduously
to the Buddhas [in the past] and are to-day going to do the same. Come, for
compassion's sake, to the Laṅkā, together with [thy] sons.
18. "Mahāmati, accept my mansion, the
company of the Apsaras, necklaces of various sorts, and the delightful Aśoka
garden.
19. "I give myself up to serve the Buddhas
and their sons; there is nothing with me that I do not give up [for their
sake]; Great Muni, have compassion on me!”
20. Hearing him speak thus, the Lord of the
Triple World said, "King of Yakshas, this mountain of precious stones was
visited by the Leaders in the past.
21. "And, taking pity on you, they
discoursed on the Truth revealed in their inmost [consciousness]. [The Buddhas
of] the future time will proclaim [the same] on this jewel-adorned mountain.
22. "This [inmost Truth] is the abode of
those Yogins who stand in the presence of the Truth. King of the Yakshas, you
have the compassion of the Sugatas and myself."
23. The Blessed One accepting the request [of
the King] remained silent and undisturbed; he now mounted the floral chariot
offered by Rāvaṇa.
24. Thus Rāvaṇa and others, wise sons of the
Victorious One, (7) honoured by the Apsaras singing and dancing, reached the
city.
25. Arriving in the delightful city [the Buddha
was] again the recipient of honours; he was honoured by the group of Yakshas
including Rāvaṇa and by the Yaksha women.
26. A net of jewels was offered to the Buddha by
the younger Yakshas, girls and boys, and necklaces beautifully ornamented with
jewels were placed by Rāvaṇa about the neck of the Buddha and those of the sons
of the Buddha.
27. The Buddhas together with the sons of the
Buddha and the wise men, accepting the offerings, discoursed on the Truth which
is the state of consciousness realised in the inmost self.
28. Honouring [him as] the best speaker, Rāvaṇa
and the company of the Yakshas honoured Mahāmati and requested of him again and
again:1
29. "Thou art the asker of the Buddha
concerning the state of consciousness realised in their inmost selves, of which
we here, Yakshas as well as the sons of the Buddha, are desirous of hearing. I,
together with the Yakshas, the sons of the Buddha, and the wise men, request
this of thee.
30. "Thou art the most eloquent of
speakers, and the most strenuous of the Yogins; with faith I beg of thee. Ask
[the Buddha] about the doctrine, O thou the proficient one!
1 Verses 20-28, inclusive, are in prose in
T'ang.
31. "Free from the faults of the
philosophers and Pratyekabuddhas and Śrāvakas is (8) the Truth of the inmost
consciousness, immaculate and culminating in the stage of Buddhahood.”
32.1 Thereupon the Blessed One created
jewel-adorned mountains and other objects magnificently embellished with jewels
in an immense number.
33. On the summit of each mountain the Buddha
himself was visible, and Rāvaṇa, the Yaksha, also was found standing there.
34. Thus the entire assembly was seen on each
mountain-peak, and all the countries Were there, and in each there was a
Leader.
35. Here also was the King of the Rākshasas and
the residents of Laṅkā, and the Laṅkā created by the Buddha rivaling [the real
one].
36. Other things were there, too, —the Aśoka
with its shining woods, and on each mountain-peak Mahāmati was making a request
of the Buddha,
37. Who discoursed for the sake of the Yakshas
on the Truth leading to the inmost realisation; on the mountain-peak he
delivered a complete sutra with an exquisite voice varied in hundreds of
thousands of ways.2
38. [After this] the teacher and the sons of the
Buddha vanished away in the air, leaving Rāvaṇa the Yaksha himself standing
[above] in his mansion.
39. Thought he, "How is this? What means
this? and by whom was it heard? What was it that was seen? and by whom was it
seen? Where is the city? and where is the Buddha?
40. "Where are those countries, those
jewel-shining Buddhas, those Sugatas? (9) Is it a dream then? or a vision? or
is it a castle conjured up by the Gandharvas?
1 From this verse T'ang is in prose again.
2 Thus according to Bodhiruci and Śikshānanda.
The Sanskrit text has: "hundreds of thousands of perfect sutras.”
41. "Or is it dust in the eye, or a fata
morgana, or the dream-child of a barren woman, or the smoke of a fire-wheel,
that which I saw here?”
42. Then [Rāvaṇa reflected], "This is the
nature as it is (dharmatā) of all things, which belongs to the realm of Mind,
and it is not comprehended by the ignorant as they are confused by every form
of imagination.
43. "There is neither the seer nor the seen,
neither the speaker nor the spoken; the form and usage of the Buddha and his
Dharma—they are nothing but discrimination.
44. "Those who see things such as were seen
before, do not see the Buddha; [even] when discrimination is not aroused, one
does not see1 the Buddha; the Buddha being fully-enlightened is seen where the
world itself is not evolved.
The Lord of Laṅkā was then immediately awakened
[from his reflection], feeling a revulsion (parāvṛiti) in his mind and
realising that the world was nothing but his own mind: he was settled in the
realm of non-discrimination, was urged by the stock of his past good deeds,
acquired the cleverness of understanding all the texts, obtained the faculty of
seeing things as they are, was no more dependent upon others, observed things
excellently with his own wisdom (buddhi), gained the insight that was not of
discursive reasoning, was no more dependent upon others,2 became a great Yogin
of the discipline, was able to manifest himself in all excellent forms, got
thoroughly acquainted with all skilful means, had the knowledge of the
characteristic aspects of every stage, by which he would surmount it skilfully,
was delighted to look into3 the self-nature of Citta, Manas, Manovijñāna, got a
view whereby he could cut himself loose from the triple continuation, had the
knowledge of disposing of every argument of (10) the philosophers on causation,
thoroughly understood the Tathāgata-garbha, the stage of Buddhahood, the inmost
self, found himself abiding in the Buddha-knowledge; [when suddenly] a voice
was heard from the sky, saying, "It is to be known by oneself.”
1 T'ang has: "He who sees in the way as was
seen before, cannot see the Buddha; when no discrimination is aroused, this,
indeed, is the seeing." According to Wei: "If he sees things and
takes them for realities, he does not see the Buddha. Even when he is not abiding
in a discriminating mind, he cannot see the Buddha. Not seeing anything doing
[in the world]—this is said to be seeing the Buddha. If a man is able thus to
see [things], he is the one who sees the Tathagata. When the wise observe all
experiences in this manner, they are transformed assuming an exquisite
body—this is the Enlightenment [attained by] the Buddha."
2 This does not appear in T'ang, nor in Wei.
3 T'ang: to go beyond.
"Well done, well done, Lord of Laṅkā! Well
done, indeed, Lord of Laṅkā, for once more! The Yogin is to discipline himself
as thou doest. The Tathagatas and all things are to be viewed as they are
viewed by thee; otherwise viewed, it is nihilism. All things are to be
comprehended by transcending the Citta, Manas, and Vijñāna as is done by thee.
Thou shouldst look inwardly and not become attached to the letter and a
superficial view of things; thou shouldst not fall into the attainments,
conceptions, experiences, views, and Samādhis of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas,
and philosophers; thou shouldst not have any liking for small talk and
witticism; thou shouldst not cherish the notion of self-substance,1 nor have
any thought for the vainglory of rulership, nor dwell on such Dhyānas as belong
to the six Dhyānas, etc.
"Lord of Laṅkā, this is the realisation of
the great Yogins: to destroy the discourses advanced by others, to crush
mischievous views in pieces, to keep themselves properly away from ego-centered
notions, to cause a revulsion in the depths of the mind fittingly by means of
an exquisite knowledge. Such are sons of the Buddha who walk in the way of the
Mahāyāna. In order to enter upon the stage of self-realisation as attained by
the Tathagatas, the discipline is to be pursued by thee.
1 Wei and T'ang: Do not hold the views maintained
in the Vedas.
"Lord of Laṅkā, conducting thyself in this
manner, let thee be further purified in the way thou hast attained; (11) by
disciplining thyself well in Samādhi and Samāpatti, follow not the state
realised and enjoyed by the Śravakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and philosophers, which
rises from the imagination of those who discipline themselves according to the
practices of the puerile philosophers. They cling to the individual forms of
the world created by their egotistical ideas; they maintain such notions as
element, quality, and substance; they cling tenaciously to views originating
from ignorance; they become confused by cherishing the idea of birth where
prevails emptiness; they cling to discrimination [as real]; they fall into the
way of thinking where obtains [the dualism of] qualifying and qualified.
"Lord of Laṅkā, this is what leads to
various excellent attainments, this is what makes one grow aware of the inmost
attainment, this is the Mahāyāna realisation. This will result in the acquirement
of an excellent condition of existence.
"Lord of Laṅkā, by entering upon the
Mahāyāna discipline the veils [of ignorance] are destroyed, and one turns away
from the multitudinous waves of the Vijñāna and falls not into the refuge and
practice of the philosophers.
"Lord of Laṅkā, the philosophers' practice
starts from their own egotistic attachments. Their ugly practice arises from
adhering to dualistic views concerning the self-nature of the Vijñāna.
"Well done, Lord of Laṅkā; reflect on the
signification of this as you did when seeing the Tathagata before; for this,
indeed, is seeing the Tathagata."
At that time it occurred to Rāvaṇa: "I wish
to see the Blessed One again, who has all the disciplinary practices at his
command, who has turned away from the practices of the philosophers, who is
born of the state of realisation in the inmost consciousness, and who is beyond
[the dualism of] the transformed and the transforming. He is the knowledge (12)
realised by the Yogins, he is the realisation attained by those who enjoy the
perfect bliss of the Samādhi which they gain by coming to an intuitive
understanding through meditation. May I see thus [again] the Compassionate One
by means of his miraculous powers in whom the fuel of passion and discrimination
is destroyed, who is surrounded by sons of the Buddha, who has penetrated into
the minds and thoughts of all beings, who moves about everywhere, who knows
everything, who keeps himself away from work (kṛiyā) and form (lakshaṇa);
seeing him may I attain what I have not yet attained, [retain] what I have
already gained, may I conduct myself with non-discrimination, abide in the joy
of Samādhi and Samāpatti, and attain the ground where the Tathagatas walk, and
in these make progress."
At that moment, the Blessed One recognising that
the Lord of Laṅkā is to attain the Anutpattikadharmakshānti showed his glorious
compassion for the ten-headed one by making himself visible once more on the
mountain-peak studded with many jewels and enveloped in a net-work of jewels.
The ten-headed King of Laṅkā saw the splendour again as seen before on the
mountain-peak, [he saw] the Tathagata, who was the Arhat and the
Fully-Enlightened One, with the thirty-two marks of excellence beautifully
adorning his person, and also saw himself on each mountain-peak, together with
Mahāmati, in front of the Tathagata, the Fully-Enlightened One, putting forward
his discourse on the realisation experienced by the Tathagata in his inmost
self, and, surrounded by the Yakshas, conversing on the verbal teachings and
stories [of the Buddha]. Those (13) [Buddha]-lands were seen with the Leaders.1
1 There is surely a discrepancy here in the
text. T'ang reads: "In all the Buddha-lands in the ten quarters were also
seen such events going on, and there was no difference whatever." Wei is
quite different and has the following: "Besides, he saw all the
Buddha-lands and all the kings thinking of the transitoriness of the body. As
they are covetously attached to their thrones, wives, children, and relatives,
they find themselves bound by the five passions and have no time for
emancipation. Seeing this, they abandon their dominions, palaces, wives,
concubines, elephants, horses, and precious treasures, giving them all up to
the Buddha and his Brotherhood. They now retreat into the mountain-woods,
leaving their homes and wishing to study the doctrine. He [Rāvaṇa] then sees
the Bodhisattvas in the mountain woods strenuously applying themseves to the
mastery of the truth, even to the extent of throwing themselves to the hungry
tiger, lion, and Rākshasas. He thus sees the Bodhisattvas reading and reciting
the sutras under a tree in the woods and discoursing on them for others,
seeking thereby the truth of the Buddha. He then sees the Bodhisattvas seated
under the Bodhi-tree in the Bodhi-maṇḍala thinking of the suffering Beings and
meditating on the truth of the Buddha. He then sees the venerable Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva before each Buddha preaching about the spiritual discipline of
one's inner life, and also sees [the Bodhisattva] surrounded by all the Yakshas
and families and talking about names, words, phrases, and paragraphs."
This last sentence is evidently the translation of the Sanskrit
deśanāpāṭhakathām, which is contrasted in the Laṅkāvatāra throughout with
pratyātmāryajñānagocara (the spiritual realm realised by noble wisdom in one's
inmost consciousness).
Then the Blessed One beholding again this great
assembly with his wisdom-eye, which is not the human eye, laughed loudly and
most vigorously like the lion-king. Emitting rays of light from the tuft of
hair between the eyebrows, from the ribs, from the loins, from the Śrivatsa1 on
the breast, and from every pore of the skin, —emitting rays of light which
shone flaming like the fire taking place at the end of a kalpa, like a luminous
rainbow, like the rising sun, blazing brilliantly, gloriously—which were
observed from the sky by Śakra, Brahma, and the guardians of the world, the one
who sat on the peak [of Laṅkā] vying with Mount Sumeru laughed the loudest
laugh. At that time the assembly of the Bodhisattvas together with Śakra and
Brahma, each thought within himself:
"For what reason, I wonder, from what cause
does the Blessed One who is the master of all the world
(sarva-dharma-vaśavartin), after smiling first,2 laugh the loudest laugh? Why
does he emit rays of light from his own body? Why, emitting [rays of light],
does he remain silent, with the realisation [of the Truth] in his inmost self,
and absorbed deeply and showing no surprise in the bliss of Samādhi, and
reviewing the [ten] quarters, looking around like the lion-king, and thinking
only of the discipline, attainment, and performance of Rāvaṇa?"
1 Swastika.
2 This is wanting in the Chinese translations.
At that time, Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva who was previously requested by Rāvaṇa [to ask the Buddha
concerning his self-realisation], feeling pity on him, (14) and knowing the
minds and thoughts of the assembly of the Bodhisattvas, and observing that
beings to be born in the future would be confused in their minds because of
their delight in the verbal teaching (deśanāpāṭha), because of their clinging
to the letter as [fully in accordance with] the spirit (artha), because of
their clinging to the disciplinary powers of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and
philosophers, —which might lead them to think how it were that the Tathagatas,
the Blessed Ones, even in their transcendental state of consciousness should
burst out into loudest laughter —Mahāmati the Bodhisattva asked the Buddha in
order to put a stop to their inquisitiveness the following question: "For
what reason, for what cause did this laughter take place?"
Said the Blessed One: "Well done, well
done, Mahāmati! Well done, indeed, for once more, Mahāmati! Viewing the world
as it is in itself and wishing to enlighten the people in the world who are fallen
into a wrong view of things in the past, present, and future, thou undertakest
to ask me the question. Thus should it be with the wise men who want to ask
questions for both themselves and others. Rāvaṇa, Lord of Laṅkā, O Mahāmati,
asked a twofold question of the Tathagatas of the past who are Arhats and
perfect Buddhas; and he wishes now to ask me too a twofold question in order to
have its distinction, attainment, and scope ascertained—this is what is never
tasted by those who practise the meditation of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas,
and philosophers; and the same will be asked by the question-loving ten-headed
one of the Buddhas to come."
Knowing that, the Blessed One said to the Lord
of Laṅkā, thus: "Ask, thou Lord of Laṅkā; the Tathagata has given thee
permission [to ask], delay not, whatever questions thou desirest to have
answered, I will answer each of them (15) with judgment to the satisfaction of
your heart. Keeping thy seat of thought free from [false] discrimination,
observe well what is to be subdued at each stage; ponder things with wisdom;
[seeing into] the nature of the inner principle in thyself, abide in the bliss
of Samādhi; embraced by the Buddhas in Samādhi, abide in the bliss of
tranquillisation; going beyond the Samādhi and understanding attained by the
Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, abide in [the attainment of the Bodhisattvas] in
the stages of Acalā, Sādhumatī, and Dharmameghā; grasp well the egolessness of
all things in its true significance; be anointed by the Buddhas in Samādhi at
the great palace of lotus-jewels. 1Surrounded by the Bodhisattvas who are
sitting on lotuses of various sorts each supported by the gracious power of the
Buddhas, thou shalt find thyself sitting on a lotus and each one of the
Bodhisattvas looking at thee face to face. This is a realm beyond the
imagination. Thou shouldst plan out an adequate plan and establish thyself at a
stage of discipline by planning out such a plan as shall include [all kinds of]
skilful means, so that thou comest to realise that realm which is beyond
imagination; and thou shouldst attain the stage of Tathagatahood in which one
is able to manifest oneself in various forms, and which is something never seen
before by the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, philosophers, Brahma, Indra, Upendra,
and others. ''
1 The following sentence is done by the aid of
T'ang, as the Sanskrit does not seem to give any sense. Literally translated it
reads: "There by the becoming lotuses, by those lotuses that are blessed
variously by the benediction of his own person.... " Wei has: "O King
of Laṅkā, thou wilt before long see thy person, too, thus sitting on the
lotus-throne and continuing to abide there in a most natural manner. There are
innumerable families of lotus-kings and innumerable families of Bodhisattvas
there, each one of whom is sitting on a lotus-throne, and surrounded by those
thou wilt find thyself and looking face to face at one another, and each one of
them will before long come to abide in a realm beyond the understanding."
At that moment the Lord of Laṅkā being permitted
by the Blessed One, rose from his seat on the peak of the jewel-mountain which
shone like the jewel-lotus immaculate and shining in splendour; he was
surrounded by a large company of celestial maidens, and all kinds of garlands,
flowers, perfumes, incense, unguents, umbrellas, banners, fiags, necklaces,
half-necklaces, diadems, tiaras, (16) and other ornaments whose splendour and
excellence were never heard of or seen before, were created; music was played
surpassing anything that could be had by the gods, Nāgas, Yakshas, Rākshasas,
Gandharvas, Kinnaras, Mahoragas, and men; musical instruments were created
equal to anything that could be had in all the world of desire and also such
superior musical instruments were created as were to be seen in the
Buddha-lands; the Blessed One and the Bodhisattvas were enveloped in a net of
jewels; a variety of dresses and high banners was made rising high in the air
as high as seven tāla trees to great [the Buddha], showering great clouds of offerings,
playing music which resounded [all around], and then descending from the air,
[the Lord of Laṅkā] sat down on the peak of the jewel-mountain ornamented with
magnificent jewel-lotus whose splendour was second only to the sun and
lightning. Sitting he made courtesy smiling first to the Blessed One for his
permission and proposed him a twofold question: " It was asked of the
Tathagatas of the past, who were Arhats, Fully-Enlightened Ones, and it was
solved by them. Blessed One, now I ask of thee; [the request] will certainly be
complied with by thee as far as verbal instruction is concerned1 as it was by
the Buddhas [of the past]. Blessed One, duality was discoursed upon by the
Transformed Tathagatas and Tathagatas of Trans-formation, but not by the Tathagatas
of Silence.2 The Tathagatas of Silence are absorbed in the blissful state of
Samādhi, they do not discriminate concerning this state, nor do they discourse
on it. Blessed One, thou assuredly wilt discourse on this subject of duality.
Thou art thyself a master of all things, an Arhat, a Tathagata. The sons of the
Buddha and myself are anxious to listen to it."
1 That is, as far as the teaching could be
conveyed in words. Deśanāpāṭha stands in contrast with siddhānta, or
pratyātmagati in the Laṅkāvatāra.
2 In T'ang and Wei: "Original
Tathagatas."
The Blessed One said, "Lord of Laṅkā, tell
me what you mean by duality?"
The Lord of the Rākshasas, (17) who was renewed
in his ornaments, full of splendour and beauty, with a diadem, bracelet, and
necklace strung with vajra thread, said, "It is said that even dharmas are
to be abandoned, and how much more adharmas. Blessed One, why does this dualism
exist that we are called upon to abandon? What are adharmas? and what are
dharmas? How can there be a duality of things to abandon—a duality that arises
from falling into discrimination, from discriminating self-substance where
there is none, from [the idea of] things created (bhautīka) and uncreated,
because the non-differentiating nature of the Ālayavijñāna is not recognised?
Like the seeing of a hair-circle as really existing in the air, [the notion of
dualism] belongs to the realm of intellection not exhaustively pur-gated. This
being the. case as it should be, how could there be any abandonment [of dharmas
and adharmas]?"
Said the Blessed One, "Lord of Laṅkā, seest
thou not that the differentiation of things, such as is perceived in jars and
other breakable objects whose nature it is to perish in time, takes place in a
realm of discrimination [cherished by] the ignorant? This being so, is it not
to be so understood? It is due to discrimination [cherished by] the ignorant
that there exists the differentiation of dharma and adharma. Noble wisdom
(āryajñāna), however, is not to be realised by seeing [things this way]. Lord
of Laṅkā, let it be so with the ignorant who follow the particularised aspect
of existence that there are such objects as jars, etc., but it is not so with
the wise. One flame of uniform nature rises up depending on houses, mansions,
parks, and terraces, and burns them down; while a difference in the flames is
seen according to the power of each burning material which varies in length,
magnitude, etc. This being so, why (18) is it not to be so understood? The
duality of dharma and adharma thus comes into existence. Not only is there seen
a fire-flame spreading out in one continuity and yet showing a variety of
flames, but from one seed, Lord of Laṅkā, are produced, also in one continuity,
stems, shoots, knots, leaves, petals, flowers, fruit, branches, all
individualised. As it is with every external object from which grows [a variety
of] objects, so also with internal objects. From ignorance there develop the
Skāndhas, Dhātus, Āyatanas, with all kinds of objects accompanying, which grow
out in the triple world where we have, as we see, happiness, form, speech, and
behaviour, each differentiating [infinitely]. The oneness of the Vijñāna is
grasped variously according to the evolution of an objective world; thus there
are seen things inferior, superior, and middling, things defiled and free from
defilement, things good and bad. Not only, Lord of Laṅkā, is there such a
difference of conditions in things generally, there is also seen a variety of
realisations attained innerly by each Yogin as he treads the path of discipline
which constitutes his practice. How much more difference in dharma and adharma
do we not see in a world of particulars which is evolved by discrimination?
Indeed, we do.
"Lord of Laṅkā, the differentiation of
dharma and adharma comes from discrimination. Lord of Laṅkā, what are dharmas?
That is, they are discriminated by the discriminations cherished by the
philosophers, Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and ignorant people. They think that
the dharmas headed by quality and substance are produced by causes—[these are
the notions] to be abandoned. Such are not to be regarded [as real] because
they are appearances (lakshaṇa). It comes from one's clinging [to appearances]
that the manifestations of his own Mind are regarded as reality (dharmatā).
(19) Such things as jars, etc., are products of discrimination conceived by the
ignorant, they exist not; their substances are not attainable. The viewing of
things from this viewpoint is known as their abandonment.
"What, then, are adharmas? Lord of Laṅkā,
[dharmas] are unattainable as to their selfhood, they are not appearances born
of discrimination, they are above causality; there is in them no such
[dualistic] happening as is seen as reality and non-reality. This is known as
the abandoning of dharmas. What again is meant by the unattainability of
dharmas? That is, it is like horns of a hare, or an ass, or a camel, or a
horse, or a child conceived by a barren woman. They are dharmas the nature of
which is unattainable; they are not to be thought [as real] because they are
appearances. They are only talked About in popular parlance if they have any
sense at all; they are not to be adhered to as in the case of jars, etc. As
these [unrealities] are to be abandoned as not comprehensible by the mind
(vijñāna), so are things (bhāva) of discrimination also to be abandoned. This
is called the abandoning of dharmas and adharmas. Lord of Laṅkā, your question
as to the way of abandoning dharmas and adharmas is hereby answered.
"Lord of Laṅkā, thou sayest again that thou
hast asked [this question] of the Tathagatas of the past who were Arhats and
Fully-Enlightened Ones and that it was solved by them. Lord of Laṅkā, that
which is spoken of as the past belongs to discrimination; as the past is thus a
discriminated [idea], even so are the [ideas] of the future and the present.
Because of reality (dharmatā) the Tathagatas do not discriminate, they go
beyond discrimination and futile reasoning, they do not follow (20) the
individuation-aspect of forms (rūpa) except when [reality] is disclosed for the
edification of the unknowing and for the sake of their happiness.1 It is by
transcendental wisdom (prajñā) that the Tathagata performs deeds transcending
forms (animittacāra); therefore, what constitutes the Tathagatas in essence as
well as in body is wisdom (jñāna). They do not discriminate, nor are they
discriminated. Wherefore do they not discriminate the Manas? Because
discrimination is of the self, of soul, of personality. How do they not
discriminate? The Manovijñāna is meant for the objective world where causality
prevails as regards forms, appearances, conditions, and figures. Therefore,
discrimination and non-discrimination must be transcended.
1 This is one of the most important sections in
this first introductory chapter, but singularly all the three texts, perhaps
excepting T'ang, present some difficulties for clear understanding. Wei:
"Lord of Laṅkā, what you speak of as past is a form of discrimination, and
so are the future and the present, also of discrimination. Lord of Laṅkā, when
I speak of the real nature of suchness as being real, it also belongs to
discrimination; it is like discriminating forms as the ultimate limit. If one
wishes to realise the bliss of real wisdom, let him discipline himself in the
knowledge that transcends forms; therefore, do not discriminate the Tathagatas
as having knowledge-body or wisdom-essence. Do not cherish any discrimination
in [thy] mind. Do not cling in [thy] will to such notions as ego, personality,
soul, etc. How not to discriminate? It is in the Manovijñāna that various
conditions are cherished such as forms, figures, [etc. ]; do not cherish such
[discriminations]. Do not discriminate nor be discriminated. Further, Lord of
Laṅkā, it is like various forms painted on the wall, all sentient beings are
such. Lord of Laṅkā, all sentient beings are like grasses and trees, with them
there are no acts, no deeds, Lord of Laṅkā, all dharmas and adharmas, of them
nothing is heard, nothing talked...." T'ang: "Lord of Laṅkā, what you
speak of as past is no more than discrimination, so is the future; I too am
like him. [Is this to be read, "the present, too, is like it"!] Lord
of Laṅkā, the teaching of all the Buddhas is outside discrimination; as it goes
beyond all discriminations and futile reasonings, it is not a form of
particularisation, it is realised only by wisdom. That [this absolute] teaching
is at all discoursed about is for the sake of giving bliss to all sentient beings.
The discoursing is done by the wisdom transcending forms. It is called the
Tathagata; therefore, the Tathagata has his essence, his body in this wisdom.
He thus does not discriminate, nor is he to be discriminated. Do not
discriminate him after the notion of ego, personality, or being. Why this
impossibility of discrimination? because the Manovijñāna is aroused on account
of an objective world wherein it attaches itself to forms and figures.
Therefore, [the Tathagata] is outside the discriminating [view] as well as the
discriminated [idea]. Lord of Laṅkā, it is like beings painted in colours on a
wall, they have no sensibility [or intelligence]. Sentient beings in the world
are also like them; no acts, no rewards [are with them]. So are all the teachings,
no hearing, no preaching."
"Lord of Laṅkā, beings are appearances,
they are like figures painted on the wall, they have no sensibility [or
consciousness]. Lord of Laṅkā, all that is in the world is devoid of work and
action because all things have no reality, and there is nothing heard, nothing
hearing. Lord of Laṅkā, all that is in the world is like an image magically
transformed. This is not comprehended by the philosophers and the ignorant.
Lord of Laṅkā, he who thus sees things, is the one who sees truthfully. Those
who see things otherwise walk in discrimination; as they depend on
discrimination, they cling to dualism. It is like seeing one's own image
reflected in a mirror, or one's own shadow in the water, or in the moonlight,
or seeing one's shadow in the house, or hearing an echo in the valley. People
grasping their own shadows of discrimination (21) uphold the discrimination of
dharma and adharma and, failing to carry out the abandonment of the dualism,
they go on discriminating and never attain tranquillity, By tranquillity is
meant oneness (ekāgra), and oneness gives birth to the highest Samādhi, which
is gained by entering into the womb of Tathagatahood, which is the realm of
noble wisdom realised in one's inmost self."
The First Chapter Called "Rāvaṇa Asking for
Instruction."1
1 It is noteworthy that the chapter endings are
not the same throughout the entire text. Generally, reference is made to the
Sutra itself at the end of a chapter, stating that the chapter bears such a
title belonging to such a Sutra. But in the present case there is no mention at
all of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra as if this Rāvaṇa section were something quite
independent. While there is no doubt about its being a later addition, seeing
what a complete piece of narrative it forms by itself, and again seeing that
the rest of the text makes no further reference to Rāvaṇa, the trend of the
discourse as presented by the Buddha shows that it is closely related to the
Sutra, especially when it emphasises at the end the importance of
self-realisation against the inanity or futility of the verbal teaching
ordinarily given out by a master.
-----------------
I1
(22) At that time Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva who had visited all the Buddha-lands, together with all
the Bodhisattvas, rose from his seat by the power of the Buddhas, drawing his
upper garment over one shoulder, placing his right knee on the ground and with
folded hands, turning in the direction of the Blessed One, respectfully saluted
him, and praised him with the following verses:
1. As thou reviewest the world with thy
transcendental knowledge and compassion, it is to thee like an ethereal flower,
of which one cannot say whether it is born or destroyed, as [the category of]
being and non-being is inapplicable to it.
2. As thou reviewest all things with thy
transcendental knowledge and compassion, they are to thee like visions, they
are beyond the reach of intellectual grasp, as [the category of] being and
non-being is inapplicable to them.
3. As thou reviewest the world with thy
transcendental knowledge and compassion, it is to thee always like a dream, of
which one cannot say whether it is permanent or destructible, as [the category
of] being and non-being is inapplicable to it.
4. In the Dharmakāya, whose self-nature is like
a vision or a dream, what is there to praise? When no thought arises as to
existence or as to not-having-self-nature, then there is praise.
5. Of a thing whose appearance is not visible because
of its being beyond the senses and their objects (23), how can it be praised or
blamed, O Muni?
1 This division is made by the translator to
facilitate the understanding of the text in which divers subjects are
promiscuously treated.
6. With thy transcendental knowledge and
compassion which are above form, thou comprehendest the egolessness of things
and persons, and art thyself always clean and free from the hindrances of
passion and knowledge.
7. Thou dost not vanish in Nirvana, nor is
Nirvana abiding in thee; for it transcends the duality of knowing and known and
of being and non-being.
8. Those who see the Muni so serene and beyond
birth [and death] will be cleansed of attachment, stainless both in this world
and in the other.
II
At that time Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
praising the Blessed One with such verses as these, made his own name known to
the Blessed One.
9. I am Mahāmati, Blessed One, and am well
versed in the Mahāyāna. I wish to ask one hundred and eight questions of thee
who art most eloquent.
10. Hearing his words the Buddha, the best
knower of the world, looking over the whole assembly, spoke to the son of the
Sugata thus:
11. Ask me, sons of the Victorious, and
Mahāmati, you ask and I will instruct you in self-realisation.
At that moment Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva who was given by the Blessed One the opportunity to
speak, prostrated himself at the feet of the Blessed One and asked:
(24) 12. How can one be cleansed of false
intellection? Whence does it arise? How can one perceive errors? Whence do they
arise?
13. Whence come lands, transformation,
appearance, and philosophers? Wherefore is the state of imagelessness, the
gradations, and whence are the sons of the Victorious?
14. Where is the way of emancipation? Who is in
bondage? By what is he redeemed? What is the mental state of those who practise
the Dhyānas? Whence is the triple vehicle?
15. What is that which is born of causation?
What is effect? What is cause [or that which works]? Whence the doctrine of
duality? Whence does it arise?
16. Wherefore is the tranquilising exercise of
formlessness? And that of complete extinction? Wherefore the extinction of
thoughts? And how is one awakened from it?
17. How does action rise? Whence is the
behaviour of those who hold the body? Whence [this] visible [world]? Whence the
conditions? Whence the entrance upon the stages?
18. Who is it that breaks through this triple
existence? What is the abode? What is the body? Where does that which is
abiding arise? Whence comes the son of the Buddha?
19. Who attains the psychic faculties, the
self-masteries, the Samādhis? How is the mind tranquilised? Pray tell me, O
Bull-like Victor?
20. What is the Ālaya? And whence the
Manovijñāna? (25) How does the visible [world] rise? How does it cease from
being visible?
21. Whence are families and no-families? What is
meant by Mind-only? The setting up of marks? And whence [the doctrine of]
egolessness?
22. Why is there no being? What kind of teaching
is in accordance with popular thinking? How can one cease cherishing eternalism
(śāśvata-darshana) and nihilism (uccheda-darshana)?
23. How is it that you do not differ from the
philosophers as regards appearance? Tell me, whence is the rise of the Nyāya
school? Its future?
24. What is meant by emptiness? What do you
understand by momentary destruction? Whence is the Womb? And whence is the
stability of the world?
25. Why is the world like a vision and a dream?
How does it resemble the city of the Gandharvas? Why it is to be regarded as
like a mirage, or like the moon reflected in water? Pray tell me.
26. What are the elements of enlightenment?
Whence are the constituents of enlightenment? Wherefore is a revolution, and
the disturbance of a kingdom? And how does the realistic view of existence
(bhavadṛishṭi) take its rise?
27. What is meant by the world being above birth
and death? or being like the flower in the air? How do you understand it? Why
do you regard it as being beyond words?
28. How is it not subject to discrimination? How
is it like the sky? Of how many sorts is suchness? How manifold is the Mind?
How many Pāramitās are there?
29. Whence is the gradation of the stages? What
is the state of imagelessness? (26) Wherefore is the twofold egolessness? How
is one cleansed of [the hindrance of] knowledge?
30. Of how many kinds is knowledge (jñāna)? O
Leader! How many moral precepts are there? and forms of being? Whence are the
families born of gold and jewel and pearl?
31. Of whom is speech born? Whence is the
differentiation of beings? Whence are the sciences, offices, arts? and by whom
are they made manifest?
32. Of how many sorts are gāthās? What is prose?
What is metre? Of how many sorts is reasoning and exegesis?
33. How many varieties of food and drink are
there? Whence does sexual desire originate? Whence are there kings, sovereigns,
and provincial rulers?
34. How does a king protect his dominion? Of how
many groups are heavenly beings? Whence are the earth, stars, constellations,
the moon, and the sun?
35. How many kinds of emancipation are there? of
the Yogins? How many kinds of discipleship? And how about the masters?
36. How many kinds of Buddhahood are there? And
how many of the Jātaka Tales? How numerous are the evil ones? How numerous are
the heretics?
37. What is meant by [the doctrine] that there
is nothing but thought-construction? Pray tell me, thou Most Eloquent One?
(27) 38. Whence are the clouds in the sky? the
wind? What is meant by recollection? by wisdom (medhā)? Whence are trees and
vines? Pray tell me, Lord of the Triple World?
39. How do horses, elephants, and deer get
caught? Wherefore are there fools and despicable people? Pray tell me, thou
Charioteer of the Mind?
40. Wherefore are the six seasons mentioned?
What is meant by the Icchantika [one who is without Buddha-nature]? Pray tell
me whence is the birth of a man? of a woman? of a hermaphrodite?
41. How does one retrograde in the Yoga
exercises? How does one make progress in them? How many exercises are there?
and how are men kept abiding in them? Pray tell me.
42. Beings are born in the various paths of
existence, what are their specific marks and forms? How is abundance of wealth
acquired? Pray tell me, thou who art like the sky?
43. Whence is the Śākya family? And the one born
of Ikshvāku? Whence is the Rishi Long-Penance? What is taught by him?
44. How is it that thou art thus apparent everywhere
in every land, surrounded by such Bodhisattvas of such various names and forms?
45. Why is meat not to be eaten? Why is it
forbidden? Whence was the carnivorous race born, who eats meat?
46. Why are the lands shaped like the moon, the
sun, the Sumeru, the lotus, the swatika, and the lion? Pray tell me.
(28) 47. Wherefore are the lands shaped like a
capsized and upturned net of Indra which is composed of all sorts of jewels?
Pray tell me why?
48. Wherefore are [the lands] shaped in the form
of a lute or a drum? Like various flowers and fruits? Like the sun and the moon
which are so stainless? Pray tell me.
49. Whence are the Buddhas of Transformation?
Whence are the Buddhas of Maturity [or Recompense]? Whence are the Buddhas who
are endowed with transcendental knowledge of suchness? Pray tell me.
50. Why does not one attain enlightenment in the
world of desire? Pray tell me. What is the meaning of your being enlightened in
the Akanishṭha by shaking off all the passions?
51. After my passing who will be the upholder of
the Discipline [or Doctrine, śāsana]! How long should the teacher abide? How
long should the teaching continue?
52. How many sorts of established truths are
there? And how many of philosophical views? Whence is morality? And what
constitutes the being of a Bhikshu? Pray tell me.
53. What is meant by a state of revulsion [or
turning-back]? Whence is a state of imagelessness, [which is realised] by the
Pratyekabuddhas, Bodhisattvas, and Śrāvakas?
54. By whom are the psychic powers of this world
attained? What are the super-worldly ones? By what means does the mind enter
upon the seven stages? Pray tell me.
55. How many kinds of Brotherhood are there? And
how does a dissension take place in a Brotherhood! Whence are medical treatises
for beings? Pray tell me.
(29) 56. You say that you were among the Buddhas
Kāśyapa, Krakuchanda, and Kanakamuni; tell me wherefore so, O Great Muni!
57. Whence is the doctrine that there is no
ego-soul in beings? Whence is the doctrine of eternity, and of annihilation?
Wherefore do you not everywhere announce the doctrine of Mind-only as the
truth?
58. What is meant by the forest of men and
women? And by the forest of Karītakī and Āmalī? Whence are the mountains
Kailāsa, Cakravāḍa, and Vajrasaṃhananā?
59. Among these, whence are the mountains
decorated with various sorts of jewels and filled with Ṛishis and Gandharvas?
Pray tell me.
60. Hearing this [which constitutes] the
wonderful doctrine of the Mahāyāna and also the most excellent heart of the
Buddhas, the Great Hero, the Buddha, the One Most Excelled in the Knowledge of
the World, [spoke thus]:
61. Well done! Well done! O Mahāprajñā-Mahāmati!
Listen well, and I will tell you in order regarding your questions.
62. Birth, no-birth, Nirvana, emptiness,
transmigration, having-no-selḹ-nature, Buddhas, sons of the Pāramitās,
63. The Śrāvakas, Bodhisattvas, the
philosophers, those who are capable of formless deeds, the Meru, oceans,
mountains, islands, lands, the earth,
64. The stars, the sun, the moon, the
philosophers, the Asura, (30) emancipations, the self-masteries, the psychic
faculties, the Dhyānas, the Samādhis,
65. The extinctions (nirodha), the supernatural
powers, the elements of enlightenment, and the paths, Dhyānas, the
unmeasurables, the aggregates (skandhas), and the comings-and-goings.
66. Samāpattis, the extinctions, the stirrings
of mind, explanations in words, the Citta, Manas, and Vijñānas, egolessness,
the five Dharmas,
67. Self-nature, the discriminating, the
discriminated, the visible [world], dualism—whence are they? Various forms of
vehicles, families, those born of gold, jewels, and pearls?
68. The Icchantika, the original elements, the
wandering-about, one Buddhahood, knowledge, the known, the marching, the
attainment, and the existence and non-existence of beings?
69. How are horses, elephants, deer caught? Pray
tell me how. What is a proposition, a teaching established by the conjunction
of reason and illustration?
70. Whence is cause and effect? Various errors?
and also reason? [Why the statement that there is] nothing but Mind, that there
is no objective [literally, seen] world, that there is no ascending of the
stages?
71. Whence is the state of imagelessness and
revulsion which is a hundredfold?1 You tell me. Likewise about medical
treatises, arts, crafts, sciences, and teachings?
1 Not found in T'ang.
72. And also what are the measurements of the
mountains, Sumeru, and the earth? What are the measurements of the ocean, moon,
and sun? Tell me.
(31) 73. How many particles of dust are there in
the body of a being? How many of the coarser ones, of the finer ones, and of
the middle ones? How many particles of dust in every land? How many in every
dhanva?
74. In measuring distance how much is a hasta, a
dhanu, a krośa, a yojana, a half-yojana? How many of rabbit-hairs, of window-dust,
louse-eggs, or ram-hairs, of barley?1
75. How many grains of barley in a prastha? How
many grains of barley in a half-prastha? Likewise how many in a droṇa, in a
khārya, a lakshā, a koṭi, a vimvana?
76. How many atoms are there in a mustard-seed?
How many mustard-seeds are there in a rakshikā? How many in a bean, in a
dharaṇa, in a māshakā?
77. How many dharaṇās are there in a karsha? How
many karshas in a pala? and how many palas are there in Mount Sumeru which is a
huge accumulation [of masses]?
78. You should ask me thus, O son! Why do you
ask me otherwise? How many atoms are there in the body of a Pratyekabuddha, of
a Śrāvaka, of a Buddha, and of a Bodhisattva? (32) Why do you not ask me in
this wise?
79. How many atoms are there at the top of a
flame? How many atoms are in the wind? How many in each sense-organ? How many
in a pore of the skin? in the eyebrows?
80. Whence are these men of immense wealth,
kings, great sovereigns? How is the kingdom taken care of by them? And how
about their emancipation?
81. Tell whence is prose and metre. Why is
sexual desire universally cherished? Whence is the variety of foods and drinks?
Whence the man-woman forest?
82. Wherefore are the mountains of
Vajrasaṃhanana? Tell me whence, wherefore; are they like a vision, a dream, and
a fata-morgana?
1 See the Abhidharmakośa, translated by Louis de
la Vallée Poussin, Ch. III, p. 178.
83. Whence is the arising of clouds? And whence
do the seasons rise? Whence is the nature of taste? Whence is woman, man, and
hermaphrodite?
84. Whence are the adornments and the
Bodhisattvas? Ask me, O my son! Whence are the divine mountains embellished by
the Rishis and Gandharvas?
85. Whence is the way of emancipation? Who is in
bondage? By whom is he delivered? What is the state of one who practises
tranquillisation? What is transformation, and who are those philosophers?
86. What is meant by non-existence, existence,
and no-effect? Whence arises the visible world? (33) How can one be cleansed of
false intellection? Whence does false intellection arise?
87. Whence arises action? And whence its
departure? Tell me. How does the extinction of thought take place? And what is
meant by a Samādhi?
88. Who is the one that breaks through the
triple world? What is the position? What is the body? Wherefore the doctrine
that beings have no ego-soul? What is meant by a teaching in accordance with
the world?1
89. Do you ask me about the marks? Do you ask me
about egolessness? Do you ask me about the womb, about the Nyāya philosophers,
O son of the Victor?
90. How about eternalism and nihilism? How is
the mind tranquillised? Again [how about] speech, knowledge, morality, family,
O son of the Victor?
91. What is meant by reasoning and illustrating,
by master and disciple, by manifoldness of beings, food and drink, sky,
intelligence, evil ones, and the statement that there is nothing but the
thought-constructed?
92. What do you ask me concerning trees and
vines, O son of the Victor? What about diversity of lands, and about
Long-Penance the Ṛishi?
1 Saṁvṛityā deśanā is contrasted to
paramārtha-satya, highest truth.
93. What is your family? Who is your master? You
tell me, O son of the Victor. Who are the people who are despised? How is it
that in the Yoga you do not attain enlightenment in the world of desire, but
that in the Akanishṭha there is realisation?
94. What do you ask me about reasoning? (34)
What about the psychic faculties belonging to this world, and about the nature
of a Bhikshu?
95. Do you ask me about Buddhas of
Transformation, Buddhas of Maturity [or Recompense]? About Buddhas of the
Knowledge of Suchness? And whence is the Bodhisattva?
96. You ask me, O son of the Victor, about the lands
that are devoid of light, resembling a lute, a drum, and a flower, and about
the mind abiding in the seven stages?
97. You ask me such and many other questions,
which are in accordance with the marks [of Truth?] and free from erroneous
views.
III
98.1 I will instruct you as regards realisation
and its teaching; listen to me intently; I will give you an explanation of the
statements, O son, listen to me, in regard to the one hundred and eight
statements as recounted by the Buddhas.
At that moment Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said to the Blessed One: What is meant by the one
hundred and eight statements?2
1 This verse is probably to be separated from
the foregoing ones as it forms a sort of introduction to what follows. The one
hundred and eight questions (praśna) so called are not to be necessarily
identified with the one hundred and eight statements (pada) which are
uniformely negated in the paragraph that comes after. Some subjects are common
to the Questions and the Negations, but others are not. I do not think there is
any organic relationship between the two sections. What strikes one in both the
Questions and the Negations is that trivial subjects are mixed up with
important ones as equally constituting the content of self-realisation. The
Sutra proper which is supposed to concern itself with them is also devoid of an
intimate connection with them.
2 Here is one of the most mysterious and
unintelligible portions of the Laṅkāvatūra Sūtra. The Sanskrit word for
"statement" is pada, which literally means, "foot-step,"
"a footing," "a position," "a subject," "an
abode," "a matter of talk," "a portion of a line in a
stanza," etc. For the Sanskrit pada the Chinese translators have "句", "見", "位", "住", but as they
stand these translations do not give any sense to the general context. 句 is perhaps the best in
retaining the original sense, but it is to be understood in the sense of
"a proposition," "a statement," and each sentence
containing this word in the following negations means that each subject
referred to is not properly conceived, because, for instance, the concept of
birth is not in accordance with the true understanding of reality. Birth stands
against death, they are relative notions, and do not apply to a world where
things are perceived in their absolute aspect. Therefore, any statement that
might be made concerning birth are not at all true; birth is no-birth, death is
no-death, and so on. Even of such notions as truth, realisation, self-nature,
mind, pāramitās, the same can be said; to make a statement about anything is to
falsify it. Hence the series of negations as illustrated here. But the mysterious
fact about them is the reference to so many trite subjects which are evidently
in no direct connection with the teachings of the Mahāyāna. There must be
something historical about these references of which the translator is at
present quite ignorant. Another mystery here concerns the number of padas: why
108, and not more or less?
The Blessed One said: A statement concerning
birth is no statement concerning birth; a statement concerning eternity is no
statement concerning eternity. [The topics thus negated are as follows:1] the
characteristic marks, abiding and changing, moment, self-nature, emptiness,
annihilation, mind, the middle, permanence, causation, cause, the passions,
desire, (35) means, contrivance, purity, inference [or conclusion], illustration,
a disciple, a master, a family, the triple vehicle, imagelessness, vows, the
triple circle, form, duality of being and non-being, bothness, the noble wisdom
of self-realisation, the bliss of the present world, lands, atoms, water, a
bow, reality, numbers and mathematics, the psychic powers, the sky, clouds, the
arts and crafts and sciences, the wind, the earth, thinking,
thought-constructions, self-nature, the aggregates, being, insight, Nirvana,
that which is known, the philosophers, disorder, a vision, a dream, (36) a
mirage, a reflection, a circle made in the dark by a fire-brand, the city of
the Gandharvas, the heavens, food and drink, sexuality, philosophical views,
the Pāramitās, morality, the moon and the sun and stars, truth, effect, annihilation
and origination, medical treatment, the characteristic marks, the limbs, arts
and sciences, Dhyāna, error, the seen [world], protection, dynasty, Ṛishi,
kingdom, apprehension, treasure, explanation, the Icchantika, man, woman, and
hermaphrodite, taste, action, the body, false intellection, motives,
sense-organs, the Samskrita,2 cause and effect, the Kanishṭha,3 the seasons, a
luxuriant growth of trees, vines and shrubs, (37) multiplicity, entering into
the teaching, systems of morality, the Bhikshus, the powers added [by the
Buddha], the lutes. These are the one hundred and eight statements recounted by
the Buddhas of the past.
1 To avoid repetitions, the subjects alone are
mentioned which are systematically negated in the text.
2 Anything that produces an effect.
3 A class of deities.
IV
At that moment, Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said again to the Blessed One: In how many ways, Blessed
One, does the rise, abiding, and ceasing of the Vijñānas take place?
The Blessed One replied: There are two ways,
Mahāmati, in which the rise, abiding, and ceasing of the Vijñānas take place,
and this is not understood by the philosophers. That is to say, the ceasing
takes place as regards continuation and form. In the rise of the Vijñānas,
also, these two are recognisable: the rise as regards continuation and the rise
as regards form. In the abiding, also, these two [are discernible]: the one
taking place as regards continuation and the other as regards form.
[Further,] three modes are distinguishable in
the Vijñānas: (1) the Vijñāna as evolving, (2) the Vijñāna as producing
effects, and (3) the Vijñāna as remaining in its original nature.
[Further,] Mahāmati, in the Vijñānas, which are
said to be eight, two functions generally are distinguishable, the perceiving
and the object-discriminating. As a mirror reflects forms, Mahāmati, the
perceiving Vijñā a perceives [objects]. Mahāmati, between the two, the
perceiving Vijñāna and the object-discriminating Vijñāna, there is no
difference; they are mutually conditioning. Then, Mahāmati, the perciving Vijñāna
functions because of transformation's taking place [in the mind] by reason of a
mysterious habit-energy, while, Mahāmati, the object-discriminating Vijñāna
(38) functions because of the mind's discriminating an objective world and
because of the habit-energy accumulated by erroneous reasoning since
beginningless time.
Again, Mahāmati, by the cessation of all the
sense-Vijñānas is meant the cessation of the Ālayavijñāna's variously
accumulating habit-energy which is generated when unrealities are discriminated.
This, Mahāmati, is known as the cessation of the form-aspect of the Vijñānas.
Again, Mahāmati, the cessation of the
continuation-aspect of the Vijñānas takes place in this wise: that is to say,
Mahāmati, when both that which supports [the Vijñānas] and that which is
comprehended [by the Vijñānas] cease to function. By that which supports [the
Vijñānas] is meant the habit-energy [or memory] which has been accumulated by
erroneous reasoning since beginningless time; and by that which is comprehended
[by the Vijñānas] is meant the objective world perceived and discriminated by
the Vijñānas, which is, however, no more than Mind itself.
Mahāmati, it is like a lump of clay and the
particles of dust making up its substance, they are neither different nor
not-different; again, it is like gold and various ornaments made of it. If,
Mahāmati, the lump of clay is different from its particles of dust, no lump
will ever come out of them. But as it comes out of them it is not different
from the particles of dust. Again, if there is no difference between the two,
the lump will be indistinguishable from its particles.
Even so, Mahāmati, if the evolving Vijñāna are
different from the Ālayavijñāna, even in its original form, the Ālaya cannot be
their cause. Again, if they are not different the cessation of the evolving
Vijñānas will mean the cessation of the Ālayavijñāna, but there is no cessation
of its original form. Therefore, Mahāmati, what ceases to function is not the
Ālaya in its original self-form, but is the effect-producing form of the
Vijñānas. When this original self-form ceases to exist, then there will indeed
be the cessation of the Ālayavijñāna. (39) If, however, there is the cessation
of the Ālayavijñāna, this doctrine will in no wise differ from the nihilistic
doctrine of the philosophers.
This doctrine, Mahāmati, as it is held by the
philosophers, is this: When the grasping of an objective world ceases the
continuation of the Vijñānas is stopped; and when there is no more of this
continuation in the Vijñānas, the continuation that has been going on since
beginningless time is also destroyed. Mahāmati, the philosophers maintain that
there is a first cause from which continuation takes place; they do not
maintain that the eye-Vijñāna arises from the interaction of form and light;
they assume another cause. What is this cause, Mahāmati? Their first cause is
known as spirit (pradhāna), soul (purusha), lord (iśvara), time, or atom.
V
Again, Mahāmati, there are seven kinds of
self-nature: collection (samudaya), being (bhāva), characteristic marks
(lakshaṇa), elements (mahābhūta), causality (hetu), conditionality (pratyaya),
and perfection (nishpatti).1
VI
Again, Mahāmati, there are seven kinds of first
principle [or highest reality, paramārtha]: the world of thought
(citta-gocara), the world of knowledge (jñāna-), the world of super-knowledge
(prajñā-), the world of dualistic views (dṛishṭi-), the world beyond dualistic
views, the world beyond the Bodhisattva-stages, and a world where the Tathagata
attains his self-realisation.2
1 What is exactly meant by these concepts
regarded as self-nature (svabhāva) is difficult to define as far as the
Laṅkāvatāra is concerned.
2 These seven principles or realities are not
explained in the text. But we can state that they are so many different kinds
of Paramārtha, as in the case of Svabhāva, so considered by different schools
of philosophers or Buddhists.
(40) Mahāmati, this is the self-nature, the
first principle, the essence, which constitutes the being of the Tathagatas,
Arhats, Fully-Enlightened Ones of the past, present, and future, whereby,
perfecting things of this world and of a world beyond this, they, by means of a
noble eye of transcendental wisdom, enter into various phases of existence,
individual and general, and establish them. And what is thus established by
them is not to be confused with the erroneous teachings generally held by the
philosophers.
Mahāmati, what are these erroneous teachings
accepted generally by the philosophers? [Their error lies in this] that they do
not recognise an objective world to be of Mind itself which is erroneously
discriminated; and, not understanding the nature of the Vijñānas which are also
no more than manifestations of Mind, like simple-minded ones that they are,
they cherish the dualism of being and non-being where there is but [one]
self-nature and [one] first principle.
Again, Mahāmati, my teaching consists in the
cessation of sufferings arising from the discrimination of the triple world; in
the cessation of ignorance, desire, deed, and causality; and in the recognition
that an objective world, like a vision, is the manifestation of Mind itself.
VII
Mahāmati, there are some Brahmans and Śramaṇas
who assume something out of nothing, saying that there exists a substance which
is bound up in causation and abides in time, and that the Skandhas, Dhātus, and
Āyatanas have their genesis and continuation in causation and, after thus
existing, pass away.
They are those, Mahāmati, who hold a destructive
and nihilistic view concerning such subjects as continuation, activity, rising,
breaking-up, existence, Nirvana, the path, karma, fruition, and truth. (41)
Why? Because they have not attained an intuitive understanding [of the Truth],
because they have no fundamental insight of things. Mahāmati, it is like a jar
broken in pieces which is unable to function as a jar; again, it is like a
burnt seed which is incapable of sprouting. Even so, Mahāmati, their Skandhas,
Dhātus, and Āyatanas which they regard as subject to changes are really
incapable of uninterrupted transformation because their views do not originate
from the perception of an objective world as a manifestation of Mind itself
which is erroneously discriminated.
If again, Mahāmati, something comes out of
nothing and there is the rise of the Vijñānas by reason of a combination of the
three effect-producing causes, we can say the same of a non-existing thing,
that a tortoise would grow hair and sands produce oil. [As this is impossible]
this proposition does not avail, it ends in affirming nothing. And, Mahāmati,
it follows that deed, work, and cause [of which they speak] will be of no use,
and so also with their reference to being and non-being. Mahāmati, when they
argue that there is a combination of the three effect-producing causes, they do
this by the principle of cause and effect [which is to say, by the principle
that something comes out of something and not of nothing]; and thus there are
[such things as] past, present, and future, and being and non-being. As long as
they remain on their philosophic ground, their demonstration will be by means
of their logic and text-books, for the memory of erroneous intellection will
ever cling to them. 1 Thus, Mahāmati, simple-minded ones, poisoned by an
erroneous view, declare the incorrect way of thinking taught by the ignorant to
be the one presented by the All-Knowing One.
1 The reasoning here may be a little difficult
to follow. The general idea maintained by the Laṅkāvatāra is that as long as a
world of relativity is asserted there is an ever-recurring chain of causation
which cannot be denied in any circumstance. In this case we cannot talk of
anything coming to an end or cessation. The fault with the philosophers is that
they have no fundamental intuition into the essential nature of an objective
world—a world of particulars—which is really the projection of mind by reason
of memory or the habit-energy accumulated since beginningless time. When this
thought is thoroughly grasped, the philosopher's point of view may also hold
good as far as it goes. As they lack, however, the fundamental intuition, all
the logical superstructure they build is essentially an error.
Again, Mahāmati, there are some Brahmans and
Śramaṇas who (42) recognising that the external world which is of Mind itself
is seen as such owing to the discrimination and false intellection practised
since beginningless time, know that the world has no self-nature and has never
been born, it is like a cloud, a ring produced by a firebrand, the castle of
the Gandharvas, a vision, a mirage, the moon as reflected in the ocean, and a
dream; that Mind in itself has nothing to do with discrimination and causation,
discourses of imagination, and terms of qualification (lakshya-lakshaṇa); that
body, property, and abode are objectifications of the Ālayavijñāna,1 which is
in itself above [the dualism of] subject and object; that the state of
imagelessness which is in compliance with the awakening of Mind itself,2 is not
affected by such changes as arising, abiding, and destruction.
1 The translator here follows the T'ang reading.
2 This clause does not appear in T'ang.
The Bodhisattvas-Mahāsattvas, Mahāmati, will
before long attain to the understanding that Nirvana and Samsāra are one. Their
conduct, Mahāmati, will be in accordance with the effortless exhibition of a
great loving heart that ingeniously contrives means [of salvation], knowing
that all beings have the nature of being like a vision or a reflection, and
that [there is one thing which is] not bound by causation, being beyond the
distinction of subject and object; [and further] seeing that there is nothing
outside Mind, and in accordance with a position of unconditionality, they will
by degrees pass through the various stages of Bodhisattvahood and will
experience the various states of Samādhi, and will by virtue of their faith
understand that the triple world is of Mind itself, and thus understanding will
attain the Samādhi Māyopama. The Bodhisattvas entering into the state of
imagelessness where they see into the truth of Mind-only, arriving at the abode
of the Pāramitās, and keeping themselves away from the thought of genesis,
deed, and discipline, they will attain the Samādhi Vajravimbopama which is in
compliance with the Tathāgatakāya and with the transformations of suchness.
After achieving a revulsion in the abode [of the Vijñānas], Mahāmati, they will
gradually realise the Tathāgatakāya, which is endowed with the powers, the
psychic faculties, self-control, love, compassion, and means; which can enter
into all the Buddha-lands and into the sanctuaries of the philosophers; and
which is beyond the realm of (43) Citta-mano-manovijñāna. Therefore, Mahāmati,
these Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas who wish, by following the Tathāgatakāya, to
realise it, should exercise themselves, in compliance with the truth of
Mind-only, to desist from discriminating and reasoning erroneously on such
notions as Skandhas, Dhātus, Āyatanas, thought, causation, deed, discipline,
and rising, abiding, and destruction.
VIII
Perceiving that the triple existence is by
reason of the habit-energy of erroneous discrimination and false reasoning that
has been going on since beginningless time, and also thinking of the state of
Buddhahood which is imageless and unborn, [the Bodhisattva] will become
thoroughly conversant with the noble truth of self-realisation, will become a
perfect master of his own mind, will conduct himself without effort, will be like
a gem reflecting a variety of colours, will be able to assume the body of
transformation, will be able to enter into the subtle minds of all beings, and,
because of his firm belief in the truth of Mind-only, will, by gradually
ascending the stages, become established in Buddhahood. Therefore, Mahāmati,
let the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva be well disciplined in self-realisation.
IX
Then Mahāmati said: Teach me, Blessed One,
concerning that most subtle doctrine which explains the Citta, Manas,
Manovijñāna, the five Dharmas, the Svabhāvas, and the Lakshanas; which is put
in practice by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas; which is separated from the state
of mind which recognises a world as something outside Mind itself; and which,
breaking down all the so-called truths established by words and reasonings,
constitutes the essence of the teachings of all the Buddhas. Pray teach this
assembly headed by the Bodhisattvas gathering on Mount Malaya in the city of
Laṅkā; teach them regarding the Dharmakāya which is praised by the Tathagatas
and which is the realm of (44) the Ālayavijñāna which resembles the ocean with
its waves. Then the Blessed One again speaking to Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said this: The reasons whereby the eye-consciousness
arises are four. What are they? They are: (1) The clinging to an external
world, not knowing that it is of Mind itself; (2) The attaching to form and
habit-energy accumulated since beginningless time by false reasoning and
erroneous views; (3) The self-nature inherent in the Vijñāna; (4) The eagerness
for multiple forms and appearances. By these four reasons, Mahāmati, the waves
of the evolving Vijñānas are stirred on the Ālayavijñāna which resembles the
waters of a flood. The same [can be said of the other sense-consciousnesses] as
of the eye-consciousness. This consciousness arises at once or by degrees in
every sense-organ including its atoms and pores of the skin; the sense-field is
apprehended like a mirror reflecting objects, like the ocean swept over by a
wind. Mahāmati, similarly the waves of the mind-ocean are stirred
uninterruptedly by the wind of objectivity; cause, deed, and appearance
condition one another inseparably; the functioning Vijñānas and the original
Vijñāna are thus inextricably bound-up together; and because the self-nature of
form, etc., is not comprehended, Mahāmati, the system of the five
consciousnesses (vijñānas) comes to function. Along with this system of the
five Vijñānas, there is what is known as Manovijñāna [i. e., the thinking
function of consciousness], whereby the objective world is distinguished and
individual appearances are distinctly determined, and in this the physical body
has its genesis. But the Manovijñāna and other Vijñānas have no thought that
they are mutually conditioned and that they grow out of their attachment to the
discrimination which is applied to the projections of Mind itself. Thus the
Vijñānas go on functioning mutually related in a most intimate manner and
discriminating a world of representations.
(45) As the Vijñānas thus go on functioning
[without being conscious of their own doings], so the Yogins while entering
upon a state of tranquillisation (Samāpatti) are not aware of the workings of
the subtle habit-energy [or memory] within themselves; for they think that they
would enter upon a state of tranquillisation by extinguishing the Vijñānas. But
[in fact] they are in this state without extinguishing the Vijñānas which still
subsist because the seeds of habit-energy have not been extinguished; and [what
they imagine to be] an extinction is really the non-functioning of the external
world to which they are no more attached. So it is, Mahāmati, with the subtle
working of the Ālayavijñāna, which, except for the Tathagata and those
Bodhisattvas who are established on the stages, is not easy to comprehend;
[especially] by those who practise the discipline belonging to the Śrāvakas,
Pratyekabuddhas, and philosophers, even with their powers of Samādhi and
transcendental knowledge, it is difficult to distinguish. Only those who, understanding
fully all the aspects of the different stages of Bodhisattvahood by the aid of
their transcendental knowledge, acquiring a definite cognition as regards the
meaning of the separate propositions, planting roots of goodness in the
Buddha-lands that know no limits, and keeping themselves away from the
discriminations and false reasonings that arise from recognising an external
world which is of Mind itself, would retire into a secluded abode in the forest
and devote themselves to the practice of the spiritual discipline, either high,
or low, or middling, only those are capable of obtaining an insight into the
flowing of Mind itself in a world of discrimination, of being baptised by the
Buddhas living in the lands without limits, and of realising the self-control,
powers, psychic faculties, and Samādhis. Surrounded by good friends and the
Buddhas, Mahāmati, they are capable of knowing the Citta, Manas, Manovijñāna,
which are the discriminating agents of an external world whose self-nature is
of Mind itself; they are capable of crossing the ocean of birth and death which
arises by reason of deed, desire, and ignorance. For this reason, Mahāmati, the
Yogins ought to exercise themselves in the discipline which has been given them
by their good friends and the Buddhas.
(46) At that time the Blessed One recited the
following verses:
99. Like waves that rise on the ocean stirred by
the wind, dancing and without interruption,
100. The Ālaya-ocean in a similar manner is
constantly stirred by the winds of objectivity, and is seen dancing about with
the Vijñānas which are the waves of multiplicity.
101. Dark-blue, red, [and other colours], with
salt, conch-shell, milk, honey, fragrance of fruits and flowers, and rays of
sunlight;
102. They are neither different nor
not-different: the relation is like that between the ocean and its waves. So
are the seven Vijñānas joined with the Citta (mind).
103. As the waves in their variety are stirred
on the ocean, so in the Ālaya is produced the variety of what is known as the
Vijñānas.
104. The Citta, Manas, and Vijñānas are
discriminated as regards their form; [but in substance] the eight are not to be
separated one from another, for there is neither qualified nor qualifying.
105. As there is no distinction between the
ocean and its waves, so in the Citta there is no evolution of the Vijñānas.
106. Karma is accumulated by the Citta,
reflected upon by the Manas, and recognised by the Manovijñāna, and the visible
world is discriminated by the five Vijñānas.
(47) 107. Varieties of colour such as dark-blue,
etc., are presented to our Vijñāna. Tell me, Great Muni, how there are these
varieties of colour like waves [on the ocean]?
108. There are no such varieties of colour in
the waves; it is for the sake of the simple-minded that the Citta is said to be
evolving as regards form.
109. There is no such evolving in the Citta
itself, which is beyond comprehension. Where there is comprehension there is
that which comprehends as in the case of waves [and ocean].
110. Body, property, and abode are presented as
such to our Vijñānas, and thus they are seen as evolving in the same way as are
the waves.
111. The ocean is manifestly seen dancing in the
state of waveness; how is it that the evolving of the Ālaya is not recognised
by the intellect even as the ocean is?1
112. That the Ālaya is compared to the ocean is
[only] for the sake of the discriminating intellect of the ignorant; the
likeness of the waves in motion is [only] brought out by way of illustration.
113. When the sun rises it shines impartially on
people high and low; so thou who art the light of the world shouldst announce
the truth (tattvam) to the ignorant.
(48) 114. How is it that in establishing thyself
in the Dharma thou announcest not the truth? If the truth is announced by me,
the truth is not in the mind.2
115. As the waves appear instantly on the ocean,
or [images] in a mirror or a dream, so the mind is reflected in its own
sense-fields.3
116. Owing to a deficiency in conditions the
evolution [of the Vijñānas] takes place by degrees.4 The function of the
Manovijñāna is to recognise and that of the Manas is to reflect upon,
117. While to the five Vijñānas the actual world
presents itself. There is no gradation when one is in a state of collectedness
(samāhita).5 Like unto a master of painting or his pupils,
1 This question according to Sung and T'ang is
Mahāmati's.
2 113 and the first part of 114 are ascribed to
Mahāmati in Sung and T'ang, but Wei gives both 113 and 114 to Mahāmati.
3 This must have found its way here by mistake,
for the ocean-waves simile in this text is generally used to illustrate the
Ālaya's relation to the other Vijñānas, and not in connection with the
immediacy of perception as in this case of the mirror-images simile.
4 This ought to belong to the preceding verse.
Not wishing, however, to disturb the original notation, the translator has
followed the text. In that which follows, the reader is asked simply to look for
the sense and to pay no attention to the division of verses.
5 Samāhita, Samādhi, Samāpatti, ekāgra may be
understood as synonymous, denoting a state of consciousness where the mind is
most intensely concentrated on one thought. It is the receptive state of
intuition, rather than the active state of thinking.
118.1 Who arrange colours to produce a picture,
I teach. The picture is not in the colours, nor in the canvas, nor in the
plate;
119. In order to make it attractive to all
beings, a picture is presented in colours. What one teaches, transgresses; for
the truth (tattva) is beyond words.
120. Establishing myself in the Dharma, I preach
the truth for the Yogins. The truth is the state of self-realisation and is
beyond categories of discrimination.
121. I teach it to the sons of the Victorious;
the teaching is not meant for the ignorant. What is seen as multitudinous is a
vision which exists not.
122. The teaching itself is thus variously
given, subject to transgression; (49) the teaching is no teaching whatever if
it is not to the point in each case.
123. According to the nature of a disease the
healer gives its medicine; even so the Buddhas teach beings in accordance with
their mentalities.
124. This is indeed not a mental realm to be
reached by the philosophers and the Śrāvakas; what is taught by the leaders is
the realm of self-realisation.
1 Follow the sense and not necessarily the verse
division as before.
X
Further, Mahāmati, if the Bodhisattva should
wish to understand fully that an external world to be subsumed under categories
of discrimination, such as the grasping (subject) and the grasped (object), is
of Mind itself, let him be kept away from such hindrances as turmoil, social
intercourse, and sleep; let him be kept away from the treatises and writings of
the philosophers, from things belonging to the vehicles of Śrāvakahood and
Pratyekabuddhahood; let the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva be thoroughly acquainted
with objects of discrimination which are to be seen as of Mind itself.
XI(a)
Further, Mahāmati, when the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva establishes himself in the abode where he has gained a
thorough understanding of Mind by means of his transcendental knowledge, he
should later discipline himself in the cultivation of noble wisdom in its
triple aspect. What are the three aspects of noble wisdom, Mahāmati, in which
he has to discipline himself later? They are: (1) imagelessness; (2) the power
added by all the Buddhas by reason of their original vows; and (3) the
self-realisation attained by noble wisdom. Having mastered them, (50) the Yogin
should abandon his knowledge of Mind gained by means of transcendental wisdom,
which still resembles a lame donkey; and entering upon the eighth stage of
Bodhisattvahood, he should further discipline himself in these three aspects of
noble wisdom.
Then again, Mahāmati, the aspect of
imagelessness comes forth when all things belonging to the Śrāvakas and
Pratyekabuddhas and philosophers are thoroughly mastered. Again, Mahāmati, as
to the power added, it comes from the original vows made by all the Buddhas.
Again, Mahāmati, as to the self-realisation aspect of noble wisdom, it rises
when a Bodhisattva, detaching himself from viewing all things in their
phenomenality, realises the Samādhi-body whereby he surveys the world as like
unto a vision, and further goes on to the attainment of the Buddha-stage.
Mahāmati, this is the triplicity of the noble life. Furnished with this
triplicity, noble ones will attain the state of self-realisation which is the
outcome of noble wisdom. For this reason, Mahāmati, you should cultivate noble
wisdom in its triple aspect.
XI(b)
At that moment, Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva knowing what was going on in the minds of the
Bodhisattvas who were gathered there, and empowered by the power added to him
by all the Buddhas, asked the Blessed One concerning the doctrine known as
examining into the reality of noble wisdom. Tell me, Blessed One, the doctrine
of examining into the reality of noble wisdom, depending on which the one
hundred and eight statements are to be distinguished—the doctrine depending on
which the Tathagatas, Arhats, Fully-Enlightened Ones will analyse and disclose
the nature and course of false imagination for the sake of (51) the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas who have fallen into the way of looking at things from
their aspects of generality and individuality. Thus the Bodhisattvas will be
instructed in the analysis and thorough examination of false imagination, and
thereby they will have the passage purified which leads to the egolessness of
things and persons, and get an illumination on the stages of Bodhisattvahood;
and, further, going beyond the bliss of the tranquillisations1 belonging to all
the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and philosophers, will attain the Dharmakāya of
the Tathagata, which belongs to the realm and course of Tathagatahood
transcending thought and in which there is no rising of the five Dharmas. That
is to say, they will attain the Tathagata-body which is the Dharma intimately
bound up with the understanding born of transcendental knowledge, and which,
entering into the realm of Māyā, reaches all the Buddha-lands, the heavenly
mansions of Tushita, and the abode of the Akanishṭha.
1 That is, dhyāna, Samādhi and Samāpatti, which
practically belong to the same category.
XII
Said the Blessed One: Mahāmati, there are some
philosophers who are addicted to negativism, according to whose philosophical
view the non-existence of the hare's horns is ascertained by means of the
discriminating intellect which affirms that the self-nature of things ceases to
exist with the destruction of their causes; and they say that all things are
non-existent just like the hare's horns.
Again, Mahāmati, there are others who, seeing
distinctions existing in things as regards the elements, qualities, atoms,
substances, formations, and positions, and, attached to the notion that the
hare's horns are non-existent, assert that the bull has horns.
There are, Mahāmati, those who have fallen into
the dualistic way of thinking, being unable to comprehend the truth of
Mind-only; they desire to discriminate a world which is of Mind itself.
Mahāmati, body, property, and abode have their existence only when measured in
discrimination. (52) The hare's horns neither are nor are not; no
discrimination is to be made about them. So it is, Mahāmati, with all things,
of which neither being nor non-being can be predicated; have no discrimination
about them!
Again, Mahāmati, those who have gone beyond
being and non-being, no more cherish the thought that the hare has no horns;
for they never think that the hare has no horns because of mutual reference,
nor do they think that the bull has horns because no ultimate substance is to
be obtained however minutely the analysis of the horns may go on even to the
subtlest particle known as atom: [that is,] the state in which noble wisdom is
realised is beyond being and non-being.
At that time Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
said this to the Blessed One: Is it not this way, Blessed One, that, seeing how
discrimination takes place, we proceed to refer this to the non-rising of
discrimination and infer that the horns exist not?
The Blessed One said: No, indeed, Mahāmati, the
non-existence of the horns has no reference to the non-rising of
discrimination. Why is it not so? Because there is discrimination owing to the
idea of the horns. Indeed, depending upon the idea of the horns, Mahāmati,
discrimination takes place. And because of this dependence of discrimination
upon the idea of the horns, Mahāmati, and because of this relationship of
dependence and apart from the anyānanya1 relationship, one talks of the
non-existence of the hare's horns, surely not because of the reference [to the
horns of the bull]. If again, Mahāmati, discrimination is different (anya) from
the hare's horns, (53) it will not take place by reason of the horns [and
therefore the one is not different from the other]; but if it is not different
(anānya), there is a discrimination taking place by reason of the horns [and
therefore the one is different from the other]. However minutely the atoms are
analysed, no horn [-substance] is obtainable; the notion of the horns itself is
not available when thus reasoned. As neither of them [that is, the bull's nor
the hare's] are existent, in reference to what should we talk of non-existence?
Therefore, Mahāmati, the reasoning by reference as regards the non-existence of
the hare's horns is of no avail. The non-existence of the hare's horns is
asserted in reference to their existence [on the bull; but really a horn itself
has no existence from the beginning]; have therefore no discrimination about
it! Mahāmati, the dualism of being and non-being as held by the philosophers
does not obtain as we see in the reasoning of horns.
1 Literally different and not-different.
Again, Mahāmati, there are other philosophers
affected with erroneous views, who are attached to such notions as form, cause,
and figure; not fully understanding the nature of space and seeing that space
is disjoined from form, they proceed to discriminate about their separate
existences. But, Mahāmati, space is form, and, Mahāmati, as space penetrates
into form, form is space. To establish the relation of supporting and
supported, Mahāmati, there obtains the separation of the two, space and form.
Mahāmati, when the elements begin to evolve [a world] they are distinguishable
one from another; they do not abide in space, and space is not non-existent in
them.
It is the same with the hare's horns, Mahāmati,
whose non-existence is asserted in reference to the bull's horns. But,
Mahāmati, when the bull's horns are analysed to their minutest atoms, which in
turn are further analysed, there is after all nothing to be known as atoms. The
non-existence of what, is to be affirmed in reference to what? As to the other
things, too, this reasoning from reference (54) does not hold true.
At that time, again, the Blessed One said this
to Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva; Mahāmati, you should discard the views
and discriminations that are concerned with the horns of a hare and a bull,
with space and form. And also, Mahāmati, let you and other Bodhisattvas reflect
on the nature of discrimination which they have of the Mind itself, and let
them go into all the Bodhisattva-lands where they should disclose the way of
disciplining themselves in the manifestations of Mind itself.
XIII
Then at that time the Blessed One recited these
verses:
125. The world [as we see it] exists not,
pluralities of things rise from the Mind being seen [externally]; body,
property, and abode are manifested to us as of the Ālayavijñāna.
126. The leaders talk about the Citta, Manas,
[Mano-]vijñāna, the [triple] Svabhāva, the five Dharmas, the twofold
egolessness, and purification.
127. Long and short, etc., exist mutually bound
up; when existence is asserted, there is non-existence, and where non-existence
is asserted, there is existence.
128. Analysed down to atoms, there is indeed no
form to be discriminated as such; what can be established is the [truth of]
Mind-only, which is not believed by those who cherish erroneous views.
129. This does not belong to the realm of the
theoreticians nor to that of the Śrāvaka; (55) the Buddhas disclose the way of
self-realisation.
XIV
At that time again, Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva made a request of the Blessed One regarding the
purification of the outflow which comes from recognising an objective world
which is of Mind itself, saying, How, O Blessed One, is the outflow purified
that takes place from recognising an external world which is of Mind itself? Is
the purification instantaneous or gradual?
Replied the Blessed One: The outflow that takes
place from recognising an external world which is of Mind itself is gradually
purified and not instantaneously. Mahāmati, it is like the āmra fruit which
ripens gradually and not instantaneously; in the same way, Mahāmati, the
purification of beings1 is gradual and not instantaneous. Mahāmati, it is like
the potter making pots, which is done gradually and not instantaneously; in the
same way, Mahāmati, the purification of beings by the Tathagata is gradual and
not instantaneous. Mahāmati, it is like grass, shrubs, herbs, and trees, that
grow up gradually from the earth and not instantaneously; in the same way,
Mahāmati, the purification by the Tathagata of beings is gradual and not
instantaneous; Mahāmati, it is like the mastery of comedy, dancing, singing,
music, lute-playing, writing, and [other] arts, which is gained gradually and
not instantaneously; in the same way, Mahāmati, the purification by the
Tathagata of all beings is gradual and not instantaneous.
Mahāmati, it is like a mirror indiscriminately
and instantaneously reflecting in it forms and images; (56) in the same way,
Mahāmati, the purification by the Tathagata of all beings is instantaneous, who
makes them free from discrimination and leads them to the state of
imagelessness. Mahāmati, it is like the sun or the moon revealing all forms
instantaneously by illuminating them with its light; in the same way, Mahāmati,
the Tathagata, by making all beings discard the habit-energy which issues from
the erroneous views they entertain in regard to an external world which is of
the Mind, instantaneously reveals to all beings the realm of unthinkable
knowledge which belongs to Buddhahood. It is like the Ālayavijñāna making
instantaneously a world of body, property, and abode, which is what is seen of
Mind itself; in the same way, Mahāmati, the Nishyanda-Buddha, instantaneously
maturing the mentality of beings, places them in the palatial abode of the
Akanishṭha mansion where they will become practisers of various spiritual
exercises. Mahāmati, it is like the Dharmatā-Buddha shining forth
instantaneously with the rays that issue from the Nishyanda-Nirmāṇa [-Buddha];
in the same way, Mahāmati, the noble truth of self-realisation instantaneously
shines out when the false [dualistic] views of existence and non-existence are
discarded.
1 Abbreviated from "the outflowing that
takes place in beings when they recognise an external world as real which is of
Mind itself" (svacittadṛiśyadhāirā sattvānām).
XV
And yet again, Mahāmati, what the
Dharmatā-Nishyanda-Buddha [that is, the Buddha that flows out of the absolute
Dharma] teaches is that all things are comprehensible under the aspects of
individuality and generality, for they are bound up with causes and conditions
of habit-energy which is accumulated by not recognising an external world as of
Mind itself; that by reason of clinging to these false imaginations there is
multitudinousness of unrealities, which resemble the various scenes and persons
created magically and imagined as really in existence. Further again, Mahāmati,
false imaginations arise from clinging to the notion of relativity. To
illustrate: when the magician depending upon grass, (57) wood, shrubs, and
creepers, exercises his art, all beings and forms take shape, magically-created
persons are produced, which appear endowed with individuality and material
body, and they are variously and fancifully discriminated. While they are thus
manifesting themselves, Mahāmati, there is no substantiality in them. Likewise,
Mahāmati, based on the notion of relativity the false imagination recognises a
variety of appearances which are distinguished by a discriminating mind. And as
their individual appearances are imagined and adhered to, there is
habit-energy, and, Mahāmati, so long as the fancying goes on we have here all
that is needed to constitute the self-nature of the false imagination.
Mahāmati, this is the discourse of the Nishyanda Buddha.
Again, Mahāmati, it is the doing of the
Dharmatā-Buddha to establish the exalted state of self-realisation which
transcends the phenomena of the [empirical] mind.
Again, Mahāmati, what the Nirmita-Nirmāṇa-Buddha
[or Buddha of transformation] establishes concerns such matters as charity,
morality, meditation, tranquillisation, various forms of transcendental
knowledge and of understanding, the Skandhas, Dhātus, and Āyatanas,
emancipation, the Vijñānas, and the ways in which they function, the forms
which they take, their distinctions and their performances. The Buddha
discloses against the philosophical views that which surpasses forms.
Again Mahāmati, the Dharmatā-Buddha is
unconditioned, free from conditions, has nothing to do with all doings, senses,
and measurements, and does not belong to the world of the ignorant, Śrāvakas,
Pratyekabuddhas, and philosophers, who are always clinging to the notion of an
ego. For this reason, Mahāmati, you should discipline yourself in the excellent
and exalted way leading to self-realisation; (58) you should keep yourself away
from the views that recognise the reality of an external world apart from the Mind
itself.
XVI
Further again, Mahāmati, in the life of the
Śrāvaka-vehicle, there are two aspects to be distinguished, namely, the
excellent and exalted state of self-realisation, and the attachment to the
notion of self-nature arising from discrimination. What is the excellent,
exalted state of self-realisation belonging to the Śrāvakas? This is a state of
mental concentration which is attained when one realises states of emptiness,
egolessness, suffering, and impermanence, and the truth that is free from
passions and is ever serene; when one annihilates notions belonging to the
externality of things, such as the Skandhas, Dhātus, Āyatanas, individuality
and generality; and when one has an insight into reality as it is. Entering
upon this state of mental concentration the Śrāvakas will attain the blissful
abode of exalted self-realisation in which there is the emancipation belonging
to a Dhyāna, the path and fruit of a Samādhi, and the deliverance of a
Samāpatti, but in which there is as yet no discarding of habit-energy and no
escape from the imperceivable transformation of death. This, Mahāmati, is the
Śrāvaka's exalted state of self-realisation. Having attained this exalted and
blissful condition of self-realisation as realised by the Śrāvakas, Mahāmati,
the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva may not enjoy by himself the bliss of cessation, the
bliss of Samāpatti, but should think compassionately of other beings and keep
ever fresh his original vows. Mahāmati, in whatever exalted and blissful state
of self-realisation the Bodhisattva may find himself, he should never exert
himself in the exalted and blissful state of self-realisation as attained by
the Śrāvakas.
(59) Mahāmati, what is meant by the attachment
to the notion of self-nature arising from discrimination? This attachment takes
place when a man, seeing that the elements and the qualities such as blue,
yellow, warmth, humidity, motility, and rigidity, have never been created by a
creator, yet clings to the notions of individuality and generality in accordance
with the measures laid down in books of logic. Mahāmati, the Bodhisattva,
knowing what this is, must abandon it. Conforming himself to the egolessness of
things and holding back the wrong views regarding the egolessness of a person,
the Bodhisattva should keep himself on the continuously-ascending journey along
the stages. This is the Śrāvaka's attachment to the notion of self-nature
arising from the discrimination of existence.
XVII
At that time Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
said this to the Blessed One: According to the Blessed One's teaching, the
eternal-unthinkable is the exalted condition of self-realisation and also of
highest reality. Now, do not the philosophers also talk about the creative
agent being the eternal-unthinkable?
The Blessed One replied: No, Mahāmati, the
eternal-unthinkable considered by the philosophers to be characteristic of
their creator is untenable. Why? Because, Mahāmati, the eternal-unthinkable as
held by the philosophers is not in conformity with the idea of a cause itself.
When, Mahāmati, this eternal-unthinkable is not in conformity with the idea of
a cause itself how can this be proved tenable? (60) Again, Mahāmati, if what is
claimed to be the eternal-unthinkable is in conformity with the idea of a cause
[which is eternal] in itself, it can be eternal; but since the idea of a
creator is based upon that of a [further] cause, it cannot be the
eternal-unthinkable.
But, Mahāmati, my highest reality is the
eternal-unthinkable since it conforms to the idea of a cause and is beyond
existence and non-existence. Because it is the exalted state of
self-realisation it has its own character; because it is the cause of the
highest reality it has its causation; because it has nothing to do with
existence and non-existence it is no doer; because it is to be classed under
the same head as space, Nirvana, and cessation it is eternal. Therefore,
Mahāmati, it is not the same as the eternal-unthinkable of the philosophers;
the eternal-unthinkable of the Tathagatas is thatness realised by noble wisdom
within themselves. For this reason, Mahāmati, let the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
discipline himself in order to attain by means of noble wisdom the truth of
self-realisation which is the eternal-unthinkable.
Again, further, Mahāmati, the eternal-unthinkable
of the philosophers is not characterised with eternality because it has a cause
which is not eternal; what they regard as eternal is not eternal as it is not
characterised with the power that can create itself. If again, Mahāmati, the
philosophers prove the eternality of their eternal-unthinkable in
contradistinction to the becoming and therefore the non-eternality of things
created, Mahāmati, by the same reasoning (61) I can prove that their eternality
has no reason to be known as such just because things created are non-eternal
owing to their becoming.
If again, Mahāmati, the eternal-unthinkable of
the philosophers is in conformity with the idea of a cause, what they regard as
characteristic of a cause is a non-entity like the horns of a hare; and,
Mahāmati, their eternal-unthinkable is no more than a verbal discrimination, in
which, Mahāmati, the philosophers' fault consists. Why? Because, Mahāmati, mere
verbal discriminations are, indeed, the hare's horns, on account of their
having no characteristic of a self-cause. Mahāmati, moreover, my
eternal-unthinkable is really eternal because it finds its cause in the exalted
state of self-realisation, and because it has nothing to do with a creator,
with being and non-being. Its eternality is not derived from the reasoning
which is based upon the external notion of being and non-being, of eternity and
non-eternity. If the eternal-unthinkable is eternal in consideration of the
non-existence and eternality of external things, we can say of this kind of the
eternal-unthinkable that the philosophers do not know what is meant by
characteristically self-caused. As they are outside the state of
self-realisation attainable by noble wisdom, Mahāmati, their discourse is not
to the point.
XVIII
Further, Mahāmati, those who, afraid of
sufferings arising from the discrimination of birth-and-death, seek for
Nirvana, do not know that birth-and-death and Nirvana are not to be separated the
one from the other; and, seeing that all things subject to discrimination have
no reality, imagine that Nirvana consists in the future annihilation of the
senses and their fields. (62) They are not aware, Mahāmati, of the fact that
Nirvana is the Ālayavijñāna where a revulsion takes place by self-realisation.
Therefore, Mahāmati, those who are stupid talk of the trinity of vehicles and
not of the state of Mind-only where there are no images. Therefore, Mahāmati,
those who do not understand the teachings of the Tathagatas of the past,
present, and future, concerning the external world, which is of Mind itself,
cling to the notion that there is a world outside what is seen of the Mind and,
Mahāmati, go on rolling themselves along the wheel of birth-and-death.
XIX
Further, Mahāmati, according to the teaching of
the Tathagatas of the past, present, and future, all things are unborn. Why?
Because they have no reality, being manifestations of Mind itself, and,
Mahāmati, as they are not born of being and non-being, they are unborn.
Mahāmati, all things are like the horns of the hare, horse, donkey, or camel,
but the ignorant and simple-minded who are given up to their false and
erroneous imaginations, discriminate things where they are not; therefore, all
things are unborn. That all things are in their self-nature unborn, Mahāmati,
belongs to the realm of self-realisation attained by noble wisdom, and does not
belong essentially to the realm of dualistic discrimination cherished by the
ignorant and simple-minded. The self-nature and the characteristic marks of
body, property, and abode evolve when the Ālayavijñāna is conceived by the
ignorant as grasping and grasped; and then they fall into a dualistic view of
existence where they recognise its rise, abiding, and disappearance, cherishing
the idea that all things are born and subject to discrimination as to being and
non-being. (63) Therefore, Mahāmati, you should discipline yourself therein [i.
e. in self-realisation].
XX
Again further, Mahāmati, there are five groups
of people, each of whom attains its own [spiritual] insight. What are the five?
They are: (1) the group of people whose insight belongs to the Śrāvaka-vehicle;
(2) the group of people whose insight belongs to the Pratyekabuddha-vehicle;
(3) the group of people whose insight belongs to the Tathagata-vehicle; (4) the
group of indefinite character; and (5) the group of people to whom no insight
is possible.
Mahāmati, how does one know the group of people
whose insight belongs to the Śrāvaka vehicle? There are people the hair of
whose body will stand on end when they know and realise the nature of the
Skandhas, Dhātus, Āyatanas, and [what is meant by] generality and
individuality; their intellect will leap with joy on knowing and practising
what belongs to appearance and not on practising what they know of the
uninterrupted chain of causation, —such ones, Mahāmati, are said to be of the
group whose insight belongs to the Śrāvaka vehicle. Having had an insight into
their own vehicle, they abide at the fifth or the sixth stage where they do
away with the rising of the passions, but not with the habit-energy; they have
not yet passed beyond the inconceivable transformation-death, and their
lion-roar is, "My life is destroyed, my morality is established, etc.";
they will then discipline themselves in the egolessness of persons and finally
gain the knowledge of Nirvana.
Again, Mahāmati, there are others who, believing
in such things as ego, being, vital principle, nourisher, supreme spirit, or
personal soul, will seek Nirvana in them. Again, Mahāmati, there are still
others who, seeing that all things exist by depending upon causes, will
recognise in this the way to Nirvana. (64) But, Mahāmati, as they have no
insight into the egolessness of things, there is no emancipation for them.
This, Mahāmati, is where those of the Śrāvaka-vehicle and the philosophers make
the mistake in their insight by regarding non-deliverance as deliverance.
Therefore, Mahāmati, you ought to discipline yourself in order to escape this
wrong view.
Now, Mahāmati, they belong to the group of the
Pratyekabuddha-vehicle who will shed tears and feel the hair of their body
stand on end when the Pratyekabuddha's insight is shown to them. When the
teaching to keep themselves away from social relations and entanglements, not
to become attached to the external world and its manifold form, to perform
miraculous powers by which they can divide their own body and appear double or
perform the transformations, is disclosed to them, they are thereby entreated.
Recognising that they are of the group whose insight belong to the
Pratyekabuddha-vehicle, their discourses will be in conformity with the insight
of the Pratyekabuddha-vehicle. This, Mahāmati, is the characteristic feature of
the group of people whose insight belongs to the Pratyekabuddha-vehicle.
Now, Mahāmati, three aspects are distinguishable
in the insight belonging to the group of the Tathagata-vehicle. They are: (1)
an insight whereby one sees into the self-nature of things, which is no
self-nature; (2) an exalted insight which is the attainment of
self-realisation; and (3) an insight into the immensity of the external
Buddha-lands. When, Mahāmati, these three aspects are disclosed one after
another and also when the inconceivable realm of the Ālayavijñāna is disclosed,
where body, property, and abode are seen to be the manifestation of Mind
itself, a man will not be frightened, nor terrified, nor show any sign of fear;
then such a one is to be known as of the group of people whose insight belongs
to the Tathagata-vehicle. This is, (65) Mahāmati, the characteristic feature of
the insight of those who belong to the Tathagata-vehicle.
Again, Mahāmati, when these three forms of
insight are disclosed to a man, he may thereby be pursuaded to discipline
himself in them. This, Mahāmati, is the stage of preparation for the
establishment of his own group. In order that he may go up to the stage of
imagelessness, there is this establishment. But the Śrāvaka who will purify his
own habit-energy of passions by attaining an inner perception into the Ālaya
and by seeing into the egolessness of things, will settle himself in the bliss
of the Samādhi and finally will attain the body of Tathagatahood.1
1 What is stated about the group of indefinite
character is not quite clear.
XXI
Then the Blessed One recited these verses:
130. The fruit of the Stream-entered, and that of
the Once-to-come; the fruit of the Not-to-come and Arhatship— all these are due
to mental perturbation.
131. The triple vehicle, the one vehicle, and
the no-vehicle, of these I talk, for the sake of the dull-witted, and [also]
for the wise, solitude-loving ones.
132. The gate of highest reality has nothing to
do with the two forms of thought-construction [subject and object]; Where the
imageless stands, why should we establish the triple vehicles?
133. The Dhyānas, the immeasurables, and the
no-form Samādhis, and the thought-cessation—all these are not at all found in
Mind-only.
XXII
Again, Mahāmati, how is it that the Icchantika1
never awaken the desire for emancipation? (66) Because they have abandoned all
the stock of merit, and because they cherish certain vows for all beings since
beginningless time. What is meant by abandoning all the stock of merit? It
refers to [those Buddhists] who have abandoned the Bodhisattva collection [of
the canonical texts], making the false accusation that they are not in
conformity with the sutras, the codes of morality, and the emancipation. By
this they have forsaken all the stock of merit and will not enter into Nirvana.
Secondly again, Mahāmati, there are Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas who, on account of
their original vows made for all beings, saying, "So long as they do not
attain Nirvana, I will not attain it myself," keep themselves away from
Nirvana. This, Mahāmati, is the reason of their not entering into Nirvana, and
because of this they go on the way of the Icchantika.
2 Those who are destitute of the Buddha-nature.
Again, Mahāmati said; Who, Blessed One, would
never enter Nirvana?
The Blessed One replied: Knowing that all things
are in Nirvana itself from the very beginning, the Bodhisattva-Icchantika would
never enter Nirvana. But those Icchantikas who have forsaken all the stock of
merit [finally] do. Those Icchantikas, Mahāmati, who have forsaken all the
stock of merit might some day be influenced by the power of the Tathagatas and
be induced at any moment to foster the stock of merit. Why? Because, Mahāmati,
no beings are left aside by the Tathagatas. For this reason, Mahāmati, it is
the Bodhisattva-Icchantika (67) who never enters into Nirvana.
XXIII
Further, Mahāmati, let the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva be well acquainted with the three kinds of Svabhāva
(self-nature). [What are the three? They are (1) false discrimination, (2)
knowledge of relativity, and (3) perfect knowledge.] Now, Mahāmati, false
discrimination rises from form (nimitta). How, Mahāmati, does it rise from
form? In [the consideration of] the relativity aspect of Svabhāva, realities
appear in various ways, as having forms, signs, and shapes; when, Mahāmati,
these objects, forms, and signs are adhered to [as real], this adherence takes
place in two ways. The Tathagatas, Arhats, and Fully-Enlightened Ones thus
declare false discrimination to consist in attachment to names and attachment
to objects. By the attachment to objects is meant, Mahāmati, to get attached to
inner and external things [as realities]. By the attachment to names is meant
to recognise in these inner and external things the characteristic marks of
individuality and generality and to regard them as definitely belonging to the
objects. These two modes of attachment, Mahāmati, constitute false
discrimination. The knowledge of the relativity-aspect (paratantra) rises from
the separation of subject (āśraya) and object (ālambana).
Now, Mahāmati, what is perfect knowledge? It is
realised when one casts aside the discriminating notions of form, name,
reality, and character; it is the inner realisation by noble wisdom. This (68)
perfect knowledge, Mahāmati, is the essence of the Tathāgata-garbha.
Then the Blessed One recited this verse:
134. Form, Name, and Discrimination [correspond
to] the two forms of Svabhāva, and Right Knowledge and Suchness [correspond to]
the Perfect Knowledge aspect.
This, Mahāmati, is called the doctrine that
examines into the nature of the five Dharmas and the two Svabhāvas
(self-nature), and constitutes the state of self-realisation attained by noble
wisdom, and in this you and other Bodhisattvas are to discipline yourselves.
XXIV
Further again, Mahāmati, let the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva have a thorough understanding as to the nature of the
twofold egolessness. Mahāmati, what is this twofold egolessness? [It is the
egolessness of persons and the egolessness of things. What is meant by
egolessness of persons? It means that] in the collection of the Skandhas,
Dhātus, and Āyatanas there is no ego-substance, nor anything belonging to it;
the Vijñāna is originated by ignorance, deed, and desire, and keeps up its
function by grasping objects by means of the sense-organs, such as the eye,
etc., and by clinging to them as real; while a world of objects and bodies is
manifested owing to the discrimination that takes place in the world which is
of Mind itself, that is, in the Ālayavijñāna. By reason of the habit-energy
stored up by false imagination since beginningless time, this world (vishaya)
is subject to change and destruction from moment to moment; it is like a river,
a seed, a lamp, wind, a cloud; [while the Vijñāna itself is] like a monkey who
is always restless, like a fly who is ever in search of unclean things and
defiled places, like a fire (69) which is never satisfied. Again, it is like a
water-drawing wheel or a machine, it [i. e., the Vijñāna] goes on rolling the
wheel of transmigration, carrying varieties of bodies and forms, resuscitating
the dead like the demon Vetāla, causing the wooden figures to move about as a
magician moves them. Mahāmati, a thorough understanding concerning these
phenomena is called comprehending the egolessness of persons.
Now, Mahāmati, what is meant by the egolessness
of things? It is to realise that the Skandhas, Dhātus, and Āyatanas are
characterised with the nature of false discrimination. Mahāmati, since the
Skandhas, Dhātus, and Āyatanas are destitute of an ego-substance, being no more
than an aggregation of the Skandhas, and subject to the conditions of mutual
origination which are causally bound up with the string of desire and deed; and
since thus there is no creating agent in them, Mahāmati, the Skandhas are even
destitute of the marks of individuality and generality; and the ignorant, owing
to their erroneous discrimination, imagine here the multiplicity of phenomena;
the wise, however, do not. Recognising, Mahāmati, that all things are devoid of
the Citta, Manas, Manovijñāna, the five Dharmas, and the [three] Svabhāvas, the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva will well understand what is meant by the egolessness of
things.
Again, Mahāmati, when the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
has a good understanding as regards the egolessness of things, before long he
will attain the first stage [of Bodhisattvahood] when he gets a definite
cognition of the imageless. When a definite acquisition is obtained regarding
the aspect of the stages [of Bodhisattvahood], the Bodhisattva will experience
joy, and, gradually and successively going up the scale, will reach the ninth
stage where his insight is perfected, and [finally the tenth stage known as]
Great Dharmameghā. Establishing himself here, (70) he will be seated in the
great jewel palace known as "Great Lotus Throne" which is in the
shape of a lotus and is adorned with various sorts of jewels and pearls; he
will then acquire and complete a world of Māyā-nature; surrounded by
Bodhisattvas of the same character and anointed like the son of the Cakravarti
by the hands of the Buddhas coming from all the Buddha-lands, he will go beyond
the last stage of Bodhisattvahood, attain the noble truth of self-realisation,
and become a Tathagata endowed with the perfect freedom of the Dharmakāya,
because of his insight into the egolessness of things. This, Mahāmati, is what
is meant by the egolessness of all things, and in this you and other
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas should well exercise yourselves.
XXV
At that time, Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
said this to the Blessed One: Pray teach me about making an assertion and
refuting it so that I and other Bodhisattvas, getting rid of the erroneous
views that may rise from assertion and refutation, may at once realise supreme
enlightenment. Having been enlightened they would keep themselves away from the
eternalistic assertions as well as from the nihilistic refutations, and leave
your enlightenment eye unrefuted.
Then the Blessed One again, understanding the
request of Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva, recited this verse:
135. Assertions and refutations are not to be
found in the Mind-only; the ignorant who understand not that the Mind is [seen
in] the form of body, property, and abode, wander about with assertions and
refutations.
(71) At that moment the Blessed One said this to
elucidate the meaning of this verse: Mahāmati, there are four forms of
assertion made concerning things not in existence. What are the four? (1) The
assertion about individual marks that are non-existent; (2) the assertion about
philosophical views which are non-existent [i. e., not true]; (3) the assertion
about a cause which is non-existent; and (4) the assertion about objects that
are non-existent. These, Mahāmati, are the four assertions.
Again, Mahāmati, what is meant by the
refutation? It means not examining properly, because of ignorance, any
assertions based on errors. This, Mahāmati, is what characterises assertion and
refutation.
Further, Mahāmati, what are the characteristics
of the assertion made about individual marks that have no existence? It
concerns the marks of individuality and generality in the Skandhas, Dhātus and
Āyatanas, which do not really exist; but taking them for realities and getting
attached to them, a man may affirm that they are just so and not otherwise.
This, Mahāmati, characterises the assertion of individual marks which are
non-existent.1 This assertion and discrimination, Mahāmati, concerning
individual marks that are not existent, rises from one's attachment to the habit-energy
which is amassed, since beginningless time, by varieties of erroneous views
issuing from false imagination. This, Mahāmati, characterises the assertion of
individual marks which are non-existent.
Again, Mahāmati, by the assertion of
philosophical views which are non-existent [i. e., not true], is meant that in
the Skandhas, Dhātus, and Āyatanas, [some philosophers] assume the existence of
an ego, a being, a soul, a living being, a nourisher, or a spirit. This is
said, Mahāmati, to be the assertion of some philosophical views which are
nonexistent [i. e., not true].
1 This is repeated below and is evidently a
clerical error.
Again, Mahāmati, by the assertion of a cause
that is nonexistent is meant that [some philosophers] assume the causeless
birth of a first (72) Vijñāna, which later comes to have a Māyā-like
non-existence; that is to say, the originally unborn Vijñāna begins to function
under the conditions of eye, form, light, and memory. The functioning goes on
for a while and then ceases. This, Mahāmati, is the assertion of a cause that
is non-existent.
Again, Mahāmati, the assertion about objects
that are not-existent is an assertion arising from the attachment to such
non-working existences as space, cessation, and Nirvana. These, Mahāmati, are
neither existent nor nonexistent; for all things are devoid of the alternatives
of being and non-being and are to be known, Mahāmati, as the horns of a hare, a
horse, or a camel, or like a hair-net. They are discriminated as realities by
the ignorant who are addicted to assertions and refutations as their
intelligence has not penetrated into the truth that there is nothing but what
is seen of the Mind itself. It is otherwise with the wise. This, Mahāmati, is
the characteristic point of the assertion about objects which are non-existent.
For this reason, Mahāmati, one should avoid the views based on assertion and
refutation.
XXVI
Further, Mahāmati, the Bodhisattvas who are
thoroughly acquainted with the nature of the Citta, Manas, and Manovijñāna, of
the five Dharmas, of the [three] Svabhāvas, and of the twofold Egolessness,
will assume various personalities for the sake of benefitting others, just like
the imagination that evolves from the seat of the relativity knowledge, and
again, like the mysterious gem that reflects varieties of colours. Going over
to all the Buddha-lands and assemblages, the Bodhisattvas will listen to the
Buddhas, discourse on the nature of all things which are like a vision, a
dream, an illusion, a reflection, and the lunar vision in water, and which have
nothing to do with birth-and-death, eternality, and extinction; the
Bodhisattvas, thus facing the Tathagatas, will listen to their discourses on
the truth that does not belong to the Śrāvaka- and Pratyekabuddha-vehicle. They
will then attain a hundred thousand Samādhis, (73) indeed, a hundred thousand
niyutas of kotis of Samādhis, and by means of these Samādhis they will go
around from one country to another; they will do homage to the Buddhas, be born
in all the celestial mansions, where they will discourse on the Triple
Treasure, manifesting Buddha-bodies; and, surrounded by Śrāvakas and
Bodhisattvas, they will, in order to free them from the alternatives of being
and non-being, instruct them to understand thoroughly what is meant by an
objective world which is nothing but Mind itself and in which there are no
realities.
At that time the Blessed One recited this verse:
136. When those who are born of the Buddha see
that the world is no more than Mind itself, they will obtain a body of
transformation, which has nothing to do with effect-producing works, but which
is endowed with the powers, psychic faculties, and self-control.
XXVII
At that time again Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva made a request of the Blessed One. Tell me, Blessed One,
how all things are empty, unborn, non-dual, and have no self-nature, so that I
and other Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas might be awakened in the teaching of
emptiness, no-birth, non-duality, and the absence of self-nature, and, quitting
the discrimination of being and non-being, quickly realise the highest
enlightenment.
Then the Blessed One said this to Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva: Now, Mahāmati, listen well and reflect well upon what I
tell you.
Replied Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva, I
will indeed, Blessed One. (74) The Blessed One said: Emptiness, emptiness,
indeed! Mahāmati, it is a term whose self-nature is false imagination. Because of
one's attachment to false imagination, Mahāmati, we have to talk of emptiness,
no-birth, non-duality, and absence of self-nature. In short, then, Mahāmati,
there are seven kinds of emptiness: (1) The emptiness of individual marks
(lakshaṇa), (2) the emptiness of self-nature (bhāvasvabhāva), (3) the emptiness
of no-work (apracarita), (4) the emptiness of work (pracarita), (5) the
emptiness of all things in the sense that they are unpredicable (nirabhilāpya),
(6) the emptiness in its highest sense of ultimate reality realisable only by
noble wisdom, and (7) the emptiness of mutuality (itaretara) which is the
seventh.
Mahāmati, what then is the emptiness of
individual marks? It is that all things have no [such distinguishing] marks of
individuality and generality. In consideration of mutuality and accumulation,
[things are thought to be realities], but when they are further investigated
and analysed, Mahāmati, they are non-existent, and not predicable with
individuality and generality; and because thus no such ideas as self, other, or
both, hold good, Mahāmati, the individual marks no longer obtain. So it is said
that all things are empty as to their self-marks.
Again, Mahāmati, what is meant by the emptiness
of self-nature? Mahāmati, it is that all things in their self-nature are
unborn, hence the emptiness of self-nature, and it is therefore said that
things are empty in their self-nature.
Again, Mahāmati, what is meant by the emptiness
of no-work? It is that the Skandhas are Nirvana itself and there is no work
doing in them from the beginning. Therefore, one speaks of the emptiness of
no-work.
(75) Again, Mahāmati, what is meant by the
emptiness of work? It is that the Skandhas are devoid of an ego and its
belongings, and go on functioning when there is a mutual conjunction of cause
and action. Thus one speaks of the emptiness of work.
Again, Mahāmati, what is meant by the emptiness
of all things in the sense that they are unpredicable? It is that the nature of
the false imagination is not expressible, hence the emptiness of all things in
the sense of their unpredicability. Thus one speaks of the emptiness of
unpredicability.
Again, Mahāmati, what is meant by the emptiness
in its highest sense of ultimate reality realisable by noble wisdom? It is that
in the attainment of an inner realisation by means of noble wisdom there is no
trace of habit-energy generated by all the erroneous conceptions [of
beginningless past]. Thus one speaks of the highest emptiness of ultimate
reality realisable by noble wisdom.
Again, Mahāmati, what is meant by the emptiness
of mutual [non-existence]? It is this: when a thing is missing here, one speaks
of its being empty there. For instance, Mahāmati, in the lecture-hall of the
Mṛigārama there are no elephants, no bulls, no sheep, but as to the Bhikshus I
can say that the hall is not devoid of them; it is empty only as far as they
[i. e. the animals] are concerned. Further, Mahāmati, it is not that the
lecture-hall is devoid of its own characteristics, nor that the Bhikshu is devoid
of this Bhikshuhood, nor that in some other places, too, elephants, bulls, and
sheep are not to be found. Mahāmati, here one sees all things in their aspect
of individuality and generality, but from the point of view of mutuality
(itaretara) some things do not exist somewhere. Thus one speaks of the
emptiness of mutual [non-existence].
These, Mahāmati, are the seven kinds of
emptiness of which mutuality ranks the lowest of all and is to be put away by
you.
(76) Again, Mahāmati, not that things are not
born, but that they are not born of themselves, except when seen in the state
of Samādhi—this is what is meant by "all things are unborn." To have
no self-nature is, according to the deeper sense, to be unborn, Mahāmati. That
all things are devoid of self-nature means that there is a constant and
uninterrupted becoming, a momentary change from one state of existence to
another; seeing this, Mahāmati, all things are destitute of self-nature. So one
speaks of all things having no self-nature.
Again, Mahāmati, what is meant by non-duality?
It means that light and shade, long and short, black and white, are relative
terms, Mahāmati, and not independent of each other; as Nirvana and Samsara are,
all things are not-two. There is no Nirvana except where is Samsara; there is
no Samsara except where is Nirvana; for the condition of existence is not of
mutually-exclusive character.1 Therefore, it is said that all things are
non-dual as are Nirvana and Samsara. For this reason, Mahāmati, you should
discipline yourself in [the realisation of] emptiness, no-birth, non-duality,
and no-self-nature.
1 Read after T'ang.
Then at that time the Blessed One recited this
couplet of verses:
137. I always preach emptiness which is beyond
eternalism and nihilism; Samsara is like a dream and a vision, and karma
vanishes not.
138. Space, Nirvana, and the two forms of
cessation— thus (77) the ignorant discriminate the things which are not
effect-producing, but the wise stand above being and non-being.
At that time again, the Blessed One said this to
Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva; This [teaching of] emptiness, no-birth,
non-duality, and no-self-nature is found in all the sutras of all the Buddhas,
and this doctrine is recognised in every one of them. However. Mahāmati, the
sutras are the teaching in conformity with the dispositions of all beings and
deviate from the [real] sense, and not the truth-preserving statement.
Mahāmati, it is like unto the mirage which entices the deer with its
treacherous springs, the springs are not there but the deer are attached,
imagining them to be real. So with the teachings disclosed in all the sutras,
they are for all beings for the gratification of their own discriminating
minds. They are not the truth-preserving statements meant for noble wisdom to
grasp. For this reason, Mahāmati, be in conformity with the sense and be not
engrossed in the word-teaching.
XXVIII
At that time, Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said this to the Blessed One: Now the Blessed One makes
mention of the Tathāgata-garbha in the sutras, and verily it is described by
you as by nature bright and pure, as primarily unspotted, endowed with the
thirty-two marks of excellence, hidden in the body of every being like a gem of
great value, which is enwrapped in a dirty garment, enveloped in the garment of
the Skandhas, Dhātus, and Āyatanas, and soiled with the dirt of greed, anger,
folly, and false imagination, (78) while it is described by the Blessed One to
be eternal, permanent, auspicious, and unchangeable. Is not this Tathāgata-garbha
taught by the Blessed One the same as the ego-substance taught by the
philosophers? The ego as taught in the systems of the philosophers is an
eternal creator, unqualified, omnipresent, and imperishable.
The Blessed One replied: No, Mahāmati, my
Tathāgata-garbha is not the same as the ego taught by the philosophers; for
what the Tathagatas teach is the Tathāgata-garbha in the sense, Mahāmati, that
it is emptiness, reality-limit, Nirvana, being unborn, unqualified, and devoid
of will-effort; the reason why the Tathagatas who are Arhats and
Fully-Enlightened Ones, teach the doctrine pointing to the Tathāgata-garbha is
to make the ignorant cast aside their fear when they listen to the teaching of
egolessness and to have them realise the state of non-discrimination and
imagelessness. I also wish, Mahāmati, that the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas of the
present and future would not attach themselves to the idea of an ego [imagining
it to be a soul]. Mahāmati, it is like a potter who manufactures various vessels
out of a mass of clay of one sort by his own manual skill and labour combined
with a rod, water, and thread, Mahāmati, that the Tathagatas preach the
egolessness of things which removes all the traces of discrimination by various
skilful means issuing from their transcendental wisdom, that is, sometimes by
the doctrine of the Tathāgata-garbha, sometimes by that of egolessness, and,
like a potter, by means of various terms, expressions, and synonyms. For this
reason, Mahāmati, the philosophers' doctrine of an ego-substance is not the
same (79) as the teaching of the Tathāgata-garbha. Thus, Mahāmati, the doctrine
of the Tathāgata-garbha is disclosed in order to awaken the philosophers from
their clinging to the idea of the ego, so that those minds that have fallen
into the views imagining the non-existent ego as real, and also into the notion
that the triple emancipation is final, may rapidly be awakened to the state of
supreme enlightenment. Accordingly, Mahāmati, the Tathagatas who are Arhats and
Fully-Enlightened Ones disclose the doctrine of the Tathāgata-garbha which is
thus not to be known as identical with the philosopher's notion of an
ego-substance. Therefore. Mahāmati, in order to abandon the misconception
cherished by the philosophers, you must strive after the teaching of
egolessness and the Tathāgata-garbha.
XXIX
At that moment then the Blessed One recited this
verse:
139. The personal soul, continuity, the
Skandhas, causation, atoms, the supreme spirit, the ruler, the creator, —[they
are] discriminations in the Mind-only.1
XXX
At that time Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
in consideration of future generations made this request again of the Blessed
One: Pray tell me, Blessed One, about the perfecting of the discipline whereby
the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas become great Yogins.
The Blessed One replied: There are four things,
Mahāmati, by fulfilling which the Bodhisattvas become great Yogins. What are
the four? They are: (1) To have a clear understanding as to what is seen of
Mind itself,2 (2) to discard the notions of birth, (80) abiding, and
disappearance, (3) to look into [the truth] that no external world obtains, and
(4) to seek for the attainment of inner realisation by noble wisdom. Provided
with these four things the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas become great Yogins.
1 This verse has strangely found its way here.
2 This is rather a clumsy translation of
svacitta-dṛiśya. Dṛiśya is "what is seen," that is, this visible
world, or this external, objective world, which according to the Laṅkāvatāra is
a manifestation of Mind itself. When this truth is realised, the objective
world loses its reality as such, and we no more cling to it as if it were a
final irreducible fact which stands oppressively against the mind. The Buddhist
idea of interpreting existence idealistically is more religious than logical,
for Buddhists want to elevate the value of spirit absolutely above matter so
that the latter will be amenable to all the commands to be given by the former.
How, Mahāmati, does the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
come to have a clear understanding as to what is seen of Mind itself? He comes
to it by recognising that this triple world is nothing but Mind itself, devoid
of an ego and its belongings, with no strivings, no comings-and-goings; that
this triple world is manifested and imagined as real, under the influence of
the habit-energy accumulated since beginningless time by false reasoning and
imagination, and with the multiplicity of objects and actions in close relationship,
and in conformity with the ideas of discrimination, such as body, property, and
abode. Thus, Mahāmati, the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva acquires a thoroughly clear
understanding as to what is seen of Mind itself.
How again, Mahāmati, does the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva discard notions of birth, abiding, and disappearance? By
this it is meant that all things are to be regarded as forms born of a vision
or a dream and have never been created since there are no such things as self,
the other, or bothness. [The Bodhisattvas] will see that the external world
exists only in conformity with Mind-only; and seeing that there is no stirring
of the Vijñānas and that the triple world is a complicated network of causation
and owes its rise to discrimination, (81) they find that all things, inner and
external, are beyond predicability, that there is nothing to be seen as
self-nature, and that [the world] is not to be viewed as born; and thereby they
will conform themselves to the insight that things are of the nature of a
vision, etc., and attain to the recognition that things are unborn.
Establishing themselves on the eighth stage of Bodhisattvahood, they will
experience a revulsion [in their consciousness] by transcending the Citta,
Manas, and Manovijñāna, and the five Dharmas, and the [three] Svabhāvas, and
the twofold Egolessness, and thereby attain the mind-made body (Manomayakāya).
Thus, Mahāmati, the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva will discard the notion of birth,
abiding, and disappearance.1
1 The proper place of this last sentence is here
as restored; it is found in the Sanskrit text near the end of page 81.
Said Mahāmati,1 what is meant by the will-body,
Blessed One? The Blessed One replied: It means that one [in this body] can
speedily move unobstructed as he wills; hence the will-body, Mahāmati. For
instance, Mahāmati, the will [or mind] travels unobstructed over mountains,
walls, rivers, trees, etc., many a hundred thousand yojanas they may be away,
when a man recollects the scenes which had previously come into his perception,
while his own mind keeps on functioning in his body without the least
interruption or hindrance. In the same fashion, Mahāmati, the will-body, in the
attainment of the Samādhi called Māyā-like and adorned with such marks as the
powers, the psychic faculties, and the self-control, will be born in the noble
paths and assemblies, moving about as freely as he wishes, as he recalls his
original vows and worlds in order to bring all beings to maturity.
1This whole paragraph is a digression, a sort of
explanatory note. The will-body (manomayakāya) is again referred to later on,
p. 115 et seq.
Then, Mahāmati, what is meant by the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva (82) having a good insight into the non-existence of
external objects? It means, Mahāmati, that all things are like unto a mirage, a
dream, a hair-net; and seeing that all things are here essentially because of
our attachment to the habit-energy of discrimination which has been maturing
since beginningless time on account of false imagination and erroneous
speculation, the Bodhisattvas will seek after the attainment of
self-realisation by their noble wisdom. Mahāmati, furnished with these four
things, Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas become great Yogins. Therefore, in these,
Mahāmati, you should exercise yourself.
XXXI
At that time Mahāmati again made a request of
the Blessed One: Pray tell me, Blessed One, about the causation of all things,
whereby I and other Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas can see into the nature of
causation, and by getting rid of the discrimination [which issues in the
philosophical views of] eternalism and nihilism, we may no more discriminate as
to the gradual or simultaneous rising of all things.
Replied the Blessed One: Mahāmati, there are two
factors of causation by which all things come into existence: external and
inner. Mahāmati, the external factors are a lump of clay, a stick, a wheel,
thread, water, a worker, and his labour, the combination of all of which
produces a jar. As with the jar, Mahāmati, which is made of a lump of clay, or
a piece of cloth made of thread, or a matting made of fragrant grass, or the
sprout growing out of a seed, or fresh butter which is produced from sour milk
by a man churning it with his own labour, (83) so it is, Mahāmati, with all
things which, governed by external causes, appear one after another in continuous
succession. As regards the inner factors of causation, Mahāmati, they are of
such kind as ignorance, desire, and action, which make up our idea of
causation. Born of these, Mahāmati, there is the manifestation of the Skandhas,
Dhātus, and Āyatanas. They are not separable [realities]1 but discriminated [as
such] by the ignorant.
Now, Mahāmati, there are six causes: (1)
possibility-cause, (2) dependence-cause, (3) objectivity-cause, (4)
agency-cause, (5) manifesting-cause, and (6) indifference-cause.2 The
possibility-cause means, Mahāmati, that when a cause to be becomes effective
there is the rising of things inner and outer. The dependence-cause means,
Mahāmati, that when conditions to be, become effective there is the rising of
the Skandha-seeds, etc., inner and outer. Further, the objectivity-cause means,
Mahāmati, that bound by the objective world [the Vijñāna] keeps up its
continuous activity. Again, Mahāmati, the agency-cause means that like a
sovereign king a cause invested with supreme authority asserts itself. Again,
the manifesting-cause means that when the discriminating faculty rises, as the
result it reveals individual marks as a lamp does forms, etc. Lastly, the
indifference-cause means that when there is a dissolution (84) the power of combination
discontinues, and there rises a state of non-discrimination.
1 Wei reads this without the negative particle,
while T'ang omits the whole sentence together with the foregoing,
pratītyasamutpādasaṁjñānāṁ pratilabhante. This latter is also omitted in this
translation as the translator regards its insertion here as a clerical error,
which perhaps was also the idea of the T'ang.
2 The Chinese 觀待 (T'ang), 相待 (Wei), or simply 待 (Sung) points to
apeksha rather than to upeksha. In this ease, "mutual reference" is
better.
These, Mahāmati, are the outcome of
discrimination carried on by the ignorant and simple-minded, and there is no
gradual nor simultaneous rising of existence. Why? Because, Mahāmati, if there
is a simultaneous rising of existence, there would be no distinction between
cause and effect, and there would be nothing to characterise a cause as such.
If a gradual rising is admitted, there is no substance that holds together
individual signs, which makes gradual rising impossible. While a child is not
yet born, Mahāmati, the term father has no significance.1 The logician argues
that there is that which is born and that which gives birth by the mutual
functioning of such causal factors as cause, subsistence, continuity,
acceleration, and others; and they conclude that there is a gradual rising of
existence. But, Mahāmati, this gradual rising does not obtain except by reason
of their attachment to the notion of self-nature. When the [ideas of] body,
property, and abode are cherished in what is nothing but the manifestation of
Mind itself, the external world is perceived under the aspects of individuality
and generality, which, however, are not realities; and therefore, Mahāmati,
neither a gradual nor a simultaneous rising of things is possible. It is only
when the Vijñāna evolves by reason of discrimination which discriminates the
manifestation of Mind itself [that existence is said to come into view]. For
this reason, Mahāmati, you must strive to get rid of notions of gradation and
simultaneity in the combination of the causal activities. Thus it is said:
140. Nothing whatever is born or ceases to exist
by reason of causation; when causation is discriminated there is birth and
cessation.
(85) 141. It is not to keep off the idea of
birth and disappearance which takes place in causation; it is to keep off the
wrong imagination as to causation, which is cherished by the ignorant.
142. The being and non-being of things subject
to causation has no reality; the triple world owes its existence to the Mind
put into confusion by reason of habit-energy.
143. Not ever being in existence, what things
are there that are born? [but] in causation nothing is lost; when
effect-producing objects (saṁskrita) are regarded as like unto a barren woman's
child or a flower in the sky, one perceives that grasping (subject) and grasped
(object) are an error and desists [from committing the same error].
144. There is nothing that is to be born, nor is
there anything that has been born; even causation is not; it is because of
wordly usage that things are talked of as existing.
1 In this and what follows the translator has
adopted the reading of T'ang.
XXXII
At that moment again Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said this to the Blessed One: Pray tell me, Blessed One,
about the teaching known as the essence of discrimination as regards words,
whereby, Blessed One, I and other Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas, comprehending and
becoming well acquainted with the essence of discrimination as regards words,
will be thoroughly informed of the signification of two things, expression and
expressed, and, thereby immediately attaining supreme enlightenment, will
explain the signification of these two things, expression and expressed, for
the purification of all beings.
Replied the Blessed One: Then, Mahāmati, listen
well and reflect well, (86) for I will tell you about it.
Well done! said Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahasattva and listened to the Blessed One.
The Blessed One said this to him: There are,
Mahāmati, four kinds of word-discrimination. They are: (1) Words denoting
individual marks, (2) dream-words, (3) words growing out of the attachment to
erroneous speculations and discriminations, and (4) words growing out of the
discrimination that knows no beginning.
Now, Mahāmati, the words denoting individual
marks rise from discriminating forms and characteristic signs as real in
themselves and becoming attached to them. The dream-words, Mahāmati, rise from
the unreal surroundings which reveal themselves [before the mind] when it
recollects its previous experience. The words growing out of the attachment to
erroneous speculations and discriminations, Mahāmati, rise from recollecting
deeds once previously committed. The words growing out of the discrimination
that has been functioning since beginningless time, Mahāmati, rise from the
habit-energy whose seeds have been growing out of the clinging to erroneous
speculations and false imaginations since beginningless time. I say, Mahāmati,
these are the four features of word-discrimination, which is the answer to your
question.
XXXIII
At that time again, Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva requested of the Blessed One to speak on this subject:
Pray tell me again, Blessed One, about the conditions whereby the
word-discrimination manifests itself. Where, whence, how, and by whom do words
indicating discrimination take place among the people?
Said the Blessed One: Mahāmati, the
word-discrimination goes on taking place by the coordination of the head,
chest, nose, throat, palate, lips, tongue, and teeth.
Said Mahāmati; Again, Blessed One, (87) are
words to be considered different (anyā) or not-different (ananyā) from
discrimination?
Replied the Blessed One: Mahāmati, they are
neither different nor not-different. Why? Because words rise, Mahāmati, with
discrimination as their cause. If, Mahāmati, words are different from
discrimination, they cannot have it for cause. Then if they are not different,
words cannot express the sense, which they do. Therefore, words and
discrimination are neither different nor not-different.
Then Mahāmati said: Again, Blessed One, are
words themselves the highest reality? or is what is expressed in words the
highest reality?
The Blessed One replied: Mahāmati, words are not
the highest reality, nor is what is expressed in words the highest reality.
Why? Because the highest reality is an exalted state of bliss, and as it cannot
be entered into by mere statements regarding it, words are not the highest
reality. Mahāmati, the highest reality is to be attained by the inner
realisation of noble wisdom; it is not a state of word-discrimination;
therefore, discrimination does not express the highest reality. And then,
Mahāmati, words are subject to birth and destruction; they are unsteady,
mutually conditioning, and are produced by the law of causation. And again,
Mahāmati, what is mutually conditioning and produced by the law of causation
cannot express the highest reality, because the indications [pointing to the
distinction between] self and not-self are non-existent. Mahāmati, words are
these indications and do not express [the highest reality].
(88) Further, Mahāmati, word-discrimination
cannot express the highest reality, for external objects with their
multitudinous individual marks are non-existent, and only appear before us as
something revealed out of Mind itself. Therefore, Mahāmati, you must try to
keep yourself away from the various forms of word-discrimination.
XXXIV
Thus it is said:
145. In all things there is no self-nature,
words too are devoid of reality; as the ignorant understand not what is meant
by emptiness, yes, by emptiness, they wander about.
146. In all things there is no self-nature, they
are mere words of people; that which is discriminated has no reality; [even]
Nirvana is like a dream; nothing is seen to be in transmigration, nor does
anything ever enter into Nirvana.
147. As a king or a wealthy householder, giving
his children various clay-made animals, pleases them and makes them play [with
the toys], but later gives them real ones; 148. So, I, making use of various
forms and images of things, instruct my sons; but the limit of reality
(bhūtakoṭi) can [only] be realised within oneself.
XXXV
At that time Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
again (89) said this to the Blessed One: Pray tell me, Blessed One, about the
attainment of self-realisation by noble wisdom, which does not belong to the
path and the usage of the philosophers; which is devoid of [all such predicates
as] being and non-being, oneness and otherness, bothness and not-bothness,
existence and non-existence, eternity and non-eternity; which has nothing to do
with the false imagination, nor with individuality and generality; which
manifests itself as the truth of highest reality; which, going up continuously
by degrees the stages of purification, enters upon the stage of Tathagatahood;
which, because of the original vows unattended by any striving, will perform
its works in infinite worlds like a gem reflecting a variety of colours; and
which is manifested [when one perceives how] signs of individuation rise in all
things as one realises the course and realm of what is seen of Mind itself, and
thereby I and other Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas are enabled to survey things from
the point of view which is not hampered by marks of individuality and
generality nor by anything of the false imagination, and may quickly attain
supreme enlightenment and enable all beings to achieve the perfection of all
their virtues.
Replied the Blessed One: Well done, well done,
Mahāmati! and again, well done, indeed, Mahāmati! Because of your compassion
for the world, for the benefit of many people, for the happiness of many
people, for the welfare, benefit, happiness of many people, both of celestial
beings and humankind, Mahāmati, you present yourself before me and make this
request. Therefore, Mahāmati, listen well and truly, and reflect, for I will
tell you.
Assuredly, said Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva, and gave ear to the Blessed One.
(90) The Blessed One said this to him: Mahāmati,
since the ignorant and the simple-minded, not knowing that the world is what is
seen of Mind itself, cling to the multitudinousness of external objects, cling
to the notions of being and non-being, oneness and otherness, bothness and
not-bothness, existence and non-existence, eternity and non-eternity, as being
characterised by self-nature which rises from discrimination based on
habit-energy, they are addicted to false imaginings. Mahāmati, it is like a
mirage in which the springs are seen as if they were real. They are imagined so
by the animals who, thirsty from the heat of the season, would run after them.
Not knowing that the springs are their own mental hallucinations, the animals
do not realise that there are no such springs. In the same way, Mahāmati, the
ignorant and simple-minded with their minds impressed by various erroneous
speculations and discriminations since beginningless time; with their minds
burning with the fire of greed, anger, and folly; delighted in a world of
multitudinous forms; with their thoughts saturated with the ideas of birth,
destruction, and subsistence; not understanding well what is meant by existent
and non-existent, by inner and outer; the ignorant and simple-minded fall into
the way of grasping at oneness and otherness, being and non-being. Mahāmati, it
is like the city of the Gandharvas which the unwitted take for a real city,
though it is not so in fact. This city appears in essence owing to their
attachment to the memory of a city preserved in seed from beginningless time. This
city is thus neither existent nor non-existent. In the same way, Mahāmati,
clinging to the memory (vāsanā) of erroneous speculations and doctrines since
beginningless time, they hold fast to ideas such as oneness and otherness,
being and non-being, and their thoughts are not at all clear about what is seen
of Mind-only. (91) Mahāmati, it is like a man, who, dreaming in his sleep of a
country variously filled with women, men, elephants, horses, cars, pedestrians,
villages, towns, hamlets, cows, buffalos, mansions, woods, mountains, rivers,
and lakes enters into its inner appartments and is awakened. While awakened
thus, he recollects the city and its inner apartments. What do you think,
Mahāmati? Is this person to be regarded as wise, who is recollecting the
various unrealities he has seen in his dream?
Said Mahāmati: Indeed, he is not, Blessed One.
The Blessed One continued: In the same way the
ignorant and simple-minded who are bitten by erroneous views and are inclined
toward the philosophers, do not recognise that things seen of the Mind itself
are like a dream, and are held fast by the notions of oneness and otherness, of
being and non-being. Mahāmati, it is like the painter's canvas on which there
is no depression nor elevation as imagined by the ignorant. In the same way,
Mahāmati, there may be in the future some people brought up in the
habit-energy, mentality, and imagination based on the philosophers' erroneous
views; clinging to the ideas of oneness and otherness, of bothness and
not-bothness, they may bring themselves and others to ruin; they may declare
those people nihilists who hold the doctrine of no-birth apart from the
alternatives of being and non-being. They [argue against] cause and effect,
they are followers of the wicked views whereby they uproot meritorious causes
of unstained purity. They are to be kept far away by those whose desires are
for things excellent. They are those whose thoughts are entangled in the errors
of self, other, and both, (92) in the errors of imagining being and non-being,
assertion and refutation, and hell will be their final refuge. Mahāmati, it is
like the dim-eyed ones who, seeing a hair-net, would exclaim to one another,
saying: "It is wonderful! it is wonderful! Look, O honourable sirs!"
And the said hair-net has never been brought into existence. It is in fact
neither an entity nor a non-entity, because it is seen and not seen. In the
same manner, Mahāmati, those whose minds are addicted to discrimination of the
erroneous views as cherished by the philosophers, and who are also given up to
the realistic ideas of being and non-being, oneness and otherness, bothness and
not-bothness, will contradict the good Dharma, ending in the destruction of
themselves and others. Mahāmati, it is like a firebrand-wheel which is no real
wheel but which is imagined to be of such character by the ignorant, but not by
the wise. In the same manner, Mahāmati, those whose minds have fallen into the
erroneous views of the philosophers will falsely imagine in the rise of all
beings oneness and otherness, bothness and not-bothness.
Mahāmati, it is like those water-bubbles in a
rainfall which have the appearance of crystal gems, and the ignorant taking
them for real crystal gems run after them. Mahāmati, they are no more than
water-bubbles, they are not gems, nor are they not-gems, because of their being
so comprehended [by one party] and being not so comprehended [by another]. In
the same manner, Mahāmati, those whose minds are impressed by the habit-energy
of the philosophical views and discriminations will regard things born as
nonexistent and those destroyed by causation as existent.
1Further, Mahāmati, by setting up the three
forms of measure and the [five] members of a syllogism, (93) [the philosophers]
make the discrimination that there is a reality existing by itself, which is
attained by the realisation of noble wisdom, and devoid of the two Svabhāvas.
[This discrimination however is] not right. [The Buddhist doctrine is this:]
Mahāmati, when a [psychological] revulsion takes place in the Yogins [by the
transcendence of] the Citta, Manas, and Vijñāna, they cast off the [dualistic]
discrimination of grasped and grasping in what is seen of Mind itself, and
entering the Tathagata-stage attain the realisation of noble wisdom; and in this
there is no thought of existence and non-existence. Again, Mahāmati, if there
is the grasping of existence and non-existence in the realm attained by the
Yogins, there will be in them the grasping of an ego, a nourisher, a supreme
soul, or a person. Again, Mahāmati, the teaching pointing to self-nature,
individuality and generality of things, is that of the Transformation Buddha
and not that of the Dharmatā Buddha. Again, Mahāmati, such teaching is meant
for the ignorant, being in conformity with their mentality, their way of
thinking and viewing things; any establishment that favours the way of
self-nature, fails to reveal the truth of self-realisation to be attained by
noble wisdom and the blissful abode of the Samādhi.
1 This whole paragraph must be independently
treated.
Mahāmati, it is like the trees reflected in
water; they are reflections and yet are not-reflections, the trees are [real]
figures, and yet no-figures. In the same manner, Mahāmati, those who are
impressed by the habit-energy of the philosophical views carry on their
discrimination regarding oneness and otherness, bothness and not-bothness,
being and non-being, for their minds are not enlightened as regards what is
seen of Mind-only.
Mahāmati, it is like a mirror reflecting all
colours and images (94) as afforded by the conditions and without
discrimination; and they are neither images nor not-images, because they are
seen as images and also as not-images. And, Mahāmati, they are discriminated
forms of what is seen of Mind itself, which are known to the ignorant as
images. In the same manner, Mahāmati, oneness and otherness, bothness and
not-bothness, are reflected images of Self-Mind while they appear as if real.
Mahāmati, it is like an echo giving the sound of
a human voice, of a river, or of the wind; it is neither existent nor
non-existent, because it is heard as a voice and yet as not a voice. In the
same way, Mahāmati, the notions of being and non-being, oneness and otherness,
bothness and not-bothness are the discriminations of Self-Mind and
habit-energy.
Mahāmati, it is like a mirage which in
conjunction with the sun appears with its flowing waves on the earth where
there are no grass, shrubs, vines, and trees. They are neither existent nor
non-existent, according to the desire for them or its absence. In the same way,
Mahāmati, the discriminating Vijñāna of the ignorant which is impressed with
the habit-energy of false imaginations and speculations since beginningless
time, is stirred like a mirage even in the midst of reality revealed by means
of noble wisdom, by the waves of birth, subsistence, and destruction, of
oneness and otherness, bothness and not-bothness, being and non-being.
Mahāmati, it is like Piśāca who by means of his
spell makes a corpse or a wooden image throb with life though it has no power
of its own; but here the ignorant cling to the non-existent imagining them to
have the power of movement. In the same way, Mahāmati, (95) the ignorant and
simple-minded committing themselves to the erroneous philosophical views are
thoroughly devoted to the ideas of oneness and otherness, but their assertion
is not at all well grounded. For this reason, Mahāmati, in order to attain the
noble reality attainable within yourself, you should cast off the
discriminations leading to the notions of birth, abiding, and destruction, of
oneness and otherness, bothness and not-bothness, being and non-being.
Therefore, it is said:
149. The Skandhas, of which the Vijñāna is the
fifth, resemble the reflections of the trees in water; they are to be regarded
as Māyā and a dream, they are so by thought-construction; make no
discriminations!
150. This triple world resembles a hair-net, or
water in a mirage which is agitated; it is like a dream, Māyā; and by thus
regarding it one is emancipated.
151. Like a mirage in the spring-time, the mind
is found bewildered; animals imagine water but there is no reality to it.
152. Thus the Vijñāna-seed is evolved and the
world comes into view; the ignorant imagine it is born, just like the dim-eyed
ones perceive things in the darkness.
153. Since beginningless time, the ignorant are
found transmigrating through the paths, enwrapped in their attachment to
existence; as a wedge is induced by another wedge, they are led to the
abandonment [of their wrappage].
154. By regarding the world as always like a
magically-moving corpse, or a machine, or like a dream, or a lightning, or a
cloud; (96) the triple continuation is torn asunder and one is emancipated.
155. There is here nothing of
thought-construction, it is like an image in the air; when they thus understand
all there is nothing to know.
156. Here is nothing but thought-construction
and name. You seek in vain for individual signs; the Skandhas are like a
hair-net wherein discrimination goes on.
157. A world of multitudes1 is a hair-net, a
vision, a dream, and the city of the Gandharvas; it is [a wheel made by] a
firebrand, a mirage; it is a non-entity, only an appearance to people.
158. Eternity and non-eternity; oneness, too,
bothness and not-bothness as well: these are discriminated by the ignorant who
are confused in mind and bound up by errors since beginningless time.
159. In a mirror, in water, in an eye, in a
vessel, and on a gem, images are seen; but in them there are no images [i. e.
realities] anywhere to take hold of.
160. Like a mirage in the air, so is a variety
of things mere appearance; they are seen in diversity of forms, but are like a
child in a barren woman's dream.
1 Read cittram, instead of cittam.
XXXVI
Further, Mahāmati, the religious teaching of the
Tathagatas is free from the four statements. That is, it is devoid of oneness
and otherness, of bothness and not-bothness, is free from being and non-being,
assertion and refutation; the religious teaching of the Tathagatas is headed by
the [four noble] truths, the [twelvefold] chain of origination, and [the
eightfold noble] path leading to emancipation. (97) The religious teaching of
the Tathagatas, Mahāmati, is not fastened to these ideas: Prakṛiti, Iśvara,
causelessness, spontaneity, atoms, time and self-nature. Again, Mahāmati, [the
Tathagatas, leading beings] successively forwards like the leader of a caravan,
in order to purify them from the two hindrances of passion and knowledge, will
establish them in the one hundred and eight statements of imagelessness and
also in the characteristic distinctions of the vehicles, of the stages [of
Bodhisattvahood], and of the constituents [of enlightenment].
XXXVII
Further, Mahāmati, there are four kinds of
Dhyānas. What are the four? They are: (1) The Dhyāna practised by the ignorant,
(2) the Dhyāna devoted to the examination of meaning, (3) the Dhyāna with
Tathatā (suchness) for its object, and (4) the Dhyāna of the Tathagatas.
What is meant by the Dhyāna practised by the
ignorant? It is the one resorted to by the Yogins exercising themselves in the
discipline of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, who perceiving that there is no
ego-substance, that things are characterised with individuality and generality,
that the body is a shadow and a skeleton which is transient, full of suffering
and is impure, persistently cling to these notions which are regarded as just
so and not otherwise, and who starting from them successively advance until
they reach the cessation where there are no thoughts. This is called the Dhyāna
practised by the ignorant.
Mahāmati, what then is the Dhyāna devoted to the
examination of meaning? It is the one [practised by those who,] having gone
beyond the egolessness of things, individuality and generality, the
untenability of such ideas as self, other, and both, which are held by the
philosophers, proceed to examine and follow up the meaning of the [various]
aspects of the egolessness of things and the stages of Bodhisattvahood. This is
the Dhyāna devoted to the examination of meaning.
What, Mahāmati, is the Dhyāna with Tathatā for
its object? When [the Yogins recognise that] the discrimination of the two
forms of egolessness is mere imagination, and that where he establishes himself
in the reality of suchness (yathābhūta) there is no rising of discrimination, I
call it the Dhyāna with Tathatā for its object.
(98) What, Mahāmati, is the Dhyāna of the
Tathagata? When [the Yogin], entering upon the stage of Tathagatahood and
abiding in the triple bliss which characterises self-realisation attained by
noble wisdom, devotes himself for the sake of all beings to the [accomplishment
of] incomprehensible works, I call it the Dhyāna of the Tathagatas. Therefore,
it is said:
161. There are the Dhyāna for the examination of
meaning, the Dhyāna practised by the ignorant; the Dhyāna with Tathatā for its
object, and the pure Dhyāna of the Tathagata.
162. The Yogin, while in his exercise, sees the
form of the sun or the moon, or something looking like a lotus, or the
underworld, or various forms like sky, fire, etc.
163. All these appearances lead him to the way
of the philosophers; they throw him down into the state of Śrāvakahood, into
the realm of the Pratyekabuddhas.
164. When all these are tossed aside and there
is a state of imagelessness, then a condition in conformity with Tathatā
presents itself; and the Buddhas will come together from all their countries
and with their shining hands will stroke the head of this benefactor.
XXXVIII
At that time Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
again said this to the Blessed One: Thou speakest of Nirvana, Blessed One. What
is meant by this term Nirvana?
Replied the Blessed One: When the self-nature
and the habit-energy of all the Vijñānas, including the Ālaya, Manas, and
Manovijñāna, from which issues the habit-energy of wrong speculations—when all
these go through a revulsion, I and all the Buddhas declare that there is
Nirvana, and the way and the self-nature of this Nirvana is emptiness, which is
the state of reality.
(99) Further, Mahāmati, Nirvana is the realm of
self-realisation attained by noble wisdom, which is free from the
discrimination of eternality and annihilation, existence and non-existence. How
is it not eternality? Because it has cast off the discrimination of
individuality and generality, it is not eternality. How about its not being
annihilation? It is because all the wise men of the past, present, and future
have attained realisation. Therefore, it is not annihilation.
Again, Mahāmati, the great Parinirvana is
neither destruction nor death. Mahāmati, if the great Parinirvana is death,
then it will be a birth and continuation. If it is destruction, then it will
assume the character of an effect-producing deed. For this reason, Mahāmati,
the great Parinirvana is neither destruction nor death. Neither has it anything
to do with vanishing;l it is the goal of the Yogins. Again, Mahāmati the great
Parinirvana is neither abandonment nor attainment, neither is it of one meaning
nor of no-meaning; this is said to be Nirvana.
Further, Mahāmati, Nirvana conceived by the
Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas consists in recognising individuality and
generality, in escaping social intercourse, in not having a perverted view of
the world, and not raising discrimination. This is their notion of Nirvana.
1 Maraṇam repeated here in the text is a
mistake.
XXXIX
Further, Mahāmati, there are two kinds of
characteristic signs of self-nature. (100) What are these two kinds? They are
the attachment to words as having self-nature, and the attachment to objects as
having self-nature. The attachment to words as having self-nature, Mahāmati,
takes place owing to one's clinging to the habit-energy of words and false
imaginings since beginningless time. And the attachment to objects as having
self-nature, Mahāmati, takes place from not knowing that the external world is
no more than Self-Mind.
XL
Further, Mahāmati, there are two kinds of the
sustaining power which issues from the Tathagatas who are Arhats and
Fully-Enlightened Ones; and sustained by this power [the Bodhisattvas] would
prostrate themselves at their feet and ask them questions. What is this twofold
power that sustains the Bodhisattvas? The one is the power by which they are
sustained to go through the Samādhis and Samāpattis; while the other is the
power whereby the Buddhas manifest themselves in person before the Bodhisattvas
and baptise them with their own hands. Then, Mahāmati, sustained by the power
of the Buddhas, the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas at their first stage will attain
the Bodhisattva-Samādhi, known as the Light of Mahāyāna, which belongs to the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas. They will immediately see the Tathagatas, Arhats,
Fully-Enlightened Ones appearing before them personally, who come from all the
different abodes in the ten quarters of the world and who now facing the
Bodhisattvas will impart to them their sustaining power displayed with the
body, mouth, and words. Mahāmati, as is the case with Vajragarbha the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva, and with other Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas who are in
possession of similar character and (101) virtue, so, Mahāmati, with the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas at the first stage, they will attain the Tathagatas'
power sustaining them in their Samādhis and Samāpattis. By virtue of their
stock of merit accumulated for a hundred thousand kalpas, they will,
successively going up the stages and getting thoroughly acquainted with what
they should do and should not do, finally reach the stage of Bodhisattvahood
called Dharmameghā. Here the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva finds himself seated on a
throne in the Lotus Palace, and surrounded by the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas of a
similar class; a tiara decorated and ornamented with all kinds of precious
stones is on his head, and his body1 shines brilliantly like the moon in the
yellowish gold colour of the Campaka flower. The Buddhas now come from their
worlds in the ten quarters, and with their lotus-like hands, sprinkle the
forehead of the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva who is seated on the throne in the Lotus
Palace; the Buddhas thus give him a baptism personally by hand as when a great
king invested with supreme authority [baptises his crown-prince]. This
Bodhisattva and these Bodhisattvas are said to be sustained by the Buddhas'
power, being thus baptised by [their] hands. Mahāmati, this is the twofold
sustaining power imparted to the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas, who, sustained by
this twofold sustaining power, personally come into the presence of all the
Buddhas. In no other way are the Tathagatas, Arhats, Fully-Enlightened Ones to be
interviewed.
1 According to the Chinese translations.
Further, Mahāmati, (102) whatever Samādhis,
psychic faculties, and teachings are exhibited by the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas,
they are sustained by the twofold sustaining power of all the Buddhas. If, Mahāmati,
the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas show their eloquence without the Buddhas'
sustaining power, the ignorant and simple-minded will also show their
eloquence. [But the latter do not.] Why? Because of the sustaining power [on
the one hand] and its absence [on the other]. Where the Tathagatas enter with
their sustaining power there will be music not only in various musical
instruments and vessels but also even in grass, shrubs, trees, and mountains,
Mahāmati, yes, in towns indeed, palaces, houses, and royal abodes. How much
more those endowed with sentiency! The mute, blind, and deaf will be cured of
their deficiencies, Mahāmati, and will enjoy their emancipation. Such,
Mahāmati, is the great extraordinary virtue of the sustaining power imparted by
the Tathagatas.
Further, Mahāmati said: Why is it, Blessed One,
that when the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas are established in the Samādhis and
Samāpattis, and when they are baptised at the most exalted stage, the
Tathagatas, Arhats, Fully-Enlightened Ones, bestow their sustaining power on
them?
Replied the Blessed One: It is in order to make
them avoid the evil ones, karma, and passions, to keep them away from the
Dhyāna and stage of the Śrāvakahood, to have them realise the stage of
Tathagatahood, and to make them grow in the truth and experience already
attained. For this reason, Mahāmati, the Tathagatas, Arhats, Fully-Enlightened
Ones sustain with their power the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas. If they were not
thus sustained, Mahāmati, (103) they would fall into the way of thinking and
feeling as cherished by the wrong philosophers, Śrāvakas, or evil ones, and
would not attain the highest enlightenment. For this reason, the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas are upheld by the Tathagatas, Arhats, Fully-Enlightened
Ones. Thus it is said:
165. The sustaining power is purified by the
Buddhas' vows; in the baptism, Samādhis, etc., from the first to the tenth
[stage], [the Bodhisattvas are in the embrace of the Buddhas].
XLI
At that time again Mahāmati the Bodhisattva said
thus to the Blessed One: The chain of origination as told by the Blessed One
depends on a cause producing an effect, and that it is not a theory established
on the principle of a self-originating substance. The philosophers also
proclaim a causal origination when they say that all things rise conditioned by
a supreme spirit, Iśvara, a personal soul, time, or atom. How is it that the
rise of all things is explained by the Blessed One in another terminology
bearing on causation but in its meaning not different? Blessed One, the
philosophers explain birth from being and non-being, while, according to the
Blessed One, all things coming into existence from nothingness pass away by
causation,1 that is to say, the Blessed One has Ignorance from which there
rises Mental Conformation until we reach Old Age and Death. This teaching as
explained by the Blessed One is the doctrine of no-causation and not that of
causation. According to the Blessed One,2 "that being so, this is"—if
this is simultaneous conditionality and not successive mutuality, it is not
right. There, Blessed One, the philosophers, (104) teaching excels, and not
thine. Why? The cause assumed by the philosophers is not dependent upon the
chain of origination and produces effects. But, Blessed One, thy cause has
reference to its effect and the effect to its cause, and thus there is an
interconnection of causal links, and from this mutuality follows the fault of
non-finality. When people talk about, "That being so, this is. "
there is a state of causelessness.
1 This is according to the Chinese translations;
in the Sanskrit text there is apparently an omission.
2 The T'ang reading seems to give the best
sense.
Replied the Blessed One: Not so, Mahāmati, mine
is not a causeless theory of causation which results in an [endless]
interconnection of causes and conditions. I speak of "That being so, this
is" because of my seeing into the nature of the external world which is
nothing but Self-Mind and because of its unreality of grasped (object) and
grasping (subject). However, Mahāmati, when people clinging to the notion of
grasped and grasping fail to understand the world as something seen of Mind
itself; and, Mahāmati, by them the fault is committed as they recognise the
external world as real with its beings and non-beings, but not by my theory of
causation.
XLII
Further, Mahāmati said: Blessed One, is it not
because of the reality of words that all things are? If not for words, Blessed
One, there would be no rising of things. Hence, Blessed One, the existence of
all things is by reason of the reality of words.
Said the Blessed One: Even when there are no
[corresponding] objects there are words, Mahāmati; for instance, the hare's
horns, the tortoise's hair, a barren woman's child, etc. (105)—they are not at
all visible in the world but the words are; Mahāmati, they are neither entities
nor nonentities but expressed in words. If, Mahāmati, you say that because of
the reality of words the objects are, this talk lacks in sense. Words are not
known in all the Buddha-lands; words, Mahāmati, are an artificial creation. In
some Buddha-lands ideas are indicated by looking steadily, in others by
gestures, in still others by a frown, by the movement of the eyes, by laughing,
by yawning, or by the clearing of the throat, or by recollection, or by
trembling. Mahāmati, for instance, in the worlds of the Steady-Looking and in
those of Exquisite Odours, and in the Buddha-land of Samantabhadra the
Tathagata, Arhat, Fully-Enlightened One, the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas by
steadily looking without a wink attain the recognition of all things as unborn
and also various most excellent Samādhis. For this reason, Mahāmati, the
validity of all things has nothing to do with the reality of words. It is
observed, Mahāmati, even in this world that in the kingdom of such special
beings as ants, bees, etc., they carry on their work without words. Thus it is
said:
166. As space, the hare's horns, and a barren
woman's child are non-entities except as expressed in words, so is this
existence imagined.
167. When causes and conditions are in
combination the ignorant imagine the birth [of this world]; (106) as they fail
to understand this reason, they wander about in the triple world which is their
dwelling.
XLIII
At that time Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
again said this to the Blessed One: Blessed One, where dost thou pronounce
sound to be eternal?
The Blessed One replied: According to error,
Mahāmati; since even to the wise there is this error, only that they are free
from perversion. Mahāmati, it is like the unwitted in the world who conceive a
perverted idea regarding a mirage, a firebrand wheel, a hair-net, the city of
the Gandharvas, Māyā, a dream, a reflected image, and an Aksha-purusha, but
with the knowing it is not so, though it. does not mean that those illusions do
not appear to them. When, Mahāmati, there is this error, diversities of forms
are seen, though to this error the idea of impermanence is inapplicable. Why?
Because it cannot be characterised with the ideas of being and non-being.
Again, Mahāmati, how are the ideas of being and non-being inapplicable to this
error? Because all the ignorant take in varieties of situations, like the waves
of the ocean and the waters of the Ganges which are not seen by the Pretas, but
seen [by others]. For this reason, Mahāmati, the error-existence [or this world
of illusion] is not, but as this water is manifest to other people it is not a
non-existence either. Thus to the wise, the error is neither a perversion nor a
non-perversion. And for this reason, Mahāmati, the error in itself is
characterised with permanency, having the nature of non-distinction [as far as
its own appearance is concerned]. Mahāmati, being discriminated as regards its
diversified individual signs, (107) the error is perceived as differentiated.
Thus the error, [as far as its own nature is concerned], is characterised with
permanency. Again, Mahāmati, how is the error to be considered reality?
Mahāmati, for this reason that as regards this error the wise cherish neither a
perverted knowledge nor an unperverted knowledge. It is [such as it is and] not
otherwise. In case, Mahāmati, the wise should cherish any thought whatever in
this error, it goes contrary to the reality attainable by noble wisdom. If
there is anything at all here it is the prattling of the ignorant, it is not
the talk of the wise.
Again, when the error is discriminated according
to a perverted and an unperverted view, it gives rise to two classes of family,
one of which is the family of the wise, and the other the family of the
ignorant and simple-minded. Now, Mahāmati, the family of the wise is divisible
into three kinds, that is, the Śrāvakas, the Pratyekabuddhas, and the Buddhas.
Mahāmati, how does the Śrāvakayāna family rise from the discrimination whereby
the ignorant conceive the error? Mahāmati, there is the rise of the
»Śrāvakayāna family where the attachment to the notions of individuality and
generality is kept up. This is the way, Mahāmati, this error gives rise to the
Śrāvakayāna family. Mahāmati, how does the Pratyekabuddhayāna family rise as
the error is discriminated? Mahāmati, when in this error the attachment to the
notions of individuality and generality (108) leads one to a retirement from
social life, there rises the Pratyebuddhayāna family. Mahāmati, how is there
the rise of the Buddhayāna family when this error is discriminated by the
intelligent? Mahāmati, when the world is understood to be nothing but Mind
itself, the existence and non-existence of external objects ceases to be
discriminated, and there is the rise of the Buddhayāna family. Mahāmati, this
is the family, that is, what is meant by the family.
Again, Mahāmati, when the error is discriminated
by the ignorant, there is the manifestation of varieties of objects which calls
forth the assertion [on their part] that this is so and not otherwise; whence
rises the family of the transmigration vehicle. For this reason, Mahāmati, the
error is discriminated by the ignorant as characterised by multitudinousness,
and this error is neither a reality nor an unreality. Thus, Mahāmati, this
error being discriminated by the wise turns into Tathatā (suchness) with them,
by virtue of a revulsion which takes place in them concerning the Citta, Manas,
Manovijñāna, false reasoning, habit-energy, the [three] Svabhāvas, and the
[five] Dharmas. Thus, Mahāmati, there is this statement that Tathatā is Mind
emancipated. Mahāmati, the meaning of this statement is here thus clearly
expressed by me, that is, by the discarding of discrimination is meant the
abandonment of all discriminations. So much for this statement.
Mahāmati said, Blessed One, is the error an
entity or not?
The Blessed One replied: It is like Māyā,
Mahāmati, the error has no character in it making for attachment; if, Mahāmati,
the error had any character in it making for attachment, (109) no liberation
would be possible from the attachment to existence, the chain of origination
would be understood in the sense of creation as held by the philosophers.
Mahāmati said: Blessed One, if the error is like
Māyā, it will thereby be the cause of another error.
The Blessed One said: No, Mahāmati, Māyā cannot
be the cause of the error, because of its incapability of producing evils and
faults; and thus, Mahāmati, Māyā does not give rise to evil thoughts and
faults. Again, Mahāmati, Māyā has no discrimination of itself; it rises when
invoked by the magical charm of a certain person. It has in itself no
habit-energy of evil thoughts and faults that, issuing from self-discrimination,
affect it. [Therefore,] there are no faults in it. This is only due to the
confused view fondly cherished by the ignorant regarding Mind, and the wise
have nothing to do with it. So it is said:
168. The wise do not see [the(?)] error, nor is
there any truth in its midst; if truth is in its midst, [the(?)] error would be
truth.
169. If there is the rising of individual forms
(nimitta) apart from all error, this will indeed be error, the defiled is like
darkness.1
XLIV
Further, Mahāmati, Māyā is not an unreality,
because it has the appearance of reality; and all things have the nature of
Māyā.
Said Mahāmati: Is it, Blessed One, that all
things are like Māyā because Māyā is something imagined and clung to as having
multitudinousness of individual forms? (110) Or is it due to the incorrect
imagining of individual forms? If all things have the likeness of Māyā because
Māyā is something imagined and clung to as having multitudinousness of
individual forms, then see, Blessed One, things are not like Māyā. Why? Because
forms are seen in the multitudinousness of individual signs not without due
causes. If they ever appear without due causes, assuming the multitudinousness
of individual signs and shapes, [then] they would be like Māyā. For this
reason, Blessed One, that things are like Māyā is not because they [i. e. all
things and Māyā] are both alike in being imagined and clung to as having
multitudinousness of individual signs.
Said the Blessed One: It is not, Mahāmati, that
all things are Māyā because they are both alike in being imagined and clung to
as having multitudinousness of individual signs, but that all things are like
Māyā because they are unreal and like a lightning-flash which is seen as
quickly disappearing. Mahāmati, a lightning appears and disappears in quick
succession as is manifest to the ignorant; in the same way, Mahāmati, all
things assume individuality and generality according to the discrimination [of
the Mind] itself. When the state of imagelessness2 is recognised, objects which
are imagined and clung to as in possession of individual signs cease to assert
themselves. Thus it is said:
170. Māyā is not without reality, because it has
something resembling it; the reality of all things is talked of [in a similar
manner]; they are unreal like a lightning-flash [appearing and disappearing]
quickly, and therefore they are regarded as resembling Māyā.
1 What is exactly meant by these two verses,
especially the latter, is difficult to find in this connection.
2 According to T'ang.
XLV
Further, Mahāmati said: Now according to the
Blessed One, all things are unborn (111) and resemble Māyā; but, Blessed One,
is there not the fault of contradiction between the previous statement and the
later one? It is asserted by thee that that all things are unborn is due to
their having the nature of Māyā.1
The Blessed One replied: Mahāmati, when all
things are asserted to be unborn because of their having the nature of Māyā,
there is no fault of contradiction between my previous statement and my later
one. Why? Because birth is no-birth, when it is recognised that the world that
presents itself before us is no more than Mind itself; and as to all external
objects of which we state that they are or are not, they are to be seen as
non-existent and unborn; and thus, Mahāmati, there is here no fault of
contradiction between my previous statement and my later one. But, Mahāmati, in
order to cast aside the philosophers' thesis on birth by causation, it is
asserted that all things are like Māyā and unborn. Mahāmati, the philosophers
who are the gathering of the deluded, foster the notion of deriving the birth
of all things from that of being and non-being, and fail to regard it as caused
by the attachment to the multidinousness which rises from the discrimination
[of the Mind] itself. Mahāmati, no fear rises in me [by making this
statement].2 In this light, Mahāmati, the term "unborn" is to be
understood.
1 This last sentence is missing in T'ang,
whereas Wei has: "It is said by the Tathagata that all things are unlike
māyā."
2 T'ang, says: I say that all things are
non-existent because of their being unborn. Wei: I say that all things are
unborn when existent, unborn when non-existent. Sung: I do not [say] that the
existent and the non-existent are born.
Again, Mahāmati, the teaching that all things
exist is given in order to admit transmigration, to check nihilism which says
"Nothing is," and to make my disciples accept the doctrine that
asserts the reality of karma in various forms and birth in the various worlds,
for by admitting the terminology of existence we admit transmigration.
Mahāmati, the teaching that all things are characterised with the self-nature
of Māyā is meant to make the ignorant and simple-minded cast aside the idea of
self-nature in anything; (112) as they cherish the thoughts characterised with
error, as they do not clearly grasp the meaning of the world which is no more
than the Mind itself, they imagine and cling to causation, work, birth, and
individual signs; in order to check this I teach that all things are
characterised in their self-nature with the nature of Māyā and a dream.
Attached to erroneous thoughts they contradict both themselves and others by
not seeing all things as they really and truly are. Mahāmati, to see all things
as they really and truly are means to realise that there is nothing to be seen
but Mind itself. So it is said:
171. In the theory of no-birth, causation is not
accepted [as is maintained by the ignorant]; where existence is accepted transmigration
prevails; seeing that [all things] are like Māyā, etc., one does not
discriminate individual signs.
XLVI
Further, Mahāmati, we will explain the
characteristics of name-body, the sentence-body, and the syllable-body; for
when name-body, sentence-body, and syllable-body are well understood, the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas conformable to the signification of a sentence and a
syllable will quickly realise supreme enlightenment and thereby awaken all
beings to it. Mahāmati, by name-body is meant the object depending on which a
name obtains, the body is this object; in another sense the body means
substance (śarīra). Mahāmati, this is the body of a name. By the body of a
sentence is meant what it signifies, the real object, determining its sense
definitely. In another sense, it completes its reference. Mahāmati, this is my
teaching as regards the sentence-body. By the syllable-body (113) is meant that
by which names and sentences are indicated; it is a symbol, a sign; in another
sense, it is something indicated.
Again, Mahāmati, the sentence (pada) -body means
the completion of the meaning expressed in the sentence. Again, Mahāmati, a
name (or a letter, nāma) means each separate letter distinguished as to its
self-nature from a to ha. Again, Mahāmati, a syllable (vyañjana) is short,
long, or lengthy. Again, Mahāmati, regarding the sentence (pada) -body the idea
of it is obtained from the foot-prints left on the road by elephants, horses,
people, deer, cattle, cows, buffalos, goats, rams, etc. Again, Mahāmati, names
(nāma) and syllables (vyañjana) belong to the four Skandhas which being
formless are indicated by names; thus are names made. By means of the
differently characterised names there are syllables (vyañjana); thus are
syllables made. This, Mahāmati, is the meaning of the body of a name (nāma), a
sentence (pada), and a syllable (vyañjana). You should endeavour to have a
thorough understanding of these terms. It is thus said:
172. Because of the distinction between nāma,
pada, and vyañjana, the ignorant, the dull-witted, stick to them like the
elephant in deep mud.
XLVII
(114) Further, Mahāmati, in the time to come,
those wrong-headed ones who are inclined to false speculations owing to their
deficiency of knowledge concerning truth and cause may be asked by the wise,
regarding that which is liberated from the dualistic conceptions of things such
as oneness and otherness, bothness and not-bothness; and thus asked, they may
answer, saying, "It is no question; it is not at all properly put—that is
to say, the question: Are form, etc. and transiency to be considered one or
different?"
In the same way, Nirvana and the Skandhas,
indices and indicated, qualities and qualified, realities and the elements,
seen and seeing, dust and atoms, knowledge and the Yogins—[are these to be
considered one or different?] Such questions concerning the various aspects of
existence lead successively from one thing to another without end, and those
who are asked about these unexplainable questions would declare that they were
put aside by the Blessed One as impossible to answer. However, these deluded
people are unable to realise [the meaning of] what they heard [from the Buddha]
because of their deficiency of knowledge. The Tathagatas, Arhats,
Fully-Enlightened Ones do not explain these things to all beings because of
their wish to keep the latter from the fear-inspiring phrases.
Mahāmati, these inexplicables (vyāhṛiāni) are
not taken up for consideration by the Tathagatas in order to keep the
philosophers away from their wrong views and theories. Mahāmati, the
philosophers may declare thus: what life is that is the body, or life is one
thing, body is another. In these they make inexplicable statements. Mahāmati,
entirely bewildered by the idea of a creator, the philosophers make an
inexplicable statement, but that is not found in my teaching. In my teaching,
Mahāmati, discrimination does not take place because I teach to stand above
grasped and grasping. (115) How could there be any setting aside here? But,
Mahāmati, to those who are addicted to grasped and grasping, as they do not
have a thorough understanding of the world which is no more than what is seen
of the Mind itself, there is something to be set aside [as inexplicable].
Mahāmati, the Tathagatas, Arhats, Fully-Enlightened Ones teach the Dharma to
all beings by means of the four forms of questioning and answering. As to the
propositions that are set aside [as inexplicable], Mahāmati, they are made use
of by me on some other occasions for those whose senses are not yet fully
matured; but for those of matured senses there is nothing to set aside.
XLVIII
Further, Mahāmati, all things being devoid of
doing and doer are unborn; as there is no doer, all things are therefore said
to be unborn. Mahāmati, all things are without self-nature. Why? Because,
Mahāmati, when they are examined by self-knowledge, there are no such signs
obtainable which characterise them with individuality and generality;
therefore, all things are said to have no self-nature. Again, Mahāmati, in all
things there is no taking birth, no going-out. Why? Because, Mahāmati, the
signs of individuality and generality are seen as existing and yet they are
non-existent; they are seen as going out, and yet they do not go out. For this
reason, Mahāmati, all things are neither taking birth, nor are they going out.
Again, Mahāmati, all things are never annihilated. Why? For this reason that
the individual signs that make up the self-nature of things are nonexistent,
and all things are beyond reach. Therefore, all things are said never to be
annihilated. Again, Mahāmati, all things are not eternal. Why? (116) Because
the rising of individual signs is characterised with non-eternality. Therefore,
all things are said not to be eternal. Again, Mahāmati, all things are eternal.
Why? Because the rising of individual signs is no-rising and is non-existent;
and all things are eternal because of their non-eternality. Therefore,
Mahāmati, all things are said to be eternal. Thus it is said:
173. 1The four kinds of explanation are: direct
statement, questioning, discernment, and setting aside; whereby the
philosophers are kept away.
174. The Sāṅkha and the Vaiśeshika philosophers
teach birth from a being or from a non-being; all that are proclaimed by them
are the inexplicables.
175. When the self-nature [of all things] is
examined by knowledge, it is beyond reach; therefore, they are without
self-nature and unattainable.
1 These three verses ought to follow § 47.
XLIX
At that time Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
again said this to the Blessed One: Pray tell me, Blessed One, regarding the
Stream-entered and their special attainment which characterises the state of
the Stream-entered, whereby I and other Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas thoroughly
becoming acquainted with the Stream-entered and their special attainment
characterising the state of the Stream-entered, will proceed to know the means
and conduct which characterises the state of the Once-returning,
Never-returning, and Arhatship; and they will then explain the Dharma to all beings
in this manner. Having understood the twofold form of egolessness and (117)
having cleansed themselves of the twofold hindrance, they will by degrees go
through the stages of Bodhisattvahood each of which has its own
characteristics, and attaining Tathagatahood whose spiritual realm is beyond
conceivability, they will be like a multicoloured gem and will accomplish what
is good for the lives of all beings, providing them with every teaching,
condition, deportment, body, and enjoyment.
Replied the Blessed One: Listen well Mahāmati,
and take well to heart; I will tell you.
Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva answering
him said: Very well, Blessed One.
The Blessed One then said this: Mahāmati, in the
fruit attained by the Śrāvakas, three kinds are distinguishable. What are the
three? They are graded, Mahāmati, low, middle, and the highest. The low ones
will be reborn seven times when their existence will come to an end; the
middling will attain Nirvana in three or five births; the highest will attain Nirvana
in this birth. Mahāmati, for these three classes [of the Stream-entered] there
are three kinds of knots: weak, middling, and strong. What are these three
knots, Mahāmati? They are: (1) the view of an individual personality, (2)
doubt, and (3) the holding-on to moral practices. Mahāmati, when all these
three knots are in succession promoted to the higher stage then1 will be the
attainment of Arhatship.
Mahāmati, there are two kinds of the view of an
individual personality; that is, (1) the inborn one and (2) the one due to the
false imagination; it is like [the relation between] the relativity view and
the false imagination [of the three] Svabhāvas. (118) For instance, Mahāmati,
depending on the relativity view of things there arise varieties of attachments
to the false imagination. But this [existence] is neither a being, nor a
non-being, nor a being-and-non-being; it is not a reality because of the false
imagination, and, being discriminated by the ignorant, assumes varieties of
individual signs to which they are strongly attached just as the deer does to a
mirage. Mahāmati, this is the view of an individual personality falsely
imagined by the Stream-entered, which has been accumulated for a long time by
their ignorance and attachment. This is destroyed when the egolessness of a
person is attained by which the clinging ceases.
Mahāmati, the inborn view of an individual
personality as held by the Stream-entered [is destroyed in this way]. When this
body which belongs equally to each of us is considered, it is perceived that it
consists of form and the other four Skandhas, that form takes its rise from the
elements and their belongings, that the elements are mutually conditioning, and
that hence there is no aggregate known as form. When thus the Stream-entered
realise that the idea of being and non-being is a partial view [of truth], the
view of individual personality is destroyed. When the view of individual
personality is thus destroyed, covetousness will never assert itself. This,
Mahāmati, is what characterises the view of individual personality.
Again, Mahāmati, as regards the nature of doubt,
when the Dharma is attained, and realised, and thoroughly understood as to its
characteristics, and when the twofold view of individual personality is
destroyed as previously described, no doubt is cherished in the teaching [of
the Buddhas]. And there is no thought [in the minds of the Stream-entered] to
follow the lead of any other teacher because of [the difference between] purity
and non-purity. This,. Mahāmati, is what is meant by doubt [discarded] (119) by
the Stream-entered.
Again, Mahāmati, how is it that the
Stream-entered do not hold themselves to the morality? They do not because they
clearly see into the nature of suffering wherever they may be reborn. [What is
meant by] the holding? Mahāmati, that the ignorant and simple-minded observe
the rules of morality, piety, and penance, is because they desire thereby to
attain worldly enjoyments and happinesses; they cherish the hope of being born
in agreeable conditions. And [the Stream-entered] do not hold [to the rules of
morality], for their thoughts are turning only towards the exalted state of
self-realisation, and the reason why they devote themselves to the details of
morality is that they wish to master such truths as are in conformity with
non-discrimination and undefiled outflows. This, Mahāmati, is the way in which
the Stream-entered Ones hold to morality and piety. Mahāmati, by thus breaking
up the three knots the Stream-entered will discard covetousness, anger, and
folly.
Mahāmati said: Many kinds of covetousness are
taught by the Blessed One; which one of them is to be cast aside?
The Blessed One replied: The world where love
grows, i. e., the desire for sexual embrace, showing itself in beating,
slapping, suggesting, kissing, embracing, smelling, looking-sidewise, or gazing
may give one momentary pleasures but is productive of future grief. [With the
Stream-entered] there is no greed for such. Why? Because they are abiding in
the bliss of the Samādhi which they have attained. Hence this casting aside,
but not of the desire for Nirvana.
(120) Again, Mahāmati, what is the fruit of the
Once-returning? There is once in them the discrimination of forms, signs, and
appearances; but as they learn not to view individual objects under the aspect
of qualified and qualifying, and as they know well what marks the attainment of
the Dhyāna, they once come back into the world, and putting an end to
suffering, realise Nirvana. Hence the appellation "Once-returning. "
Again, Mahāmati, what is meant by
Never-returning? It means that while there is yet the viewing of individual
objects as characterised by being and non-being in the past, present, and
future, the discrimination does not return with its errors and faults, the
dormant passions do not assert themselves, and the knots are completely cut off
never to return. Hence the appellation "Never-returning."
Again, Mahāmati, the Arhat is the one who has
attained the Dhyānas, Samādhis, emancipations, powers, psychic faculties, and
with whom there are no more passions, sufferings, and discriminations. Hence
the appellation "Arhat."
Mahāmati said: Now, the Blessed One declares
that there are three kinds of Arhats: to which one of the three is this term
"Arhat" to be applied? To one who makes straightway for the path of
cessation? Or to one who neglects all his accumulated stock of merit for the
sake of his vow to enlighten others? Or to one who is a form of the Transformation
[Buddha]?
Replied the Blessed One: Mahāmati, [the term
"Arhat"] applies to the Śrāvaka who makes straightway for the path of
cessation, and to no others. Mahāmati, as for the others, they are those who
have finished practising the deeds of a Bodhisattva; they are forms of the
Transformation Buddha. With skilful means born of their fundamental and
original vows (121), they manifest themselves among the multitudes in order to
adorn the assemblages of the Buddhas. Mahāmati, here in these paths and abodes
of existence they give out varieties of teachings which are based on
discrimination; that is to say, as they are above such things as the attainment
of the fruit, the Dhyānas, the Dhyāna-practisers, or subjects for meditation,
and as they know that this world is no more than what is seen of the Mind
itself, they discourse on the fruit attained [for the sake of all beings].
Further, Mahāmati, if the Stream-entered should think."These are the
fetters, but I am disengaged from them, " they commit a double fault: they
still hold to the vices of the ego, and they have not freed themselves from the
fetters.
Further, Mahāmati, in order to go beyond the
Dhyānas, the immeasurables, and the formless world, the signs of this visible
world which is Mind itself should be discarded. The Samāpatti leading to the
extinction of thought and sensation does not enable one to transcend the world
of particulars, for there is nothing but Mind. So it is said:
176. The Dhyānas, the immeasurables, the
formless, the Samādhis, and the complete extinction of thought (nirodha)—these
do not exist where the Mind alone is.
177. The fruit of the Stream-entered, and that
of the Once-returning, and that of the Never-returning, and Arhatship—these are
the bewildered states of mind.
178. The Dhyāna-practiser, the Dhyāna, the
subject for it, the destruction, the seeing of the truth, —these are no more
than discriminations; when this is recognised there is emancipation.
L
(122) Further, Mahāmati, there are two kinds of
intellect: the intellect as an examining function, and the intellect which
functions in connection with the attachment to ideas of discrimination. As for
the intellect that examines, Mahāmati, it is that act of intellect which
examines into the self-nature of things, finding it to be devoid of the four
propositions, and unattainable. This is known as the intellect that examines.
What is meant by [being devoid of] the four propositions? It means to be devoid
of oneness and otherness, bothness and not-bothness, being and non-being,
eternity and non-eternity. These are called the four propositions. Mahāmati,
train yourself to examine carefully all things as regards these four
propositions. What, Mahāmati, is the intellect which functions in connection
with the attachment to ideas of discrimination? It is the intellect with which
the Mind is discriminated and the ideas arising therefrom are adhered to [as
real]; and this adherence gives rise to the conceptions of warmth, fluidity,
motility, and solidity as characterising the gross elements; while the tenacious
holding to proposition, reason, definition, and illustration, leads to the
assertion of a non-entity [as entity]. This is called the intellect that
functions in connection with the attachment to ideas of discrimination.
This, Mahāmati, is what characterises the two
kinds of intellect, in accordance with which the Bodhisattvas, thoroughly
mastering the signs of egolessness of persons and things, (123) and, by means
of knowledge of imagelessness, becoming conversant with the stage of
examination and practice, will attain the first stage [of Bodhisattvahood] and
acquire one hundred Dhyānas. Attaining the excellent Samādhis, they will see
one hundred Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, they will enter into one hundred kalpas
that were prior to the present and also into those that will follow the
present, they will illuminate one hundred Buddha-lands, and, illuminating one
hundred Buddha-lands, they will understand the signs belonging to the higher
stages; and by virtue of the most exalted vows they will manifest wonderful
powers, they will be baptised by [the Buddhas] when they reach the stage of
Dharmameghā (law-cloud); and realising the inmost realm of the Tathagatas, they
will be provided with things which are closely connected with the ten
inexhaustible vows; and, in order to bring all beings into maturity, they will
shine out in various forms with the rays of transformation; they will be quite
absorbed in the bliss of self-realisation.
LI
Further, Mahāmati, the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas
are to be well acquainted with the primary and the secondary elements. How do
the Bodhisattvas know the primary and the secondary elements? Mahāmati, the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas are to know this that the truth is that the primary
elements have never come into existence, and that, Mahāmati, these elements are
unborn. Thus understood, there is nothing in the world but what is
discriminated [by our imagination]. When it is recognised that the visible
world is no more than Mind itself, external objects cease to be realities, and
there is nothing but what is discriminated by the mind and perceived [as
external]. That is to say, let it be understood that the triple world has
nothing to do with the primary and the secondary elements, (124) that it is
removed from the four propositions and philosophical systems, that it has
nothing to do with a personal ego and what belongs to it; and that it
establishes itself in the abode of real reality, where it is seen in its own
form, i. e. in its unborn state.
Mahāmati, what is meant by the elements derived
from the primary elements? The element discriminated as vascidity produces the
realm of water, inner and outer; the element discriminated as energy produces
the realm of fire, inner and outer; the element discriminated as motility
produces the realm of air, inner and outer; the element discriminated as
divisibility of form gives birth to the realm of earth together with space,
inner and outer. Because of the attachment to the incorrect truths there is the
aggregation of the five Skandhas giving rise to the elements primary and
secondary.
Again, Mahāmati, the Vijñāna has its cause in
our attachment to and the desire for the multitudinousness of statements and
objective fields; and it continues to evolve in another path of existence.
Mahāmati, the secondary elements such as earth, etc., [are said] to have their
cause in the primary elements which, however, are non-existent. Because,
Mahāmati, of things endowed with being, characteristics, marks,
perceivableness, abode, and work, one can say that they are born of the
combination of various effect-producing [elements]; but not of things which are
devoid of characteristic marks. For this reason, Mahāmati, the elements primary
and secondary are the discriminations of the philosophers and not mine.
LII
Further, Mahāmati, I will explain what characterises
the self-nature of the Skandhas. Mahāmati, what are the five Skandhas? They are
form, (125) sensation, thought, conformation, and consciousness. Mahāmati, four
of these have no material forms—sensation, thought, conformation, and
consciousness. Form, Mahāmati, belongs to what is made of the four primary
elements, and these elements differ from one another in their individual signs.
But the four Skandhas that are without form cannot be reckoned as four, they
are like space. For instance, Mahāmati, space cannot be numbered, and it is due
to our discrimination that it is designated as such; in the same way, Mahāmati,
the Skandhas that are beyond calculability as they have no number-marks, are
not to be predicated as existing and non-existing, and are beyond the four
propositions; but to the ignorant they are described as subject to numeration,
but not so to the wise.
Again, Mahāmati, by the wise the five Skandhas
are regarded as thought-constructions, devoid of [dualisties such as] otherness
and not-otherness; for they are like varieties of forms and objects in a
vision, like images and persons in a dream. As they have no better substance
for their support, and as they obstruct the passage of noble wisdom, there is
what is known as the Skandha-discrimination. This, Mahāmati, is what
characterises the self-nature of the Skandhas. This discrimination must be
discarded by you, and having discarded this, you should declare the truth of
solitude. Keeping back the views held by the philosophers, the truth of solitude
is to be announced in all the Buddha-assemblies, Mahāmati, and thereby the
teaching of the egolessness of things is purified and you will enter upon the
stage of Far-going (dūramgaṁā). Entering upon the stage of Dūramgamā you will
become the master of many Samādhis, and, attaining the will-body (126) you will
realise the Samādhi known as Māyopama (Māyā-like). Thoroughly conversant with
the powers, psychic faculties and self-control, you will be the supporter of
all beings like the earth. Mahāmati, as the great earth is the supporter of all
beings, so is the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva the supporter of all beings.
LIII
Further, Mahāmati, there are four kinds of
Nirvana. What are the four? They are: (1) the Nirvana which is attained when
the self-nature of all things is seen as nonentity; (2) the Nirvana which is
attained when varieties of individual marks characterising all things are seen
as non-entities; (3) the Nirvana which is attained when there is the
recognition of the non-existence of a being endowed with its own specific
attributes; and (4) the Nirvana which is attained when there takes place the
severance of the bondage conditioning the continuation of individuality and
generality of the Skandhas. Mahāmati, these four views of Nirvana belong to the
philosophers and are not my teaching. According to my teaching, Mahāmati, the
getting rid of the discriminating Manovijñāna—this is said to be Nirvana.
Mahāmati said: Does not the Blessed One
establish eight Vijñānas?
The Blessed One replied: I do, Mahāmati.
Mahāmati said: If eight Vijñānas are
established, why do you refer to the getting-rid of the Manovijñāna and not of
the seven [other] Vijñānas [as well]?
The Blessed One said: With the Manovijñāna as
cause and supporter, Mahāmati, there rise the seven Vijñanas. Again, Mahāmati,
the Manovijñāna is kept functioning, as it discerns a world of objects and
becomes attached to it, and by means of manifold habit-energy [or memory] (127)
it nourishes the Ālayavijñāna. The Manas is evolved along with the notion of an
ego and its belongings, to which it clings and on which it reflects. It has no
body of its own, nor its own marks; the Ālayavijñāna is its cause and support.
Because the world which is the Mind itself is imagined real and attached to as
such, the whole psychic system evolves mutually conditioning. Like the waves of
the ocean, Mahāmati, the world which is the mind-manifested, is stirred up by
the wind of objectivity, it evolves and dissolves. Thus, Mahāmati, when the
Manovijñāna is got rid of, the seven Vijñānas are also got rid of. So it is
said:
179. I enter not into Nirvana by means of being,
of work, of individual signs; I enter into Nirvana when the Vijñāna which is
caused by discrimination ceases.
180. With it [i. e. the Manovijñāna] for its
cause and support, the Manas secures its use; the Vijñāna causes the Citta to
function, and is supported [by it].
181. Like a great flood where no waves are
stirred because of its being dried up, the Vijñāna [-system] in its various
forms ceases to work when there is the annihilation [of the Manovijñāna].
LIV
Further, Mahāmati, I will tell you about the
various features of the false imagination (parikalpita); and when you and the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas are well acquainted with each of them in its specific
form, you will get away from discrimination; and seeing well and knowing the
way of inner realisation by noble wisdom and also the ways of speculation by
the philosophers, (128) you will cast off discriminations such as grasped and
grasping, and will not be induced to discriminate in respect to the multiple
aspects of relativity-knowledge (paratantra), as well as the forms of the false
imagination. What are the various features of the false imagination, Mahāmati?
They are the discriminations as regards (1) words (abhilāpa), (2) meaning, (3)
individual marks, (4) property, (5) self-nature, (6) cause, (7) philosophical
views, (8) reasoning, (9) birth, (10) no-birth, (11) dependence, and (12)
bondage and emancipation. These, Mahāmati, are the various features of the
false imagination.
Now, Mahāmati, what is the discrimination of
words? That is the becoming attached to various sweet voices and singing—this
is the discrimination as regards words.
What is the discrimination of meaning? It is the
discrimination by which one imagines that words rise depending on whatever
subjects they express, and which subjects one regards as self-existent and
belonging to the realisation of noble wisdom.
What is the discrimination of individual marks?
It is to imagine in whatever is denoted by words the multitudinousness of
individual marks which are like a mirage, and, clinging tenaciously to them, to
discriminate all things according to these categories: warmth, fluidity,
motility, and solidity.
What is the discrimination of property? It is to
desire a state of wealth such as gold, silver, and various precious stones.
What is the discrimination of self-nature? It is
to make discrimination according to the imaginary views of the philosophers in
reference to the self-nature of all things (129) which they stoutly maintain,
saying, "This is just it, and there is no other."
What is the discrimination of cause? That is, to
distinguish the notion of causation in reference to being and non-being and to
imagine that there are cause-signs—this is the discrimination of cause.
What is the discrimination of philosophical
views? That means getting attached to the philosophers' wrong views and
discriminations concerning such notions as being and non-being, oneness and
otherness, bothness and not-bothness.
What is the discrimination of reasoning? It
means the teaching whose reasoning is based on the grasping of the notion of an
ego-substance and what belongs to it.
What is the discrimination of birth? It means
getting attached to the notion that things come into existence and go out of it
according to causation.
What is the discrimination of no-birth? It is to
discriminate that all things are from the beginning unborn, that the causeless
substances which were not, come into existence by reason of causation.
What is the discrimination of dependence? It
means the mutual dependence of gold and the filament [which is made of gold].
What is the discrimination of bondage and
emancipation? It is like imagining that there is something bound because of
something binding as in the case of a man who by the help of a cord ties a knot
or loosens it.
These, Mahāmati, are the various features of the
false imagination, to which all the ignorant and simple-minded ones cling,
imagining that things are or are not. Those attached to the notion of
relativity are attached to the notion of multitudinousness of things rising
from the false imagination. It is like seeing varieties of objects depending on
Māyā, but these varieties thus revealing themselves are discriminated by the
ignorant as something other than Māyā itself according to their way of
thinking. (130) Now, Mahāmati, Māyā and varieties of objects are neither
different nor one. If they were different, varieties of objects would not have
Māyā for their cause. If Māyā were one with varieties of objects, there would
be no distinction between the two, but as there is the distinction these
two—Māyā and varieties of objects—are neither one nor different. For this
reason you and the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas should never give yourselves up to
the notion of being and non-being.
LV
So it is said:
182. The Citta is bound up with the objective
world; the intellect's function is to speculate; and in the excellent state of
imagelessness there is the evolving of transcendental wisdom (prajñā).
183. According to the false imagination,
[self-substance] is, but from the point of view of relativity (paratantra) it
is not; owing to perversion, what is discriminated is grasped [as real]; in the
relativity there is no discrimination.
184. Multitudinousness of differentiations is
imagined [as real by the ignorant], but being like Māyā they obtain not;
varieties of individual forms are discriminated as such, but they [really] do
not obtain.
185. [To imagine] individual forms is wrong, it
puts one in bondage; they are born of Mind due to the false imagination of the
ignorant; based on the relativity they are discriminated.
186. The existence thus subjected to
discrimination is no other than its relativity aspect; (131) the false
imagination is of various forms; based on the relativity, discrimination is
carried on.
187. Conventional truth (saṁvṛiti) and ultimate
truth (paramārtha)—if there be a third, non-entity is its cause; the false
imagination belongs to the conventional; when it is cut asunder, there is the
realm of the wise.
188. As to the Yogins there is one reality which
reveals itself as multiplicity and yet there is no multiplicity in it; so is
the nature of the false imagination.
189. As by the dim-eyed a variety of objects is
seen and imagined while the dimness itself is neither a form (rūpa) nor a no-form
(arupa), so is the relativity [discriminated] by the unknowing ones.
190. As is pure gold, water free from dirt, the
sky without a cloud, so is [the Mind] pure when detached1 from the false
imagination.
191. Falsely-imagined existence is not, but from
the relativity point of view it is, assertion and refutation are destroyed when
one is freed from the imagination.
192. If the relativity-aspect of existence is,
while the imagination is not, this means that there is a being apart from being
and that a being is born of a non-being.
193. Depending on the false imagination there
obtains the relativity-aspect of existence; from the conjunction of form and
name there rises false imagination.
194. False imagination can never be perfect
knowledge (nishpanna), it is not productive of anything else [but itself];
(132) then one knows what is meant by ultimate truth whose self-nature is
purity.
195. There are ten kinds2 of false imagination
and six kinds of relativity; in the knowledge of Tathatā innerly attained there
is no differentiation.
196. Truth consists in [knowing] the five
Dharmas and also the three Svabhāvas; when the Yogin thus comprehends [the
truth], he does not transgress Tathatā.
197. According to the form of relativity, there
are those names that belong to false imagination; and the various aspects of
false imagination arise from relativity.
1 Throughout the text, vikalpa is translated
"discrimination" or "imagination," but here the term is
evidently used as negating the function of kalpita which stands in these verses
for parikalpita.
2 All the Chinese texts have "twelve"
instead of "ten."
198. When well pondered with intelligence
(buddhi) there is neither relativity nor false imagination; where perfect
knowledge is, there is nothing [dualistically] existent; for how with
intelligence can discrimination take place?
199. Where perfect knowledge is, the existent
cannot be qualified with being and non-being; in what cannot be qualified with
being and non-being, how can there be these two Svabhāvas?
200. Because of false imagination, the two
Svabhāvas are established; where there is false imagination multitudinousness
of things is recognised, which being purified the [spiritual] condition of the
wise obtains.
201. Where there is false imagination there is
multitudinousness of objects, which are discriminated under the aspect of
relativity; if otherwise discriminated, one becomes attached to the teachings
of the philosophers.
202. What is imagined being subjected to further
imagination, there are various views from which rises the doctrine of causal
origination; (133) when the dualistic discrimination is got rid of, there
indeed is perfect knowledge.1
1 This whole section treats of the threefold
Svabhāva, chiefly explaining where Parikalpita (false imagination) is
differentiated from Paratantra (relativity view). While the explanation
sometimes appears quite complicated, the main point is clear enough. The
Kalpita is a net of wrong interpretations woven about the Paratantra, which is
the dualistic view of existence, and which is valid as far as it goes. But to
reach the Nishpanna (perfect knowledge) it is necessary to transcend all forms
of dualism, for the Paratantra is by no means ultimate truth.
LVI
Further, Mahāmati said: Pray tell me, Blessed
One, about the one vehicle that characterises the inner realisation of noble
wisdom, whereby, Blessed One, I and other Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas, becoming
conversant with the one vehicle which marks the inner attainment of noble
wisdom, may be established without depending on anybody else in the teaching of
the Buddha.
Said the Blessed One: Then, Mahāmati, listen
well and reflect within yourself as I tell you.
Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said, Yes, I
will, Blessed One; and gave ear to the Blessed One.
Thereupon the Blessed One said: In accordance
with the authoritative teachings in which there are no discriminations,
Mahāmati, let the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva retire by himself to a quiet secluded
place, where he may reflect within himself, not relying on anybody else, but by
means of his own inner intelligence, in order to discard erroneous views and
discriminations, make successive advances and exert himself to finally enter
upon the stage of Tathagatahood. This, Mahāmati, is the characteristic feature
of the inner realisation to be gained by means of noble wisdom.
What characterises the way of the one vehicle? I
call it the one vehicle because thereby one recognises and realises the path
leading to the one vehicle. How is this path of the one vehicle to be
recognised and realised? The recognition of the one vehicle is obtained when
there is no rising of discrimination by doing away with the notion of grasped
and grasping and by abiding in the reality of suchness (yathābhūta). Mahāmati,
this recognition of the one vehicle, (134) except by the Tathagata himself, has
never been obtained before by anybody else—the philosophers, Śrāvakas,
Pratyekabuddhas, Brahmans, etc. For this reason, Mahāmati, this is known as the
one vehicle.
Mahāmati said: For what reason is it that the
Blessed One speaks of the triple vehicle and not of the one vehicle?
The Blessed One replied: Because there is no
teaching whereby the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas can realise Nirvana by themselves,
I do not speak of the one vehicle. Thus, Mahāmati, the Śrāvakas and
Pratyekabuddhas are disciplined, segregated, and trained in meditation
according to the discourse of the Tathagata, whereby they are led to
emancipation and not by themselves.
Further, Mahāmati, as they have not yet
destroyed the habit-energy (memory) of karma and the hindrance of knowledge,
all the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas are unable to realise the egolessness of
things and have not attained the inconceivable transformation-death, I preach
to the Śrāvakas [and Pratyekabuddhas] the triple vehicle and not the one
vehicle.1 When, Mahāmati, destroying all the evil habit-energy, they realise
the egolessness of things, they who are now free from the evil habit-energy
will not be intoxicated by the Samādhis and will be awakened into the realm of
no-evil-outflows. Now being taken into a super-world which is the realm of
no-evil-outflows, they will gather up all the material for the attainment of
the Dharmakāya which is of severeign power and beyond conception. So it is
said:
203. The Deva vehicle, the Brahma vehicle, the
Śrāvaka vehicle, (135) the Pratyekabuddha vehicle, and the Tathagata vehicle,
of these I speak.
204. So long as there is a mind making conscious
efforts, there can be no culmination as regards the various vehicles; when a
revulsion takes place in the mind, there is neither a vehicle nor one who rides
in it.
205. There is really no establishment of various
vehicles, and so I speak of the one vehicle;2 but in order to carry the
ignorant I talk of a variety of vehicles.
1 Transfer naikayānam (line 9) to line 10 after
yānatrayam.
2 According to the Chinese translations.
206. There are three emancipations, and in all
things there is no ego-substance; knowledge and passions are of the same
nature, when [one is] emancipated they are discarded.
207. Like a piece of wood floating on the waves
of the ocean, the Śrāvaka obsessed with individual marks is driven along [the
stream of existence].
208. Though disengaged from the
actively-functioning passions, they [the Śrāvakas] are still bound up with the
habit-energy of the passions; intoxicated with the liquor of the Samādhi, they
still have their abode in the realm of outflows.
209. In this there is no course of finality, nor
retrogression either; [losing himself] in the attainment of the Samādhi-body,
he is not at all awakened even to the end of kalpas.
210. Like unto the drunkard who, being awakened
from his intoxication, regains his intelligence, [the Śrāvakas] will have the
realisation of the Buddha's truth, which is his own body.
Here Ends the Second Chapter, [Known as] the
"Collection of All the Dharmas," Taken from the Laṅkāvatāra of 36,000
[Ślokas].
-----------------
LVII
(136) At that time again the Blessed One said
this to Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva: I will tell you, Mahāmati, about
the various forms of the will-body; listen well and reflect well within
yourself. I will tell you.
Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said; I
will, Blessed One, and gave ear to the Blessed One.
The Blessed One then said this: There are three
kinds of will-body, Mahāmati. What are the three? They are: (1) the will-body
obtained in the enjoyment of the Samādhi; (2) the will-body obtained by
recognising the self-nature of the Dharma; and (3) the will-body which is
assumed [by a Bodhisattva according to] the class of beings [to be saved] and
which perfects and achieves [without a thought of its own achievement]. By
realising the higher stages successively after the first is attained, the Yogin
will experience them [all].
Now, Mahāmati, what is the will-body attained in
the enjoyment of the Samādhi? It is this: when [the Yogin] in the third,
fourth, fifth stages removes the various discriminations going on in his mind
and is at rest,1 the waves of consciousness are no more stirred in the
Mind-ocean and the Vijñāna functions are quieted, the bliss of which is enjoyed
by him; and when he thus recognises the non-existence of the external world,
which is no more than his own mind, he is said to have the will-body.2
1 It will be interesting for the Chinese readers
of the Laṅkāvatāra to notice that the compound, svacitta-vividha-viveka-vihāra,
is here read in three different ways by the three Chinese translators, showing
how variously a Sanskrit compound allows itself to be interpreted. This is one
of numerous such examples to be met with throughout the text.
Sung: 種種自心寂靜安. The mind itself,
variously [discriminating], grows quiet and finds its rest.
Wei: 自心寂靜行種種行. The mind itself is
quiet and practises various deeds.
T'ang: 離種種心寂然不動. Discarding various
[mentations], the mind is quiet and immovable.
2 Page 136, line 14, delete abhāva and manaso.
(137) What is the will-body obtained by
recognising the self-nature of the Dharma? When [the Yogin] of the eighth stage
has a thoroughgoing penetration into the nature of things which is like Māyā
and not image-producing, he experiences a revulsion at the seat of
consciousness and obtains the Samādhi known as Māyā-like and other Samādhis. By
entering upon the Samādhis he gains a body which exhibits various powers of
self-mastery and supernatural activity, which moves according to his wish as
quickly as a flower opens up, which resembles Māyā, a dream, and a reflected
image, and which is not a product of the elements but has something analogous
to what is produced of the elements, which is furnished with all the
differences appertaining to the world of forms and yet is able to follow up all
the assemblages in the Buddha-lands. This is the body which has a thoroughgoing
knowledge of the self-nature of the Dharma and for this reason is called
will-body.
Now what is the will-body which is born in
accordance with the class and which perfects and achieves? When [the Yogin] is
thoroughly conversant with all the characteristics of self-realisation and its
bliss which pervades the teachings of the Buddha, he is said to have the body
which is will-made, born with [the class], perfecting and achieving. Mahāmati,
you should exert yourself in order to have a thoroughly penetrating knowledge
of these three marks of the will-body. So it is said:
1. My Mahāyāna is neither a vehicle, nor a
sound, nor words; it is neither the truth, nor emancipation, nor the realm of
imagelessness.
2. Yet the Mahāyāna is a vehicle on which the
Samādhis are carried leading to various creative activities; the several forms
of the will-body are adorned with the flowers of the sovereign will.
LVIII
(138) At that time again Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said this to the Blessed One: The five immediacies are
preached by the Blessed One; and what are these five, Blessed One, which being
committed by a son or a daughter of a good family cause them to fall into the
Avici hell?
The Blessed One replied: Then, Mahāmati, listen
well and reflect, for I will tell you.
Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said;
Certainly, Blessed One, and gave ear to the Blessed One.
The Blessed One said thus to him: What are the
five immediacies? They are: (1) the murdering of the mother, (2) of the father,
(3) of the Arhat, (4) the breaking-up of the Brotherhood, and (5) causing the
body of the Tathagata to bleed from malice.
Now what is meant by the mother of all beings?
It is desire which is procreative, going together with joy and anger and
upholding all with motherliness. Ignorance representing fatherhood brings about
one's rebirth in the six villages of the sense-world. When there takes place a
complete destruction of both roots, fatherhood and motherhood, it is said that
mother and father are murdered. When there is a complete extermination of the
subordinate group of passions such as anger, etc., which are like an enemy, a
venomous rat, the murdering of the Arhat is said to take place. What is meant
by the breaking-up of the Brotherhood? When there is a complete fundamental
breaking-up of the combination of the Skandhas whose characteristic mark is a
state of mutual dependence among dissimilarities, it is said that the
Brotherhood is split up. (139) Mahāmati, when the body of the eight Vijñānas,
which erroneously recognises individuality and generality as being outside the
Mind—which is seen [by the ignorant] in the form of an external world—is
completely extirpated by means of faulty discriminations, that is, by means of
the triple emancipation and the non-outflows, and when thus the faulty
mentality of the Vijñāna-Buddha is made to bleed, it is known as an
immediacy-deed. These,
Mahāmati, are the five inner immediacies, and
when they are experienced by a son or a daughter of a good family, there is an
immediacy-deed of realisation as regards the Dharma.
Further, Mahāmati, there are five external
immediacies which I will point out to you, in order that you and other
Bodhisattvas in the future may thereby be saved from ignorance. What are these
five? They are those immediacies which are described in the canonical texts,
and those who commit these crimes can never experience any one of these
manifestations, except those Transformation [-Buddhas] who are sustained by the
power [of the Tathagatas] and have already attained a realisation. The Śrāvakas
of transformation, Mahāmati, who are sustained by the sustaining power either
of the Bodhisattvas or Tathagatas, may see somebody else practising deeds of
wickedness, and they will repeatedly make great efforts to turn him away from
his wickness and faulty views, and to make him realise the non-reality of
wickedness and faulty views by laying down his burden. This is the way I
demonstrate facts of the transformation, the sustaining power, and the
realisation. Mahāmati, there is, however, no realisation for those who are
sheer offenders of the immediacies, (140) except when they come to the
recognition of the truth that an external world is nothing but1 the Mind
itself, seeing that body, property, and abiding place are discriminations, and
that the notion of an ego and its belongings are to be kept away; or, when they
are released from the fault of self-discrimination by encountering a good
friend at some time or other, or at any time, and being born in some other path
of existence. So it is said:
3. Desire is said to be the mother and ignorance
the father; the Vijñāna which recognises an objective world is [compared to]
the Buddha.
4. The secondary group of passions is the Arhat,
the amassing of the five Skandhas the Brotherhood; as these are to be destroyed
immediately they are known as immediacy-deeds.
1 Page 140, line 1: bhavana is to be deleted.
LIX
Again Mahāmati said: Pray tell me, Blessed One,
what makes the Buddhas and the Blessed Ones such as they are: that is, [what
is] the Buddha-nature of the Buddhas?1
Said the Blessed One: when the egolessness of
things as well as of persons is understood, when the knowledge of the twofold
hindrance is thoroughly taken hold of, when the twofold death (cyuti) is
accomplished, and when the twofold group of passions is destroyed, there,
Mahāmati, is the Buddha-nature of the Buddhas and the Blessed Ones. When these
teachings are experienced by the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, this is their
Buddha-nature. So it is said:
5. The twofold egolessness, the twofold group of
passions, the twofold hindrance, and the inconceivable transformation-death,
—when these are attained, there is the Tathagata.
1 Bhagavān buddhānām, page 140, line 10, may
better be dropped.
LX
(141) At that time again, Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
said this to the Blessed One: According to what deeper sense2 did you make this
announcement before the congregation, that "I am all the Buddhas of the
past," and that "I have gone through many a birth in varieties of
forms, being thus at times the king Māndhātṛi, Elephant, Parrot, Indra, Vyāsa,
Sunetra, and other beings in my one hundred thousand births?"
Said the Blessed One: There are, according to
the deeper sense, four kinds of sameness distinguished, Mahāmati, and the
Tathagatas, Arhats, Fully-Enlightened Ones make this assertion: I was thus at
that time the Buddha Krakucchanda, Kanakamuni, and Kāśyapa. What are the four
kinds of sameness which are distinguished according to the deeper sense? They
are: (1) sameness of letters, (2) sameness of words, (3) sameness of teachings,
and (4) sameness of the body. According to this fourfold sameness in the deeper
sense, the Tathagatas, Arhats, Fully-Enlightened Ones make the announcement
before the congregation.
2 Saṁdhāya. There is no reference to this in Wei
and Sung. The term has a special sense here and elsewhere in the Laṅkāvatāra.
Now, Mahāmati, what is the sameness of letters?
It is that my name is [spelt] B-u-d-d-h-a, and these letters are also used for
other Buddhas and Blessed Ones; Mahāmati, these letters in their nature are not
to be distinguished one from another; therefore, Mahāmati, there is the
sameness of letters.
Now, Mahāmati, what is the sameness of words
with regard to the Tathagatas, Arhats, and (142) Fully-Enlightened Ones? It is
that sixty-four sounds of the Brahman language are distinguished by me, and
these identical sixty-four sounds of the Brahman language are also uttered by
the Tathagatas, Arhats, and Fully-Enlightened Ones, and their Kalaviṅka-like
notes are the same with all of us, as we are indistinguishable in this respect.
Now, Mahāmati, what is the sameness of the body?
It is that I and other Tathagatas, Arhats, Fully-Enlightened Ones are the same
as regards our Dharmakāya and the [thirty-two] signs and the [eighty] minor
excellencies of bodily perfection—no distinction existing among us, except that
the Tathagatas manifest varieties of forms according to the different
dispositions of beings, who are to be disciplined by varieties of means.
Now, Mahāmati, what is the sameness of the
teaching? It is that I as well as they [other Tathagatas] are all conversant
with the teachings belonging to the thirty-seven branches of enlightenment.
According to the deeper sense which is concerned with this fourfold sameness, the
Tathagatas, Arhats, Fully-Enlightened Ones make their announcement before the
congregation. So it is said:
6. "I am Kāśyapa, Krakucchanda, and
Kanakamuni"; this I preach who come out of the sameness for the sake of
the sons of the Buddha.
LXI
Again Mahāmati said: It is said by the Blessed
One that from the night of the Enlightenment till the night of the Parinirvana,
the Tathagata (143) in the meantime has not uttered even a word, nor will he
ever utter; for not-speaking is the Buddha's speaking. According to what deeper
sense is it that not-speaking is the Buddha's speaking?
The Blessed One replied: By reason of two things
of the deeper sense, Mahāmati, this statement is made. What are the two things:
They are the truth of self-realisation and an eternally-abiding reality.
According to these two things of the deeper sense the statement is made by me.
Of what deeper sense is the truth of self-realisation? What has been realised
by the Tathagatas, that is my own realisation, in which there is neither
decreasing nor increasing; for the realm of self-realisation is free from words
and discriminations, having nothing to do with dualistic terminology.
What is meant by an eternally-abiding reality?
The ancient road of reality, Mahāmati, has been here all the time, like gold,
silver, or pearl preserved in the mine, Mahāmati; the Dharmadhātu abides
foreover, whether the Tathagata appears in the world or not; as the Tathagata
eternally abides so does the reason (dharmatā) of all things; reality foreover
abides, reality keeps its order, like the roads in an ancient city. For
instance, Mahāmati, a man who is walking in a forest and discovering an ancient
city with its orderly streets may enter into the city, and having entered into
it, he may have a rest, conduct himself like a citizen, and enjoy all the
pleasures accruing therefrom. (144) What do you think, Mahāmati? Did this man
make the road along which he enters into the city, and also the various things
in the city?
Mahāmati said: No, Blessed One.
The Blessed One said: Just so, Mahāmati, what
has been realised by myself and other Tathagatas is this reality, the
eternally-abiding reality (sthititā), the self-regulating reality (niyāmatā),
the suchness of things (tathatā), the realness of things (bhūtatā), the truth
itself (satyatā). For this reason, Mahāmati, it is stated by me that from the
night of the Tathagata's Enlightenment till the night of his entrance into
Nirvana, he has not in the meantime uttered, nor ever will utter, one word. So
it is said:
7. From the night of Enlightenment till that of
Nirvana, I have not in the meantime made any proclamation whatever.1
8. It is on account of the deeper meaning that
the eternally-abiding reality of self-realisation is talked of by me; and
between myself and [all the other] Buddhas, in this respect, there is no
distinction whatever.
1 The Zen masters frequently refer to this
important declaration.
LXII
At that time, Mahāmati made this request of the
Blessed One: Pray tell me, Blessed One, about the being and non-being of all
things; and when myself and other Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas are freed of the
notions of being and non-being, may we quickly attain supreme enlightenment.
(145) The Blessed One replied: Then, Mahāmati,
listen well and reflect well within yourself; I will tell you.
Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said,
Certainly, Blessed One, and gave ear to the Blessed One.
Then the Blessed One said: People of this world
are dependent on two things, Mahāmati, that is, they are dependent on the idea
of being and on that of non-being, and they fall into the views whereby they
take pleasure either in nihilism or in realism. They imagine emancipation where
there is no emancipation.
Now, Mahāmati, who are the people dependent on
the notion of being? It means this that they regard the world as rising from
causation which is really existent, and that the actually existing and becoming
world does not take its rise from causation which is non-existent. This will
not be the case if the world is something non-existing. They thus talk of the
really-existing world as arising from the reality of causation. This is the
realistic view of causation as held by some people.
Now, Mahāmati, what is meant by being dependent
upon the idea of non-being? It means, Mahāmati, admitting greed, anger, and
folly, and yet discriminating as regards the non-reality of what makes up
greed, anger, and folly; and, Mahāmati, there is one who does not admit the
reality of things because of their being devoid of individual marks; and there
is another who, seeing that the Buddhas, Śrāvakas, and Pratyekabuddhas are free
from greed, anger, and folly, because of all things being devoid of individual marks,
[think that greed, anger, and folly] do not exist.
Now, Mahāmati, who of these is the one doomed to
ruin?
Said Mahāmati; Blessed One, it is he who,
admitting greed, anger, and folly, yet refuses to admit them.
(146) The Blessed One said: Well said indeed,
Mahāmati! Again thou hast indeed spoken well, Mahāmati! Not only is he himself
doomed to ruin because of his notion of greed, anger, and folly as existent and
yet as not-existent, but he ruins even the character of the Buddha, the
Śrāvaka, and the Pratyekabuddha. Why? Because the passions are not to be taken
hold of innerly and outwardly, because they are neither different nor
not-different. Mahāmati, greed, anger, and folly too are not to be taken hold
of innerly as well as outwardly; they have no substance of their own and they
are not to be admitted; Mahāmati, as there is no reality in the nature of
greed, anger, and folly, [he who fails to understand this] is the one who ruins
the character of the Buddha, Śrāvaka, and Pratyekabuddha. The Buddha, Śrāvaka,
and Pratyekabuddha are by nature emancipated as there is in them no cause for
being bound and binding; Mahāmati, [on the other hand,] where there is a state
of being bound there are the binding and the cause of bondage. [And yet there
is] one who talks thus, [that is, denies causation]; such is doomed to ruin.
Mahāmati, this characterises nihilism and realism.
This is stated by me in accordance with the
deeper sense. It is better to cherish the notion of an ego-substance as much as
Mount Sumeru than to have the notion of emptiness derived from the
self-conceited view of being and non-being. One who is conceited in the view of
being and non-being is indeed doomed to ruin. Those who are delighted in
cherishing notions of individuality and generality fail to understand that an
external world is nothing but Mind itself and has no reality; and as they do
not understand this they regard things external as transient, for they suffer
every moment changes which follow one after another, now splitting, now dividing,
while the Skandhas, Dhātus, and Āyatanas succeeding one another and combining
with one another, now come forward and (147) now pass away. They who thus
disregarding words of the scriptures are given up to wrong discriminations are
also doomed to ruin. So it is said:
9. As far as the duality of being and non-being
extends, there is the realm of intellection; when this realm vanishes,
intellection completely ceases.
10. When the external world is not grasped [as
real] there is neither causation nor reality; there is the essence of suchness
(thatatā), which is the [spiritual] realm of the wise.
11. Those who believe in the birth of something
that has never been in existence and, coming to exist, finally vanishes away,
—which leads them to assert that things come to exist, things pass away,
according to causation, —such people have no foothold in my teaching.
12. It is not by the philosophers, not by the
Buddhas, not by myself, not by anybody else, but by causation that being
obtains; how can one talk of non-being?
13. When being obtains by causation, who can
bring about non-being? By reason of the wrong views based on the doctrine of
birth, being and non-being are discriminated.
14. When it is realised that there is nothing
born, nothing passing away, there is no way to admit its being and not-being;
the world is to be regarded as quiescent.
LXIII
At that time again Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva requested of the Blessed One, saying: Pray point out to
me, Blessed One; pray point out to me, Sugata; pray point out to me, Tathagata,
Arhat, Fully-Enlightened One! Pray tell me, Most Excellent One! (148) What is
the characteristic of the realisation by which I and other
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas, becoming thoroughly conversant with its meaning, may quickly
attain the highest enlightenment, and, relying upon themselves, will not be led
away by any speculations or philosophies?
Said the Blessed One: Then listen well,
Mahāmati, and well reflect within yourself; I will tell you.
Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said;
Certainly, I will; and gave ear to the Blessed One.
Thereupon the Blessed One said this: There are
two ways of characterising the realisation attained by all the Śrāvakas, the
Pratyekabuddhas, and the Bodhisattvas: the realisation itself and the teaching
[about it]. Now, Mahāmati, by the realisation itself is meant that it is the
realm of inner attainment; its characteristic features are that it has nothing
to do with words, discriminations, and letters; that it leads one up to the
realm of non-outflows; that it is the state of an inner experience; that it is
entirely devoid of philosophical speculations and [the doings of] evil beings;
and that, destroying philosophical speculations and [the doings of] evil
beings, it shines out in its own inner light of attainment. These, Mahāmati,
are the characteristics of the realisation.
Now, Mahāmati, what is meant by the teaching
[concerning it]? It is variously given in the nine divisions of the doctrinal
works; it keeps one away from the dualistic notions of being and non-being, of
oneness and otherness; first making use of skilful means and expedients, it
induces all beings to have a perception [of this teaching] so that whoever is
inclined towards it, may be instructed in it. This, Mahāmati, is the
characteristic of the teaching. Let, therefore, Mahāmati, you and other
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas (149) exert yourselves in this.
15. Realisation and teaching, self-attainment
and doctrinal instruction—those who have an insight into the difference will not
be led away by philosophical authorities.
16. There is no truth in any object that is
imagined by the ignorant; deliverance is where there is no objective world; why
is this not sought by the speculators?
17. The world of the Saṁskritas is observed as
the continuation of birth-and-death, whereby dualisms are nourished, and
because of this perversion [the truth] is not perceived.
18. There is just one truth, which is Nirvana—it
has nothing to do with the Manas (intellection); the world seen as subject to
discrimination resembles a plantain tree, a dream,1 a vision.
19. No greed there is, no anger, nor folly
either, and again, no personal ego; from desire start the Skandhas, which
resemble a dream.
1 The text has skandha; but svapna seems to be
better.
LXIV
At that time again Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva requested of the Blessed One, saying: Pray tell me,
Blessed One, pray tell me, Sugata, regarding what characterises wrong
discrimination (abhūtaparikalpa). Blessed One, tell me as to the how, what,
why, and who of wrong discrimination, which, when rising and going on,
constitutes what is known as wrong discrimination; that is to say, to what kind
of thought is the term wrong discrimination applicable? or what kind of
discrimination is to be called wrong?
(150) The Blessed One said: Well said, well
said, Mahāmati; and again, well said, indeed, Mahāmati! You who have been
admitted [into the order of Bodhisattvas], Mahāmati, think of this matter which
is worth asking about, for the welfare of many people, for the happiness of
many people, because of your compassion for the world, for the benefit of the
multitudes, for the welfare and happiness of celestial beings and humankind.
Therefore, Mahāmati, listen well and reflect well within yourself as I tell
you.
Certainly, Blessed One; said Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva, and gave ear to the Blessed One.
Then the Blessed One said thus to him: When the
multitudinousness of objects is wrongly imagined [as real] and attached to,
discrimination goes on evolving; and, Mahāmati, as people are attached
tenaciously to the notion of grasping, as they have not ascertained in their
minds as to the nature of the objective world which is no more than the Mind
itself, as they have fallen into the dualistic view of being and non-being,
and, Mahāmati, as they are nourished by the habit-energy of the views and
discriminations of the philosophers, they perceive the multitudinousness of
external objects [as real] and become attached to them; and for this reason a
system of mentation—mind and what belongs to it —is discriminated and is spoken
of [as real], and with the assertion of an ego-soul and its belongings, the
system goes on functioning.
Said Mahāmati: As you say, Blessed One, when the
multitudinousness of external objects is wrongly imagined [as real] and
attached to by people, discrimination goes evolving on; and they fall into the
dualistic view of being and non-being,1 they nourish the views and
discriminations of the philosophers which are based on the notion of grasped
and grasping; (151) and as they perceive the multitudinousness of external
objects [as real] and become attached to them, a system of mentation—mind and
what belongs to it —is discriminated and is spoken of [as real] and goes on
functioning owing to the fact that the external world is not recognised as
nothing but the Mind itself, and that the multitudinousness of things is
tenaciously clung to as subject to [the notion of] being and non-being. This
being the case, Blessed One, the multitudinousness of external objects which is
characterised with the dualism of being and non-being, is to be said neither
existent nor non-existent, and does not render itself to the formation of the
philosophical views. [Inasmuch as the external world owes its existence to discrimination,
it in itself must be said to be devoid of all forms of dualism.] Blessed One,
in the same way the highest reality is declared to be devoid of [all forms of
logical analysis such as] the means of proof, sense-perception, syllogistic
arguments, illustration, reasoning, etc. How is it, Blessed One, that while, on
the one hand, the discrimination of multiplicity is said to go on operating on
the strength of the attachment which attaches itself to the multiplicity of
external unrealities, the attachment, on the other hand, to the highest reality
does not give rise to discrimination which goes on functioning in its own way?
Is it not, Blessed One, unfair reasoning on your part to say, "It gives
rise [to discrimination]" in one place, and to say in another place,
"It does not"? 2According to the Blessed One, depending on and
attaching to the dualism of being and non-being, there evolve views
characteristic of wrong discrimination as when the magician produces varieties
of people that are not at all real and complete objects. Thus signs of
existence and non-existence are falsely imagined and go on so imagined; [but in
fact existence itself is] devoid of discrimination. If so, how does one come to
cherish the dualism as held by a man of the world?
1 This is omitted in T'ang.
2 The whole passage below does not appear in
Sung. The text seems to be confused and it is difficult to make out what it
really means. The present translation is merely tentative. It mainly follows
the T'ang interpretation; Wei gives no sense as far as one can see.
Said the Blessed One: Mahāmati, discrimination,
indeed, does not evolve, nor is it put away. Why? Because there is no evolving
of discrimination as regards being and non-being; because the perception of
objective realities is not real; because all that is seen is to be recognised
as nothing but the Mind itself. (152) Mahāmati, discrimination does not evolve,
nor is it put away. But, Mahāmati, for the sake of the ignorant who are
addicted to discriminating the multiplicity of things which are of their own
Mind, it is said by me that discrimination whose first function is to produce
effects takes its rise owing to the attachment to the aspect of multiplicity as
characteristic of objects. How otherwise, Mahāmati, can the ignorant and
simple-minded have an insight into the Mind itself which they discriminate, and
see themselves freed from the notion of an ego and what belongs to it, and also
freed from the wrong conception of cause and effect? And, again, how can they
recognise that there is nothing but Mind itself and cause a revulsion at the
inmost seat of consciousness (cittāśraya)? How can they have a clear perception
of all the stages and attain the inner realisation of the Tathagatas, which
transcends the five Dharmas, the three Svabhāvas, and the idea of reality as
well as discrimination? For this reason, Mahāmati, I state that discrimination
takes its rise from our attachment to the multiplicity of objects which are not
real, and that emancipation comes from our thoroughly understanding the meaning
of reality as it is and also the meaning of multiplicity of things which evolve
from discrimination. So it is said:
20. Those who, regarding the world as evolving
from causes and conditions, are attached to these notions as well as to the
fourfold proposition, fail to understand my teaching.
21. The world cannot be predicated anywhere as
being, or as non-being, or as being-and-non-being, as is discriminated by the
ignorant who regard it as subject to causes and conditions,
22. When the world is seen [to be unpredicable
with such notions as] being, non-being, or being-and-non-being, (153) a change
takes place in the mind, and egolessness is attained.
23. All things are unborn because they are born
of causation; anything that is born of causation is an effect, and from an
effect nothing is produced.
24. From an effect no effect is produced; [if
you assert this,] you commit the fault of a double effect; and this double
effect being untenable, no existence comes from an effect.
25. When the Saṁskṛita [i. e. anything produced]
is regarded as free from [the dualism of] depended and depending, there
decidedly is Mind-only, and hence my teaching of Mind-only.
26. The [Mind as] norm is the abode of
self-nature which has nothing to do with a world of causation; of this norm
which is perfect existence and the highest Brahma, 1 I speak.
27. An ego-soul is a truth belonging to
thought-construction, in which there is no real reality; the self-nature of the
Skandhas is also a thought-construction, as there is no reality in it.
1 The Chinese all have "the Pure" for
this. Does it mean "the Absolute" cleansed of all dualistic
impurities?
28. The sameness is of four kinds: individual
forms, cause, the coming into being,1 and the sameness of non-ego is the
fourth: these are subjects of discipline for the Yogins.
29. [There is a state which is] removed from all
philosophical views, free from imagined and imagining, of no attainment, and of
no birth—this I call Mind-norm.
30. Of neither existence nor non-existence do I
speak, but of Mind-only which has nothing to do with existence and
non-existence, and which is thus2 free from intellection.
(154) 31. Suchness (tathatā), emptiness, realm
of truth (dharmadhātu), the various forms of the will-body— these I call
Mind-only.
32. Multiplicity of objects evolves from the
conjunction of habit-energy and discrimination; it is born of Mind, but is regarded
by people as existing outwardly: this I call Mind-only.
33. The external world is not, and multiplicity
of objects is what is seen of Mind; body, property, and abode— these I call
Mind-only.
1 Bhāvaja, coming into existence.
2 Tathā, not tathatā, according to the Chinese
versions.
LXV
At that time Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
said this to the Blessed One: This is said by the Blessed One that the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva and others should not grasp meaning [or reality, artha],
according to words. But, Blessed One, why should not the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
grasp meaning from words? What are words? What is meaning?
Said the Blessed One: Then, Mahāmati, listen
well and reflect within yourself well; I will tell you.
Thereupon said Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva,
Certainly, Blessed One; and gave ear to the Blessed One.
The Blessed One then said this to him: Now,
Mahāmati, how is speech produced? Depending on discrimination and habit-energy
[or memory] as the cause, there is the conjunction and the distinction of
sounds and letters, which, issuing from the teeth, jaws, palate, tongue, lips,
and the cavity of the mouth, make mutual conversations possible. This is
speech. Now, Mahāmati, what is meaning? (155) The Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva is
said to have grasped meaning well, when, all alone in a lonely place, he walks
the path leading to Nirvana, by means of his transcendental wisdom (prajñā)
which grows from learning, thinking, and meditation, and causing a revulsion
first at the source of habit-energy by his self-knowledge (svabuddhi), abides
on the stages of self-realisation where he leads a life full of excellent
deeds.
Further, Mahāmati, the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
who is conversant with words and meaning observes that words are neither
different nor not-different from meaning and that meaning stands in the same
relation to words. If, Mahāmati, meaning is different from words, it will not
be made manifest by means of words; but meaning is entered into by words as
things [are revealed] by a lamp. It is, Mahāmati, like a man carrying a lamp to
look after his property. [By means of this light] he can say: This is my
property and so is kept in this place. Just so, Mahāmati, by means of the lamp
of words and speech originating from discrimination, the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas
can enter into the exalted state of self-realisation which is free from
speech-discrimination.
Further, Mahāmati, if a man becomes attached to
the [literal] meaning or words and holds fast to their agreement in regard to
the original state of Nirvana which is unborn and undying, the Triple vehicle,
the one vehicle, the five [Dharmas], mentation, the [three] Svabhāvas, etc., he
will come to cherish views either affirmative or negative. As varieties of
objects are seen in Māyā and are discriminated [as real], statements are
erroneously made, discriminations erroneously go on. (156) It is by the
ignorant that discriminations thus go on; it is otherwise with the wise.1
1 The reading is move or less after T'ang.
Abhiniveśaṁ pratītya (p. 155, line 15) is dropped, and tad yathā mahāmate
anyathā hi māyā-vaicitryaṁ drashṭavyam avyathā (p. 155, line 17—p. 156, line 1)
does not appear in T'ang, and as it is partly a repetition of what precedes,
not to speak of its making the whole passage obscure, it is omitted in this
translation.
So it is said:
34. 1Those who following words, discriminate and
assert various notions, are bound for hell because of their assertions.
35. The ego-soul is not with the Skandhas, nor
are the Skandhas in the ego-soul. They are not as they are discriminated, nor
are they otherwise.
36. The reality of objects is seen being
discriminated by the ignorant; if it were so as they are seen, all would be
seeing the truth.
37. As all things are unreal, there is neither
defilement nor purity; things are not as they are seen, nor are they otherwise.
LXVI
Further, Mahāmati, I will tell you about the
features of Jñāna (absolute knowledge) and Vijñāna (relative knowledge)2; and
when you and other Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas are well conversant with these
distinctive features of Jñāna and Vijñāna, you will quickly realise supreme
enlightenment. There are three kinds of Jñāna—worldly, super-worldly, and
transcendental. Now, worldly knowledge belongs to the philosophers and to the
ignorant and simple-minded who are attached to the dualistic views of being and
non-being. Super-worldly knowledge belongs to all the Śrāvakas and
Pratyekabuddhas who are attached to the notions of individuality and
generality. Transcendental knowledge which is free from the dualism of being
and non-being, belongs to the Bodhisattvas and takes its rise when they
thoroughly examine things of imagelessness, see into the state of no-birth and
no-annihilation, and realise egolessness at the stage of Tathagatahood.3
1 According to the Chinese versions.
2 The use of vijñāna in this sense is unusual in
the Laṅkā; while jñāna, āryajñāna, prajñā, and buddhi are frequently used as
synonyms.
3 The passage between "Now, worldly
knowledge" and "Tathagatahood" which is restored here according
to T'ang and Sung, is found in the Sanskrit text inserted after the next
paragraph, p. 157, 11. 8-13.
(157) Vijñāna is subject to birth and
destruction, and Jñāna is not subject to birth and destruction. Further,
Mahāmati, Vijñāna falls into [the dualism of] form and no-form, being and
non-being, and is characterised with multiplicity; but Jñāna is marked with the
transcendence of [the dualism of] form and no-form. Further, Mahāmati, Vijñāna
is characterised with accumulation and Jñāna with non-accumulation. Jñāna is of
three kinds: that which assertains individuality and generality, that which
assertains birth and decay, and that which assertains no-birth and no-decay.
Further, Mahāmati, Jñāna is devoid of
attachment; Vijñāna attaches itself to the multitudinousness of objects. Again,
Vijñāna is produced from the concordance of the triple combination;1 Jñāna, in
its self-nature, has nothing to do with combination or concordance. Again,
Mahāmati,2 Jñāna is characterised with unattainability; it is the inner state
of self-realisation by noble wisdom, (158) and as it neither enters nor goes
out, it is like the moon in water. So it is said:
38. Karma is accumulated by Citta, and
discriminated by Jñāna; and one acquires by Prajñā the state of imagelessness
and the powers.
39. Citta is bound up with an objective world,
Jñāna evolves with reflection; and Prajñā evolves in the exalted state of
imagelessness and in the excellent conditions.
40. Citta, Manas, and Vijñāna are devoid of
thoughts and discriminations;3 it is the Śrāvakas and not the Bodhisattvas that
try to reach reality by means of discrimination.
1 Read trisaṁgatyutpādayogalaksanam (lines
15-10), and asaṁgatiyogasva° (line 16), according to Sung and T'ang.
2 T'ang and Sung have inserted here: Vijñāna is
characterised with attainability.
3 Is this in accord with the general drift of
thought maintained in the text? T'ang and Sung have: Citta, Manas, and Vijñāna,
when devoid of thought and discrimination, attain the state of
non-discrimination; this belongs to the Bodhisattvas and not to the Śrāvakas.
41. The Tathagata's Jñāna is pure, [resting] in
quietude in the most excellent patience [or recognition of truth]; it is
productive of excellent sense and is devoid of purposive-ness
(samudācāra-varijitam).
42. Prajñā, with me, is of three kinds; whereby
the wise grow powerful, individual signs are discriminated, and all things are
manifested.1
43. My Prajñā has nothing to do with the two
vehicles, it excludes the world of beings; that of the Śrāvakas evolves from
their attachment to the world of beings; the Tathagata's Prajñā is spotless2
because of its being in accord with Mind-only.
1 After T'ang.
2 Read amalā, not matā.
LXVII
Further, Mahāmati, there are nine kinds of
transformation as held by the philosophers endorsing the doctrine of
transformation. They are: (1) the transformation of form; (159) (2) the
transformation of characteristics; (3) the transformation of cause; (4) the
transformation of concordance; (5) the transformation of view; (6) the
transformation of origin; (7) the transformation of nature; (8) the
transformation of manifest conditions; and (9) the transformation of manifest
work. These, Mahāmati, are the nine views of transformation expounded by all
the philosophers in accordance with their secret teaching, and they are all
founded upon the dualism of being and non-being.
Now, Mahāmati, by the transformation of form is
meant the alteration of form in appearance as gold takes various shapes when
made into all kinds of ornament. For example: gold is seen made into a
bracelet, a necklace, a fylfot, or what not; though the gold itself remains the
same, varieties of articles [made of it] are all different in form, that is, in
their transformations. In the same way, Mahāmati, there is a general transformation
of things which is discriminated by other philosophers as coming from a causal
agency. They are not right, nor are they otherwise. All differentiation in
transformation is to be regarded as due to discrimination, such as the
thickening of milk into curds and the ripening of fruit into a liquor.
Mahāmati, like this thickening and ripening each transformation is a
transformation rising from discrimination, which is discriminated by the
philosophers; really there is nothing transformed, for the external objects of
which being and non-being are discriminated, are what is seen of Mind itself
and have no reality of their own. In the same way, Mahāmati, what is regarded
by the ignorant and simple-minded as the evolving of objects is no more than
the discrimination of their own mind, and, (160) Mahāmati, there is really
nothing evolving, nothing disappearing, as it is like seeing things that evolve
in a vision and a dream. Mahāmati, it is like perceiving the rise and
disappearance of things in a dream; it is like the birth and death of a barren
woman's child. So it is said:
44. The transformation of the form in time, and
the embracing [of the soul] in the elements and sense-organs, which is in its
middle-way existence (antarābhava)—they who [thus] imagine [the birth of a
child] are not wise men.
45. The Buddhas do not discriminate the world as
subject to the chain of origination; but they regard the causation which rules
this world as something like the city of the Gandharvas.
LXVIII
At that time, Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
asked the Blessed One to explain concerning the deep-seated attachment to the
existence of all things and the way of emancipation, saying: Pray tell me,
Blessed One, pray tell me Tathagata, Arhat, Fully-Enlightened One, concerning the
characteristics of our deep attachment to existence and of our detachment from
it. When I and other Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas understand well the distinction
between attachment and detachment, we shall know what is the skilful means
concerning them, and shall no more become attached to words according to which
we grasp meaning. When we understand well what is meant by attachment to the
existence of all things and the detachment from them, we shall destroy our
discrimination of words and letters; and, by means of our wisdom (buddhi),
enter into all the Buddha-lands and assemblies; be well stamped with the stamp
of the powers, the self-control, the psychic faculties, and the Dhāranīs; and,
well furnished with the wisdom (buddhi) in the ten inexhaustible vows and
shining with varieties of rays pertaining to the Transformation Body, (161)
behave ourselves with effortlessness like the moon, the sun, the jewel, and the
elements; and hold such views at every stage as are free from all the signs of
self-discrimination; and, seeing that all things are like a dream, like Māyā,
etc., [shall be able to] enter the stage and abode of Buddhahood, and deliver
discourses on the Dharma in the world of all beings and ill accordance with
their needs, and free them from the dualistic notion of being and non-being in
the contemplation of all things which are like a dream and Māyā, and free them
also from the false discrimination of birth and destruction; and. finally,
[shall be able to] establish ourselves where there is a revulsion at the
deepest recesses [of our consciousness], which is more than words [can
express].
Said the Blessed One: Well said, well said,
Mahāmati! Listen well to me then, Mahāmati, and reflect well within yourself; I
will tell you.
Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said,
Certainly, I will, Blessed One; and gave ear to the Blessed One.
The Blessed One said to him thus: Mahāmati,
immeasurable is our deep-seated attachment to the existence of all things the
significance of which we try to understand after words. For instance, there are
the deep-seated attachments to signs of individuality, to causation, to the
notion of being and non-being, to the discrimination of birth and no-birth, to
the discrimination of cessation and no-cessation, to the discrimination of
vehicle and no-vehicle, of Saṁskṛita and Asaṁskṛita, of the characteristics of
the stages and no-stages, and the attachment to discrimination itself, and to
that arising from enlightenment, the attachment to the discrimination of being
and non-being on which the philosophers are so dependent, and the attachment to
the triple vehicle and the one vehicle, which are discriminated.
These and others, Mahāmati, are the deep-seated
attachments cherished by the ignorant and simple-minded (162) to their
discriminations. Tenaciously attaching themselves to these the ignorant and
simple-minded go on ever discriminating like the silk-worms who, with their own
thread of discrimination and attachment, enwrap not only themselves but others
and are charmed with the thread; and thus they are ever tenaciously attached to
the notions of existence and non-existence. [But really] Mahāmati, there are no
signs here of deep-seated attachment or detachment. All things are to be seen
as abiding in solitude where there is no evolving of discrimination. Mahāmati,
the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva should have his abode where he can see all things
from the viewpoint of solitude.
Further, Mahāmati, when the existence and
non-existence of the external world are understood to be due to the seeing of
the Mind itself in these signs, [the Bodhisattva] can enter upon the state of
imagelessness where Mind-only is, and [there] see into the solitude which
characterises the discrimination of all things as being and non-being and the
deep-seated attachments resulting therefrom. This being so, there are in all
things no signs of a deep-rooted attachment or of detachment. Here, Mahāmati,
is nobody in bondage, nobody in emancipation, except those who by reason of
their perverted wisdom1 recognise bondage and emancipation. Why? Because in all
things neither being nor non-being is to be taken hold of.
Further, Mahāmati, there are three attachments
deep-seated in the minds of the ignorant and simple-minded. They are greed,
anger, and folly; and thus there is desire which is procreative and is
accompanied by joy and greed; closely attached to this there takes place a
succession of births in the [five] paths. Thus there are the five paths of
existence for all beings who are found closely attached [to greed, anger, and
folly]. When one is cut off from this attachment, (163) no signs will be seen
indicative of attachment or of non-attachment.
1 Read buddhyā, instead of budhyā.
Further, Mahāmati, depending upon and attaching
to the triple combination which works in unison, there is the continuation of
the Vijñānas incessantly functioning; and because of the attachment there is a
continued and deep-felt assertion of existence. When the triple combination
which causes the functioning of the Vijñānas no more takes place, there is the
triple emancipation, and when this is kept in view, there is no rising of any
combination. So it is said:
46. The imagining of things not existent—this is
characteristic of attachment [deeply seated in all beings]; when the truth of
this is thoroughly understood, the net of attachment is cleared away.
47. The ignorant take hold of the knowledge of
existence according to words and are bound up like the silk-worm with their own
discriminations; hence their ignorance of attachment [deeply seated in their
minds].
LXIX
Further, Mahāmati said: According to the Blessed
One, in all things that are variously discriminated by discrimination there is
no self-nature, as it is nothing but [the creation of] false imagination
(parikalpita); if, Blessed One, it is but [the creation of] false imagination
and there is nothing in the world which is to be conceived as indicative of
self-nature, does it not, Blessed One, come to this, according to your
statement, that there is neither defilement nor purification, because all
things are of the nature of false imagination?
Said the Blessed One: Mahāmati, it is just as
you say. The self-nature of things is the discrimination of the ignorant and
simple-minded, and it is not as it- is discriminated by them. (164) Mahāmati,
it is the creation of false imagination; nothing indicative of self-nature is
to be ascertained. But, Mahāmati, there is the self-nature of things such as is
ascertained by the wise, by their wise knowledge, by their wise insight, by
their wise transcendental vision.
Said Mahāmati: Blessed One, if there is the
self-nature of things such as is ascertained by the wise, by their wise
knowledge, by their wise insight, by their wise transcendental vision which is
neither human nor celestial vision, and if there is no such self-nature as is
discriminated by the ignorant and simple-minded, how, Blessed One, can the
ignorant and the simple-minded abandon their discriminations, as they have no
way to recognise the presence of an exalted reality (āryabhāvavastu)? For they
are neither perverted nor unperverted, Blessed One. [that is, they are what
they are]. Why? Because they are unable to have an insight into the self-nature
of exalted reality, because they see the course of things in the aspect of
being and non-being. And Blessed One, the reality1 cannot be such as is discriminated
even by the wise, because the aspect of reality as it is in itself cannot be an
object [of discrimination by anybody]; because, Blessed One, what appears to
the wise as the self-nature of reality is no more than the creation of their
imagination, which is predicable with the notion of causation and no-causation;
that is, they also cherish in their own way the idea of a being with
self-nature. [And they would say] that this is a realm that belongs to somebody
else and is not that [of the ignorant]. This is committing the fault of
non-finality, for thus what constitutes the self-nature of reality becomes
impossible to know. Blessed One, what is derived from the imagination cannot be
the self-nature of reality. How is it (165) that while things are said to exist
owing to the imagination2 [or discrimination], they are said again not to be
such as are imagined?
1 Vastu and bhāva are both used here in the
sense of reality.
2 Throughout this text, parikalpa, vikalpa,
pratikalpa, and prativikalpa are used interchangeably
Blessed One, [it is true that] according to the
way the imagination is carried on, the self-nature of reality conceived may
vary; for when the cause is not alike, the notion of reality that thus comes to
be cherished may not be alike. But according to you, Blessed One, while the
imagination is kept on going with the wise as well as with the ignorant, the
latter alone fail to see reality as it is; and yet you tell us that the reason
why it is said that things are not really such as are imagined by the
imagination is to make all beings discard their imagination. Now, Blessed One,
is it that in order to have all beings free from the notion of being [which is
realism] and of non-being [which is nihilism], you in turn make them cherish a
realistic view of existence1 by telling them to uphold the idea of the
self-nature of reality, whereby they are led to cling to the realm of noble
wisdom? Why do you deny the truth of solitude by teaching the doctrine of
reality whose self-nature is [according to you] noble wisdom?2
Said the Blessed One: Mahāmati, it is not true
that I deny truth of solitude, nor that I fall into a realistic view by
upholding the noble doctrine of self-existing reality. But in order to save all
beings from becoming frightened, who are addicted from beginningless past to
the notion of self-nature, it is told them that there is truth of solitude,
after making them realise by means of noble wisdom that reality in its
self-nature is made the subject of attachment [by the ignorant]. Mahāmati, the
doctrine of self-nature is not taught by me. But, Mahāmati, those who have
realised by themselves truth of solitude as it really is and are abiding in it,
will see that [this existence of] error has no form; and thereby knowing that
what is seen is nothing but the Mind itself, (166) they are kept away from
[dualistically] viewing an external world3 under the aspect of being and
non-being; they are stamped well with the stamp of suchness which is gained by
the triple emancipation; they will have an intuition into the self-nature of
all things by the wisdom which is acquired within themselves, and thus get away
from such ideas of reality as to lead themselves to realism and nihilism.
1 Not abhiniveśānnāstitvadṛishṭih (lines 8-9) as
it stands in the text, but abhiniveśādastitva° according to T'ang and Sung.
2 This whole passage ascribed to Mahāmati is one
of the most difficult passages in the Laṅkāvatāra, partly due to discrepancies.
The translator is not at all satisfied with the result. In the Appendix the
whole section 69 is given in the original Sanskrit together with all the four
versions, Chinese and Tibetan.
3 Viviktadharma......yathātathya (lines 2-3)
being a curious repetition of the preceding lines is dropped in the
translation.
LXX
Further, Mahāmati, the thesis: "All things
are unborn" is not to be maintained by the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva as
valid. Why? Of this thesis it is to be stated that anything of which something
is asserted partakes thereby of the nature of being, and that the reason for
this thesis is characterised with the quality of birth; while it is being
asserted by the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva that all things are unborn, the very
assertion destroys his thesis. The thesis that all things are unborn acts
against the one who holds it because it is born of the principle of mutuality.
Even when this thesis of no-birth is to be maintained within the extent of
existence itself, the notion of no-birth cannot hold itself in it, and the
statement, the thesis, that all things are unborn is destroyed since it is
dependent on the members of the syllogism. As regards the thesis maintaining
the no-birth1 of being and non-being, Mahāmati, this thesis, to be valid, must
be within the limits of existence itself; but there is no aspect of existence
which can be regarded either as being or as non-being. If, Mahāmati, the
no-birth of all things is to be asserted by this thesis of no-birth, (167) the
very attempt defeats the thesis itself.2 Therefore, this thesis is not to be
upheld. Because many faults come out in connection with the members of the
syllogism, and because in these syllogistic members there is a mutual mixing-up
of reasons, this thesis is not to be upheld.
1 Literally, "is not born."
2 Pratijñāyāṁ......pratijñā bhavati (lines 1-4)
is omitted in the translation following T'ang and Sung, as it does not add to
the clearing up of the meaning.
As with [the thesis that] all things are unborn,
so with [the thesis that] all things are empty and have no self-nature—neither
is to be maintained by the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva. But, Mahāmati, this is to be
pointed out by the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva, that things in their self-nature are
like Māyā, like a dream; for they are in one way perceived [as existing] and in
another way are not perceived [as such], and all things are thus seen in [two]
ways, in accordance either with knowledge or ignorance. Let it be pointed out
that all things are like Māyā and a dream, except when the feeling of fear is
aroused in the minds of the ignorant. Mahāmati, the ignorant and the
simple-minded are addicted to the views of being and non-being, and are liable
to tremble [at our teaching]; Mahāmati, let them not be frightened away from
the Mahāyāna. So it is said:
48. There is no self-nature, no
thought-construction, no reality, no Ālaya-vijñāna; these, indeed, are so many
discriminations cherished by the ignorant who like a corpse are bad logicians.
(168) 49. All things are unborn—[this thesis] is
established by all the philosophers; [but] nothing whatever is ever born, [no
establishment is needed,] things are all linked by causation.
50. All things are unborn—no such discrimination
is made by transcendental knowledge; when a certain conclusion is made
depending on a cause, there is no sound judgment in it.
51. As a hair-net is what is wrongly perceived
by those who are dim-eyed, so existence discriminated [as real] is due to the
wrong discrimination of the ignorant.
52. The triple world is no more than
thought-construction (prajñapti), there is no reality in its self-nature; by
means of this thought-constructed reality, logicians go on discriminating.
53. Individual form, reality,
thought-construction, — these are [only] a mental disturbance; transcending all
this, my sons will walk where there is no discrimination.
54. As in a mirage in the air, the thought of
water is cherished where there is no water, so things are seen by the ignorant
otherwise than by the wise.
55. The insight of the wise, who move about in
the realm of imagelessness, is pure, is born of the triple emancipation, is
released from birth and destruction.
56. Where all things are wiped away, even a
state of imagelessness ceases to exist for the Yogins; in the sameness of
existence and non-existence, the fruit [of wisdom] is born to the wise.
(169) 57. How does existence cease to exist? How
does the sameness take place? When the mind fails to understand [the truth],
there is disturbance inside, outside, and in the middle; with the cessation [of
the disturbance] the mind sees the sameness.
LXXI
Further, Mahāmati said: It is told by the
Blessed One, again, that [true] knowledge is gained independent of any object
supporting it, and whatever statements one makes about it are no more than
thought-construction, and that as this thought-construction is not to be seized
as real, the seizing act of the seizer itself ceases, and when there is thus no
seizing, knowledge which is known as discrimination no more evolves. Now,
Blessed One, [how is transcendental knowledge unobtainable?] Is it unobtainable
because of our not recognising the generality and individuality of things,
their pluralities, their unities? Or is it unobtainable because [such ideas as]
individuality, generality, multiplicity, and self-nature overpower one another?
Or is it unobtainable because of the obstructions presented by a wall, a
mountain, an earth-work, a rampart, or by earth, wind, water, or fire? Or
because of remoteness or nearness? Or does the knowledge fail to obtain its
object of cognition because of [the imperfection of] the sense-organs due to
youth, age, or blindness? If, Blessed One, knowledge was not obtainable because
of our not recognising individuality, generality, unity and plurality, then,
Blessed One, such cannot be [transcendental] knowledge; it is to be called
ignorance (ajñāna), for in spite of the fact that objects to be known are
before us we do not know them. Again, if knowledge is unobtainable because
[such ideas as] individuality, generality, multiplicity, and self-nature
overpower one another, such is ignorance (ajñāna). (170) Blessed One, it is not
[transcendental] knowledge. Where there is something to be known, Blessed One,
knowledge evolves; where there is nothing, none evolves; knowledge is possible
[only] where there is a correspondence with that which is known. Again, if
knowledge is unobtainable because of the obstruction presented by a wall,
mountain, earthwork, rampart, or by earth, water, wind, or fire, or due to
farness or nearness, or on account of the imperfection of the sense-organs as
in the case of an infant, the aged, and the blind, such as is unattainable is
not [transcendental] knowledge; it is ignorance, for the object to be known is
there but the knowing faculty is lacking.
Said the Blessed One: Mahāmati, such [knowledge
as is unobtainable] is not ignorance, such is [transcendental] knowledge;
Mahāmati, it is not ignorance. It is not because of the deeper sense that I say
this, but when [we know that] there is knowledge gained independent of any supporting
object, whatever statements we make about it are no more than
thought-constructions. That [transcendental] knowledge is unobtainable is due
to the recognition that there is nothing in the world but what is seen of the
Mind, and that these external objects to which being and non-being are
predicated are non-existent. As this [knowledge] is unobtainable, there is no
evolving of knowing and known, and as thus the triple emancipation is realised,
there is unattainable knowledge [which is transcendental]. But logicians being
under the habit-energy of the wrong reasoning which has been carried on since
beginningless time as to existence and non-existence are unable to know all
this, and, while not knowing it, they are concerned with [such notions as] external
objects, substances, forms, indications, existence and non-existence; and yet
they declare that the cessation of discrimination is [the state of] the
Mind-only. As they are tenaciously clinging to the thought of an ego-soul and
all that belongs to it, they are really unable to understand what is meant by
the doctrine of Mind-only, (171) and go on discriminating knowing and known.
And because of their discriminating knowing and known, they think of things as
existent and non-existent, and declaring that [transcendental knowledge] is
unobtainable, abide in nihilism. So it is said:
58. If [transcendental] knowledge fails to see
an objective world which lies before it, such is ignorance and not knowledge;
this teaching belongs to the logicians.
59. If [transcendental] knowledge fails to see,
though various obstructions far and near, its own unique object that does not
present itself [as an object], such is to be called wrong knowledge.
60. If [transcendental] knowledge fails to know,
on account of defective senses such as infancy, old age, and blindness, its own
object which is present, such is to be called wrong knowledge.
LXXII
Further, Mahāmati, the ignorant and
simple-minded keep on dancing and leaping fascinated with their wrong
reasonings, falsehoods, and self-discriminations, and are unable to understand
the truth of self-realisation and its discourse in words; clinging to the
external world which is seen of the Mind itself, they cling to the study of the
discourses which are a means and do not know properly how to assertain the
truth of self-realisation which is the truth unspoiled by the fourfold
proposition.
Said Mahāmati: Blessed One, it is just as you
say. Pray tell me, Blessed One, about the characteristic features of the truth
of self-realisation and about the discourses on it, whereby I and other
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas in future time, understanding what they are, may keep
ourselves away from the wrong logicians such as the philosophers and those who
belong to the vehicles of the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha.
(172) Said the Blessed One: Then, Mahāmati,
listen well and reflect well within yourself; I will tell you.
Certainly, Blessed One; said Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva and gave ear to the Blessed One.
The Blessed One said this to him: Mahāmati,
there are two forms of teaching the truth attained by the Tathagatas, Arhats,
Fully-Enlightened Ones of the past, present, and future. They are: the teaching
by discourses, and the teaching by the establishment of self-realisation. What
is meant
by the studying of the discourses is this,
Mahāmati: there are various materials and canonical texts and discourses by which
sentient beings are taught according to their dispositions and inclinations.
What then is the truth of self-realisation by which the Yogins turn away from
discriminating what is seen of the Mind itself? There is an exalted state of
inner attainment which does not fall into the dualism of oneness and otherness,
of bothness and not-bothness; which goes beyond the Citta, Manas, and
Manovijñāna; which has nothing to do with logic, reasoning, theorising, and
illustrating; which has never been tasted by any bad logicians, by the
philosophers, Śrāvakas, and Pratyekabuddhas, who have fallen into the dualistic
views of being and non-being— this I call self-realisation. This, Mahamati, is
what characterises the truth of self-realisation and discoursing on it, and in
this you and the other Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas are to discipline themselves. So
it is said:
61. I have two forms of teaching the truth:
self-realisation and discoursing. I discourse with the ignorant and [disclose]
self-realisation to the Yogins.
LXXIII
(173) At that time again, Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said this to the Blessed One: It was told at one time by
the Blessed One, the Tathagata, the Arhat, the Fully-Enlightened One, that the
Lokāyatika who is [skilled in] various forms of incantation and in the art of
eloquence is not to be honoured, adored, and reverently attended upon; for what
one gains from such devotions is worldly enjoyments and not the Dharma [or
Truth]. For what reason is this said, Blessed One, that by devoting ourselves to
the Lokāyatika who is skilled in varieties of incantations and in the art of
eloquence, worldly enjoyments are gained but not the Dharma [or Truth]?
Said the Blessed One: The Lokāyatika who is
skilled in varieties of incantations and in the art of eloquence, Mahāmati,
puts the minds of the ignorant in utter confusion by means of various
reasonings, by [clever manipulation of] words and phrases, and what he teaches
being the mere prattle of a child as far as one can make out is not at all in
accordance with truth nor in unison with sense. For this reason, Mahāmati, the
Lokāyatika is said to be skilled in varieties of incantations and in the art of
eloquence. He attracts the ignorant by making clever use of various words,
[but] he never leads them to the way of truth and right teaching. As he himself
does not understand what all things mean, he puts the minds of the ignorant
into utter confusion by his dualistic views, thus ruining himself. Not being
released of the transition from one path to another, not understanding that
there is nothing but what is seen of the Mind itself, and attaching himself to
the idea of self-nature in external things, the Lokāyatika knows no deliverance
from discrimination. For this reason, Mahāmati, the Lokāyatika who is clever in
various incantations (174) and in the art of eloquence, being thus never
emancipated from such calamities1 as birth, age, disease, sorrow, lamentation,
pain, and despair, leads the ignorant into bewilderment by means of various
words, phrases, reasons, examples, and conclusions.
1 Read apāyāsa instead of upāyāsa.
Mahāmati, Indra was a brilliant [Lokāyatika]
whose knowledge made him master of many treatises and who was himself the
author of a work on sound. He had a disciple who assuming the body of a serpent
went up to heaven and got into the society of the god Indra. Making up a thesis
he challenged the god: Either your one-thousand-spoked chariot be smashed to
pieces, or every one of my own serpent-hoods be cut off. In the argument the
Lokāyatika disciple who had assumed the form of a serpent defeated [the
god-opponent], whereupon the one-thousand-spoked chariot was smashed to pieces.
The disciple then came down again to this world. In such a way, Mahāmati, [the
Lokāyatika] has a system composed of various reasonings and exemplifications,
and, knowing well even the minds of the animal world, puts the gods and
fighting demons in utter confusion by means of various words and phrases; he
then makes them tenaciously adhere to the notion of coming and going
(āyavyaya); how much more human beings! For this reason, Mahāmati, the
Lokāyatika is to be shunned, for he carries with him the cause leading to the
birth of pain. No homage, no reverence, no service is to be shown him.
Mahāmati, the attainment of the Lokāyatika does not go beyond the realm of the
body and knowledge belonging to it, though he may explain his materialism by using
varieties of words and phrases (175) amounting to a hundred thousand. But in
after times, after five hundred years, divisions will take place [among his
followers] leading them to wrong reasonings and demonstrations; divisions will
abound because of this, not being able to hold disciples. Thus, Mahāmati,
materialism splitting into many parties and adhering to varieties of reasonings
is explained by the philosophers, each of whom clings to his way of reasoning
as he knows no truth existing by itself. While this is not at all the case with
[all] the philosophers who have their own treatises and doctrines, materialism
is asserted under various disguises which are explained by a hundred thousand
different methods; there is in them [also] no truth existing by itself, and
they do not recognise that theirs is materialism because of their stupidity.1
1 Read mohāt instead of mohohāt.
Said Mahāmati: If all the philosophers teach
materialism by means of various words, phrases, examples, and conclusions,
which are not the truth as it is, but are their own selfish assertions
tenaciously maintained, does not the Blessed One too teach materialism by means
of various words and phrases, to the assemblages of the gods, demons, and human
beings, who come from various countries—I say, materialism which is not the
truth of self-realisation but is something like the discourses of all the
philosophers?
The Blessed One said: I do not teach
materialism, nor coming-and-going (āyavyaya). But I teach, Mahāmati, that which
is not coming-and-going. Now, Mahāmati, coming means production and mass, it is
born of accumulation. Going, Mahāmati, means destruction. That which is not
coming-and-going is designated unborn. (176) Mahāmati, I do not teach anything
approaching the discrimination of the philosophers. For what reason? Because
there are no external objects, there is nothing to get attached to; when one
abides in Mind-only, beyond which there is no external world, dualism ceases;
as there is no realm of form based on discrimination, one comes to recognise
that there is nothing but what is seen of the Mind itself; and for these
reasons the discrimination of what is seen of the Mind itself does not take
place. Owing to the cessation of discrimination, one enters into the triple
emancipation where is the state of no-form, emptiness, and effortlessness.
Hence it is called deliverance.
I remember, Mahāmati, when I was staying in a
certain place, a Brahman Lokāyatika approached where I was and having
approached suddenly asked me, saying: Gautama, is all created?
I said this to him: Brahman, if all is created,
this is the first school of materialism.
Guatama, is all uncreated?
Brahman, if all is uncreated, this is the second
school of materialism. Thus [to state that] all is non-eternal, or that all is
eternal, or that all is born, or that all is unborn, this, Brahman, is the sixth
school of materialism.
Again, Mahāmati, the Brahman Lokāyatika said
this to me: Gautama, is all one? Is all different? Is all characterised with
bothness? Is all characterised with not-bothness? Is all to be regarded as
subject to causation since all is seen as born of varieties of causes?
This, Brahman, is the tenth school of
materialism.
Again, Gautama, is all explainable? Is all
unexplainable? Is there an ego-soul? Is there no ego-soul? Is this world real?
(177) Is this world not-real? Is there another world? Is there no other world?
Is another world existent or non-existent?1 Is there emancipation? Is there no
emancipation? Is all momentary? Is all not momentary? Are space,
Apratisaṁkhya-nirodha,2 and Nirvana, O Gautama, are they created or uncreated?
Is there the middle existence? Is there no middle existence?
1 The Chinese translations omit this question.
2 "Annihilation taking place without
premeditation"—one of the three non-effect-producing objects (asaṁskṛita).
I then said this to him, Mahāmati: If so,
Brahman, this is materialism. It is not mine. O Brahman, it is your worldly
philosophy. I explain, Brahman, that the triple world has its cause in the
habit-energy of discrimination going on since beginningless time on account of
error and wrong reasoning: for discrimination takes place. Brahman, because it
is not recognised that there is no external world but the Mind itself, and not
because an external world is seen as the object of cognition. According to the
philosophers, there is a triple concordance of an ego-soul, sense-organs, and
an objective world, but such is not mine. Brahman, I do not belong to the
school of causation, nor to the school of no-causation, except that I teach the
chain of origination as far as the thought-constructed world of grasped and
grasping exists depending on discrimination. This is not understood by you and
others who cherish the notion of an ego-soul and its continuity. Mahāmati,
space, Nirvana, and causation exist in enumeration; as realities they are
unobtainable. Hence the question whether they are created or not requires no
answering.
Again, Mahāmati, the Brahman Lokāyatika said
this: Is the triple world to be regarded as caused by ignorance, desire, and
action? or is it causeless?
Brahman, this twofold question again belongs to
materialism.
Gautama, are all things to be conceived (178)
under the aspect of individuality and generality?
This, too, Brahman, belongs to materialism. So
long as there is a mental perturbation which makes one cling to an objective
world of discrimination, there is materialism.
Further, Mahāmati, this Brahman materialist said
this to me: Gautama, is there any philosophy that is not of the world? All the
truth that is taught by all the philosophers by means of varieties of words and
phrases, by means of reasons, examples, and conclusions, by general consent,
Gautama, belongs to me.
Brahman, there is something that does not belong
to you, though it is not beyond the truth of general consent, nor independent
of varieties of words and phrases, and further, it is not out of accord with
reason.
[The Brahman asked,] Is there any philosophy
that is not of the world and yet belongs to the general opinion of the world?
Brahman, there is that which does not belong to
materialism and which is not reached by your wisdom nor by that of the
philosophers who cling to false discriminations and wrong reasonings as they
fail to see the unreality of external objects. By this is meant the cessation
of discrimination. When it is recognised that there is nothing beyond what is
seen of the Mind itself, the discrimination of being and non-being ceases; as
thus there is no external world as the object of perception, discrimination
abides in its own abode.1 This is not of materialism; it belongs to me, it does
not belong to you. By abiding in its own abode is meant that it ceases to
evolve; as discrimination is no more born, it is said to have ceased to evolve.
This, Brahman, is not of materialism. In short, Brahman, if there is any
coming-and-going of the Vijñānas, (179) a vanishing-and-appearing, a
solicitation, an attachment, an intense affection, a philosophical view, a
theory, an abode, a touch, the clinging to various signs, assemblage,
continuity,2 desire (tṛishṇā), and attachment to a cause, this, Brahman, is
materialism of yours but not mine.
1 A better reading of the Nanjo text may be to
follow the T'ang and the Wei, according to which vikalpaḥ (1. 16) is negated
and svasthāne 'vatishṭhate forms a separate sentence, thus:
"Discrimination ceases, and one abides in the self-abode." That by
this self-abode is meant the self-abode of reality is gathered from such
phrases as yathābhūtārthasthāna-darśanam (p. 200, 1. 6),
yathābhūtāvasthānadarśanam (p. 112, 1. 6),
yathābhūtasvalakshaṇāvasthānāvasthitam (p. 124, 1. 1), vikalpasyāpravṛitteḥ
svastho, loko nishkṛiyaḥ (p. 199, 1. 3), etc. The self-abode of reality is
where reality is seen as it is in itself, or as the suchness of existence, or
as something solitary (viviktadharma), i. e. absolute.
2 Saṁtatiḥ instead of sattvānām, according to
T'ang and Sung.
Mahāmati, I was thus questioned by the Brahman
materialist, who came to me, and when he was thus sent off he silently
departed.
At that time there came to the Blessed One the
King of the Nāgas, called Kṛishṇapakshaka, who assumed the body of a Brahman
and said thus: Gautama, is there not another world?
Now, young man, whence do you come?
Gautama, I am come from White Isle.
Brahman, that is another world.
The young man thus refuted and put to silence
made himself invisible without asking me anything about my own teaching, which
stands in opposition to his;1 he thought within himself: This son of the Śākyas
stands outside of my own system; he is a pitiable fellow, he belongs to the
school which holds the cessation of signs and causes, he talks of the cessation
of discrimination which will take place when there is the cognition of an
external world as something seen of one's own discrimination. And, Mahāmati,
you too ask me how, for one who serves the Lokāyatika skilled in various
incantations and in the art of eloquence, there are worldly enjoyments and not
the attainment of the Dharma.
Said Mahāmati; What is meant, Blessed One, by
the words, "the objects of worldly enjoyment" and "the
Dharma"?
(180) Said the Blessed One: Well said, well
said, Mahāmati! You have thought deeply about this twofold meaning, having in
view present and future generations. Then, Mahāmati, listen well and reflect
well within yourself; I will tell you.
Certainly, Blessed One; said Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva and gave ear to the Blessed One.
1 There is no allusion in the Chinese versions
to this dialogue between Kṛishnapakshaka and the Buddha.
The Blessed One said this to him: What is meant
by a worldly object of enjoyment, Mahāmati? It means that which can be touched,
attracted by, wiped off, handled, and tasted; it is that which makes one get
attached to an external world, enter into a dualism on account of a wrong view,
and appear again in the Skandhas, where, owing to the procreative force of
desire, there arise all kinds of disaster such as birth, age, disease, death,
sorrow, lamentation, pain, despair, etc. This is called the object of worldly
enjoyment by myself and other Buddhas. This, Mahāmati, is the attainment of worldly
enjoyments and not that of the Truth. It is materialism which one learns by
serving the Lokāyatika.
Mahāmati, what is meant by the attainment of the
Dharma (Truth)? When the truth of Self-mind and the twofold egolessness are
understood, and further, when the nature of the egolessness of things and
persons is seen into, discrimination ceases to assert itself; when the various
stages of Bodhisattvahood are thoroughly perceived one after another, the
Citta, Manas, and Manovijñāna are turned away; and when one enters upon the
path of baptism by the wisdom of all the Buddhas, and takes hold of the [ten]
inexhaustible vows,1 one becomes (181) sovereign master of all things by virtue
of a life of effortlessness. Hence it is called the Dharma, as one is thereby
released from all philosophical views, unsound reasonings, discriminations, and
dualistic notions. As a rule, Mahāmati, the philosophical views lead the
ignorant, though not the wise, to a dualism, that is, to nihilism and
eternalism. Eternalism rises from embracing a doctrine of no-causation, while
nihilism rises from believing in the annihilation of causal conditions and in
the non-existence of a cause. I teach, however, the Dharma so called which is
[subject to] the conditions of rising, abiding, and destruction. This,
Mahāmati, is the conclusion with regard to worldly enjoyment and the Dharma. So
it is said:
62. Beings are subdued by the reception
(saṁgraha),2 and are brought into subjection by the moral precepts (śila); they
are removed from philosophical views by transcendental knowledge (prajñā) and
are nourished by the emancipations.3
1 Read anishṭhāpada, instead of anadishṭhāpada.
2 There are four ways of receiving others,
catvāri saṁgrahavustūni: charity, kindly spirit, benevolent deeds, and impartiality.
3 Missing in Sung.
63. All that is taught by the philosophers to no
purpose is materialism; where the realistic view of cause and effect is
cherished, there is no self-realisation.
64. I teach to my group of disciples one
self-realisation which has nothing to do with cause and effect, being free from
materialism.
65. There is nothing but that which is seen of
the Mind itself, the duality too is of the Mind; while existence1 is [observed
as divided into] the grasped and the grasping, it has nothing to do with
eternalism or nihilism.
(182) 66. As long as mentation goes on, there is
materialism; when there is no rising of discrimination, the world is seen as of
Mind itself.
67. "Coming" (āyam) means the
originating of the objective world as effect, and "going" (vyayam) is
the not-seeing2 of the effect; when one thoroughly understands the
"coming-and-going," discrimination ceases.
68. Eternity and non-eternity, 'the made and
not-made, this world and that world—all these and other [ideas] belong to
materialism.
1 Abhāvena(?) in Sung.
2 According to the Chinese translations.
LXXIV
At that time again, Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said this to the Blessed One: Nirvana, Nirvana is talked
of by the Blessed One; what does this term designate? What is the Nirvana that
is discriminated by all the philosophers?
Said the Blessed One: Then, Mahāmati, listen
well and reflect well within yourself; I will tell you.
Certainly, Blessed One; said Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva and gave ear to the Blessed One.
The Blessed One said this to him: As to such
Nirvanas as are discriminated by the philosophers, there are really none in
existence. Some philosophers conceive Nirvana to be found where a system of
mentation no more operates owing to the cessation of the Skandhas, Dhātus, and
Āyatanas, or to the indifference to the objective world, or to the recognition
that all things are impermanent; (183) or where there is no recollection of the
past and present, just as when a lamp is extinguished, or when a seed is burnt,
or when a fire goes out, because then there is the cessation of all the
substrate, which is explained by the philosophers as the non-rising of
discrimination. But, Mahāmati, Nirvana does not consist in mere annihilation.
Again, some explain deliverance by going to
another quarter and abode, as when a wind stops blowing, when the
discrimination of objects ceases. Again, some philosophers explain deliverance
by the getting-rid of the [dualistic] view of knower and known. Some conceive
deliverance to be the cessation of discrimination where one sees permanence and
impermanence.
Again, some explain the discrimination of
various forms as the bearer of pain, and yet not understanding that there is
nothing but what is seen of the Mind itself, are alarmed by the notion of form,
and seek their happiness in formlessness.1 In this they cherish the notion of
Nirvana.
Again some conceive this to be Nirvana: that in
consideration of generality and individuality recognisable in all things inner
and outer, they are never destroyed, maintaining their being throughout the
past, present, and future. Again some conceive that Nirvana is an ego-soul, a
being, a vital force, a nourisher, a supreme spirit, and the indestructability
of all things.
Again, Mahāmati, some philosophers owing to
their foolishness declare this to be Nirvana: that there is a primary
substance, there is a supreme soul, and they are seen differently by each, and
that they produce all things from the transformations of the qualities.
1 According to the Chinese translations, nimitto
(line 10) is to be cancelled.
Some conceive Nirvana to consist in the
extinction of merit and demerit; some in the destruction of the passions by
means of knowledge; (184) some in regarding Iśvara as the free creator of the
world. Some think that the world is born of interaction and that there is no
[special] cause other than this cause, and clinging to it they have no
awakening because of stupidity, and they conceive Nirvana to consist in this
non-awakening.
Again, Mahāmati, some philosophers conceive
Nirvana to be the attaining of the true path. Some cherish the thought of
Nirvana as where there is the union of qualities and their owner, from which
there is oneness and otherness, bothness and not-bothness. Some imagine that
Nirvana is where they see the self-nature of things existing all by its own
nature, such as the variegated feathers of the peacock, variously formed
precious stones, or the pointedness of a thorn.
Some, Mahāmati, conceive Nirvana in the recognition
of the twenty-five Tattvas (truths); some in the king's observance of the
teaching of the six virtues. Some, seeing that time is a creator and that the
rise of the world depends on time, conceive that Nirvana consists in
recognising this fact. Again, Mahāmati, some conceive being to be Nirvana, some
non-being, while some conceive that all things and Nirvana are not to be
distinguished one from the other.
All these views of Nirvana severally advanced by
the philosophers with their reasonings are not in accord with logic, nor are
they acceptable to the wise. Mahāmati, they all conceive Nirvana dualistically
and in a causal connection. By these discriminations, Mahāmati, all
philosophers imagine Nirvana, but there is nothing rising, nothing disappearing
here, -[and there is no room for discrimination.] Mahāmati, each philosopher
relying on his own text-book from which he draws his understanding and
intelligence, examines [the subject] and sins against [the truth], because [the
truth] is not such as is imagined by him; [his reasoning] ends in setting the
mind to wandering about and becoming confused, as Nirvana is not to be found
anywhere.
Again, Mahāmati, there are others who, roaring
with their all-knowledge as a lion roars, explain Nirvana in the following
wise: that is, Nirvana is where it is recognised that there is nothing but what
is seen of the Mind itself; where there is no attachment to external objects,
existent or nonexistent; where, getting rid of the four propositions, there is
an insight into the abode of reality as it is; where, recognising the nature of
the Self-mind, (185) one does not cherish the dualism of discrimination; where
grasped and grasping are no more obtainable; where all logical measures are not
seized upon as it is realised that they never assert themselves; where the idea
of truth is not adhered to but treated with indifference because of its causing
a bewilderment; where, by the attainment of the exalted Dharma which lies
within the inmost recesses of one's being, the two forms of egolessness are
recognised, the two forms of passions subsided, and the two kinds of hindrance
cleared away; where the stages of Bodhisattvahood are passed one after another
until the stage of Tathagatahood is attained, in which all the Samādhis beginning
with the Māyopama (Māyā-like) are realised, and the Citta, Manas, and
Manovijñāna are put away:1 [here indeed they say Nirvana is to be found].
69. Nirvana is severally conceived by the
philosophers; (186) but theirs is no more than imagination, it is not the way
of emancipation.
70. Released of bound and binding and free from
all expediencies, the philosophers imagine they are emancipated, but
emancipation is not to be found there.
71. Divided into many a school are the systems
of the philosophers; there is thus no emancipation in them, because of their
imagination stupidly carried on.
72. Wrongly imbued with the ideas of cause and
effect, all the philosophers are beguiled, and their is thus no emancipation
for them who are of the dualistic school of being and non-being.
1 This whole paragraph which ought to be where
it is in the present translation, is put after the paragraph preceding the last
one in the Sanskrit text and also in Sung. Delete kalpayanti (p. 185, 1. 6).
73. The ignorant are delighted with discoursing
and false reasoning [but] they are unable to raise any great intelligence
towards truth (tattva), discoursing is a source of suffering in the triple
world, while truth is the extinguisher of suffering.
74. Like an image seen in a mirror, which is not
real, the Mind is seen by the ignorant in a dualistic form in the mirror of
habit-energy.
75. When it is not thoroughly understood that
there is nothing but what is seen of the Mind itself, dualistic discriminations
take place; when it is thoroughly understood that there is nothing but what is
seen of the Mind itself, discrimination ceases,
76. Mind is no other than multiplicity, [and yet
it is] devoid of qualified and qualifying; forms are visible but not in the way
as seen discriminated by the ignorant.
77. The triple world is no other than
discrimination, there are no external objects; discrimination sees
multiplicity, this is not understood by the ignorant.
(187) 78. [The truth] is told [differently]
discriminated in the different sutras because of names and notions; [yet] apart
from words no meaning is attainable.
LXXV
At that time Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
said this to him: Tell me, Blessed One, Tathagata, Arhat, Fully-Enlightened
One, concerning the self-nature of Buddhahood, whereby I and other
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas, understanding well what constitutes the self-nature1
of the Tathagata, may have both ourselves and others awakened [in the truth].
The Blessed One said: Then, Mahāmati, ask me as
you desire, according to which I will answer.
Mahāmati replied: Blessed One, is the Tathagata,
the Arhat, the Fully-Enlightened One to be considered unmade or made, an effect
or a cause, predicated or predicating, an expression or that which is
expressed, knowledge or that which is knowable? Is the Blessed One different
from all these expressions, or not?
1 Tathāgata-svabhāvakuśalā, instead of
svakuśalā.
The Blessed One said: If the Tathagata, Arhat,
Fully-Enlightened One is to be described by those expressions, he is neither
made nor unmade, neither an effect nor a cause. Why? Because the error of
dualism would here be committed. If, Mahāmati, the Tathagata is something made,
he is impermanent; if he is impermanent, anything made would be a Tathagata,
which is not desired by myself and other Tathagatas. If he is something unmade,
his self-essence being attainment, all the preparations brought forward [for
the realisation of Tathagatahood] will be useless, (188) like a hare's horns,
or a barren woman's child, because of their never having been made. That which
is neither an effect nor a cause, Mahāmati, is neither a being nor a non-being;
and that which is neither a being nor a non-being is outside the four
propositions. The four propositions, Mahāmati, belong to worldly usage. That
which is outside the four propositions is no more than a word, like a barren
woman's child. Mahāmati, a barren woman's child is a mere word and is beyond
the four propositions. As it is beyond them, the wise know it to be not subject
to measurement. So is the meaning of all the terms concerning the Tathagata to
be understood by the wise.
It is told by me that all things are egoless; by
this is meant, Mahāmati, that they are devoid of selfhood; hence this
egolessness. What I mean is that all things have each its own individuality
which does not belong to another, as in the case of a cow and a horse. For
example, Mahāmati, the being of a cow is not of horse-nature, nor is the being
of a horse of cow-nature. This [exemplifies] the case of neither being nor
non-being. Each of them is not without its own individuality, each is such as
it is by its own nature. In the same way, Mahāmati, things are not each without
its own individuality, they are such as they are, and thus the ignorant and
simple-minded fail to understand the signification of egolessness by reason of
their discrimination; indeed, they are not free from discrimination. The same
is to be known exactly about all things being empty, unborn, and without
self-nature.
In the same way the Tathagata and the Skandhas
are neither not-different nor different. If he is not different from the
Skandhas, he is impermanent as (189) the Skandhas are something made. If they
are different, they are two separate entities; the case is like a cow's horns.
As they look alike, they are not different; as the one is short and the other
long, they are different. [This can be said] of all things. Mahāmati, the right
horn of a cow is thus different from her left horn; so is the left from the
right; the one is longer or shorter than the other. The same can be said of
varieties of colours. Thus the Tathagata and the Skandhas are neither different
nor not-different the one from the other.
In the same way, the Tathagata is neither
different nor not-different from emancipation, he can be described in terms of
emancipation. If the Tathagata is different from emancipation, he partakes of
the nature of a material object; if he does he is impermanent. If he is not
different, there will be no distinction in the attainments of the Yogins, and,
Mahāmati, a distinction is seen in the Yogins; therefore, [the Tathagata] is
neither different nor not-different [from emancipation].
In the same way, knowledge is neither different
nor not-different from that which is known. That, Mahāmati, which is neither
eternal nor not-eternal, neither effect nor cause, neither effect-producing nor
not-effect-producing, neither knowledge nor that which is knowable, neither
predicated nor predicating, neither the Skandhas nor different from the
Skandhas, neither that which is expressed nor expression, nor bound-up with
oneness and otherness, with bothness and not-bothness, —this is something
removed from all measurement; that which is removed from all measurement is not
expressible in words;1 that which is not expressible1 is something unborn; that
which is unborn is not subject to destruction; that which is not subject to
destruction (190) is like space, and, Mahāmati, space is neither an effect nor
a cause. That which is neither an effect nor a cause is something
unconditioned. That which is unconditioned goes beyond all idle reasonings.
That which goes beyond all idle reasonings, that is the Tathagata. Mahāmati,
this is the essence of perfect enlightenment, this is the self-nature of
Buddhahood which is removed from all senses and measurements. So it is said:
79. That which is released from senses and
measurements is neither an effect nor a cause; it has nothing to do with
knowledge and that which is to be known; it is free from predicated and
predicating.
80. There is something which is nowhere to be
seen by anybody as the Skandhas, causation, enlightenment; of that which is
nowhere to be seen by anybody, what description can we make?
81. It is not something made nor unmade, it is
neither an effect nor a cause, it is neither the Skandhas nor not-Skandhas, nor
is it other than the combination.
82. There is something that is not to be seen by
the discrimination of its being, nor is it to be known as nonexistent; such is
the self-essence of all things.
83. Accompanied by being, there is non-being;
accompanied by non-being there is being; as thus non-being is not to be known
[by itself], being is not to be discriminated.
84. Those who cling to mere words, not knowing
what is meant by an ego-soul and egolessness, are immersed in dualism; they are
corrupted and lead the ignorant to corruption.
(191) 85. When they see my religion liberated
from all detriments, they behold properly, they do not defile the
world-leaders.
1 After Sung.
LXXVI
At that time again, Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said this to the Blessed One: Tell me, Blessed One; tell
me, Sugata. Mention is made in the canonical books of the Blessed One's being
subject neither to birth nor to destruction, and it is declared by you that
this being subject neither to birth nor to destruction is an epithet of the
Tathagata. Now, Blessed One, by this being subject neither to birth nor to
destruction, is a non-entity meant? And is it another name for the Tathagata,
as is declared by the Blessed One? It is taught by the Blessed One that all
things are subject neither to birth nor to destruction because they are not to
be seen in the dualistic aspect of being and non-being. If all things are
unborn, Blessed One, no one can take hold of anything because nothing has ever
been born; and if that is another name of something, what can this something
be, Blessed One?
The Blessed One said: Then, Mahāmati, listen
well and reflect well within yourself; I will tell you.
Certainly, Blessed One, said Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
and gave ear to the Blessed One.
The Blessed One said this to him: Mahāmati, the
Tathagata is not a non-entity; nor is he to be conceived as all things are, as
neither born nor disappearing; nor is he to look around for causation [in order
to appear before others]; nor is he without signification; I refer to him as
unborn. (192) Nevertheless, Mahāmati, there is another name for the Tathagata
when his Dharmakāya assumes a will-body. This is what goes beyond the
comprehension of the philosophers, Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and those
Bodhisattvas still abiding in the seventh stage. The unborn, Mahāmati, is
synonymous with the Tathagata.
For instance, Mahāmati, Indra is [sometimes
known as] Śakra, [sometimes? as] Purandara; hand is hasta, kara, paṇi; the body
is tanu, deha, śarīra; the earth is pṛithivī, bhūmi, vasuṁdhara; the sky is
kha, ākāśa, gagana; all these objects each in its way are designated with many
names, synonymously used and discriminated; but on account of these different
names different objects are not to be imagined, nor are they without their
self-nature. The same, Mahāmati, can be said of myself, for I come within the
range of hearing of ignorant people, in this world of patience, under many
names, amounting to a hundred thousand times three asaṁkhyeyas, and they
address me by these names not knowing that they are all other names of the
Tathagata. Of these, Mahāmati, some recognise me as the Tathagata, some as the
Self-existent One, some as Leader, as Vinayaka (Remover), as Pariṇāyaka
(Guide), as Buddha, as Rishi (Ascetic), as Bull-king, as Brahma, as Vishṇu, as
Īśvara, as Original Source (pradhāna), as Kapila, as Bhūtānta (End of Reality),
as Arishṭa, as Nemina, as Soma (moon), as the Sun, as Rāma, as Vyāsa, as Śuka,
as Indra, as Balin, as Varuṇa, as is known to some; while others recognise me
as One who is never born and never passes away, as Emptiness, as Suchness, as
Truth, as Reality, as Limit of Reality, (193) as the Dharmadhātu, as Nirvana,
as the Eternal, as Sameness, as Non-duality, as the Undying, as the Formless,
as Causation, as the Doctrine of Buddha-cause, as Emancipation, as the Truth of
the Path, as the All-Knower, as the Victor, as the Will-made Mind. Mahāmati,
thus in full possession of one hundred thousand times three asaṁkhyeyas of
appellations, neither more nor less, in this world and in other worlds, I am
known to the peoples, like the moon in water which is neither in it nor out of
it. But this is not understood by the ignorant who have fallen into the dualistic
conception of continuity.1 Though they honour, praise, esteem, and revere me,
they do not understand well the meaning of words and definitions; they do not
distinguish ideas, they do not have their own truth, and, clinging to the words
of the canonical books, they imagine that not being subject to birth and
destruction means a non-entity, and fail to see that it is one of the many
names of the Tathagata as in the case of Indra, Śakra, Purandara. They have no
confidence in the texts where the self-standing truth is revealed, since in
their study of all things they follow mere words as expressed in the texts
trying thereby to gain into the meaning.
1 This is missing in T'ang and Sung.
Thus, Mahāmati, these deluded ones would declare
that as words are so is meaning, that meaning is not otherwise than words. For
what reason? Because meaning has no body of its own and cannot be different
from words. That the unintelligent declare words to be identical with meaning,
is due to their ignorance as to the self-nature of words. They do not know,
Mahāmati, that words (194) are subject to birth and death whereas meaning is
not. Mahāmati, words are dependent on letters, but meaning is not. As meaning
is freed from existence and non-existence, it is not born, it has no
substratum. And, Mahāmati, the Tathagatas do not teach the doctrine that is
dependent upon letters. As to letters, their being or non-being is not
attainable; it is otherwise with the thought that is never dependent on
letters. Again, Mahāmati, anyone that discourses on a truth that is dependent
on letters is a mere prattler because truth is beyond letters. For this reason,
Mahāmati, it is declared in the canonical text by myself and other Buddhas and
Bodhisattvas that not a letter is uttered or answered by the Tathagatas. For
what reason? Because truths are not dependent on letters. It is not that they
never declare what is in conformity with meaning; when they declare anything,
it is according to the discrimination [of all beings]. If, Mahāmati, the truth
is not declared1 [in words] the scriptures containing all truths will
disappear, and when the scriptures disappear there will be no Buddhas,
Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas; and when there is no one [to
teach], what is to be taught and to whom? For this reason, then, Mahāmati, the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva is not to become attached to the words of the canonical
texts. Mahāmati, owing to the functioning of the minds of sentient beings, the
canonical texts sometimes deviate from their straightforward course; religious
discourses are given by myself and other Tathagatas, Arhats, Fully-Enlightened
Ones in response to varieties of faiths on the part of beings, in order to
remove them from [the bondage of] the Citta, Manas and Manovijñāna, and not for
the attainment and establishment of self-realisation which issues from noble
wisdom. When there is the recognition of the fact that all things are
characterised with imagelessness and that there is nothing in the world but
what is seen of the Mind itself, there is the discarding of the dualistic
discrimination.
1 According to the Chinese versions.
Upādāyānupādāyāt in this connection is not quite intelligible.
Therefore, Mahāmati, let the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva be in conformity with the meaning (195) and not with the
letter. Mahāmati, a son or a daughter of a good family who conforms himself or
herself to the letter will ruin his or her understanding of ultimate reality1
and will cause others to fail to recognise [the truth]. Continuing to cherish
wrong views, one's own assertion is confounded by the philosophers who do not
understand well what characterises all the stages of the Dharma, and who have
no adequate knowledge as to the interpretation of words. If they well
understand what characterises all the stages of the Dharma and are adequately
equipped with the interpretation of words and expressions, and have a good
understanding of the meaning and reason of all things, they will properly enjoy
by themselves the bliss of formlessness while others are properly established
in the Mahāyāna. Being properly embraced in the Mahāyāna they will, Mahāmati,
be in the embrace of the Buddhas, Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas.
Being embraced by the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Śrāvakas,
they will [in turn] embrace all beings. Embracing all beings they will embrace
the good Dharma. The good Dharma being embraced, the Buddha-seeds will not be
destroyed. When the Buddha-seeds are not destroyed, the excellent abodes will
be attained. When thus these excellent abodes are attained, Mahāmati, the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas will see to it that [all beings], being established in
the Mahāyāna, are born there [in the excellent abodes], and fortifying
themselves with the tenfold supernatural power and assuming various forms,
(196) they will discourse on the Dharma in conformity to its true nature
(tathātva), and with a thorough knowledge of various wishes and characteristics
of beings. Now the true nature of things (tathātva) is characterised by
non-differentiation and trueness, it is neither coming nor departing, it puts a
stop to all idle reasonings, and it is called the truth (tattvam).
1 Read paramārtha after Sung and Wei.
Therefore, Mahamati, let son or daughter of a
good family take good heed not to get attached to words as being in perfect
conformity with meaning, because the truth is not of the letter. Be not like
the one who looks at the finger-tip. For instance, Mahāmati, when a man with
his finger-tip points at something to somebody, the finger-tip may be taken
wrongly for the thing pointed at; in like manner, Mahāmati, the people
belonging to the class of the ignorant and simple-minded, like those of a
childish group, are unable even unto their death to abandon the idea that in
the finger-tip of words there is the meaning itself, and will not grasp
ultimate reality because of their intent clinging to words which are no more
than the finger-tip to them. To give another illustration, Mahāmati: boiled
rice is the proper food for infants, to whom [suppose] somebody gave uncooked
food to eat. In this case, this one is to be considered to be out of his sense
because of his not knowing how to prepare food properly. So it is with that
which is neither born nor destroyed, Mahāmati; it will not manifest itself to anybody
unless he is well disciplined in it. Therefore, you should most assuredly
discipline yourself in this and not be like one who grasping his own finger-tip
sees the meaning there. For this reason, Mahāmati, (197) you should
energetically discipline yourself to get at the meaning itself.
Mahāmati, the meaning is alone with itself
(vivikta) and is the cause of Nirvana. Words are bound up with discrimination
and are the carrier of transmigration. Meaning, Mahāmati, is attained from much
learning, and this much learning, Mahāmati, means to be conversant with meaning
and not with words. To be conversant with meaning means [to ascertain] the view
which is not at all associated with any philosophical school and which will
keep not only yourself but others from falling into [the false views]. Being
so, Mahāmati, this is said to be learned much in meaning. Therefore, let
seekers for meaning reverently approach those [who are much learned in it], but
those who are attached to words as being in accord with meaning, they are to be
left to themselves and to be shunned by truth-seekers.
LXXVII
Further, Mahāmati to whom the Buddha's spiritual
powers were added, said: There is nothing specially distinguishable in the
Buddha's teaching of no-birth and no-annihilation. Why? Because all the
philosophers also declare, Blessed One, their causes to be unborn and not to be
annihilated; and you, too, Blessed One, declare space, Aprati-saṁkhyanirodha
(annihilation), and Nirvana to be unborn and not to be annihilated. The philosophers
declare, Blessed One, that the world rises from causal agencies and causation,
while the Blessed One too declares that the world takes its rise from
ignorance, desire, deed, discrimination, which work in accordance with the law
of causation. Both thus refer to causation, the difference being in names only.
So with the rise of external objects, both you
and they assume external causation. Thus, there is no distinction between your
teaching, Blessed One, and that of the philosophers. [With them] there are nine
substances which are regarded as unborn and not to be annihilated: atoms,
supreme soul (pradhāna), Iśvara, creator (prajāpati), etc., (198) while,
Blessed One, you assert that all things are neither born nor annihilated as
their being and non-being is unattainable. Now as the elements are
indestructible, their self-nature is neither born nor annihilated; while
following various courses of transformation, what constitutes their essential
nature is not abandoned. Though your notion of the elements may differ in form,
Blessed One, it is what has been imagined by all the philosophers as well as by
yourself. For this reason this teaching of yours has nothing distinctive. If
there is anything distinctive by which the teaching of the Tathagata excels that
of the philosophers, pray tell me. Blessed One, if there is nothing distinctive
in your own teaching, we can say that there is something of Buddhahood in the
teaching of all the philosophers, because in them there is a cause pointing to
no-birth and no-annihilation. It was declared by the Blessed One that many
Tathagatas are not born simultaneously in the same district in one world. But
if the rule of cause and effect with regard to being and non-being holds true,
and your own teaching leaves nothing contradicting behind, there must be many
Tathagatas [rising at the same time and in the same locality].
The Blessed One said: Mahāmati, my [teaching of]
no-birth and no-annihilation is not like that of philosophers who also speak of
no-birth and no-annihilation; nor is it like their doctrine of birth and
impermanency. Why? Because, Mahāmati, that to which the philosophers ascribe
the characteristics of no-birth and no-change is the self-nature of all things.
But mine is not that which falls into the dualism of being and non-being. Mine,
Mahāmati, goes beyond the dualism of being and non-being; has nothing to do
with birth, abiding, and destruction; is neither existent nor non-existent. How
is it not non-existent? Because (199) multitudinousness of objects is to be
seen as like Māyā and a dream; I say that it is not non-existent. How is it not
existent? Because there are no characteristic signs to be perceived as
belonging to the self-nature of things; they are seen [in one sense as
individual objects] and not seen [as such in another sense]; again they are
[something in one sense] graspable [and in another sense] ungraspable. For this
reason, things are existent and non-existent.
But when it is understood that there is nothing
in the world but what is seen of the Mind itself, discrimination no more rises,
and one is thus established in his own abode which is the realm of no-work. The
ignorant work and discriminate but not the wise. Mahāmati, [the doings of the
ignorant] are unrealities discriminated, realities confounded; they are like
the city of the Gandharvas, like magically-created figures. To illustrate,
Mahāmati, here is a city of the Gandharvas where children see magically-created
people, merchants, and many others, going in or coming out, and imagine that they
are really people going in and coming out. It is owing to this discrimination
characterised by perturbation that such takes place. It is the same, Mahāmati,
with the ignorant that they have a confused perception of birth and no-birth.
There is really nothing made or unmade, like the rising of magically-created
people; for magically-created people are neither born nor annihilated, because
here is no question whatever as to their existence or non-existence. In like
manner, all things have nothing to do with birth and destruction, except that
the ignorant cherishing false ideas imagine the birth and annihilation of
objects. It is, however, not so with the wise. By false ideas it is meant that
objects are not judged as they are in themselves. They are nothing else. When
[reality] is discriminated other than it is, there is the clinging to the idea
that all things have their self-nature (200) and what is alone by itself is not
seen, and when what is alone by itself is not seen there is no disappearance of
discrimination. For this reason, Mahāmati, an insight into formlessness excels,
and not an insight into form; as form causes another birth, it excels not. By
formlessness, Mahāmati, is meant the disappearance of discrimination.
No-birth and no-annihilation,1 this I call
Nirvana. By Nirvana, Mahāmati, is meant the looking into the abode of reality
as it really is in itself; and when, along with the turning-back of the entire
system of mentation (citta-caitta-kalāpa), there is the attainment of
self-realisation by means of noble wisdom, which belongs to the Tathagatas, I
call it Nirvana.2
1 Added after the Chinese translations; but Wei
has animitta instead of anirodha.
2 This digression on Nirvana somehow found its
way here.
LXXVIII
So it is said:
86. In order to remove [the notion of] birth and
to accomplish [that of] no-birth, I teach the doctrine of no-cause; but this is
not understood by the ignorant.
87. This all is unborn, but that does not mean
that there are no objects; they are seen to be like the city of the Gandharvas,
a dream, and Māyā; objects are here, but causeless.
88. Tell me how things are unborn, without
self-nature1 and empty. When things are seen by [transcendental] knowledge,
they are not subject to combination and are unobtainable; therefore, I declare
that they are empty, unborn, and without self-nature.
89. Considered one by one combination is there,
the world appears to exist, but nothing is really existing; it is not as it is
conceived by the philosophers; when combination is dissolved, nothing is left
to be seen.
90. As is a dream, a hair-net, Māyā, the city of
the Gandharvas, and a mirage, (201) which rise into view causelessly, so is the
multitudinousness of the world.
91. By keeping down the theory of no-causation,2
no-birth is demonstrated; when the theory of no-birth is declared, my law-eye3
is never destroyed; when the theory of no-cause is pointed out, the
philosophers are horrified.
92. [Mahāmati asked].4 How, by whom, where, and
wherefore does the theory of no-cause make its appearance? [The Blessed One
answered.]4 When things (saṁskṛita) are perceived as neither subject to
causation nor above it, then the view maintained by the philosophers of birth
and destruction is done away with.
93. [Mahāmati asked;] Is non-being no-birth? or
does it look for causation? or is it a being's name without a [corresponding]
reality? Pray tell me.
94. [The Blessed One answered,] Non-being is not
no-birth, nor does it look for causation, nor is it a being's name, nor is it a
name without a [corresponding] object.
95. Here is a reality which does not belong to
the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, nor to the philosophers; neither does it belong
to the Bodhisattvas who have entered upon the seventh stage; this is what
characterises no-birth.
1 According to Sung and T'ang.
2 According to T'ang and Sung, "theory of
causation."
3 Netrī, according to T'ang; Sung has
"law-stream" and Wei "my law."
4 According to Sung.
96. The doing away with the notion of cause and
condition, the giving up of a causal agency, the establishment of the
Mind-only—this I state to be no-birth.
97. The getting-rid of [the idea that] things
are caused, the removal of [the dualism of] imagined and imagining, (202) the
being liberated from the alternatives of being and non-being—this I state to be
no-birth.
98. The mind liberated from its objective world,
the getting-rid of the twofold Svabhāva [parikalpita and paratantra], a
turning-up at the seat of mentation—this I state to be no-birth.
99. No external existence, no non-existence, not
even the grasping of mind; [things are like] a dream, a hair-net, Māyā, [the
city of] Gandharvas, a mirage;1 the abandonment of all the philosophical views,
—this is what characterises no-birth.
100. Thus too all these words will be understood,
that is, emptiness, having no self-nature, etc.; [the world] is empty, not,
indeed, because of its being empty, but because of its being empty in the sense
of being unborn.
101. A system [of mentality] may have its rise
and fall owing to causation; when there is a dissolution of the system, there
is neither birth nor annihilation.
102. When a dissolution somewhere takes place
among the members of the system, such existence ceases as is discriminated by
the philosophers by means of [such categories as] oneness and separateness.
103. Nothing is born; being is not, non-being is
not, nowhere is being-and-non-being; except that where there is a system, there
is the rising of things and their dissolution.
104. It is only in accordance with general
convention that a chain2 of mutual dependence is talked of; (203) birth has no
sense when the chain of dependence is severed.
105. As there is nothing generating, there is
no-birth, free from the faults of the philosophers; I talk of this
conventionally according [to the theory of] concatenation, and this is not
intelligible to the ignorant.
1 This line may better be dropped as an
interpolation.
2 Saṁkata.
106. If there is anything born somewhere apart
from concatenation, here is one who is to be recognised as an advocate of
no-causation as he destroys concatenation.
107. If concatenation works [from outside] like
a lamp revealing all kinds of things, this means the presence of something
outside concatenation itself.
108. All things are devoid of self-nature, have
never been born, and in their original nature are like the sky; things
separated from concatenation belong to the discrimination of the ignorant.
109. There is another kind of no-birth which is
the self-essence of things realised by the wise; its birth is no-birth, and in
this no-birth there is a recognition.1
110. When this entire world is regarded as
concatenation, as nothing else but concatenation, then the mind gains
tranquillity.
111. Ignorance, desire, karma, etc. —these are
the inner concatenation; a ladle, clay, a vessel, a wheel, etc., or seeds, the
elements, etc. —these are external concatenations.
112. If there is any other existence born of
concatenation, this goes against the law of concatenation; those [who hold this
view] are not established in the principles of correct reasoning.
(204) 113. If there is an object coming to exist
and yet is non-existent, by what law of causation is there the recognition of
it? Things here are of mutual origination, and for this reason causation is
declared.
114. Heat, fluidity, motility, solidity—such
notions are discriminated by the ignorant; there is a system of relations, no
individual objects exist; hence the denial of self-nature [as constituting the
realness of objects].
115. The physician varies his treatment
according to diseases though there is no difference in the principle [of
healing]; the difference comes from varieties of diseases.
1 This is what constitutes
anutpattikadharmakshānti, the "recognition of all things as unborn,"
which is considered the supreme spiritual attainment of Bodhisattvas.
116. In like manner, [in order to save]
generations of beings from their disease of passions with which they are ill, I
teach people with my doctrines, knowing the power of their senses.
117. My doctrine does not vary, but the passions
and powers are differentiated; there is just one vehicle; auspicious is the
eightfold path.
LXXIX
At that time again, Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said this to the Blessed One: Impermanence,
impermanence—this is the discrimination of the philosophers, Blessed One, and
you, too, declare in the canonical texts that all composite things are
impermanent, to be subject to birth and destruction is the nature of things;
but, Blessed One, is this right or wrong? And how many kinds of impermanency
[are there], Blessed One?
Said the Blessed One: Mahāmati, there are eight1
kinds of impermanency as discriminated by the philosophers, but not by me. What
are the eight kinds? (1) Some say (205) that there is origination and then
cessation—this is impermanency: that is to say, Mahāmati, in the beginning
there is something born which ceases to exist—this is impermanency. (2) Some
explain impermanency as the changing of shape. (3) Some say, form2 itself is
impermanent. (4) Some regard impermanency to consist in the changing of form (rūpa),
saying that in a continuous, uninterrupted existence of all things there takes
place a change in their natural flavour; for instance, milk going through a
transformation turns into sour milk, and that such an invisible decomposition
happens to all things; this is called impermanency. (5) Some imagine that there
is an objective existence (bhāva) which is called impermanency. (6) Some
imagine that existence and non-existence—this is impermanency. (7) Some say
that not being born is impermanency; because of all things being impermanent,
and because of impermanency being inherent in them.3
1 Both T'ang and Sung have seven, not eight. The
present text also enumerates only seven; the missing one is supplied in a
footnote from Wei.
2 Or matter, rūpa.
3 This is the eighth in Wei, and for the seventh
Wei has this: "Again there are other philosophers according to whom
impermanency consists in not being [existent] at first but coming later to
exist. That is to say, when things born of the elements cease to exist, nothing
is seen, nothing is born, as they are separated from the substances that
subsist—this is called impermanency."
Now, Mahāmati, by impermanency that exists in
existence and non-existence, is meant that things made of the elements1 are by
nature subject to destruction and have nothing in them one can take hold of,
while the elements themselves are never set in motion.
By impermanency that is no-birth is meant that
there is neither2 permanency nor impermanency; that in all things there is no
[dualistic] evolution of being and non-being, and that nothing is seen to
exist, even when they are examined into the last atom. This not seeing of
anything is another name for no-birth, and not for birth. This, Mahāmati, is
the nature of impermanency that is no-birth, and as this is not understood, all
the philosophers cherish the view of impermanency that is based on birth.
1 Bhūta before bhautika (line 10) may better be
dropped.
2 The negative particle na is inserted here
according to Sung.
Further, Mahāmati, by the conception of
impermanency as objective existence is meant that there is a discrimination in
[the philosopher's] own mind as to that which is not permanent and that which
is not impermanent. What is the sense of this? (206) It means that there is a
thing called impermanency which in itself is not subject to destruction, but by
whose working there is the disappearance of all things; and if not for
impermanency there will be no disappearance of all things. It is like a stick
or a stone, or like a hammer breaking other things to pieces while itself
remains unbroken. [This is the philosopher's meaning but] as we actually see
things about us, there is no such mutual differentiation which compels us to
say that here is impermanency the cause, and there is the disappearance of all
things as the effect; there is no such differentiation of cause and effect, and
we cannot say: Here is impermanency as cause and there is the effect. When
there is thus no differentiation of cause and effect, all things are permanent
since no cause exists to render them otherwise. Mahāmati, as to the
disappearance of all things, there is a cause, but it is not in the
understanding of the ignorant and simple-minded. When the cause is of a
dissimilar nature, the [same] effect is not produced. In case it does, the
impermanency of all things is an example of dissimilar effect, and there is no
distinction between cause and effect. But the distinction between cause and
effect is observed in them. If there is an [objective] existence to be known as
impermanence, it will be characterised with the nature of an effect-producing
cause, and there will be one entity contained in all things. When the notion is
cherished of a cause-producing effect, this means that impermanence the cause
is impermanent because it partakes of the nature of the effect which is
impermanent. All things then are not to be regarded as impermanent but as
permanent.
If impermanency [as the cause] resides within
all things, it will come under the three divisions of time. It passes away
together with things past; its future is not yet here as things of the future
are still unborn; in the present it breaks up together with things of the
present.
(207) Form [or matter] results from the
combination and variation of the elements; as the primary elements and the
secondary elements are neither different nor not-different, they are by nature
not subject to destruction, because according to the philosophers the elements
are indestructible. [But, Mahāmati,] it is an established fact that the entire
triple world with its elements primary and secondary is born, abides, and
disappears. How do the philosophers conceive a separate existence of
impermanency which is independent of the elements primary and secondary, while
the elements themselves are neither set in motion nor destroyed because they
cling to the notion of self-nature [as eternally unchangeable]?
The conception of impermanency as existing in
the first origination which ceases to continue [is not tenable for three
reasons]; the elements cannot produce one another, because each has its
self-nature different from the others. Each individual one cannot produce
itself because there is no differentiation in it. The [mutually] separated
origination of the elements is impossible because there is no correspondence
between the two. Hence the conclusion that the conception of
origination-impermanency is untenable.
By the conception of impermanency in
consideration of changes taking place in external form is meant that the
elements primary and secondary are not subject to dissolution. What is known as
dissolution, Mahāmati, even when closely examined until atoms are reached, is
not the destruction of the elements primary and secondary but of their external
forms whereby the elements assume different appearances as short or long; but,
in fact, nothing is destroyed in the elemental atoms. What is seen as ceased to
exist is the external formation of the elements. This view is cherished by the
Sāṁkhya school.
By the impermanency of external shapes is meant
the impermanency of form (rūpa); (208) what is impermanent is thus the external
shape and not the elements. If the elements themselves are impermanent all our
everyday experiences come to naught. This is cherishing the view of the
Lokāyatika, according to which all things are reducible to mere words because
their self-nature is never seen as born.
By the impermanency of changes is meant the
changing of forms (rūpa) and not the changing of the elements themselves as is
seen in various ornamental articles of gold which assume various forms. While
there is no disappearance in the nature of gold, the ornamental articles
variously change in form.
These and other views of impermanency as changes
are discriminated variously by the philosophers as is here described. Fire may
burn all the elements but their self-nature can never be burned; when each goes
asunder by itself, there is the destruction of what constitutes the elements
primary and secondary.
However, Mahāmati, I am neither for permanency
nor for impermanency. Why? For these reasons: external objects are not
admitted; the triple world is taught as not being anything else but the Mind
itself; multiplicities of external existences are not accepted; there is no
rising of the elements, nor their disappearance, nor their continuation, nor
their differentiation; there are no such things as the elements primary and
secondary; because of discrimination there evolve the dualistic indications of
perceived and perceiving; when it is recognised that because of discrimination
there is a duality, the discussion concerning the existence and non-existence
of the external world ceases because Mind-only is understood. Discrimination
(209) rises from discriminating a world of effect-producing works; no
discrimination takes place when this world is not recognised.1 Then a man
ceases to cherish the discrimination of existence and non-existence which rises
out of his own mind, he sees that things, either of this world or of a higher
world, or of the highest, are not to be described as permanent or impermanent,
because he does not understand the truth that there is nothing in the world but
what is seen of the Mind itself. As [the meaning of] discrimination is not
understood by all the philosophers who have fallen into wrong ideas of dualism
and who are people of no [spiritual] attainment, impermanency comes up to them
as a subject for discussion. Mahāmati,2 the triple aspect of all things as
distinguished as of this world, of a higher world, and of the highest, is the
outcome of word-discrimination, but this is not understood by the ignorant and
simple-minded. So it is said:
118. By the deluded philosophers the notion of
impermanency is discriminated as origination-cessation, as transformation of
external forms, as an [independent] existence, as form.
1 Read after the Chinese.
2 Sarvatīrthakara (line 6) is dropped, according
to the Chinese.
119. There is no destruction of things; the
elements abide for ever as regards their self-essence; immersed in varieties of
views the philosophers discriminate impermanency.
120. To these philosophers there is no
destruction, no birth; the elements are permanent as regards their
self-essence; who ever discriminates impermanency? [This is the position of the
philosophers.]
121. [According to the Buddha,] there is nothing
in the world but the Mind itself, and all that is of duality has its rise from
the Mind and is seen as perceived and perceiving; an ego-soul and what belongs to
it—they exist not.
122. The abode and realm of Brahma, etc. —I
declare all to be of Mind-only, (210) outside Mind-only, Brahma, etc., are not
attainable.
Here Ends the Third Chapter, "On
Impermanency," in the Laṅkāvatāra-Mahāyāna-Sūtra.
-----------------
LXXX
(211) At that time again Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said this to the Blessed One: Pray tell me, Blessed One,
about the state of perfect tranquillisation (nirodha) and its further development
as attained by all the Bodhisattvas, Śrāvakas, and Pratyekabuddhas; for when
this further development is thoroughly understood by myself and other
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas all may be saved from being confounded by the happiness
which comes from the attainment of perfect tranquillisation and also from
falling into the confused state of mind of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and
philosophers.
Said the Blessed One: Then listen well and
reflect well within yourself; I will tell you.
Certainly, Blessed One, said Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva and gave ear to the Blessed One.
The Blessed One said this to him: Those
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas who have reached the sixth stage as well as all the
Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas attain perfect tranquillisation. At the seventh
stage, the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas, giving up the view of self-nature as
subsisting in all things, attain perfect tranquillisation in every minute of
their mental lives, which is not however the case with the Śrāvakas and
Pratyekabuddhas; for with them there is something effect-producing, and in
their attainment of perfect tranquillisation there is a trace [of dualism], of
grasped and grasping. Therefore, they do not attain perfect tranquillisation in
every minute of their mental lives which is possible at the seventh stage. They
cannot attain to [the clear conviction of] an undifferentiated state of all
things (212) and the cessation of [all] multiplicities. Their attainment is due
to understanding the aspect of all things in which their self-nature is
discriminated as good and as not-good. Therefore, until the seventh stage there
is not a well-established attainment of tranquillisation in every minute of
their mental lives.
Mahāmati, at the eighth stage the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas, Śrāvakas, and Pratyekabuddhas cease cherishing
discriminative ideas that arise from the Citta, Mana and Manovijñāna. From the
first stage up to the sixth, they perceive that the triple world is no more
than the Citta. Manas, and Manovijñāna, that as it is born of a discriminating
mind there is no ego-soul and what belongs to it, and that there is no falling
into the multitudinousness of external objects except through [the
discrimination of] the Mind itself. The ignorant turning their self-knowledge
(svajñāna) towards the dualism of grasped and grasping fail to understand, for
there is the working of habit-energy which has "been accumulating since
beginningless time owing to false reasoning and discrimination.
Mahāmati, at the eighth stage there is Nirvana
for the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas; but the Bodhisattvas are
kept away by the power of all the Buddhas1 from [being intoxicated by] the
bliss of the Samādhi, and thereby they will not enter into Nirvana. When the
stage of Tathagatahood is not fulfilled there would be the cessation of all
doings, and if [the Bodhisattvas] were not supported [by the Buddhas] the
Tathagata-family would become extinct. Therefore, the Buddhas, the Blessed
Ones, point out the virtues of Buddhahood which are beyond conception. (213)
Therefore, [the Bodhisattvas] do not enter into Nirvana, but the Śrāvakas and
Pratyekabuddhas, engrossed in the bliss of the Samādhis, therein cherish the
thought of Nirvana.
1 Read according to T'ang.
At the seventh stage, Mahāmati, the Bodhisattva
properly examines into the nature of the Citta, Manas, and Manovijñāna; he
examines into [such subjects as] ego-soul and what belongs1 to it, grasped and
grasping, the egolessness of persons and things, rising and disappearing,
individuality and generality; he skilfully ascertains the fourfold logical
analysis; he enjoys the bliss of self-mastery; he enters successively upon the
stages; he knows the differences obtaining in the various elements of
enlightenment. The grading of the stages is arranged by me lest the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva, not knowing what is meant by individuality and
generality and failing to understand the continuous development of the
successive stages, should fall into the philosophers' wrong way of viewing
things. But, Mahāmati, there is really nothing rising, nothing disappearing,
all is nothing except what is seen of the Mind itself; that is, the continuous
development of the successive stages and all the multiple doings of the triple
world [—they are all of Mind itself]. This is not understood by the ignorant. I
and all the Buddhas1 establish the doctrine of the stages which develop
successively as do all the doings of the triple world.
1 The Chinese reading is here adopted.
Further, Mahāmati, the Śrāvakas and
Pratyekabuddhas at the eighth stage of Bodhisattvahood are so intoxicated with
the happiness that comes from the attainment of perfect tranquillisation, and,
failing to understand fully that there is nothing in the world but what is seen
of the Mind itself, they are thus unable to overcome the hindrances and
habit-energy growing out of their notions of generality and individuality; and
adhering to the egolessness of persons and things and (214) cherishing views
arising therefrom, they have the discriminating idea and knowledge of Nirvana,
which is not that of the truth of absolute solitude. Mahāmati, when the
Bodhisattvas face and perceive the happiness of the Samādhi of perfect
tranquillisation, they are moved with the feeling of love and sympathy owing to
their original vows, and they become aware of the part they are to perform as
regards the [ten] inexhaustible vows. Thus, they do not enter Nirvana. But the
fact is that they are already in Nirvana because in them there is no rising of
discrimination. With them the discrimination of grasped and grasping no more
takes place; as they [now] recognise that there is nothing in the world but
what is seen of the Mind itself, they have done away with the thought of
discrimination concerning all things. They have abandoned adhering to and
discriminating about such notions as the Citta, Manas, and Manovijñāna, and
external objects, and self-nature; however, they have not given up the things
promoting the cause of Buddhism; because of their attainment of the inner
insight which belongs to the stage of Tathagatahood; whatever they do all
issues from their transcendental knowledge.
It is like a man crossing a stream in a dream.
For instance, Mahāmati, suppose that while sleeping a man dreams that he is in
the midst of a great river which he earnestly endeavours with all his might to
cross by himself; but before he succeeds in crossing the stream, he is awakened
from the dream, and being awakened he thinks: "Is this real or
unreal?" He thinks again: "No, it is neither real nor unreal. By
reason of the habit-energy of discrimination which has been accumulated by
experience ever since beginningless time, as multiplicities of forms and
conditions are seen, heard, thought, and recognised, there is the perception
and discrimination of all things as existent and nonexistent; and for this
reason my Manovijñāna experiences even in a dream all that has been seen by
myself."
In the same way, Mahāmati, the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas of the eighth stage of Bodhisattvahood, (215) after
passing through the first up to the seventh stage, observe that "there is
no more rising in them of discrimination since all things are seen as like
Māyā, etc., when they have an intuitive understanding of the [true] nature of
all things, and [further] observing that, therefore, there is the cessation of
all things as to grasped and grasping which rise from one's ardent desire for
things, and also observing how the mind and what belongs to it carry on their
discrimination, the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas never relax their efforts to
practise the teachings of the Buddhas. Mahāmati, they will exercise themselves
to make those who have not yet attained the truth attain it. For the
Bodhisattvas, Nirvana does not mean extinction; as they have abandoned thoughts
of discrimination evolving from the Citta, Manas, and Manovijñāna, there is for
them the attainment of the recognition that all things are unborn. And,
Mahāmati, in ultimate reality there is neither gradation nor continuous
succession; [only] the truth of absolute solitude (viviktadharma) is taught
here in which the discrimination of all the images is quieted. So it is said:
1. The abodes and the stages of Buddhahood are
established in1 the Mind-only which is imageless—this was told, is told, and
will be told by the Buddhas.
2. The [first] seven stages are [still] of the
mind, but here the eighth is imageless; the two stages, [the ninth and the
tenth,] have [still] something to rest themselves on; the [highest] stage that
is left belongs to me.
3. Self-realisation and absolute purity—this
stage is my own; it is the highest station of Maheśvara, the Akanishtha
[heaven] shining brilliantly.
4. Its rays of light move forward like a mass of
fire; they who are bright-coloured, charming, and auspicious transform the
triple world.
5. Some worlds are being transformed, while
others have already been transformed;2 there I preach the various vehicles
which belong to my own stage.
(216) 6. But [from the absolute point of view]
the tenth is the first, and the first is the eighth; and the ninth is the
seventh, and the seventh is the eighth.
7. And the second is the third, and the fourth
is the fifth, and the third is the sixth; what gradation is there where
imagelessness prevails?
The Fourth Chapter, "On Intuitive
Understanding."
1 The Sagāthakam, V. 105, has cittamātraṁ
nirābhāsam...... instead of cittamātre nirābhāse......, as it stands here.
2 According to T'ang.
(217) At that time again, Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said this to the Blessed One: Is the Blessed One, the
Tathagata, the Arhat, the Fully-Enlightened One, permanent or impermanent?
Said the Blessed One: Mahāmati, the Tathagata is
neither permanent nor impermanent. Why? Because either way there is a fault
connected with it. Mahāmati, what fault is connected with either assertion?1 If
the Tathagata is permanent, he will be connected with the creating agencies.
For, Mahāmati, according to all the philosophers the creating agencies are
something uncreated and permanent. But the Tathagata is not permanent [in the
same sense] as the uncreated are permanent. If he is impermanent, he will be
connected with things created. Because the Skandhas which are predicable as
qualified and qualifying are nonexistent, and because the Skandhas are subject to
annihilation, destructibility is their nature. Mahāmati, all that is created is
impermanent as is a jug, a garment, straw, a piece of wood, a brick, etc.,
which are all connected with impermanency. Thus all the preparations for the
knowledge of the All-Knowing One will become useless as they are things
created. On account of no distinction being made, the Tathagata, indeed, would
be something created. For this reason, the Tathagata is neither permanent nor
impermanent.
1 Following T'ang.
Again, Mahāmati, the Tathagata is not permanent
for the reason that [if he were] he would be like space, and the preparations
one makes for Tathagatahood would be useless. That is to say, Mahāmati, space
is neither permanent nor impermanent as it excludes [the idea of] permanence
and impermanence, (218) and it is improper to speak of it as characterised with
the faults of oneness and otherness, of bothness and not-bothness, of
permanence and impermanence. Further, Mahāmati, it is like the horns of a hare,
or a horse, or an ass, or a camel, or a frog, or a snake, or a fly, or a fish;
[with the Tathagata] as with them here is the permanency of no-birth. Because
of this fault of the permanency of no-birth, the Tathagata cannot be permanent.
However, Mahāmati, there is another sense in
which the Tathagata can be said to be permanent. How? Because the knowledge
arising from the attainment of enlightenment [ = an intuitive understanding] is
of a permanent nature, the Tathagata is permanent. Mahāmati, this knowledge, as
it is attained intuitively by the Tathagatas, Arhats, Fully-Enlightened Ones,
is, indeed, permanent. Whether the Tathagatas are born or not, this Dharmatā,
which is the regulative and sustaining principle to be discoverable in the
enlightenment of all the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and philosophers, abides,
and this sustaining principle of existence is not like the emptiness of space,
which, however, is not understood by the ignorant and simple-minded. Mahāmati,
this knowledge of enlightenment belonging to the Tathagatas comes forth from
transcendental knowledge (prajñājñāna); Mahāmati, the Tathagatas, Arhats,
Fully-Enlightened Ones do not come forth from the habit-energy of ignorance
which is concerned with the Citta, Manas, and Manovijñāna, and the Skandhas,
Dhātus, and Āyatanas. The triple world originates from the discriminating of
unrealities, but the Tathagatas do not originate from the discriminating of
unrealities. Where duality obtains, Mahāmati, there is permanency and
impermanency because of its not being one. Mahāmati, [the truth of] absolute
solitude is, indeed, non-dualistic1 because all things are characterised with
non-duality and no-birth. For this reason, Mahāmati, the Tathagatas, Arhats,
Fully-Enlightened Ones are neither permanent nor impermanent. Mahāmati, as long
as there is word-discrimination, (219) there follows the faulty notion of
permanency and impermanency. The destruction of the notion of permanency and
impermanency as held by the ignorant, Mahāmati, comes from the getting rid of
the knowledge that is based on discrimination, and not from the getting rid of
the knowledge that is based on the insight of solitude. So it is said:
1. By keeping away permanency and impermanency,
[and yet] by keeping permanency and impermanency in sight, those who always see
the Buddhas will not expose themselves to the power of the philosophical
doctrines.
2. When permanency and impermanency are adhered
to all the accumulation [one makes for the attainment of reality] will be of no
avail; by destroying the knowledge that is based on discrimination, [the idea
of] permanency and impermanency is kept back.
3. As soon as an assertion is made, all is in
confusion; when it is understood that there is nothing in the world but what is
seen of the Mind itself, disputes never arise.
Here Ends the Fifth Chapter, "On the
Deduction of the Permanency and Impermanency of Tathagatahood."
1 Read advayam, not dvayam.
(220) At that time again, Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva made a request of the Blessed One, saying: Blessed One,
tell me; Sugata, tell me about the rising and disappearing of the Skandhas,
Dhātus, and Āyatanas. In case there is no ego-soul, what is it that comes to
exist and to disappear? The ignorant who are attached to the notion of rising
and disappearing, fail to understand the extinction of pain, and thus they know
not what Nirvana is.
Said the Blessed One: Then, Mahāmati, listen
well and reflect well within yourself; I will tell you.
Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said: Certainly,
Blessed One; and gave ear to the Blessed One.
The Blessed One said this to him: Mahāmati, the
Tathāgata-garbha holds within it the cause for both good and evil, and by it
all the forms of existence are produced. Like an actor it takes on a variety of
forms, and [in itself] is devoid of an ego-soul and what belongs to it. As this
is not understood, there is the functioning together of the triple combination
from which effects take place. But the philosophers not knowing this are
tenaciously attached to the idea of a cause [or a creating agency]. Because of
the influence of habit-energy that has been accumulating variously by false
reasoning since beginningless time, what here goes under the name of
Ālayavijñāna is accompanied by the seven Vijñānas which give birth to a state
known as the abode of ignorance. It is like a great ocean in which the waves
roll on permanently but the [deeps remain unmoved; that is, the Alaya-] body
itself subsists uninterruptedly, quite free from fault of impermanence, unconcerned
with the doctrine of ego-substance, and (221) thoroughly pure in its essential
nature.
As to the other seven Vijñānas beginning with
the Manas and Manovijñāna, they have their rise and complete ending from moment
to moment; they are born with false discrimination as cause, and with forms and
appearances and objectivity as conditions which are intimately linked together;
adhering to names and forms, they do not realise that objective individual
forms are no1 more than what is seen of the Mind itself; they do not give exact
information regarding pleasure and pain; they are not the cause of
emancipation; by setting up names and forms which originate from greed, greed
is begotten in turn, thus mutually conditioned and conditioning. When the
sense-organs which seize [upon the objective world] are destroyed and
annihilated, the other things immediately cease to function, and there is no
recognition of pleasure and pain which are the self-discrimination of
knowledge; thus there is the attainment of perfect tranquillisation in which
thoughts and sensations are quieted, or there is the realisation of the four
Dhyānas, in which truths of emancipation are well understood; whereupon the
Yogins are led to cherish herein the notion of [true] emancipation, because of
the not-rising [of the Vijñānas].
1 According to T'ang and Sung.
[But] when a revulsion [or turning-back] has not
taken place in the Ālayavijñāna known under the name of Tathāgata-garbha, there
is no cessation of the seven evolving Vijñānas. Why? Because the evolution of
the Vijñānas is depending on this cause; but this does not belong to the realm
of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and those who are disciplining themselves in
the exercises of the philosophers. As they [only] know the egolessness of the self-soul,
as they [only] accept the individuality and generality of the Skandhas, Dhātus,
and Āyatanas, there is the evolving of the Tathāgata-garbha. When an insight
into the five Dharmas, the three Svabhāvas, and the egolessness of all things
is obtained, the Tathāgata-garbha becomes quiescent. By causing a revulsion in
the continuous development of the graded stages, [the Bodhisattva] may not be
led astray in the path [of enlightenment] by those philosophers who hold
different views. Thus establishing himself at the Bodhisattva stage of Acalā
(immovable), (222) he obtains the paths leading to the happiness of the ten
Samādhis. Supported by the Buddhas in Samādhi, observing the truths of the
Buddha which go beyond thought and his own original vows, not entering into the
happiness of the Samādhi which is the limit of reality, but by means of the
self-realisation which is not generally gained by the paths of discipline
belonging to the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and philosophers, he obtains the
ten paths of discipline which belong to the noble family [of the Tathagatas],
and [also obtains] the knowledge-body created by the will which is removed from
the [premeditated] workings of Samādhi. For this reason, Mahāmati, let those
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas who are seeking after the exalted truth effect the
purification of the Tathāgata-garbha which is known as Ālayavijñāna.
Mahāmati, if you say that there is no
Tathāgata-garbha known as Ālayavijñāna, there will be neither the rising nor
the disappearing [of an external world of multiplicities] in the absence of the
Tathāgata-garbha known as Ālayavijñāna. But, Mahāmati, there is the rising and
disappearing of the ignorant as well as the holy ones. [Therefore], the Yogins,
while walking in the noble path of self-realisation and abiding in the
enjoyment of things as they are, do not abandon working hard and are never
frustrated [in their undertakings]. Mahāmati, this realm of the
Tathāgata-garbha is primarily undefiled and is beyond all the speculative
theories of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and philosophers; but it appears to
them devoid of purity, as it is soiled by these external defilements. This is
not the case with the Tathagatas, Mahāmati; with the Tathagatas it is an
intuitive experience as if it were an Āmalaka fruit held in the palm of the
hand.
This, Mahāmati, was told by me in the canonical
text relating to Queen Śrīmālā, (223) and in another where the Bodhisattvas,
endowed with subtle, fine, pure knowledge, are supported [by my spiritual
powers] —that the Tathāgata-garbha known as Ālayavijñāna evolves together with
the seven Vijñānas. This is meant for the Śrāvakas who are not free from
attachment, to make them see into the egolessness of things; and for Queen
Śrīmālā to whom the Buddha's spiritual power was added, the [pure] realm of
Tathagatahood was expounded. This does not belong to the realm of speculation
as it is carried on by the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and other philosophers,
except, Mahāmati, that this realm of Tathagatahood which is the realm of the
Tathāgata-garbha-ālayavijñāna is meant for those Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas who
like you are endowed with subtle, fine, penetrating thought-power and whose
understanding is in accordance with the meaning; and it is not for others, such
as philosophers, Śrāvakas, and Pratyekabuddhas, who are attached to the letters
of the canonical texts. For this reason, Mahāmati, let you and other
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas discipline yourselves in the realm of Tathagatahood, in
the understanding of this Tathāgata-garbha-ālayavijñāna, so that you may not
rest contented with mere learning. So it is said:
1. The Garbha of the Tathagatas is indeed united
with the seven Vijñānas; when this is adhered to, there arises duality, but
when rightly understood, duality ceases.
2. The mind, which is the product of
intellection since beginningless time, is seen like a mere image; when things
are viewed as they are in themselves, there is neither objectivity nor its
appearance.
3. As the ignorant grasp the finger-tip and not
the moon, (224) so those who cling to the letter, know not my truth.
4. The Citta dances like a dancer; the Manas
resembles a jester; the [Mano-] vijñāna together with the five [Vijñānas]
creates an objective world which is like a stage.1
1 Sung and T'ang seem to be incorrect in their
reading of this
At that time, Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva made a request of the Blessed One, saying: Pray tell me,
Blessed One; pray tell me, Sugata, concerning the distinguishing aspects of the
five Dharmas, the [three] Svabhāvas, the [eight] Vijñānas, and the twofold
egolessness. By [recognising] the distinguishing aspects of the twofold
egolessness, I and other Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas will be able to establish
those truths while effecting a continuous development through the various
stages of Bodhisattvahood. It is said that by these truths we can enter into
all the Buddha-truths, and that by entering into all the Buddha-truths we can
enter even into the ground of the Tathagata's inner realisation.
Said the Blessed One: Then, Mahāmati, listen
well and reflect well within yourself; I will tell you.
Certainly, Blessed One, said Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva and gave ear to the Blessed One.
The Blessed One said this to him: Mahāmati, I
will tell you about the distinguishing aspects of the five Dharmas, the [three]
Svabhāvas, the [eight] Vijñānas, and the twofold egolessness. The five Dharmas
are: name, form, discrimination, right knowledge, and suchness. [When these are
thoroughly comprehended] by the Yogins, they enter into the course of the
Tathagata's inner realisation, where they are kept away from such views as
eternalism and nihilism, realism and negativism, and (225) where they come face
to face with the abode of happiness belonging to the present existence as well
as to the Samāpatti (tranquillisation). But, Mahāmati, as the ignorant do not
understand that the five Dharmas, the [three] Svabhāvas, the [eight] Vijñānas,
and the twofold egolessness, together with the external objects which are
regarded as existent and nonexistent— [all these are no more than] what is seen
of the Mind itself—they are given to discrimination, but it is otherwise with
the wise.
Said Mahāmati: How is it that the ignorant are
given up to discrimination and the wise are not?
Said the Blessed One: Mahāmati, the ignorant
cling to names, ideas, and signs; their minds move along [these channels]. As
thus they move along, they feed on multiplicities of objects, and fall into the
notion of an ego-soul and what belongs to it, and cling to salutary
appearances. As thus they cling, there is a reversion to ignorance, and they
become tainted, karma born of greed, anger, and folly is accumulated. As karma
is accumulated again and again, their minds become swathed in the cocoon of
discrimination as the silk-worm; and, transmigrating in the ocean of
birth-and-death (gati), they are unable, like the water-drawing wheel, to move
forward. And because of folly, they do not understand that all things are like
Māyā, a mirage, the moon in water, and have no self-substance to be imagined as
an ego-soul and its belongings; that things rise from their false
discrimination; that they are devoid of qualified and qualifying; and have
nothing to do with the course of birth, abiding, and destruction; that they are
born of the discrimination of what is only seen of the Mind itself; and assert1
that they are born of Iśvara, time, atoms, or a supreme spirit, for they follow
names and appearances. Mahāmati, the ignorant move along with appearances.
Further, Mahāmati, by "appearance" is
meant that which reveals itself to the visual sense (226) and is perceived as
form, and in like manner that which, appearing to the sense of hearing,
smelling, tasting, the body, and the Manovijñāna, is perceived as sound, odour,
taste, tactility, and idea, —all this I call "appearance."
Further, Mahāmati, by "discrimination"
is meant that by which names are declared, and there is thus the indicating of
[various] appearances. Saying that this is such and no other, for instance,
saying that this is an elephant, a horse, a wheel, a pedestrian, a woman, or a
man, each idea thus discriminated is so determined.
1 According to T'ang and Wei.
Further, Mahāmati, by "right
knowledge" is meant this: when names and appearances are seen as unobtainable
owing to their mutual conditioning, there is no more rising of the Vijñānas,
for nothing comes to annihilation, nothing abides everlastingly; and when there
is thus no falling back into the stage of the philosophers, Śrāvakas, and
Pratyekabuddhas, it is said that there is right knowledge. Further, Mahāmati,
by reason of this right knowledge, the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva does not regard
name as reality and appearance as non-reality.
When erroneous views based on the dualistic
notion of assertion and negation are gotten rid of, and when the Vijñānas cease
to rise as regards the objective world of names and appearances, this I call
"suchness." Mahāmati, a Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva who is established on
suchness attains the state of imagelessness and thereby attains the
Bodhisattva-stage of Joy (pramuditā).
When [the Bodhisattva] attains the stage of Joy,
he is kept away from all the evil courses belonging to the philosophers and
enters upon the path of supra-worldly truths. When [all] the conditions [of
truth] are brought to consummation, he discerns that the course of all things
starts with the notion of Māyā, etc.; and after the attainment of the noble
truth of self-realisation, he earnestly desires to put a stop to speculative
theorisation; (227) and going up in succession through the stages of
Bodhisattvahood he finally reaches the stage of Dharma-Cloud (dharmameghā).
After being at the stage of Dharma-Cloud, he reaches as far as the stage of
Tathagatahood where the flowers of the Samādhis, powers, self-control, and
psychic faculties are in bloom. After reaching here, in order to bring all
beings to maturity, he shines like the moon in water, with varieties of rays of
transformation. Perfectly fulfilling1 the [ten] inexhaustible vows, he preaches
the Dharma to all beings according to their various understandings. As the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas, Mahāmati, have entered into suchness, they attain the
body which is free from the will and thought-constructions.2
Again, Mahāmati said: Are the three Svabhāvas to
be regarded as included in the five Dharmas, or as having their own
characteristics complete in themselves?
1 According to Sung and T'ang.
2 T'ang and Wei have
citta-mano-manovijñānarahitam.
The Blessed One said: The three Svabhāvas, the
eight Vijñānas, and the twofold egolessness—they are all included [in the five
Dharmas]. Of these, name and appearance are known as the Parikalpita [false
imagination]. Then, Mahāmati, discrimination which rises depending upon them,
is the notion of an ego-soul and what belongs to it, —the notion and the
discrimination are of simultaneous occurrence, like the rising of the sun and
its rays. Mahāmati, the discrimination thus supporting the notion of
self-nature which subsists in the multiplicities of objects, is called the Paratantra
[dependence on another]. Right knowledge and suchness, Mahāmati, are
indestructible, and thus they are known as Parinishpanna [perfect knowledge].
Further, Mahāmati, by adhering to what is seen
of the Mind itself there is an eightfold discrimination. This comes from
imagining unreal individual appearances [as real]. (228) When the twofold
clinging to an ego-soul and what belongs to it is stopped, there is the birth
of the twofold egolessness. Mahāmati, in these five Dharmas are included all
the Buddha-truths and also the differentiation and succession of the
[Bodhisattva-] stages, and the entrance of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas,
Bodhisattvas, and Tathagatas into the state of self-realisation by means of
their noble wisdom.
Further, Mahāmati, of the five Dharmas—name,
appearance, discrimination, right knowledge, and suchness— appearance is that
which is seen as having such characteristics as form, shape, distinctive
features, images, colours, etc. —this is "appearance." Out of this
appearance ideas are formed such as a jar, etc., by which one can say, this is
such and such, and no other; this is "name." When names are thus
pronounced, appearances are determined1 and there is "discrimination,
" saying this is mind and this is what belongs to it. That these names and
appearances are after all unobtainable because when intellection is put away
the aspect of mutuality [in which all things are determined] ceases to be
perceived and imagined—this is called the "suchness" of things. And
this suchness may be characterised as truth, reality, exact knowledge, limit,
source, self-substance, the unattainable. This has been realised by myself and
the Tathagatas, truthfully pointed out, recognised, made public, and widely
shown. When, in agreement with this, [the truth] is rightly understood as
neither negative nor affirmative, discrimination ceases to rise, and there is a
state conformable to self-realisation by means of noble wisdom, which is not
the course of controversy pertaining to the philosophers, Śrāvakas, and
Pratyekabuddhas; this is "right knowledge."
1 Samadharmeti vā that follows here is probably
to be dropped on the strength of the Chinese versions.
(229) These are, Mahāmati, the five Dharmas, and
in them are included the three Svabhāvas, the eight Vijñānas, the twofold
egolessness, and all the Buddha-truths. In this, Mahāmati, reflect well with
your own wisdom and let others do [the same] and do not allow yourself to be
led by another. So it is said:
5. The five Dharmas, the Svabhāvas, the eight
Vijñānas, and the twofold egolessness—they are all embraced in the Mahāyāna.
6. Name, appearance, and discrimination
[correspond to] the first two Svabhāvas, while right knowledge and suchness are
the Parinishpanna.
At that time again, Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said this to the Blessed One: It is told by the Blessed
One in the canonical text the Tathagatas of the past, present, and future are
like the sands of the river Gangā. Blessed One, is this to be accepted
literally? or is there another distinct meaning? Pray tell me, Blessed One.
The Blessed One said: Mahāmati, do not take it
in its literal sense; for, Mahāmati, the Buddhas of the three divisions of time
are not measurable by the measurement of the sands of the Gangā. Why? Because
an analogy which is superior to anything of the world and surpasses it cannot
be called an analogy, since there is in it something resembling and something
not resembling. (230) The Tathagatas, Arhats, Fully-Enlightened Ones do not
give out such an analogy that has in it something resembling and something not
resembling and that is superior to the world and surpasses it. But this
comparison is only given out, Mahāmati, by myself and the Tathagatas, in which
the Tathagatas, Arhats, Fully-Enlightened Ones are said to be like the sands of
the river Gangā; the idea is to terrify those ignorant and simple-minded ones
who, tenaciously clinging to the idea of permanency and impermanency, and
giving themselves up to the ways of thinking and the erroneous views of the
philosophers, follow up the wheel of transmigration. To those who, anxious to
escape the intricacies of the wheel of existence, seek after the excellent
state, thinking how this could be realised, it is told them that the appearance
of the Tathagatas is not like the blooming of the Udumbara flower, because they
will thereby see that the attainment of Buddhahood is not a difficult
undertaking and will pu1 forward their energy. But it is told in the canonical
text that the Tathagatas appear as rarely as the Udumbara flower, and this is
in consideration of those people who are to be led by me. Mahāmati, however, no
one has ever seen the Udumbara flower blooming, nor will anyone; while,
Mahāmati, the Tathagatas are at present in the world, they were seen and are to
be seen. To say that the Tathagatas appear as rarely as the Udumbara flower has
[really] no reference to the establishment of the truth itself. When, Mahāmati,
the establishment of the truth itself is pointed out, it surpasses beyond
measure anything in the world that can be offered as an analogy to it, because
[the ignorant] are incapable of believing. And thus there is an unbelief on the
part of the ignorant and simple-minded. (231) There is indeed no room for
analogies to enter in the realm of self-realisation which is effected by means
of noble wisdom. The truth transcends all the notions that are characteristic
of the Citta, Manas, and Manovijñāna. The truth is the Tathagatas, and,
therefore, in them there is nothing describable by analogy.
But, Mahāmati, [sometimes] a comparison is made
use of; that is to say, the Tathagatas are said to be like the sands of the
river Gangā, because they are the same and impartial [to all things], because
they are free from imagination and discrimination. For example, Mahāmati, the
sands of the river Gangā are tossed about by the fishes, tortoises, porpoises,
crocodiles, buffalos, lions, elephants, etc., but they are free from
imagination and discrimination; for they do not resent, saying."We are down-trodden,"
or "We are not." They are non-discriminative, pure in themselves,
separated from defilement. In the same way, Mahāmati, the self-realisation of
noble wisdom which has been attained by the Tathagatas, Arhats,
Fully-Enlightened Ones, is like the river Gangā, and their powers, psychic
faculties, and self-control are like the sands; and however much they are
tossed about by the fishes of the philosophers, by the ignorant who belong to
other schools, they are not troubled by imaginations and discriminations.
Because of their original vows, the Tathagatas [whose hearts are] filled with
all the happiness of the Samāpatti are not troubled by imaginations and
discriminations with regard to beings. Therefore, the Tathagatas, like the
sands of the river Gangā, are free from partiality because of their being
devoid of likes and dislikes.
To illustrate, Mahāmati: as the sands of the
river Gangā partake of the character of the earth, the conflagration that will
break out at the end of the Kalpa may burn the earth but does not destroy its
self-nature. Mahāmati, the earth is not consumed because of its being
inseparably connected with the element of fire, (232) and it is only the
ignorant and simple-minded that on account of their falling into false ideas
imagine the earth being consumed by fire. But as it supplies the material cause
to the element fire, it is never consumed. In the same way, Mahāmati, the
Dharmakāya of the Tathagatas, like the sands of the river Gangā, is never
destroyed.
To illustrate, Mahāmati: the sands of the river
Gangā are immeasurable. In the same way, Mahāmati, the rays of light of the
Tathagatas are beyond measure, which arc-emitted by them in all the
Buddha-assemblies in order to bring beings to maturity and arouse them [to the
knowledge of the truth].
To illustrate, Mahāmati: the sands of the river
Gangā do not assume another nature than itself remaining forever the same. In
the same way, Mahāmati, the Tathagatas, Arhats, Fully-Enlightened Ones are
neither evolving nor disappearing in transmigration because in them the cause
of making them come into existence is destroyed.
To illustrate, Mahāmati: the sands of the river
Gangā are unconcerned whether they are carried away or whether more is added
into them. In the same way, Mahāmati, the knowledge of the Tathagatas which is
exercised for the maturing of beings is neither exhausted nor augmented,
because the Dharma is without a physical body. Mahāmati, that which has a
physical body is subject to annihilation, but not that which has no physical body;
and the Dharma is not a physical body.
To illustrate, Mahāmati: the sands of the river
Gangā, however much they are compressed for the sake of the ghee and oil, are
destitute of them. In the same way, (233) Mahāmati, the Tathagatas never
abandon their deep concerns1 and original vows and happiness as regards the
Dharmadhātu, however hard they are oppressed with pain for the sake of beings,
as long as all beings have not yet been led into Nirvana by the Tathagatas, who
are endowed with a great compassionate heart.
To illustrate, Mahāmati: the sands of the river
Gangā are drawn along with the flow of the stream, but not where there is no
water. In the same way, Mahāmati, the Tathagata's teaching in regard to all the
Buddha-truths takes place along the flow of the Nirvana-stream; and for this
reason the Tathagatas are said to be like the sands of the river Gangā.
1 After T'ang.
Mahāmati, in tathāgata ("thus come")
there is no sense of "going away"; Mahāmati, "going away"
means destruction. Mahāmati, the primary limit of transmigration is unknown.
Not being known, how can I talk of the sense of "gong away"? The
sense of "going away," Mahāmati, is annihilation, and this is not
known by the ignorant and simple-minded.
Mahāmati said: If, Blessed One, the primary
limit of transmigration of all beings is unknowable, how is the emancipation of
beings knowable?
The Blessed One said: Mahāmati, when it is
understood that the objective world is nothing but what is seen of the Mind
itself, the habit-energy of false speculations and erroneous discriminations
which have been going on since beginningless time is removed, and there is a
revulsion [or turning-back] at the basis of discrimination—this is
emancipation, Mahāmati, and not annihilation. Therefore, Mahāmati, there cannot
be any talk about endlessness. To be endless in limit, Mahāmati, is another
name for discrimination. Apart from discriminations (234) there are no other
beings. When all things external or internal are examined with intelligence,
Mahāmati, knowing and known are found to be quiescent. But when it is not
recognised that all things rise from the discrimination of the Mind itself,
discrimination asserts itself. When this is understood discrimination ceases.
So it is said:
7. Those who regard the removers of obstruction
[i. e., Buddhas] as neither destroyed nor departed for ever, like the sands of
the Gangā, see the Tathagata.
8. Like the sands of the Gangā they are devoid
of all error: they flow along the stream and are permanent, and so is the essence
[or nature] of Buddhahood.
At that time again, Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said this to the Blessed One; Tell me, Blessed One; tell
me, Sugata, Tathagata, Arhat, Fully-Enlightened One, regarding the momentary
destruction of all things and their distinctive signs. Blessed One, what is
meant by all things being momentary?
The Blessed One replied: Then, Mahāmati, listen
well and reflect well within yourself; I will tell you.
Certainly, Blessed One; said Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva and gave ear to the Blessed One.
The Blessed One said this to him: Mahāmati, all
things, all things we speak of, and they are good or bad, effect-producing or
not effect-producing, of this world (235) or of super-world, faulty or
faultless, of evil flowings or the non-flowings, receptive or non-receptive. In
short, Mahāmati, the five appropriating1 Skandhas have their rise from the
habit-energy of the Citta, Manas, and Manovijñāna, they are imagined good or
bad. Mahāmati, the happiness of the Samādhi and the attainments [resulting
therefrom], which belong to the wise by reason of their abiding in the
happiness of the existing world, are called the non-outflowing goods.
1 All the Skandhas are self-appropriating, or
self-grasping, as long as there is attachment to the notion of an ego-soul.
When that is got rid of, the Skandhas are anāsrava, i. e. not tainted with evil
outflows.
Again, Mahāmati, by good and bad are meant the
eight Vijñānas. What are the eight? They are the Tathāgata-garbha known as the Ālayavijñāna,
Manas, Manovijñāna, and the system of the five Vijñānas as described by the
philosophers. Now, Mahāmati, the system of the five Vijñānas is together with
the Manovijñāna, and there is an undivided succession and differentiation of
good and bad, and the entire body moves on continuously and closely bound
together; moving on, it comes to an end; but as it fails to understand that
there is nothing in the world but what is seen of Mind-only, there is the
rising of another Vijñāna [-system] following the cessation of the first; and
the Manovijñāna in union with the system of the five Vijñānas, perceiving the
difference of forms and figures, is set in motion, not remaining still even for
a moment—this I call momentariness. Mahāmati, momentary is the Ālayavijñāna
known as the Tathāgata-garbha, which is together with the Manas and with the
habit-energy of the evolving Vijñānas— this is momentary. But [the Ālayavijñāna
which is together] with the habit-energy of the non-outflows (anāsrava) (236)
is not momentary. This is not understood by the ignorant and simple-minded who
are addicted to the doctrine of momentariness. Not understanding the
momentariness and non-momentariness of all things, they cherish nihilism
whereby they even try to destroy the unmade (asaṁskṛita). Mahāmati, the system
itself of the five Vijñānas is not subject to transmigration, nor does it
suffer pleasure and pain, nor is it conducive to Nirvana. But, Mahāmati, the
Tathāgata-garbha is together with the cause that suffers pleasure and pain; it
is this that is set in motion and ceases to work; it is stupefied by the
fourfold habit-energy. But the ignorant do not understand it, as their thoughts
are infused with the habit-energy of discrimination which cherishes the view of
momentariness.
Further, Mahāmati, gold, vajra, and the relics
of the Buddha, owing to their specific character, are never destroyed but
remain the same until the end of time. If, Mahāmati, the nature of
enlightenment is momentary, the wise would lose their wiseness (āryatva), but
they have never lost it. Mahāmati, gold and vajra remain the same until the end
of time; remaining the same they are neither diminished nor increased. How is
it that the ignorant, failing to recognise the hidden meaning of all things
internal and external, discriminate in the sense of momentariness?
Further, Mahāmati said: It is again said by the
Blessed One that by fulfilling the six Pāramitās Buddhahood is realised. What
are the six (237) Pāramitās? And how are they fulfilled?
The Blessed One replied: Mahāmati, there are
three kinds of Pāramitās. What are the three? They are the worldly, the
super-worldly, and the highest super-wordly. Of these, Mahāmati, the worldly
Pāramitās [are practised thus]: Adhering tenaciously to the notion of an
ego-soul and what belongs to it and holding fast to dualism, those who are
desirous for this world of form, etc., will practise the Pāramitā of charity in
order to obtain the various realms of existence. In the same way, Mahāmati, the
ignorant will practise the Pāramitās of morality, patience, energy, Dhyāna, and
Prajñā. Attaining the psychic powers they will be born in Brahma's heaven.
As to the super-worldly Pāramitās, they are
practised by the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas whose thoughts are possessed by
the notion of Nirvana; the Pāramitās of charity, etc. are thus performed by
them, who, like the ignorant, are desirous of enjoying Nirvana for themselves.
Again, Mahāmati, as to the highest super-worldly
Pāramitās, [they are practised] by the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas who are the
practisers of the highest form of spiritual discipline; that is, perceiving
that there is nothing in the world but what is only seen of the Mind itself, on
account of discrimination, and understanding that duality is of the Mind
itself, they see that discrimination ceases to function; and, that seizing and
holding is non-existent; and, free from all thoughts of attachment to
individual objects which are of the Mind itself, and in order to benefit and
give happiness to all sentient beings, [the Bodhisattvas] practise the Pāramitā
of charity. While dealing with an objective world there is no rising in them of
discrimination; they just practise morality and this is the Pāramitā [of
morality]. To practise patience with no thought of discrimination rising in
them (238) and yet with full knowledge of grasped and grasping —this is the
Pāramitā of patience. To exert oneself with energy from the first part of the
night to its end and in conformity with the disciplinary measures and not to
give rise to discrimination—this is the Pāramitā of energy. Not to cherish
discrimination, not to fall into the philosopher's notion of Nirvana—this is
the Pāramitā of Dhyāna. As to the Pāramitā of Prajñā: when the discrimination
of the Mind itself ceases, when things are thoroughly examined by means of
intelligence, there is no falling into dualism, and a revulsion takes place at
the basis, while previous karma is not destroyed; when [transcendental
knowledge] is exercised for the accomplishment of self-realisation, then there
is the Pāramitā of Prajñā. These, Mahāmati, are the Pāramitās and their
meanings.
So it is said:
9. The created (Samskrita) are empty,
impermanent, momentary—so the ignorant discriminate; the meaning of
momentariness is discriminated by means of the analogies of a river, a lamp,
and seeds.
10. All things are non-existent, they are
not-momentary, quiescent, not subject to destruction, and unborn— this, I say,
is the meaning of momentariness.
11. Birth and death succeed without
interruption— this I do not point out for the ignorant. Owing to the
uninterrupted succession of existence, discrimination moves on in the [six]
paths.
12. Ignorance is the cause and there is the
general rising of -minds, when form is not yet born, where is the abode of the
middle existence?
13. If another mind is set in motion in an
uninterrupted succession of deaths, (239) where does it find its dependence as
form is not established in time?
14. If mind is set in motion, somewhere,
somehow, the cause is an unreal one; it is not complete; how can one know of
its momentary disappearances?
15. The attainment of the Yogins, gold, the
Buddha-relics, and the heavenly palace of Abhāsvara are indestructible by any
worldly agencies.
16. Ever abiding are the truths attained by the
Buddhas and their perfect knowledge; the nature of Buddhahood as realised [by
them]—how can there be momentariness in them?
17. The city of the Gandharvas, Māyā-like
forms—how can they be otherwise than momentary? Realities are characterised
with unreality, and how can they be causal agencies?
Here Ends the Sixth Chapter "On
Momentariness."
1 The proper place for this section is after the
section on "Momentary" and before the "Pāramitā," or what
is the same thing the latter is wrongly inserted where it is found in in the
text.
(240) At that time again, Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva said this to the Blessed One: [How was it that] the
Arhats were given assurance by the Blessed One of their attainment of supreme
enlightenment? [How can] all beings attain Tathagatahood without realising the
truths of Parinirvana? [What does it mean that] from the night when the
Tathagata was awakened to supreme enlightenment until the night when he entered
into Parinirvana, between these times the Tathagata has not uttered, has not
pronounced, a word. [What is the meaning of this] that being always in Samādhi
the Tathagatas neither deliberate nor contemplate? [How do] Buddhas of
transformation, being in the state of transformation, execute the works of the
Tathagatas? How is the succession of momentary decomposition explained which
takes place in the Vijñānas?
[Further, what do these statements mean] that
Vajrapāṇi is constantly with [the Tathagata] as his personal guard; that the
primary limit is unknown and yet cessation is knowable; that there are evil
ones, their activities, and left-over karma? Blessed One, [facts of]
karma-hindrance are said to be shown [by the Tathagata in the incident of]
Cañcā the daughter of a Brahmin, of Sundarī the daughter of a mendicant, an
empty bowl, etc.; how can the Blessed One with these unexhausted evils attain
all-knowledge?
The Blessed One replied: Then, Mahāmati, listen
well and reflect well within yourself; I will tell you.
Certainly, Blessed One; (241) said Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva and gave ear to the Blessed One.
The Blessed One said this to him: The realm of
Nirvana where no substratum is left behind is according to the hidden meaning
and for the sake of the practisers who are thereby inspired to exert themselves
in the work of the Bodhisattvas. Mahāmati, there are Bodhisattvas practising
the work of the Bodhisattva here and in other Buddha-lands, who, however, are
desirous of attaining the Nirvana of the Śrāvakayāna. In order to turn their
inclination away from the Śrāvakayāna and to make them exert themselves in the
course of the Mahāyāna, the Śrāvakas in transformation are given assurance [as
to their future Buddhahood] by the Body of Transformation; but this is not done
by the Dharmatā-Buddha. This giving assurance to the Śrāvakas, Mahāmati, is
declared according to the hidden meaning. Mahāmati, that the abandonment of
passion-hindrance by the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas is not different [from
that by the Tathagatas] is due to the sameness of the taste of emancipation,
but this does not apply to the abandonment of knowledge-hindrance.
Knowledge-hindrance, Mahāmati, is purified when the egolessness of things is
distinctly perceived; but passion-hindrance is destroyed when first the
egolessness of persons is perceived and acted upon, for [then] the Manovijñāna
ceases to function. Further, dharma-hindrance is given up because of the
disappearance of the habit-energy [accumulated in] the Ālayavijñāna, it is now
thoroughly purified.
There is an eternally-abiding reality [which is
to be understood] according to the hidden meaning, because it is something that
has neither antecedents nor consequents. The Tathagata points out the Dharma
without deliberation, without contemplation, and by means of such words that
are original and independent. Because of his right thinking and because of his
unfailing memory, he neither deliberates nor contemplates, he is no more at the
stage of the fourfold habit-energy, (242) he is free from the twofold death, he
has relinquished the twofold hindrance of passion and knowledge.
Mahāmati, the seven Vijñānas, that is, Manas,
Manovijñāna,, eye-vijñāna, etc., are characterised with momentariness because
they originate from habit-energy, they are destitute of the good non-flowing
factors, and are not transmigratory. What transmigrates, Mahāmati, is the
Tathāgata-garbha which is the cause of Nirvana as well as that of pleasure and
pain. This is not understood by the ignorant whose minds are torn asunder by
the notion of emptiness.
Mahāmati, the Tathagatas who are accompanied by
Vajrapāṇi are the Tathagatas transformed in transformation and are not the
original Tathagatas, Arhats, Fully-Enlightened Ones. The original Tathagatas,
Mahāmati, are indeed beyond all sense and measurement, beyond the reach of all
ignorant ones, Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and philosophers. [These Tathagatas]
are abiding in the joy of existence as it is, as they have reached the truth of
intuitive knowledge by means of Jñānakshānti. Thus Vajrapāṇi is not attached to
them. All the Buddhas of Transformation do not owe their existence to karma; in
them there is no Tathagatahood, but apart from them there is no Tathagatahood
either. Like the potter who is dependent on various combinations, [the Buddha
of Transformation] does his work for sentient beings; he teaches the doctrine
meeting conditions, but not the doctrine that will establish the truth as it
is, which belongs to the noble realm of self-realisation.
Further, Mahāmati, on account of the cessation
of the six Vijñānas the ignorant and simple-minded look for nihilism, and on
account of their not understanding the Ālayavijñāna they have eternalism. The
primary limit of the discrimination of their own minds (243) is unknown,
Mahāmati. Emancipation is obtained when this discrimination of Mind itself
ceases. With the abandonment of the fourfold habit-energy the abandonment of
all faults takes place.
So it is said:1
1. The three vehicles are no-vehicle; there is
no Nirvana with the Buddhas; it is pointed out that the assurance of Buddhahood
is given to all that are freed from faults.
2. Ultimate intuitive knowledge, Nirvana that
leaves no remnant, —this is told according to the hidden meaning in order to
give encouragement to the timid.
1The following gāthās do not seem to have any
specific relation to the prose section.
3. Knowledge is produced by the Buddhas, and the
path is pointed out by them: they move in it and not in anything else,
therefore there is no Nirvana with them.
4. Existence, desire, form (rūpa),
theorising—this is the fourfold habit-energy; this is where the Manovijñāna
takes its rise and the Ālaya and Manas abide.
5. Nihilism and the idea of impermanency rise
because of the Manovijñāna, the eye-vijñāna, etc.; eternalism rises from [the
thought that] there is no beginning in Nirvana, intelligence, and theorisation.
Here Ends the Seventh Chapter, "On
Transformation."
(244) At that time Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva asked the Blessed One in verse and again made a request,
saying: Pray tell me, Blessed One, Tathagata, Arhat, Fully-Enlightened One
regarding the merit and vice of meat-eating; thereby I and other
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas of the present and future may teach the Dharma to make
those beings abandon their greed for meat, who, under the influence of the
habit-energy belonging to the carnivorous existence, strongly crave meat-food.
These meat-eaters thus abandoning their desire for [its] taste will seek the
Dharma for their food and enjoyment, and, regarding all beings with love as if
they were an only child, will cherish great compassion towards them. Cherishing
[great compassion], they will discipline themselves at the stages of
Bodhisattvahood and will quickly be awakened in supreme enlightenment; or
staying a while at the stage of Śrāvakahood and Pratyekabuddhahood, they will
finally reach the highest stage of Tathagatahood.
1 This chapter on meat-eating is another later
addition to the text, which was probably done earlier than the Rāvaṇa chapter.
It already appears in the Sung, but of the three Chinese versions it appears
here in its shortest form, the proportion being S = 1, T = 2, W = 3. It is
quite likely that meat-eating was practised more or less among the earlier
Buddhists, which was made a subject of severe criticism by their opponents. The
Buddhists at the time of the Laṅkāvatāra did not like it, hence this addition
in which an apologetic tone is noticeable.
Blessed One, even those philosophers who hold erroneous
doctrines and are addicted to the views of the Lokāyata such as the dualism of
being and non-being, nihilism, and eternalism, will prohibit meat-eating and
will themselves refrain from eating it. How much more, O World Leader, he who
promotes one taste for mercy and is the Fully-Enlightened One; (245) why not
prohibit in his teachings the eating of flesh not only by himself but by
others? Indeed, let the Blessed One who at heart is filled with pity for the
entire world, who regards all beings as his only child, and who possesses great
compassion in compliance with his sympathetic feelings, teach us as to the
merit and vice of meat-eating, so that I and other Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas may
teach the Dharma.
Said the Blessed One: Then, Mahāmati, listen well
and reflect well within yourself; I will tell you.
Certainly, Blessed One; said Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva and gave ear to the Blessed One.
The Blessed One said this to him: For
innumerable reasons, Mahāmati, the Bodhisattva, whose nature is compassion, is
not to eat any meat; I will explain them: Mahāmati, in this long course of
transmigration here, there is not one living being that, having assumed the
form of a living being, has not been your mother, or father, or brother, or
sister, or son, or daughter, or the one or the other, in various degrees of
kinship; and when acquiring another form of life may live as a beast, as a
domestic animal, as a bird, or as a womb-born, or as something standing in some
relationship to you; [this being so] how can the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva who
desires to approach all living beings as if they were himself and to practise
the Buddha-truths, eat the flesh of any living being that is of the same nature
as himself? Even, Mahāmati, the Rakshasa, listening to the Tathagata's
discourse on the highest essence of the Dharma, attained the notion of
protecting [Buddhism], and, feeling pity, (246) refrains from eating flesh; how
much more those who love the Dharma! Thus, Mahāmati, wherever there is the
evolution of living beings, let people cherish the thought of kinship with
them, and, thinking that all beings are [to be loved as if they were] an only
child, let them refrain from eating meat. So with Bodhisattvas whose nature is
compassion, [the eating of] meat is to be avoided by him. Even in exceptional
cases, it is not [compassionate] of a Bodhisattva of good standing to eat meat.
The flesh of a dog, an ass, a buffalo, a horse, a bull, or man, or any other
[being], Mahāmati, that is not generally eaten by people, is sold on the
roadside as mutton for the sake of money; and therefore, Mahāmati, the
Bodhisattva should not eat meat.
For the sake of love of purity, Mahāmati, the
Bodhisattva should refrain from eating flesh which is born of semen, blood,
etc. For fear of causing terror to living beings, Mahāmati, let the Bodhisattva
who is disciplining himself to attain compassion, refrain from eating flesh. To
illustrate, Mahāmati: When a dog sees, even from a distance, a hunter, a
pariah, a fisherman, etc., whose desires are for meat-eating, he is terrified
with fear, thinking, "They are death-dealers, they will even kill
me." In the same way, Mahāmati, even those minute animals that are living
in the air, on earth, and in water, seeing meat-eaters at a distance, will
perceive in them, by their keen sense of smell, (247) the odour of the Rakshasa
and will run away from such people as quickly as possible; for they are to them
the threat of death. For this reason, Mahāmati, let the Bodhisattva, who is
disciplining himself, to abide in great compassion, because of its terrifying
living beings, refrain from eating meat. Mahāmati, meat which is liked by
unwise people is full of bad smell and its eating gives one a bad reputation
which turns wise people away; let the Bodhisattva refrain from eating meat. The
food of the wise, Mahāmati, is what is eaten by the Rishis; it does not consist
of meat and blood. Therefore, Mahāmati, let the Bodhisattva refrain from eating
meat.
In order to guard the minds of all people,
Mahāmati, let the Bodhisattva whose nature is holy and who is desirous of
avoiding censure on the teaching of the Buddha, refrain from eating meat. For
instance, Mahāmati, there are some in the world who speak ill of the teaching
of the Buddha; [they would say,] "Why are those who are living the life of
a Śramaṇa or a Brahmin reject such food as was enjoyed by the ancient Rishis,
and like the carnivorous animals, living in the air, on earth, or in the water?
Why do they go wandering about in the world thoroughly terrifying living
beings, disregarding the life of a Śramaṇa and destroying the vow of a Brahmin?
There is no Dharma, no discipline in them." There are many such
adverse-minded people who thus speak ill of the teaching of the Buddha. For
this reason, Mahāmati, in order to guard the minds of all people, (248) let the
Bodhisattva whose nature is full of pity and who is desirous of avoiding
censure on the teaching of the Buddha, refrain from eating meat.
Mahāmati, there is generally an offensive odour
to a corpse, which goes against nature; therefore, let the Bodhisattva refrain
from eating meat. Mahāmati, when flesh is burned, whether it be that of a dead
man or of some other living creature, there is no distinction in the odour.
When flesh of either kind is burned, the odour emitted is equally noxious.
Therefore, Mahāmati, let the Bodhisattva, who is ever desirous of purity in his
discipline, wholly refrain from eating meat.
Mahāmati, when sons or daughters of good family,
wishing to exercise themselves in various disciplines such as the attainment of
a compassionate heart, the holding a magical formula, or the perfecting of
magical knowledge, or starting on a pilgrimage to the Mahāyāna, retire into a
cemetery, or to a wilderness, or a forest, where demons gather or frequently
approach; or when they attempt to sit on a couch or a seat for the exercise;
they are hindered [because of their meat-eating] from gaining magical powers or
from obtaining emancipation. Mahāmati, seeing that thus there are obstacles to
the accomplishing of all the practices, let the Bodhisattva, who is desirous of
benefiting himself as well as others, wholly refrain from eating meat.
As even the sight of objective forms gives rise
to the desire for tasting their delicious flavour, let the Bodhisattva, whose
nature is pity and who regards all beings as his only child, wholly refrain
from eating meat. (249) Recognising that his mouth smells most obnoxiously,
even while living this life, let the Bodhisattva whose nature is pity, wholly
refrain from eating meat.
[The meat-eater] sleeps uneasily and when
awakened is distressed. He dreams of dreadful events, which makes his hair rise
on end. He is left alone in an empty hut; he leads a solitary life; and his
spirit is seized by demons. Frequently he is struck with terror, he trembles
without knowing why, there is no regularity in his eating, he is never
satisfied. In his eating1 he never knows what is meant by proper taste,
digestion, and nourishment. His visceras are filled with worms and other impure
creatures and harbour the cause of leprosy. He ceases to entertain any thoughts
of aversion towards all diseases. When I teach to regard food as if it were
eating the flesh of one's own child, or taking a drug, how can I permit my
disciples, Mahāmati, to eat food consisting of flesh and blood, which is
gratifying to the unwise but is abhorred by the wise, which brings many evils
and keeps away many merits; and which was not offered to the Rishis and is
altogether unsuitable?
1 Delete pītakhāditā (line 7).
Now, Mahāmati, the food I have permitted [my
disciples to take] is gratifying to all wise people but is avoided by the
unwise; it is productive of many merits, it keeps away many evils; and it has
been prescribed by the ancient Rishis. (250) It comprises rice, barley, wheat,
kidney beans, beans, lentils, etc., clarified butter, oil, honey, molasses,
treacle, sugar cane, coarse sugar, etc.; food prepared with these is proper
food. Mahāmati, there may be some irrational people in the future who will
discriminate and establish new rules of moral discipline, and who, under the
influence of the habit-energy belonging to the carnivorous races, will greedily
desire the taste [of meat]: it is not for these people that the above food is
prescribed. Mahāmati, this is the food I urge for the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas
who have made offerings to the previous Buddhas, who have planted roots of
goodness, who are possessed of faith, devoid of discrimination, who are all men
and women belonging to the Śākya family, who are sons and daughters of good
family, who have no attachment to body, life, and property, who do not covet
delicacies, are not at all greedy, who being compassionate desire to embrace
all living beings as their own person, and who regard all beings with affection
as if they were an only child.
Long ago in the past, Mahāmati, there lived a
king whose name was Siṁhasaudāsa. His excessive fondness for meat, his greed to
be served with it, (251) stimulated his taste for it to the highest degree so
that he [even] ate human flesh. In consequence of this he was alienated from
the society of his friends, counsellors, kinsmen, relatives, not to speak of
his townsmen and countrymen. In consequence he had to renounce his throne and
dominion and to suffer great calamities because of his passion for meat.
Mahāmati, even Indra who obtained sovereignty
over the gods had once to assume the form of a hawk owing to his habit-energy
of eating meat for food in a previous existence; he then chased Viśvakarma
appearing in the guise of a pigeon, who had thus to place himself on the scale.
King Śivi feeling pity for the innocent [pigeon had to sacrifice himself to the
hawk and thus] to suffer great pain. Even a god who became Indra the Powerful,
after going through many a birth, Mahāmati, is liable to bring misfortune both
upon himself and others; how much more those who are not Indra!
Mahāmati, there was another king1 who was
carried away by his horse into a forest. After wandering about in it, he
committed evil deeds with a lioness out of fear for his life, and children were
born to her. Because of their descending from the union with a lioness, (252)
the royal children were called the Spotted-Feet, etc. On account of their evil
habit-energy in the past when their food had been flesh, they ate meat even
[after becoming] king, and, Mahāmati, in this life they lived in a village
called Kuṭīraka ("seven huts"), and because they were excessively
attached and devoted to meat-eating they gave birth to Dākās and Dākinīs who
were terrible eaters of human flesh. In the life of transmigration, Mahāmati,
such ones will fall into the wombs of such excessive flesh-devouring creatures
as the lion, tiger, panther, wolf, hyena, wild-cat, jackal, owl, etc.; they
will fall into the wombs of still more greedily flesh-devouring and still more
terrible Rākshasas. Falling into such, it will be with difficulty that they can
ever obtain a human womb; how much more [difficult] attaining Nirvana!
1 The text has all this in the plural.
Such as these, Mahāmati, are the evils of
meat-eating; how much more numerous [evil] qualities that are born of the
perverted minds of those devoted to [meat-eating]1. And, Mahāmati, the ignorant
and simple-minded are not aware of all this and other evils and merits [in
connection with meat-eating]. I tell you, Mahāmati, that seeing these evils and
merits the Bodhisattva whose nature is pity should eat no meat.
If, Mahāmati, meat is not eaten by anybody for
any reason, there will be no destroyer of life. Mahāmati, in the majority of
cases (253) the slaughtering of innocent living beings is done for pride and
very rarely for other causes. Though nothing special may be said of eating the
flesh of living creatures such as animals and birds, alas, Mahāmati, that one
addicted to the love of [meat-] taste should eat human flesh! Mahāmati, in most
cases nets and other devices are prepared in various places by people who have
lost their sense on account of their appetite for meat-taste, and thereby many
innocent victims are destroyed for the sake of the price [they bring in]—such
as birds, Kaurabhraka, Kaivarta, etc., that are moving about in the air, on
land, and in water. There are even some, Mahāmati, who are like Rākshasas
hard-hearted and used to practising cruelties, 2 who, being so devoid of compassion,
would now and then look at living beings as meant for food and destruction— no
compassion is awakened in them.
1 Both T'ang and Wei have here a sentence to the
following effect: "Those who do not eat meat acquire a large sum of
merit."
2 According to T'ang.
It is not true, Mahāmati, that meat is proper
food and permissible for the Śrāvaka when [the victim] was not killed by
himself, when he did not order others to kill it, when it was not specially
meant for him. Again, Mahāmati, there may be some unwitted people in the future
time, who, beginning to lead the homeless life according to my teaching, are
acknowledged as sons of the Śākya, and carry the Kāshāya robe about them as a
badge, but who are in thought evilly affected by erroneous reasonings. They may
talk about various discriminations which they make in their moral discipline,
being addicted to the view of a personal soul. Being under the influence of the
thirst for [meat-] taste, they will string together in various ways (254) some
sophistic arguments to defend meat-eating. They think they are giving me an
unprecedented calumny when they discriminate and talk about facts that are
capable of various interpretations. Imagining that this fact allows this
interpretation, [they conclude that] the Blessed One permits meat as proper
food, and that it is mentioned among permitted foods and that probably the
Tathagata himself partook of it. But, Mahāmati, nowhere in the sutras is meat
permitted as something enjoyable, nor it is referred to as proper among the
foods prescribed [for the Buddha's followers].
If however, Mahāmati, I had the mind to permit
[meat-eating], or if I said it was proper for the Śrāvakas [to eat meat], I
would not have forbidden, I would not forbid, ail meat-eating for these Yogins,
the sons and daughters of good family, who, wishing to cherish the idea that
all beings are to them like an only child, are possessed of compassion,
practise contemplation, mortification, and are on their way to the Mahāyāna.
And, Mahāmati, the interdiction not to eat any kind of meat is here given to
all sons and daughters of good family, whether they are cemetery-ascetics of
forest-ascetics, or Yogins who are practising the exercises, if they wish the
Dharma and are on the way to the mastery of any vehicle, and being possessed of
compassion, conceive the idea of regarding all beings as an only child, in
order to accomplish the end of their discipline.
(255) In the canonical texts here and there the
process of discipline is developed in orderly sequence like a ladder going up
step by step, and one joined to another in a regular and methodical manner;
after explaining each point meat obtained in these specific circumstances is
not interdicted.1 Further, a tenfold prohibition is given as regards the flesh
of animals found dead by themselves. But in the present sutra all [meat-eating]
in any form, in any manner, and in any place, is unconditionally and once for
all, prohibited for all. Thus, Mahāmati, meat-eating I have not permitted to
anyone, I do not permit, I will not permit. Meat-eating, I tell you, Mahāmati,
is not proper for homeless monks. There may be some, Mahāmati, who would say
that meat was eaten by the Tathagata thinking this would calumniate him. Such
unwitted people as these, Mahāmati, will follow the evil course of their own
karma-hindrance, and will fall into such regions where long nights are passed
without profit and without happiness. Mahāmati, the noble Śrāvakas do not eat
the food taken properly by [ordinary] men, how much less the food of flesh and
blood, which is altogether improper. Mahāmati, the food for my Śrāvakas,
Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas is the Dharma and not flesh2-food; how much
more the Tathagata! The Tathagata is the Dharmakāya, Mahāmati; he abides in the
Dharma as food; his is not a body feeding on flesh; he does not abide in any
flesh-food. He has ejected the habit-energy of thirst and desire which sustain
all existence; he keeps away the habit-energy of all evil passions; he is
thoroughly emancipated in mind and knowledge; he is the All-knower; (256) he is
All-seer; he regards all beings impartially as an only child; he is a great
compassionate heart. Mahāmati, having the thought of an only child for all
beings, how can I, such as I am, permit the Śrāvakas to eat the flesh of their
own child? How much less my eating it! That I have permitted the Śrāvakas as
well as myself to partake of [meat-eating], Mahāmati, has no foundation
whatever.
So it is said:
1. Liquor, meat, and onions are to be avoided,
Mahāmati, by the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas and those who are Victor-heroes.
1 The text as it stands requires fuller
explanation.
2 Amiśra (mixed) in T'ang.
2. Meat is not agreeable to the wise: it has a
nauseating odour, it causes a bad reputation, it is food for the carnivorous; I
say1 this, Mahāmati, it is not to be eaten.
3. To those who eat [meat] there are detrimental
effects, to those who do not, merits; Mahāmati, you should know that
meat-eaters bring detrimental effects upon themselves.
4. Let the Yogin refrain from eating flesh as it
is born of himself, as [the eating] involves transgression, as [flesh] is
produced of semen and blood, and as [the killing of animals] causes terror to
living beings.
5. Let the Yogin always refrain from meat,
onions, various kinds of liquor, allium, and garlic.
6. Do not anoint the body with sesamum oil; do
not sleep on a bed, perforated with spikes; (257) for the living beings who
find their shelter in the cavities and in places where there are no cavities
may be terribly frightened.2
7. From eating [meat] arrogance is born, from
arrogance erroneous imaginations issue, and from imagination is born greed; and
for this reason refrain from eating [meat].
8. From imagination, greed is born, and by greed
the mind it stupefied; there is attachment to stupefaction, and there is no
emancipation from birth [and death].
9. For profit sentient beings are destroyed, for
flesh money is paid out, they are both evil-doers and [the deed] matures in the
hells called Raurava (screaming), etc.
10. One who eats flesh, trespassing against the
words of the Muni, is evil-minded; he is pointed out in the teachings of the
Śākya as the destroyer of the welfare of the two worlds.
11. Those evil-doers go to the most horrifying
hell; meat-eaters are matured in the terrific hells such as Raurava, etc.
12. There is no meat to be regarded as pure in
three ways: not premeditated, not asked for, and not impelled; therefore,
refrain from eating meat.
1 Brūmi, instead of brūhi as in the text.
2 Unintelligible as far as the translator can
see.
13. Let not the Yogin eat meat, it is forbidden
by myself as well as by the Buddhas; those sentient beings who feed on one
another will be reborn among the carnivorous animals.
14. [The meat-eater] is ill-smelling, contemptuous,
and born deprived of intelligence; (258) he will be born again and again among
the families of the Caṇḍāla, the Pukkasa, and the Domba.
15. From the womb of Dākinī he will be born in
the meat-eaters' family, and then into the womb of a Rākshasī and a cat; he
belongs to the lowest class of men.
16. Meat-eating is rejected by me in such sutras
as the Hastikakshya, the Mahāmegha, the Nirvāna, the Aṅglimālika, and the
Laṅkāvatāra.
17. [Meat-eating] is condemned by the Buddhas,
Bodhisattvas, and Śrāvakas; if one devours [meat] out of shamelessness he will
always be devoid of sense.
18. One who avoids meat, etc., will be born,
because of this fact, in the family of the Brahmins or of the Yogins, endowed
with knowledge and wealth.
19. Let one avoid all meat-eating [whatever they
may say about] witnessing, hearing, and suspecting; these theorisers born in a
carnivorous family understand this not.
20. As greed is the hindrance to emancipation,
so are meat-eating, liquor, etc., hindrances.
21. There may be in time to come people who make
foolish remarks about meat-eating, saying, "Meat is proper to eat,
unobjectionable, and permitted by the Buddha."
22. Meat-eating is a medicine; again, it is like
a child's flesh; (259) follow the proper measure and be averse [to meat, and
thus] let the Yogin go about begging.
23. [Meat-eating] is forbidden by me everywhere
and all the time for those who are abiding in compassion; [he who eats meat]
will be born in the same place as the lion, tiger, wolf, etc.
24. Therefore, do not eat meat which will cause
terror among people, because it hinders the truth of emancipation; [not to eat
meat—] this is the mark of the wise.
Here Ends the Eighth Chapter, "On
Meat-eating," from the Laṅkāvatāra, the Essence of the Teaching of All the
Buddhas.1
1 For the phrase "The essence of the
teaching of the Buddhas (sarvabuddhapravacanahṛidaya)," see pp. 39-40.
(260) At that time the Blessed One addressed
Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva: Mahāmati, you should hold forth these
magical phrases of the Laṅkāvatāra, which were recited, are recited, and will
be recited by the Buddhas of the past, present, and future. I will recite them
here for the benefit of the proclaimers of the Dharma, who will retain them in
memory. They are:
Tuṭṭe, tuṭṭe—vuṭṭe, vuṭṭe—paṭṭe, paṭṭe—kaṭṭe,
kaṭṭe—amale, amale—vimale, vimale—nime, nime—hime, hime—vame, vame—kale, kale,
kale, kale—aṭṭe, maṭṭe—vaṭṭe, tuṭṭe—jñeṭṭe, spuṭṭe—kaṭṭe, kaṭṭe—laṭṭe,
paṭṭe—dime dime—cale, cale—pace, pace—badhe, bandhe—añce, mañce—dutāre,
dutāre—patāre, patāre—arkke, arkke—sarkke, sarkke—cakre, cakre—dime, dime—hime,
hime—ṭu ṭu ṭu ṭu (4)—ḍu ḍu ḍu ḍu (4)—ru ru ru ru (4)—phu phu phu phu (4)—svāhā.
1 Another later addition probably when Dhāraṇī
was extensively taken into the body of Buddhist literature just before its
disappearance from the land of its birth. Dhāraṇī is a study by itself. In
India where all kinds of what may be termed abnormalities in religious
symbology are profusely thriving, Dhāraṇī has also attained a high degree of
development as in the case of Mudrā (holding the fingers), Āsana (sitting), and
Kalpa (mystic rite). When a religious symbolism takes a start in a certain
direction, it pursues its own course regardless of its original meaning, and the
symbolism itself begins to gain a new signification which has never been
thought of before in connection with the original idea. The mystery of an
articulate sound which infinitely fascinated the imagination of the primitive
man has come to create a string of meaningless sounds in the form of a Dhāraṇī.
Its recitation is now considered by its followers to produce mysterious effects
in various ways in life.
(261) These, Mahāmati, are the magical phrases
of the Laṅkāvatāra Mahāyāna Sūtra: If sons and daughters of good family should
hold forth, retain, proclaim, realise these magical phrases, no one should ever
be able to effect his descent upon them. Whether it be a god, or a goddess, or
a Nāga, or a Nāgī, or a Yaksha, or a Yakshī, or an Asura, or an Asurī, or a
Garuḍa, or a Garuḍī, or a Kinnara, or a Kannarī, or a Mahoraga, or a Mahoragī,
or a Gandharva, or a Gandharvī, or a Bhūta, or a Bhutī, or a Kumbhāṇḍa, or a
Kumbhāṇḍī, or a Piśāra, or a Piśācī, or an Austāraka, or an Austārakī, or a
Apasmāra, or an Apasmārī, or a Rākshasa, or a Rākshasī, or a Dāka, or a Dākinī,
or an Aujohāra, or an Aujohārī, or a Kaṭapūtana, or a Katapūtanī, or an
Amanushya, or an Amanushyī, —no one of these will be able to effect his or her
descent [upon the holder of these magical phrases]. If any misfortune should
befall, let him recite the magical phrases for one hundred and eight times, and
[the evil ones] will, wailing and crying, turn away and go in another
direction.
I will tell you, Mahāmati, other magical
phrases. They are:
Padme, padmadeve—hine, hini, hine—cu, cule,
culu, cule (262)—phale, phula, phule—yule, ghule, yula, yule—ghule, ghula,
ghule—pale, pala, pale—muñce, muñce, muñce—cchinde, bhinde, bhañje, marde,
pramarde, dinakare—svāhā.
If, Mahāmati, any son or daughter of good family
should hold forth, retain, proclaim, and realise these magical phrases, on him
or her no [evil beings] should be able to make their descent. Whether it be a
god, or a goddess, or a Nāga, or a Nāgī, or a Yaksha, or a Yakshī, or an Asura,
or an Asurī, a Garuḍa, or a Garuḍī, or a Kinnara, or a Kinnarī, or a Mahoraga,
or a Mahoragī, or a Gandharva, or a Gandharvī, or a Bhūta, or a Bhūtī, or a
Kumbhāṇḍa, or a Kumbhāṇḍī, or a Piśāca, or a Piśācī, or an Austāraka, or an
Austāraki, or an Apasmāra, or an Apasmārī, or a Rākshasa, or a Rākshasī, or a
Dāka, or a Dākinī, or an Aujohara, or an Aujoharī, or a Kaṭapūtana, or a
Kaṭapūtanī, or an Amanushya, or an Amanushyī—no one of these will be able to
effect his or her descent upon [the holder of these magical phrases]. By him
who will recite these magic phrases, the [whole] Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra will be
recited. (263) These magic phrases are given by the Blessed One to guard
against the interference of the Rākshasas.
Here Ends the Ninth Chapter Called "Dhāraṇī"
in the Laṅkāvatāra.
-----------------
(264) Listen to the wonderful Mahāyāna doctrine,
Declared in this Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra,
Composed into verse-gems,
And destroying a net of the philosophical views.
At that time Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva
said this to the Blessed One:2
1. (Chapter II, verse 1.)
2. (Chapter II, verse 3.)
3. (Chapter II, verse 2.)
4, 5. (Chapter II, verses 6, 7.)
(265) 6. (Chapter II, verse 8.)3
7, 8. (Chapter II, verses 151, 152.)
9. (Chapter II, verse 178.)
1 This section entitled, "Sagāthakam,"
consists entirely of verses. It is probable that it was added later into the
text. The subjects treated are many and varied, including those that have never
appeared in the text. The verses are in a most confused condition, and it is
frequently quite difficult to disentangle them and give them a semblance of
order. The reader may use his own judgment in the matter.
2 This remark refers only to the first six
verses. The Chinese translations have here the following: "At that time
the Blessed One wishing to declare again the deep signification of the Sutra
uttered the following verses." The verses enumerated in the Sanskrit text
are 884, out of which about 208 are repetitions of those which have already
appeared in the main text. These repetitions are systematically excluded in
T'ang, while Wei, with a few exceptions, repeats them all. In this English
translation I have followed the method of T'ang. When we know more about the historical
circumstances of the compilation of the various sutras we may be able to see
how these repetitions came to be inserted here and also may learn something
regarding the relation which this "Sagāthakam" section stands to the
preceding part of the Sutra.
3 These verses are not repeated in the same
order as they are in the prose section of the text. There are some omissions,
too. These irregularities take place throughout the "Sagāthakam, "
showing that the verses were originally an independent body.
10. These individual objects are not solid
[realities]; they rise because of imagination; as the imagination itself is
empty, what is imagined is empty.
11. (Chapter II, verse 149.)
12. (Chapter II, verse 154.)
13. By wrong discrimination the Vijñāna[-system]
rises; severally as eightfold, as ninefold,1 like waves on the great ocean.
14. The root is constantly nourished by
habit-energy, firmly attached to the seat; (266) the mind moves along with an
objective world as iron is drawn by the loadstone.
15. The original source on which all sentient
beings are dependent is beyond theorisation; all doings cease and emancipation
obtains, knowing and known are transcended.
16. In the Samādhi known as Māyā-like, one goes
beyond the ten stages of Bodhisattvaship; one who is removed from thought and
knowledge perceives the Mind-king.
17. When a "turning-back" takes place
in the mind, one abides permanently in the palace of lotus-form, which is born
of the realm of Māyā.
18. Abiding in it one attains a life of imagelessness,
and, like a many-coloured jewel, performs religious deeds for all beings.
19. Except for discrimination, there is neither
Saṁskṛita (or things made) nor Asaṁskṛita (or things not made); the ignorant
hold on to them as a barren woman does to the child of her dream; what fools
they are!
20. Let it be known that without self-nature,
unborn, and empty are a personal soul, the Skandha-continuity, causation, the
Dhātus, and [the notion of] existence and non-existence.
21. To me teaching is an expedient, but I do not
teach external signs; the ignorant because of their attachment to existence
seize on signified and signifying.
22. A knower of all things is not an all-knower,
and all is not within all; the ignorant discriminate and [think] "I am the
enlightened one in the world"; but I am not enlightened nor do I enlighten
others.
1 This requires attention. The Sutra itself
maintains a system of eight Vijñānas, and not a ninefold one, which is a later
development.
(267) 23. (Chapter II, verse 156.)
24. (Chapter II, verse 143 and the first half of
144.)
25. (Chapter II, verse 179.)1
26. (Chapter II, verse 181.)
27. These things are empty, without self-nature,
and unborn, like Māyā, like a dream, and their being and non-being is
unobtainable.
28. One self-nature (svabhāva) I teach, which is
removed from speculation and thought-construction, which belongs to the
exquisite [spiritual] realm of the wise, removed from the two Svabhāvas [i. e.,
the Parikalpita and the Paratantra].
(268) 29. Though multitudinousness of things has
no [real] existence as such, they appear to the intoxicated as like fire-flies
because of their constitutional disturbance; likewise is the world essentially
[appearance].
30. As Māyā is manifested depending on grass,
wood, and brick, though Māyā itself is non-existent, so are all things
essentially [mere appearances].
31. There is neither seizing nor seized, neither
bound nor binding; all is like Māyā, like a mirage, like a dream, like an
affected eye.
32. When the truth-seeker sees [the truth]
devoid of discrimination and free from impurities, then he is accomplished in
his contemplation; he sees me, there is no doubt.
33. In this there is nothing of thought
construction; it is like a mirage in the air; those who thus see all things,
see nothing whatever.2
34. In causation which governs being and
non-being things do not originate; in the triple world the mind is perturbed,
therefore multiplicities appear.
1 Omit the line in parentheses.
2 This verse and the following one do not appear
in T'ang, and they are also missing in the prose section.
35. The world is the same as a dream, and so are
the multiplicities of things in it; [the wise] see property, touch, death, a
world-teacher, and work as of the same nature.1
36. This mind is the source of the triple world;
when the mind goes astray there appears this world and that; (269) recognising
the world as such, as it is non-existent, [a wise man] does not discriminate a
world.
37. The ignorant because of their stupidity see
[an objective world] as taking its rise and disappearing, but he who has
transcendental knowledge sees it neither rising nor disappearing.
38. Those who are always above discrimination,
in conformity with truth, and removed from mind and its belongings, are in the
celestial palace of Akanishtha where all evils are discarded.
39. Such attain the powers, psychic faculties,
and self-control, are thoroughly adept in the Samādhis, and are there [in the
heaven] awakened to enlightenment; but the transformed ones are awakened here
[on earth].
40. The Buddhas appear on earth in their
innumerable transformation-bodies beyond calculation, and everywhere the
ignorant following them listen to the Dharma.
41. [There is one thing which is] released from
[such conditions of existence as] beginning, middle, and ending, removed from
existence and non-existence, all-pervading, immovable, pure, and above
multiplicity, and [yet] producing multiplicity.
42. There is an essence2 entirely covered by
thought-constructions and hidden inside all that has body; because of
perversion there is Māyā; Māyā, [however], is not the cause of perversion.
43. Even because of the mind being deluded,
there is a somewhat [perceived as real]; being bound up with the two Svabhāvas
there is the transformation of the Ālayavijñāna.
1 For the last quarter Wei has: "The
honoured one of the world preaches these doings." T'ang: "The person
who perceives this well will be honoured by the world."
2 Gotra (眞性) according to T'ang.
(270) 44. The world is no more than
thought-construction, and there rages an ocean of views as regards ego and
things (dharma); when the world is clearly perceived as such and there takes
place a revulsion1 [in the mind], this [one] is my child who is devoted to the
truth of perfect knowledge.
45. Things are discriminated by the ignorant as
heat, fluidity, motility, and solidity; they are, however, unrealities
asserted; there is neither signified nor signifying.
46. But this body, form (saṁsthāna) and senses
are made of the eight substances; deluded in the cage of transmigration, the
ignorant thus discriminate this phenomenal world (rūpa).
47. In the intermingling of causes and
conditions, the ignorant imagine the birth [of all things]; but as they do not
understand the truth, they go astray in this abode of the triple world.
48. (Chapter II, verse 146.)
(271) 49. What is known as multiplicity-seeds
multiply in the mind (citta); in what is revealed, the ignorant imagine birth
and are delighted with dualism.
50. Ignorance, desire, and karma—they are the
causes of mind and its belongings;2 as they evolve thus [relatively], they are
[recognised] by me to be Paratantric.
51. When the field of mentation gets confused,
they imagine that there is something [real] to take hold of; in this
imagination there is no perfect knowledge, it is false imagination rising from
delusion.
52. When bound in conditions there evolves a
mind in all beings; when released from conditions, I say, I see no [mind
rising].
53. When the mind, released from conditions and
unsupported by thought of self, abides no longer in the body, to me there is no
objective world.
54 and 55. (Chapter II, verses 147 and 148.)
56. (Chapter II, verse 99.)
1 Parāvṛitti, turning-over, or turning-up, or
turning-back.
2 Read cittacaittānam kārakam.
(272) 57. So the flood of the Ālayavijñāna is
always stirred by the winds of objectivity (vishaya), and goes on dancing with
the various Vijñāna-waves.
58. Because there is that which is seized and
that which seizes, mind rises in all beings; there are no such signs visible
[in the world] as are imagined by the ignorant.
59. There is the highest Ālayavijñāna, and again
there is the Ālaya as thought-construction (vijñāpti); I teach suchness
(tathatā) that is above seized and seizing.
60. Neither an ego, nor a being, nor a person
exists in the Skandhas; [there is birth when] the Vijñāna is born, and
[cessation when] the Vijñāna ceases.
61. As a picture shows highness and lowness
while [in reality] there is nothing of the sort in it; so in things existent
there is thingness seen [as real] while there is nothing of the sort in them.
62. The visible world (dṛiśyam) has always the
appearance of the city of the Gandharvas and that of fata morgana; it is to be
regarded as such, but it does not thus exist to the transcendental wisdom [of
the wise].
63 and 64. (Chapter III, verses 79 and 80.)
65. A proposition [is established] by means of
conditions, reasons, and examples, (273) such as a dream, the Gandharva's
[castle, fire-]wheel, mirage, the moon, the sun.
66. By such examples as flame, hair, etc., I
teach that birth is something not to be recognised really as such;1 the world
is something imagined, empty like a dream, or Māyā, which is error.
67. The triple world has nowhere to place
itself, either within nor without, it is thus [homeless]; seeing that all
beings are unborn, there grows a full acceptance of the truth that nothing is
ever born (kshānti-anutpatti).
68. He will then attain the Samādhi called
Māyā-like, the will-body, the psychic faculties, the self-mastery, the various
powers belonging to the Mind.
69. All things existent are unborn, empty, and
without self-substance; and the delusion about them rises and ceases in
accordance with conditions.
1 Here I have followed T'ang.
70. Depending upon the Mind, there appears
[within] a mind and, without a world of individual objects (rūpiṇa); this and
no other is an external world which is imagined by the ignorant.
71. This heap of bones, the Buddha-image, the
analysis of the elements—[these are subjects of meditation]; by means of mental
images (prajñapti) good students handle the various aspects of the world.
72. Body, abode, and property are three
representations (vijñapti) seized upon [as objects]; the will, [the desire] to hold,
the discrimination of these representations are the seizing agents.
(274) 73. As long as those philosophers who get
confused in their reasonings and who are unable to go beyond the realm of
words, distinguish the discriminating from the discriminated—so long they do
not see [the truth] of suchness.
74. When the Yogin by means of his
transcendental wisdom understands that all things existent have no
self-substance, he thus attains calmness and establishes himself in the state
of no-form (animitta).
75. As an object painted black is taken by the
unwise to be a cock, so by the ignorant who do not know, the triple vehicle is
understood in like manner.
76. There are no Śrāvakas, no Pratyekabuddhas
here; if, however, one recognises the form of a Buddha, of a Śrāvaka, this is a
transformed manifestation of the Bodhisattva whose nature is compassion itself.
77. The triple world of existence is no more
than thought-construction, which is discriminated by the twofold Svabhāva [of
imagination and relative knowledge]; but when [within the mind] a turning-away
from the course of sense-objects (dharma) and the ego-soul (pudgala) takes
place, then we have [the truth of] suchness (tathatā).
78. The sun, the moon, the lamp-light, the
elements, and the gems, —each functions in its own way without discrimination;
and so does the Buddha's nature work on its own accord.
79. (Chapter II, verse 51.)
80. Things known as defiled or as pure are like
hairnets [that is, wrongly perceived by the dim-eyed]; (275) they [really] have
nothing to do with such notions as birth, abiding, and disappearance, or as
eternity and non-eternity.
81. It is like a drugged man whoever he is, who
sees the world in golden colours; though there is no gold, for him the earth
has changed into gold.
82. The ignorant, thus defiled since
beginningless time with the mind and what belongs to it, apprehend existing
things to be really such as they appear to be; though in fact they owe their
origin to Māyā or a mirage.
83. One seed and no-seed are of the same stamp,
and one seed and all seed also; and in one mind you see multiplicity.
84. When one seed is made pure, there is a
turning into a state of no-seed; the sameness comes from non-discrimination;
from superabundance there is birth and general confusion from which there grows
a multitude of seeds, hence the designation all-seed.1
85. (Chapter II, verse 140.)
86. (Chapter III, verse 52.)
87. When the self-nature of existence is
understood there is no need of keeping off the delusion; no-birth is the
self-nature of existence, seeing thus one is released.
(276) 88. (Chapter II, verse 170.)
89. (Chapter II, verse 144.)
90. (Chapter II, verse 141.)
91. (Chapter III, verse 48.)
92. (Chapter II, verse 136.)
93. When the mind is evolved, forms begin to
manifest themselves; really [if] no minds, no forms; the mind is due to [the
accumulation of] delusions since beginningless past; then the Yogin by his
transcendental wisdom sees the world shorn of its appearances (abhāsa).2
1 The two verses 83 and 84 on "seed"
(bīja) require fuller explanation to make them more intelligible.
2 The first line of verse 94 properly belongs to
the preceding verse.
94. (Chapter III, verse 53.)
(277) 95. The Gandharva's air-castle, Māyā, a
hair-circle, and a fata morgana, —they are non-entities yet they appear as if
they were entities; the nature of an objective existence is thus to be
regarded.
96. Nothing has ever been brought into
existence, all that is seen before us is delusion; it is due to delusion that
things are imagined to have come into existence, the ignorant are delighted
with the dualism of discrimination.
97. As memory [or habit-energy, vāsanā] grows in
various forms the Mind is evolved like the waves; when memory is cut off, there
is no evolving of Mind.
98. The Mind is evolved dependent upon a variety
of conditions, just as a painting depends upon the wall [on which it is
painted]; if otherwise why is not the painting produced in the air?1
99. If Mind evolves at all depending on
individual forms as conditions, then Mind is condition-born, and the doctrine
of Mind-only will not be held true.
100. Mind is grasped by mind, it is not a
something produced by a cause; Mind is by nature pure, memory (habit-energy)
has no existence in [mind which is like] the sky.
101. An individual mind is evolved by clinging
to Mind in itself; there is no visible world outside [Mind itself]; therefore,
[it is declared that] Mind-only exists.
(278) 102. Mind (citta2) is the Ālayavijñāna,
Manas is that which has reflection as its characteristic nature, it apprehends
the various sense-fields, for which reason it is called a Vijñāna.
1 The Sanskrit as it stands is unintelligible; I
have followed the T'ang. This gāthā may be regarded as a question to which the
following few verses are a reply.
2 Citta which is generally translated
"mind," either with the "m" capitalised or not, is used in
this text in two different senses. When it stands in the series of Citta,
Manas, and Vijñānas, it means the empirical mind. It is also used in a general
sense meaning mentation. Besides this, citta has an absolute sense denoting
something that goes beyond the realm of relativity and yet that lies at the
foundation of this world of particulars. When the Laṅkā speaks of
"Mind-only," it refers to this something defined here. It is
important to keep this distinction in mind. See also my Studies in the
Laṅkāvatāra, p. 176 and elsewhere.
103. Citta is always neutral; Manas functions in
two ways; the functioning Vijñāna is either good or bad.
104. (Chapter II, verse 132.)
105-109. (Chapter IV, verses 1-5.)
(279) 110. In self-realisation itself there are
no time[-limits]; it goes beyond all the realms belonging to the various
stages; transcending the measure of thought, it establishes itself as the result
[of discipline in the realm] of no-appearance.
111. That non-existence and existence is
recognised, and multiplicity too, is due to erroneous attachment of the
ignorant; the error [is to see] multiplicity.
112. If there is non-discriminative knowledge,
it is not in accord with reason to say that [individual] realities (vastu)
exist; because of Mind, there are no individual forms (rūpāṇi), and, therefore,
we speak of non-discriminative [knowledge].
113. The sense-organs are to be known as Māyā,
the sense-fields resemble a dream; actor, act, and acting—they do not at all
[in reality] exist.1
114. (Chapter II, v. 133, v. 176.)
115. (Chapter II, v. 130, v. 177.)
116(280)-117. (Chapter II, vv. 9 and 10.)
118. (Chapter II, v. 174.)
119. (Chapter II, v. 173.)
120. According to worldly knowledge (saṁvṛiti)
everything exists, but in ultimate truth (paramārtha) none exists; in ultimate
truth, indeed, one sees that all things are devoid of self-substance. Although
there is no self-substance, there rises something which one perceives [as
objective reality] — this is called worldly knowledge.
121. If things are regarded as existing by
themselves, they exist because of their being so designated in words; if there
were no words to designate their existence, they are not.
1 This verse is missing in Wei.
122. That which exists only as word and not as
reality —such is not to be found even in worldly knowledge; this comes from the
nature of reality being erroneously understood, for no such perception is
possible.
123. If such errors were granted, it would not
be possible to talk about the non-existence of self-substance; (281) as the
nature of reality is erroneously understood, there is something perceived where
there is really no self-substance; all is indeed non-existent.
124. What is seen as multiplicity is the mind
saturated with the forms of evil habits; because of mental delusions one clings
to forms and appearances regarding them as objective [realities].
125. Discrimination is cut asunder by
non-discriminating discrimination; the truth of emptiness is seen into by
non-discriminating discrimination.
126. Like an elephant magically created, like
golden leaves in a painting, the visible world is to the people whose minds are
saturated with the forms of ignorance.
127-128. (Chapter II, vv. 168 and 169.)
129. As a man whose eye is affected with a
cataract perceives a hair-circle because of his delusion, so the ignorant
perceive an objective world rising with its various aspects.
130. (Chapter II, v. 150.)
(282) 131. Discrimination, that which is
discriminated, and the setting up of discrimination; binding, that which is
bound, and its cause: these six are conditions of liberation.
132. There are no stages [of Bodhisattvaship],
no truths, no [Buddha-]lands, no bodies of transformation; Buddhas.
Pratyekabuddhas, Śrāvakas are [products of] imagination.
133. (Chapter II, v. 139.)
134. Mind is all, it is found everywhere and in
every body; it is by the evil-minded that multiplicity is recognised, there are
no [recognisable] marks where Mind-only is.
135-137. (Chapter III, vv. 35, 36, 37.)
138. The constructing of appearances (nimitta)
created by delusion is the characteristic mark of Paratantra (dependence)
knowledge; (283) the giving of names to these appearances [regarding them as
real individual existences] is characteristic of the imagination.1
139. When the constructing of appearances and
names, which come from the union of conditions and realities, no more takes
place, we have the characteristic mark of perfected knowledge (parinishpanna).2
140. The world is everywhere filled with Buddhas
of Maturity,3 Buddhas of Transformation,4 beings, Bodhisattvas, and
[Buddha-]lands.
141. The Issuing5[-Buddhas], Dharma[-Buddhas],
Transformation[-Buddhas] and those that appear transformed—they all come forth
from Amitābha's Land of Bliss.
142. What is uttered by Buddhas of
Transformation and what is uttered by Buddhas of Maturity constitute the
doctrine fully developed in the sutras, whose secret meaning you should know.
143. What is uttered by the Bodhisattvas and
what is uttered by the teachers—they are both what is uttered by the Buddhas of
Transformation and not by the Buddhas of Maturity.
144. All these individual objects (dharmas) have
never been born, but they are not exactly non-existent either; they resemble
the Gandharva's castle, a dream, and magical creations.
145. Mind is set in motion in various ways, and
mind is liberated; mind rises in no other way, and mind thus ceases.
1 Generally parikalpita, but here vikalpita.
2 This is the reading of T'ang, but I suggest
the following: "When the constructing of names and appearances no more
takes place in it, there are only causal signs indicative of reality—this is
the characteristic mark of perfected knowledge." Both Wei and T'ang here
understand saṅketa in the sense of "union."
3 Vaipākika.
4 Nairmāṇika.
5 Nisyanda.
146. The mind of all beings is that which
perceives something like objective reality, and this mind is the product of
imagination; (284) in Mind-only there is no objective world; when one is
released from discrimination there is liberation.
147. Brought together by the evil habit of
erroneous reasoning, discrimination asserts itself; hence the evolution of this
fallacious world.
148. [Relative] knowledge (vijñāna) takes place
where there is something resembling an external world; [transcendental]
knowledge (jñāna)1 belongs to the realm of Suchness. When a turning-back
(parāvṛitta) takes place, there is a state of imagelessness, which is the realm
of the wise.
149. (Chapter II, v. 161.)
150. By reason of false imagination
(parikalpita) all things existent are declared unborn; as people take refuge in
relative knowledge (paratantra), they get confused in their discriminations.
151. When relative knowledge is purified by
keeping itself aloof from discrimination, and detached from imagination, there
is a turning-back to the abode of suchness.
152. Do not discriminate discrimination, there
is no truth in discrimination; [this world of] delusion is discriminated as to
that which is perceived and that which perceives, but in reality there is no
such dualism in it; it is an error to recognise an external world, [the
conception of] self-substance is due to imagination.
(285) 153. Imagining by this imagination,
self-substance is conceived to rise by the conditions of origination
(pratyayodbhava); an external world is recognised in distortion, there is [in
fact] no such external world, but just the Mind.
154. To those who see [the world] clearly and properly,
the separation between that which perceives and that which is perceived ceases;
there is no such external world as is discriminated by the ignorant.
1As to the distinction between Jñāna and Vijñāna
see p.135 et seq.
155. When the Mind is agitated by habit-energy
(or memory) there rises what appears to be an external world; when the
dualistic imagination ceases there grows [transcendental] knowledge (jñāna),
the realm of suchness, the realm of the wise, which is free from appearances
and beyond thought.1
156. (Chap. II, v. 134; Chap. VI, v. 3.)
157. From the union of mother and father, the
Ālaya gets connected with Manas; like a rat in a pot of ghee, the red together
with the white grows up.
158. Through the stages of Peśī, Ghana, and
Arbuda, the boil grows—an unclean mass bearing a variety of karma; nourished by
the wind of karma and the four elements, it comes to maturity like a fruit.
159. The five, the five, and the five; and the
sores are nine; (286) nails, teeth, and hair are supplied; when ready to spring
forth it is born.
160. When [the baby] is just born, it is like a
worm growing in the dung; like a man waking from sleep, the eye begins to
distinguish forms, and discrimination goes on increasing.
161. With knowledge gained by discrimination,
human speech is produced from the combination of the palate, lips, and cavity;
and discrimination goes on like a parrot.
162. Philosophical doctrines are definite, but
the Mahāyāna [or Great Vehicle] is not definite, it is set in motion by the thoughts
of beings; it is not an abode for those who see wrongly. The vehicle realised
within my own inner self is not the realm that can be reached by
dialecticians.2
163-164. After the passing of the Teacher, pray
tell me who will be the bearer [of the Mahāyāna]? O Mahāmati, thou shouldst
know that there will be one who bears the Dharma, when sometime is past after
the Sugata's entrance into Nirvana.
165. In Vedalī, in the southern part, a Bhikshu
most illustrious and distinguished [will be born]; his name is Nāgāhvaya, he is
the destroyer of the one-sided views based on being and non-being.
1 The first line of verse 156 is a part of the
preceding one. Cf. v. 148.
2 The verses are wrongly divided here, for this
line properly belongs to 162 and not to 163.
166. He will declare my Vehicle, the unsurpassed
Mahāyāna, to the world; attaining the stage of Joy he will go to the Land of
Bliss.
(287) 167. (Chapter II, v. 175.)
168. In the realm of conditional origination,
"there is" and "there is not" do not take place; those who
imagine something real in the midst of conditional origination say, "there
is" and "there is not," but these philosophical views are far
away from my teaching.
169. The giving names to all things existent has
always been going on for hundreds of generations past; this has been repeated,
is being repeated constantly; an endless mutual discrimination is thus taking
place.
170. If this designating does not take place,
the whole world falls into confusion; thus names are established in order to
get rid of confusion.
171. Things existent are discriminated by the
ignorant in the threefold form of discrimination; there is delusion from
discriminating names, from conditional origination, and from the [the notion
of] being born.
172. [The philosophers argue that] the primary
elements are unborn and like the sky are imperishable; but [in reality] there
are no individual self-substances and the notion [itself] belongs to
discrimination.
173. [Individual existences are] appearances,
images, like Māyā, like a mirage, a dream, a wheel made by a revolving
fire-brand, the Gandharva's [castle], an echo—they are all born in the same
manner.
(288) 174. Non-duality, suchness, emptiness,
ultimate limit, essence (dharmatā), non-discrimination, —all these I teach as
belonging to the aspect of perfected knowledge (parinishpanna).
175. Language belongs to the realm of thought,
the truth becomes [thus] wrongly [represented]; transcendental knowledge
(prajñā) being discriminated by thought falls into a duality; therefore,
transcendental knowledge is something not imagined.
176-177. (Chap. III, vv. 9 and 10.)
178. The whole existence is not perceived by the
ignorant as it is perceived by the wise; the whole existence as it is perceived
by the wise, has no marks [of individuation].
179. As a spurious necklace, not of gold though
looking like it, is imagined by the ignorant to be of [genuine] gold, so all
things are imagined by those who reason wrongly.
180. (Chapter III, v. 11.)
181. Things have no beginning, no end; they are
abiding in the aspect of reality; (289) there is no creator, nothing doing in
the world, but the logicians do not understand.
182. Whatever things that are thought to have
been in existence in the past, to come into existence in the future, or to be
in existence at present, —all such are unborn.
183-184. (Chap. III, vv. 44 and 45.)
185. This [world] is just a sign1 indicative of
reality (dharmatā); apart from the sign, nothing is produced, nothing is
destroyed.
186-187. (Chap. II, vv. 159 and 160.)
188-189. (Chap. III, vv. 1 and 2.)
(290) 190. Existence in its conditional
relations cannot be [described] as unity or diversity; it is just in a general
way of speaking that there is birth, cessation, and destruction.
191. Emptiness unborn is one thing, emptiness
born is another; emptiness unborn is the better, [because] emptiness born leads
to destruction.
192. Suchness, emptiness, the limit, Nirvana,
and the Dharmadhātu, the various will-made bodies, —these I point out as
synonymous.
193. Those who discriminate purity according to
the Sutras, Vinayas, and Abhidharmas, follow books and not the inner meaning;
they are not established in egolessness.
194-196. (Chap. III, vv. 12-14.)
(291) 197. The visible world is likened to the
hare's horns as long as all beings go on discriminating; those who discriminate
are deluded just like a deer running after a mirage.
1 Saṅketa; see also verse 139.
198. By clinging to discrimination, [more]
discrimination goes on; when the cause of discrimination is put away, one is
disengaged therefrom.
199-200. (Chap. III, vv. 54 and 55.)
201. Transcendental knowledge is deep, exalted,
far-reaching, and perceives all the Buddha-countries; this I teach for the sons
of the Victorious One; for the Śrāvakas I teach transitoriness.
202. The triple existence is transitory, empty,
devoid of the ego and what belongs to it; thus I teach the doctrine of
generality to the Śrāvakas.
203. Not to be attached to anything existent,
truly knowing what the truth of solitude is, is to walk all alone; the fruit of
Pratyekabuddhahood which is above speculation is what I teach.
204. External objects are imagined, those
endowed with corporeality are dependent on relative knowledge; being deluded
they see not themselves, therefore a mind is evolved.
205(292)-206. (Chap. IV, vv. 6 and 7.)
207 and 208. (Chapter III, verses 56 and 57.)
209. (Chapter II, verse 153.)
210. (Chapter II, verse 150.)
211. There are four psychic powers: that which
comes from the maturing [of the disciplinary exercises], that which comes from
the sustaining power of the Buddhas, that which rises from entering into the
various paths of living beings, and that which is obtained in a dream.
212. The psychic power which is obtained in a
dream, that which comes from the power of the Buddhas, and that which has its
birth by entering the various paths of beings —these powers are not1 born of
the maturing [of the disciplinary exercises].
(293) 213. The mind being influenced by
habit-energy, there rises a something resembling real existence (bhāvābhāsa);
as the ignorant do not understand, it is said that there is the birth [of
realities].
1 Read after the Chinese and Tibetan versions.
Not vijñāna-vipākajaḥ, but 'bhijñā na vipākajaḥ.
214. As long as external objects (bāhyam)1 are
discriminated as possessing individual marks, the mind is confused (vimuhyate)2
being unable to see its own delusion.
215. Why is birth spoken of? Why is not the
perceived world spoken of? When the perceived world, which has no existence, is
yet perceived as existing, what is that which is spoken of? To whom is it? and
why?
216. The Citta in its essence is thoroughly
pure, the Manas is defiled, and the Manas is with the Vijñānas, habit-energy is
always casting out [its seeds].
217. The Ālaya is released from the body, the
Manas solicits the [various] paths of existence; the Vijñāna is deluded with
something resembling an objective world, and perceiving it is befooled.3
218. What is seen is one's own mind, an
objective world exists not; when one thus perceives [that existence is] an
error,4 one even gets into suchness.
219. The [spiritual] realm attained by
Dhyāna-devotees, karma, and the exalted state of the Buddhas—these three are
beyond thought, they belong to the Vijñāna-5 realm that surpasses thought.
(294) 220. The past and the future, Nirvana, a
personal ego, [space6], words, —of these I talk because of worldly convention,
but ultimate reality is beyond the letter.
221. The two vehicles7 and the philosophers are
one in their dependence on [wrong] views; they are confused in regard to
Mind-only, and imagine an external existence.
222. The enlightenment attained by the
Pratyekabuddhas, Buddhahood, Arhatship, and the seeing of the Buddhas—these are
the secret seeds that grow in enlightenment; but it is accomplished in a
dream.8
1 After the Chinese.
2 After Wei.
3 Pralubhyate, "greedily attached,"
according to Wei and T'ang.
4 Bhrānti, "a delusion," "an
external world."
5 Should be jñāna, or does it refer to the
Ālaya?
6 According to the Chinese.
7 Naikāyikās, literally, "they who belong
to the Nikāya."
8 What this verse purports to mean is difficult
to gather from the contents of the Laṅkāvatāra as we have it here. The
existence of such verses as this, and there are quite a number of them in the
Sagāthakam, suggests in one way that this verge section has no organic relation
with the main text.
223. Māyā, Citta (mind), intelligence,1
tranquillity, the dualism of being and non-being—where are these teachings? for
whom? whence? wherefore? and of what signification? Pray tell me.
224. I teach such things as Māyā, being and
non-being, etc., to those who are confused in the teaching of Mind-only; when
birth and death are linked together [as one], qualified and qualifying are
removed.
225. Another name for Manas is discrimination
(vikalpa), and it goes along with the five Vijñānas; mind seeds (cittabīja)
take their rise in the way images [appear in a mirror] or [waves roll on] the
ocean-waters.
226. When the Citta, Manas, Vijñāna cease to
rise, (295) then there is the attainment of the will-body and of the
Buddha-stage.
227. Causation, the Dhātus, Skandhas, and the
self-nature of all things, thought-construction, a personal soul, and mind—they
are all like a dream, like a hair-net.
228. Seeing the world as like Māyā and a dream,
one abides with the truth; the truth, indeed, is free from individual marks,
removed from speculative reasoning.
229. The inner realisation attained by the wise
always abides in a state of no-memory2; it leads the world to the truth as it
is not confused with speculative reasoning.
230. When all false speculation subsides, error
no more rises; as long as there is discriminative knowledge,3 error keeps on
rising.
231. The world is empty and has no self-nature;
to talk of permanency and impermanency is the view maintained by followers of
birth and not by those of no-birth.
232. [The philosophers] imagine the world to be
of oneness and otherness, of bothness [and not-bothness], and [to have risen]
from Iśvara, or spontaneously, or from time, or from a supreme spirit, or other
causal agency.
1 The Chinese read gati (path or course), and
not mati.
2 Asmara, T'ang.
3 Jñāna for prajñā.
233. The Vijñāna which is the seed of
transmigration is not evolved when this visible world is [truly] recognised;
like a picture on a wall, it disappears when [its nature] is recognised.
(296) 234. Like figures in Māyā, people are born
and die; in the same way the ignorant because of their stupidity [imagine]
there really is bondage and release.
235. The duality of the world, inner and outer,
and things subject to causation—by distinctly understanding what they are, one
is established in imagelessness.
236. The mind (citta) is not separate from
habit-energy, nor is it together with it; though enveloped with habit-energy
the mind itself remains undifferentiated.
237. Habit-energy born of the Manovijñāna is
like dirt wherewith the Citta, which is a perfectly white garment, is enveloped
and fails to display itself.
238. As space is neither existent nor
non-existent, so is the Ālaya in the body, I say; it is devoid of existence as
well as of non-existence.
239. When the Manovijñāna is "turned
over" (vyārṛitta), the Citta frees itself from turbidity; by understanding
[the nature of] all things, the mind (citta) becomes Buddha, I say.
240. Removed from the triple continuity, devoid
of being and non-being, released from the four propositions, all things (bhava)
are always like Māyā.
241. The [first] seven stages are mind-born and
belong to the two Svabhāvas; the remaining [two] stages and the Buddha-stage
are the Nishpanna ("perfected knowledge").
(297) 242. The world of form, of no-form, and
the world of desire, and Nirvana are in this body; all is told to belong to the
realm of Mind.
243. As long as there is something attained,
there is so much error rising; when the Mind itself is thoroughly understood,
error neither rises nor ceases.
244. (Chapter II, verse 171.)
245. (Chapter II, verse 131.)
246. Two things are established by me;
individual objects and realisation; there are four principles which constitute
the dogmas of logic.
247. The error [or the world] is discriminated
when it is seen as characterised with varieties of forms and figures; when
names and forms are removed self-nature becomes pure which is the realm of the
wise.
248. As long as discrimination is carried on,
the Parikalpita (false imagination) continues to take place; but as what is
imagined by discrimination has no reality, self-nature is [truly understood in]
the realm of the wise.
249. The mind emancipated is truth constant and
everlasting; the essence making up the self-nature of things (298) and suchness
is devoid of discrimination.
250. There is reality (vastu); it is not to be
qualified as pure, nor is it to be said defiled; since a mind purified leaves
traces of defilement, but reality is the truth that is [absolutely] pure,
belonging to the realm of the wise.
251. The world is born of causation; when it is
regarded as removed from discrimination and as resembling Māyā, a dream, etc.,
one is emancipated.
252. Varieties of habit-energy growing out of
error are united with the mind; they are perceived by the ignorant as objects
externally existing; and the essence of mind (cittasya dharmatā) is not perceived.
253. The essence of mind is pure but not the
mind that is born of error; error rises from error, therefore Mind is not
perceived.
254. Delusion itself is no more than truth,
truth is neither in Saṁskāra nor anywhere else, but it is where Saṁskāra is
observed [in its proper bearings].
255. When the Samskrita is seen as devoid of
qualified and qualifying, all predicates are discarded and thus the world is
seen as of Mind itself.
256. When the [Yogin] enters upon Mind-only7, he
will cease discriminating an external world; establishing himself where
suchness has its asylum he will pass on to Mind-only.1
1 Cittamātram here and in the following verse is
rendered in T'ang as 心量 (hsin-liang) and not the usual 唯心 (wei-hsin). Hsin-liang
means "mind-measurement," the term used in Sung throughout for
cittamātram, for in the days of Sung wei-shin had not been thought of. But why
does T'ang use hsin-liang for wei-shin in this particular case while wei-shin
is used in the preceding line? Does cittamātram mean here simply "mental
or intellectual measurement" and is not used in the technical sense in
which the term is found elsewhere in this sutra?
257. By passing on to Mind-only, he passes on to
the state of imagelessness; (299) when he establishes himself in the state of
imagelessness, he sees not [even] the Mahāyāna.1
258. The state of non-striving (anābhoga) is
quiescent and thoroughly purified with the [original] vows; the most excellent
knowledge of egolessness sees no [duality in the world] because of imagelessness.
259. Let him review the realm of mind, let him
review the realm of knowledge, let him review the realm, with transcendental
knowledge (prajñā), and he will not be confounded with individual signs.
260. Pain belongs to mind, accumulation is the
realm of knowledge (jñāna); the [remaining] two truths2 and the Buddha-stage
are where transcendental knowledge functions.
261. The attainment of the fruits, Nirvana, and
the eightfold path—when all these truths are thus understood, there is
Buddha-knowledge thoroughly purified.
262. The eye, form, light, space, and attention
(manas) —out of this [combination] there is the birth of consciousness
(vijñāna) in people; consciousness is indeed born of the Ālaya.
263. There is nothing grasped, nor grasping, nor
one who grasps; there are no names, no objects; those who carry on their
groundless discriminative way of thinking lack intelligence.
264. Name is not born of meaning, nor is meaning
born of name; (300) whether things are born of cause or of no-cause, such is
discrimination; have no discrimination!
265. (Chapter II, verse 145.)
1 "Not" (na) is replaced by
"he" (sa) in one MS. May this be a better reading?
2 Referring to the Four Noble Truths.
266. Imagining himself to be standing on a
truth, he discourses on thought-construction; oneness is not attained in five
ways, and thus the truth is abandoned.1
267. Delusion (prapañca) is the evil one who is
to be broken down; being and non-being is to be transcended; as one sees into
[the truth of] egolessness, he has no longing for, no evil thought of, the
world.
268. [The philosophers imagine] a permanently
existing creator engaged in mere verbalism; highest truth is beyond words, the
Dharma is seen when cessation takes place.
269. Leaning on the Ālaya for support the Manas
is evolved; depending on the Citta and Manas the Vijñāna-system is evolved.
270. What is established by a proposition
(samāropa) is a proposition; suchness is the essence of mind; when this is
clearly perceived, the Yogin attains the knowledge of Mind-only.
271. Let one not think of the Manas, individual
signs, and reality from the point of view of permanency and impermanency; nor
let him think in his meditation of birth and no-birth.
272. They do not discriminate duality; the
Vijñāna rises from Ālaya; (301) the oneness of meaning thus taking place is not
to be known by a dually operating mind.
273. There is neither a speaker nor speaking nor
emptiness, since the Mind is seen; but when the Mind is not seen there rises a
net of philosophical doctrines.
274. There is no rising of the
causation[-chain], nor are there any sense-organs; no Dhātus, no Skandhas, no
greed, no Saṁskṛita.
275. There is no primarily working fire;2 no
working done, no effects produced, no final limit, no power, no deliverance, no
bondage.
1 The reference is not clear.
2 T'ang has, "karma and its effects";
while Wei has, "karma in work."
276. There is no state of being to be called
neutral [or inexplicable] (avyākṛita); there is no duality of dharma and
adharma; there is no time, no Nirvana, no dharma-essence.
277. And there are no Buddhas, no truths, no
fruition, no causal agents, no perversion, no Nirvana, no passing away, no
birth.
278. And then there are no twelve elements
(aṅga), and no duality either, of limit and no-limit; because of the cessation
of all the notions [that are cherished by the philosophers] I declare [there
is] Mind-only.
279. The passions, path of karma, the body,
creators, fruitions—they are like a fata morgana and a dream; they are like a
city of the Gandharvas.
280. By maintaining the Mind-only, the idea of
reality is removed; by establishing the Mind-only permanency and annihilation
are seen [in their proper relationship].
281. There are no Skandhas in Nirvana, nor is
there an ego-soul, nor any individual signs; (302) by entering into the
Mind-only, one escapes from becoming attached to emancipation.
282. It is error (dosha) that causes the world
to be externally perceived as it is manifested to people; Mind is not born of
the visible world; therefore, Mind is not visible.
283. It is the habit-energy of people that
brings out into view something resembling body, property, and abode; Mind is
neither a being nor a non-being, it does not reveal itself because of
habit-energy.
284. Dirt is revealed within purity but purity
itself is not soiled; as when the sky is veiled with clouds, Mind is invisible
[when defiled with error].
285. ( Chapter
III, verse 38.)
286. ( „ II, „ 182.)
287. ( „ III, „ 40.)
288. ( „ III, „ 41.)
289. ( „ II, „ 183.)
(303) 290. Mind is not born of the elements
(bhūta), Mind is nowhere to be seen; it is the habit-energy of people that
brings out into view body, property, and abode.1
1 This is a repetition of the latter half of
verse 282 and the first half of 283. This is omitted in both T'ang and Wei,
showing that the insertion is probably due to a clerical mistake.
291. All that is element-made is not form and
form is not element-made; the city of the Gandharvas, a dream, Māyā, an image,
—these are not element-made.
292.1
293.2
294. (Chapter III, verse 43.)
295. As reality and non-reality can be
predicated of existence that originates from causation, the view of oneness and
otherness definitely belongs to them.
296-302. (Chapter II, verses 184-190.)
(304) 303. There are three kinds of my Śrāvakas:
the transformed, the born of the vows, and the Śrāvakas disengaged from greed
and anger, and born of the Dharma.
304. There are three kinds, also, of the
Bodhisattvas: those who have not yet reached Buddhahood, those who manifest
themselves according to the thoughts of sentient beings, and those who are seen
in the likeness of the Buddha.3
305-310. (Chapter II, verses 191-196.)
(305) 311. It is a man's mind that is perceived
as something resembling (saṁnibham) the form of a star, a cloud, a moon, a sun;
and what is thus perceived by them is born of habit-energy.
312. The elements are devoid of selfhood, there
is neither qualified nor qualifying in them; if all element-made objects were
the elements, form (rūpa) would be element-made.
1 The first half of this corresponds to the
first half of Chapter III, verse 42; while the second half of 292 and the first
half of 293 are practically a repetition of 290, and also of the second half of
282 and the first half of 283. Nanjo's verse divisions are to be revised I
think in some places, but fearing to cause greater confusion in the numbering
of the whole "Sagāthakam" I have followed Nanjo.
2 The first half of 292 and the second half of
293 correspond to Chapter III, verse 42,
3 This is the T'ang reading. Another reading is:
"There are three kinds of Bodhisattvas. As to the Buddhas, they have no
[tangible] form, but something looking like a Buddha may be seen according to
the thoughts of each sentient being."
313. The elements are uniform, there are no
element-made objects in the elements; the elements are the cause; the earth,
water, etc. are the result.
314. Substances and forms of
thought-construction are like things born of Māyā; (306) they appear like a
dream and a city of the Gandharvas, they are a mirage and a fifth.1
315. There are five kinds of the Icchantika, so
with the families which are five; there are five vehicles and no-vehicle, and
six kinds of Nirvana.
316. The Skandhas are divided into twenty-five,
and there are eight kinds of form, twenty-four Buddhas, and there are two kinds
of Buddha-sons.
317. There are one hundred and eight doctrines,
and three kinds of Śrāvakas; there is one land of the Buddhas, and so with the
Buddha, there is one.
318. Likewise with emancipation; there are three
forms, four kinds of mind-streams, six kinds of my egolessness, and also four
kinds of knowledge.
319. Disjoined from causal agencies, removed
from faulty theories, is the knowledge of self-realisation, which is the
Mahāyāna, immovable and highest.
320. Of birth and no-birth there are eight and
nine kinds; whether the attainment is instantaneous or successive, it is one
realisation.
321. There are eight worlds of formlessness;
Dhyāna is divided into six; and with the Pratyekabuddhas and Buddha-sons, there
are seven forms of emancipation.
322. There are no such things as the past,
present, and future; there is neither permanency nor impermanency; doing, work,
and fruition—all is no more than a dream-event.
323. From beginning to end the Buddhas,
Śrāvakas, and Buddha-sons have never been born; (307) the mind is removed from
what is visible, being always a Māyā-like existence.
1 The text gives no clue to this. Is
prajñaptirūpam (form of thought-construction) the same as vijñaptirūpam of the
Abhiāharmakośa?
324. Thus the abode in the Tushita heaven, the
conception, the birth, the leaving, the worldly life, the revolving of the
wheel, the wandering about in all the countries. [A Buddha] is seen [doing all
these things], but he is not one born of the womb.
325. Thus, for the sake of sentient beings who
are wandering and moving about from one place to another, emancipation is
taught, the truth, the knowledge of the [Buddha-]land, and the rising of things
by causation.
326. Worlds, forests, islands, egolessness,
philosophers, wanderings, Dhyānas, the vehicles, the Ālaya, the attainments,
the inconceivable realm of fruition,
327. Families of the moon and stars, families of
kings, abodes of the gods, families of the Yakshas and Gandharvas, —they are
all born of karma and are born of desire.
328. Inconceivable transformation-death is
[still] in union with habit-energy; when interrupted, death is put a stop to,
the net of passions is destroyed.
329. [The Bodhisattva] is not to keep1 money,
grain, gold, land, goods, kine and sheep, slaves, nor horses, elephants, etc.
330. He is not to sleep on a perforated couch,
nor is he to smear the ground with mud;2 he is not to have a bowl made of gold,
silver, brass, or copper.
331. Let the Yogin have white cloth dyed in dark
blue or brownish-red with cow-dung, or mud, or fruits, or leaves.
(308) 332. The Yogin is permitted to carry a
bowl of full Magadha measure made of either stone, or clay, or iron, or shell,
or quartz.
333. The Yogin whose final aim is to discipline
himself may carry a curved knife four fingers long for cutting cloth; he who is
intent on disciplining himself may not learn the science of mechanics.
334. The Yogin who disciplines himself in the
exercises is not to be engaged in buying and selling: [if necessary] let the
attendant see to it—these are the regulations I teach.
1 According to the Chinese
2 The source is unknown to the translator.
335. Thus, guarding his senses, let him have an
exact understanding in the meaning of the Sutras and the Vināya, and let him
not associate with men of the world, such I call the Yogin.
336. Let the Yogin prepare his abode in an empty
house, or a cemetery, or under a tree, or in a cavern, or among the straw, or
in an open place.
337. Let [the Yogin] dress himself in three
garments, whether in the cemetery or any other place; if anyone should
voluntarily give him a garment—let him accept it.
338. When he goes about begging food, let him
look ahead not more than the length of a yoke; let him conduct himself in the
way bees treat flowers.
339. When the Yogin finds himself in a large
company, in the confusion of a company, or with Bhikshunīs [women-mendicants],
this is not a desirable relationship for Yogins; for it means to share a
livelihood with them.
340. The Yogin, whose aim is to discipline
himself in the exercise, (309) is not to approach for his food kings, princes,
ministers of state, or persons of rank.
341. In houses where a death or a birth has
taken place, or in the houses of friends and relatives, or where Bhikshus and
Bhikshunīs are mixed together, it is not proper for the Yogins to take their
food.
342. In the monasteries food is always regularly
cooked, and when it is purposely prepared [somewhere else], it is not proper
for the Yogins to take their food.
343. The Yogin should regard the world as
removed from birth and death, as exempt from the alternation of being and
non-being, though it is seen in the aspect of qualified and qualifying.
344. When birth [and death] is not
discriminated, the Yogin before long will attain the Samādhi, the powers, the
psychic faculties, and the self-mastery.
345. The Yogin should not cherish the thought
that the world exists from such causal agents as atoms, time, or supreme soul;
nor that it is born of causes and conditions.
346. From self-discrimination the world is
imagined, which is born of varieties of habit-energy; let the Yogin perceive
existence as always like unto Māyā and a dream.
347. The [true] insight is always removed from
assertions as well as from negations; let not [the Yogin] discriminate the
triple world which appears as body, property, and abode.
348. Not thinking how to obtain food and drink,
but holding his body upright, let him pay homage over and over again to the
Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.
349. Gathering truth from the Vināya, from the
teachings in the Sutras, let the Yogin have a clear insight into the five
Dharmas, Mind itself, and egolessness.
(310) 350. The Yogin should have a distinct
understanding of the undefiled truth of self-realisation and as to what the
stages [of Bodhisattvahood] and the Buddha-stage are and be anointed on the
great lotus [seat].
351. Wandering through all the paths, he becomes
averse to existence, and directing his steps toward some quiet cemetery he will
begin various practices.
352-354. (Chapter II, verses 162-164.)
355. [According to the philosophers] there is a
reality born of no-cause, neither permanent nor subject to annihilation, and
removed from the alternatives of being and non-being, and this is imagined by
them to be the Middle Path.
356. They imagine the theory of no-cause but
their no-cause is nihilistic; as they fail to understand [the real nature of]
external objects they destroy the Middle Path.
357. The attachment to existence is not
abandoned for the fear of being nihilistic, and they try to teach the Middle
Path by means of assertion and negation.
(311) 358. When Mind-only is understood,
external objects are abandoned and discrimination no more takes place; here the
Middle Path is reached.
359. There is Mind-only, there is no visible
world; as there is no visible world, [Mind] is not risen;1 this is taught by
myself and other [Tathagatas] to be the Middle Path.
1 After T'ang. Wei has: "Apart from Mind
there is no rising." No rising of a visible world?
360. Birth and no-birth, being and non-being,
—these are all empty; there is no self-nature in all things; the duality is not
to be cherished.
361. Where there is no possibility of
discrimination taking its rise, the ignorant imagine there is emancipation; but
as there is no understanding [in them] as to the rise of a mind, how can they
destroy their attachment to duality!1
362. As it is understood that there is nothing
but what is seen of the Mind, the attachment to duality is destroyed;
knowledge, indeed, is the abandonment, not the destruction of the
discriminated.
363. As it becomes thoroughly known that there
is nothing but what is seen of the Mind, discrimination ceases; as
discrimination ceases, suchness is removed from intellection (citta).2
364. If a man, seeing the rise [of all things],
yet perceives that Nirvana is devoid of the faults of the philosophers, this is
the Nirvana as held by the wise, because of its not being annihilation.
365. To realise this is said by myself and
[other] Buddhas to be [the attainment of] Buddhahood; if there is any other
discrimination one is committed to the philosophers' views.
366. Nothing is born, and yet things are being
born; nothing dies and yet things are passing away; (312) all over millions of
worlds what is seen simultaneously is like a lunar reflection in water.
367. Unity being transformed into plurality,
rain falls and fire burns; as a mind is changed into [many] thoughts, they
declare that there is Mind-only.
368. Mind is of Mind-only, no-mind is also born
of Mind; when understood varieties of forms and appearances are of Mind-only.
369. By assuming Buddha[-forms], Śrāvaka-forms,
Pratyekabuddha-appearances, and varieties of other forms, they declare
Mind-only.
1 The text as it stands is difficult to
understand. I follow T'ang.2 Cf. Chapter III, verses 25, and the
"Sagāthakam," verse 651.
370. For the sake of beings [the Buddhas] show
forms by means of no-form, from the world of no-form and of form down to the
hells where hell-dwellers are; and all this originates from Mind-only.
371. When a [spiritual] revulsion [takes place
in them], they will attain the Samādhi called Māyā-like, the will-body, the ten
stages, the self-mastery.
372. On account of self-discrimination which
causes errors and sets false reasonings in motion, the ignorant are bound up
with ideas in what they see, hear, think, or understand.
373. (Chapter II, verse 197.)
374. (Chapter II, verse 198.)
(313) 375-378. (Chapter II, verses 199-202.)
379. The Buddhas in [every] land are those of
transformation, where [the doctrine of] the one vehicle and the triple vehicle
is taught; I never enter into Nirvana, for all things are empty being devoid of
birth [and death].
380. There are thirty-six different Buddhas, and
in each ten different ones; in accordance with the thought of all beings they
share their lands.
381. When existence is discriminated there are
varieties of appearances; in like manner the Dharma-Buddha's world may appear
in its multiplicity, which in reality exists not.
382. The Dharma-Buddha is the true Buddha and
the rest are his transformations; according to a continuous flow of their own
seeds, sentient beings see their Buddha-forms.1
383. When [the mind is] bound up with error and
appearance, discrimination is set in motion; (314) suchness is no other than
discrimination and discrimination is no other than appearance.
384. The Self-nature Buddha, the Enjoyment
Buddha, the Transformation Buddha, the five Transformation Buddhas, and a group
of thirty-six Buddhas—they are all of the Self-nature Buddha.2
1 After T'ang and Wei.
2 The five transformation bodies (pañcanirmita)
may mean those transformation Buddhas who manifest themselves in the five
(sometimes six) paths of existence in order to save the sentient beings that
are suffering there in the endless wheel of transformation. According to the
Shingon doctrine of the fourfold Dharmakāya, this last transformation or
manifestation is distinguished from the generally accepted
transformation-Buddha and is given a special position by itself. The fourth one
thus in the Shingon is known as the Nishyandakāya, distinguishing it from the
third which is Nirmāṇa- or Nirmita-kāya. This verse is quoted by Amoghavajra
(704-774), one of the Indian Shingon Fathers, who settled in China, in one of
his works called 略述金剛頂瑜伽分別聖位修證法門經 (the Taisho Tripitaka,
No. 870; Nanjo Catalogue, No. 1433). I owe this information to Professor Shōun
Toganowo, of Kōya Buddhist College.
385-(315-316)-406. (Chapter II, verses 101-123,
with verse-divisions occasionally varying.)
407. Owing to seeds of habit-energy [that grow
from the recognition] of an outer world, discrimination takes place; and
thereby the relativity aspect1 is grasped, and that which is grasped is
variously imagined.2
(317) 408. When one depending upon the mind
recognises an external world, error is produced; error takes place from these
two [causes], and there is no third cause.
409. Depending on that and from that cause error
is produced; the six (indryas), the twelve (āyatanas), the eighteen (dhātus),
are thus said by me to be of the Mind.
410. [When it is understood that things are
because of] the combination of self-seeds and an external world (grāhya), the
ego-attachment is abandoned.
411. Because of the Ālayavijñāna the
Vijñāna[-system] is evolved; because of inner support there is something
externally appearing.
412. The unintelligent imagine the Saṁskṛita and
Asaṁskṛita to be permanent, while they are not, as they are like the stars, a
hair-net, an echo, or things seen in a dream.
413. [As they are] like the city of the
Gandharvas, a mirage, or Māyā; they are not, yet they are perceived [as if they
were real]; so is the relativity aspect of existence (paratantra).
414. By means of a triple mentality I teach the
self, senses, and their behaviour; but the Citta, Manas, and Vijñāna are devoid
of self-nature.
1 Tantram = paratantram.
2 Kalpitam = parikalpitam.
415. The Citta, Manas, and Vijñāna, the twofold
egolessness, the five Dharmas, the [three] Svabhāvas, — these belong to the
realm of the Buddhas.
416. Habit-energy as cause is one, but as far as
form (lakshaṇa) goes it is triple; (318) this is the way in which a picture of
one colour appears variously on the wall.
417. The twofold egolessness, the Citta, Manas,
and Vijñāna, the five Dharmas, the [three] Svabhāvas—they do not belong to my
essence.1
418. When the Citta-form is put aside, the Manas
and Vijñāna removed, and the [five] Dharmas, and the [three] Svabhāvas abandoned,
then one attains the essence of Tathagatahood.
419. The pure [essence of Tathagatahood] is not
obtained by body, speech, and thought; the essence of Tathagatahood (gotraṁ
tāthāgatam) being pure is devoid of doings.
420. To be pure by means of the psychic
faculties, and the self-mastery, to be embellished with the Samādhis and the
powers, to be provided with varieties of the will-body—these belong to the pure
essence of Tathagatahood.
421. To be undefiled in inner realisation, to be
released from cause and form (hetulakshaṇa), to attain the eighth stage and the
Buddha-stage—this is the essence of Tathagatahood.
422. The Far-Going, the Good-Wisdom, the
Law-Cloud, and the Tathagata-stage—they belong to the essence of Buddhahood,
while the rest are taken up by the two vehicles.
423. Since sentient beings are differentiated as
to their mentality and individuality, the Buddhas who have achieved
self-mastery over their minds teach the ignorant the seven stages.
424. At the seventh stage no faults arise as to
body, speech, and thought; at the eighth, the final abode [of consciousness],
it seems to him like having crossed a great river in a dream.
1 Gotra, lit."family."
(319) 425. At the fifth and the eighth stage the
Bodhisattvas acquire proficiency in mechanical arts and philosophy and attain
kingship in the triple world.
426. Birth and no-birth, emptiness and
no-emptiness, self-nature and no-self-nature, —these are not discriminated [by
the knowing one]; in Mind-only [no such things] obtain.
427. To discriminate, saying "This is true,
this is true, this is false," is teaching meant for the Śrāvakas and
Pratyekabuddhas, and not for the sons of the Buddha.
428. There is neither being-and-non-being, nor
the aspect of momentariness, there are neither thought-constructions
(prajñapti) nor substances (dravya); nothing obtains in Mind-only.
429. According to conventional truth (saṁvṛiti),
things are, but not in the highest truth; to be confused in things not having
self-nature—this belongs to conventional truth.
430. I establish thought-constructions where all
things are non-existent; whatever expressions and experiences that belong to
the ignorant are not of the truth as it is (tattva).
431. Things born of words seem to belong to an
objective realm; but when it is perceived that they are born of words, they
become non-existent.
432. As no pictures are separable from the wall,
no shadow from the post, so are no [Vijñāna-]waves stirred when the
Ālaya[-ocean] is pure [and quiet].
433. (Chapter VI, verse 4.)
(320) 434. It is taught that from the
Dharma[-Buddha] comes the Nishyanda, and from the Nishyanda the Nirmita;1 these
are the original Buddhas, the rest are transformed bodies.
435-436. (Chapter II, verses 125-126.)
437. (Chapter II, verses 123 and 129.)
438-439. (Chapter II, verses 127-128.)
440. Do not discriminate, saying "Here is
emptiness," or saying again, "Here is no emptiness"; both being
and non-being are merely imagined, for there is no reality corresponding to the
imagined.
1 After T'ang.
441. The ignorant imagine that things originate
from the accumulation of qualities, or atoms, or substances; but there is not a
single atom in existence, and, therefore, there is no external world.
442. Forms seen as external are due to the
imagination of people, they are nothing but the Mind itself; (321) there is
nothing to be seen externally, and, therefore, there is no external world.
443-444. (Chapter III, verses 157-158.)
445-447. (Chapter II, verses 205-207.)
448. (Chapter II, verse 209.)
449. (Chapter II, verse 208.)
450. (Chapter II, verse 210.)
(322) 451. As the elephant who is immersed in
deep mud is unable to move about, so the Śrāvakas, who are deeply intoxicated
with the liquor of Samādhi, stand still.
452. (Chapter II, verse 135.)
453. Space, the hare's horns, and a barren
woman's child are unrealities, and yet they are spoken of [as if real]; so are
all things imagined.
454. The world originates from habit-energy,
there is nothing whatever to be designated as being and non-being, nor is there
its negation; those who see into this are emancipated, as they understand the
egolessness of things.
455. [Of the three Svabhāvas] one is
Parikalpita, mutuality is Paritantra, and suchness is Parinishpanna; this is
always taught by me in the sutra.
456. (Chapter II, verse 172.) 457-458. (Chapter
II, verses 203-204.)
459. The Citta, discrimination,
thought-construction, Manas, Vijñāna, (323) the Ālaya, all that which sets the
triple world in motion, are synonyms of Mind.
460. Life, warmth, the Vijñāna, the Ālaya, the
vital principle, Manas, Manovijñāna, —these are the names for discrimination.
461. The body is maintained by the Citta, the
Manas always cognitates, the [Mano-]vijñāna together with the Vijñānas cuts the
world in pieces as objects of Citta.
462-464. (Chapter II, verses 3-5.)
465-469 (324). (Chapter II, verses 15-19.)
470-471. (Chapter III, verses 7-8.)
472. [Some say that] an ego-soul really is,
which is separate from the Skandha-appearance, or that the Skandhas really exist;
[but] there is after all no ego-soul in them.
473. When one's doings, together with the
passions primary and secondary, are brought to light, one perceives the world
to be the Mind itself and is released from all sufferings.
474-487 (325-326). (Chapter II, verses 20-33.)
488. The extinction-knowledge attained by the
Śrāvakas, the birth of the Buddhas, and [that] of the Pratyekabuddhas and
Bodhisattvas—all takes place by getting rid of the passions.
489. No external forms are in existence, what is
external is what is seen of the Mind itself; as the ignorant fail to understand
as regards the Mind itself, they imagine the Saṁskṛita [as real].
490. The insight that pluralities are of the
Mind itself is withheld from the bewildered who, not knowing what the nature of
the external world is, are under bondage to [the idea] of causation, and the
fourfold proposition.
491. There are no reasons, no statements, no
illustrations, no syllogistic members to the intelligent who know that the
external world is the reflection of their own Mind.
492. Do not discriminate by discrimination, to
discriminate is characteristic of the Parikalpita (imagination); depending on
the imagination, discrimination is evolved.
493. One's habit-energy is the origin [of all
things] which are mutually and uninterruptedly knitted together; (327) as
dualism is [primarily] external to people's minds, there is no rising of it.
494. Because of mind and what belongs to it,
there is discrimination, [the ignorant] are comfortably established in the
triple world; that an external world of appearances is evolved is due to the
discrimination of self-nature.
495. Because of the combination of appearances
and seeds there are the twelve Āyatanas; because of the combination of subject
and object,1 I talk of doings.
496. Like images in a mirror, like a hair-net,
to the dim-eyed, the mind to the ignorant is seen enveloped in habit-energy.
497. Discrimination goes on in the world
imagined by self-discrimination; but there is no external world as it is discriminated
by the philosophers.
498. Like the ignorant who not recognising the
rope take it for a snake, people imagine an external world, not knowing that it
is of Mind itself.
499. Thus the rope in its own nature is neither
the one nor the other; but owing to the fault of not recognising Mind itself,
people go on with their discrimination over the rope.
500-501. (Chapter III, verses 82-83.)
(328) 502. While the imagined is being imagined,
the imagination itself has no reality; seeing that discrimination has no
reality, how does it [really] take place?
503. Form (rūpam, or matter) has no reality of
its own, as is the case with a jar, a garment, etc.; in the world, however,
which has no real existence, discrimination is carried on.
504. If people discriminate erroneously
regarding the Saṁskṛita since the beginningless past, how is the self-nature of
beings an error? Pray tell me, O Muni.
505. The nature of all beings is non-existent,
and what is seen [as external] is nothing but the Mind; when the Mind itself is
not perceived discrimination is evolved.
506. When it is said that there are no such
things imagined as the ignorant imagine, it means that there is something which
is not recognised by the intellect.
507. If it is said that something exists with
the wise, this is not what is discriminated by the ignorant; if the wise and
the ignorant walk the same way, that which [is real] with the wise must be a
falsehood.
1 āśraya and ālambana, depended and depending.
508. To the wise there is nothing erroneous,
therefore their mind is undefiled; the ignorant whose mind is uninterruptedly
defiled goes on imagining the imagined.
509. It is like the mother who fetches for her
child a fruit from the air, saying, "O son, don't cry, pick the fruit,
there are so many of them."
510. In like manner I make all beings covet
varieties of imagined fruit (329) whereby I [lead them to] the truth that goes
beyond the antithesis of being and non-being.
511. The being [which is realised by the wise]
having never been in existence is not united with causation; it is primarily
unborn and yet born, while its essence is not obtainable.1
512. The unobtainable essence (alabdhātmaka) is
indeed unborn, and yet it is nowhere separated from causation; nor are things
as they are for this moment anywhere separated from causation.
513. When the visible world is thus approached,
it is anywhere neither existent nor non-existent, nor is it
not-existent-and-non-existent; putting itself under causation, reality is not
the subject of discrimination to the wise.
514. The philosophers cherishing wrong ideas and
the ignorant have theories of oneness and otherness; they understand not that
the world, subject to causation, is like Māyā and a dream.
515. The supreme Mahāyāna is beyond the realm of
words, its meaning is well elucidated by me, but the ignorant do not
comprehend.
516. [The doctrines] thus advanced by the
Śrāvakas and philosophers are tainted with jealousy; they go astray from
reality, because their doctrines are false theorisings.
517. Appearance, self-nature, form (saṁsthānam),
and name, —depending on these four conditions all kinds of imagination are
carried on.
1 The meaning of this and what follow is this:
there is an absolute being which precludes all form of qualification, but
without which this world of cause and effect is impossible; the absolute is
thus in one sense unobtainable, and yet in another sense it is the reason of
this existence subject to causation.
518. Those who believe in the oneness or the
manyness [of cause], those who imagine Brahma god or the authority of Iśvara,
(330) those who take the sun and the moon for an element—they are not my sons.1
519. Those who are equipped with a noble insight
and are thoroughly conversant with the suchness of reality, know well how to
turn over ideas and reach the other shore of the Vijñāna.
520. This is the seal of emancipation belonging
to those sons who [have embraced] my teaching; it is released from existence
and non-existence, removed from coming and going.
521. If karma disappears by causing a
transformation in the world of matter (rūpa) and the Vijñānas, permanence and
impermanence no more obtain, and transmigration ceases.
522. When this transformation takes place, the
idea of matter is shaken off, space-relations are banished, but karma released
from the fault of being and non-being abides with the Ālaya.
523. While matter and Vijñānas pass into
annihilation, karma abides with the being of the Ālaya which is not destroyed,
whereby there is the union of matter and Vijñānas.
524. If people's karma which is in combination
with them is destroyed, karma-succession being thus destroyed, there will be no
transmigration, no attainment of Nirvana.
525. If karma is destroyed together with matter
and Vijñānas, and yet is subject to transmigration, matter will then subsist as
it differs in no way from karma.
526. Mind (citta) and matter are neither
different nor not-different from discrimination; there is no distinction of all
things as they are removed from being and non-being.
(331) 527. The Parikalpita and the Paratantra
are mutually dependent and are not to be differentiated; thus with matter and
impermanency, they are mutually conditioning.
1 The whole verse is not at all clear.
528. Apart from oneness and otherness the
[Pari-]kalpita is not knowable; so with, matter and impermanency; how can one
speak of their being and non-being?
529. When the Parikalpita is thoroughly
understood [as to its nature], the Paratantra is not born; when the Paratantra
is understood, the Parikalpita becomes suchness.
530. When the Parikalpita is destroyed my
Dharma-eye (netrī)1 is destroyed; and there takes place within my teaching [the
controversy of] assertion and negation.
531. In this way, then, and at that time, there
will rise disparagers of the Dharma, none of whom are worth talking with as
they are destroyers of my Dharma-eye.
532. As they are not taken into the company of
the intelligent, they abandon the life of the Bhikshu; and as they destroy the
Parikalpita, they are engaged in controversies asserting and negating.
533. As their insight is bound up with being and
non-being, what appears to their imagination resembles a hairnet, Māyā, a
dream, the Gandharva's city, a mirage, etc.
534. He who studies under the Buddhas may not
live together with those who cherish dualism and are destroyers of others.
535. But if there are Yogins who see a being
separated from the imagination (332) and released from existence and
non-existence, he [i. e. a Buddhist] may associate with them [i. e. such
Yogins].
536. It is like a mine in the earth producing
gold and precious stones; it harbours no cause of strife in it, and yet it
furnishes people with various means of subsistence.
537. Likewise, though the essence (gotra)2 of
all beings appears various, it has nothing to do with karma; as the visible
world is non-existent, there is no karma, nor is the path born of karma.
538. As is understood by the wise, all things
have no self-being, but according to the discriminations of the ignorant things
appear to exist.
1 T'ang, 法眼; Wei, 法輪 or 我法.
2 性, read after Wei.
539. If things are not existent as discriminated
by the ignorant, all things being non-existent, there are no defilements for
any one.
540. Because of varieties of defilement cherished
by beings there is transmigration, and the sense-organs are completed; being
bound up by ignorance and desire there is the evolution of beings possessed of
a body.
541. If beings are not existent as discriminated
by the ignorant, there will be no evolving of the sense-organs in these beings,
which is not the Yogin's [view].
542. If beings themselves are not and yet they
become the cause of transmigration, then there will be an emancipation which is
independent of people's strivings.
543. If beings are non-existent to you, how can
there be any distinction between the wise and the ignorant? Nor will there be
anything characterising the wise who are disciplining themselves for the triple
emancipation.
(333) 544. The Skandhas, personal soul,
doctrines, individuality and generality, no-signs, causation, and senses —of
these I talk for the sake of the Śrāvakas.
545. No-cause, Mind-only, the powers (vibhūti),
the stages [of Bodhisattvahood], the inner realisation, pure suchness—of these
I talk for the sake of the Bodhisattvas.
546. In the time to come there will be
disparagers of my teaching who, putting on the Kāshāya robe, will talk about
being-and-non-being and its works.
547. Things born of causation are
non-existent—this is the realm of the wise; a thing imagined has no reality,
yet things are imagined by the theorisers.
548. In the time to come there will be [a class
of ignorant people headed by] Kaṇabhuj; they will talk about the non-existence
of work, and will ruin the people with their evil theories.
549. The world is originated from atoms, atoms
are causeless, and there are nine permanent substances—such evil theories they
teach.
550. [They say that] substances are produced by
substances, and so qualities by qualities; and they destroy the self-being of
all things [saying that] it is another being.
551. If it is said that originally the world was
not and then evolved, it must have had a beginning; but my statement is that
there is no primary limit to transmigration.
(334) 552. If all the innumerable things in the
triple world were not and then evolved, nobody would doubt if horns grow on a
bitch, or a she-camel, or a donkey.
553. If the eye, form (rupa), and Vijñāna were
not and now they are, straw-mats, crowns, cloth, etc. would be produced from
lumps of clay.
554. A straw-mat is not found in cloth, nor
cloth in a straw matting; why is it that by some combination anything is not
produced from any other thing?
555. That life and the body so called were not
and then evolved; all such controversies as this have been declared by me [as
untrue].
556. The statement has been made first [against
the philosophers] and their views are warded off; their views being warded off,
I will make my own statement.
557. While I [first] make a statement in behalf
of the philosophical systems, let not my disciples be disturbed by [my] drawing
on the dualism of being and non-being.
558. That the world is born of a supreme soul
and that changes are due to the qualities, —this is what the school of Kapita
teaches its disciples; but it is not the right way of thinking.
559. There is no reality, no non-reality, nor is
there any [world of] causation conditioned by causation; as there is nothing to
be characterised as causation, non-reality never has its rise.
560. My statement is free from the alternatives
of being and non-being, is removed from cause and condition, has nothing to do
with birth and destruction, and is removed from qualified [and qualifying].
561. When the world is regarded as like Māyā and
a dream, exempt from cause and condition, (335) and eternally causeless, there
is no rising of imagination.
562. When existence is always regarded as
resembling the Gandharva's [city], a mirage, a hair-net, and as free from the
alternatives of being and non-being, removed from cause and condition, and
causeless, then the mind flows clear of defilements.
563. [The philosophers may say that] if there is
no external reality, Mind-only too will be non-existent; how can Mind exist
without objective reality? The [doctrine of] Mind-only1 [therefore] is
untenable.
564. [Further they may say that] on account of
an objective world of realities, people's minds are aroused; how can there be a
mind without a cause? [The doctrine of] Mind-only1 is [therefore] untenable.
565. But suchness and Mind-only1 are realities
belonging to the teaching of the wise; neither those who deny nor those who
affirm comprehend my teachings.
566. If a mind is said to evolve on account of
perceived and perceiving, this is the mind that is of the world; then the
Mind-only obtains not.
567. When it is said that there is something
resembling body, property, and abode produced in a dream-like manner, a mind,
indeed, is seen under the aspect of duality; but Mind itself is not dualistic.
568. As a sword cannot cut itself, or as a
finger cannot touch its own tip, Mind cannot see itself.
569. In the state of imagelessness there is no
reality, no Parikalpita, no Paratantra, no five Dharmas, no twofold mind.2
(336) 570. The dualism of giving-birth and being-born
belongs to the nature of things; when I speak of the giving-birth of things
that have no self-nature, it is on account of a hidden meaning.
571. If multiplicities of forms are born of
imagination, there will be something of objectivity in [the notion of] space,
in [that of] a hare's horns.
1 For these cittamātra, T'ang has 唯識 instead of 唯心. Ordinarily 唯識 is for vijñānamātra or
vijñaptimātra, and not for cittamātra. In this respect Wei is consistent, for
it has 唯心
throughout.
2 After T'ang.
572. When an objective reality is of mind, this
reality does not belong to imagination; but reality born of imagination is
something other than mind and is unobtainable.
573. In a transmigration that has no beginning,
an objective world nowhere obtains; when there is no nourishing mind, where can
an objective semblance take its rise?
574. If there is any growth from nothingness,
horns will grow on a hare; let no discrimination take place, thinking that
something grows out of nothing.
575. As there is nothing existing now, so there
was nothing existing previously; where there is no objective world, how can a
mind which is bound up with an objective world take its rise?
576. Suchness, emptiness, [reality-]limit,
Nirvana, the Dharmadhātu, no-birth of all things, self-being—these characterise
the highest truth.
577. The ignorant, who cherish [the notion of]
being and non-being, by imagining causes and conditions, are unable to
understand that all things are causeless and unborn.
578. The Mind is manifested; there is no
objective world of pluralities whose cause is in the beginningless past; (337)
if there is no objective world since the beginningless past, how does
individualisation1 ever come to exist?
579. If anything grows from nothingness, the
poor will become rich; when there is no objective world, how can a mind be
born? Pray tell me, O Muni.
580. As all this is causeless, there is neither
mind nor objective world; as the mind is not born, the triple world is devoid
of doings.
581-613 (338-341). (Chapter III, verses 86-117.)
614. The statement that a hare has no horns is
made out of the reasonings concerning a jar, a garment, a crown, and a horn;
where there is no complete cause, there is no [real] existence; thus you should
know.
1 According to T'ang, viśesha here is evidently
citta.
615. There is non-existence when proof of
existence [is produced]; non-existence does not prove non-existence; existence,
indeed, looks for non-existence, they look for each other and are mutually
conditioned.
616. If it is thought, again, that something
appears depending on something else, the something thus depended upon must be
causeless, but there is nothing that is causeless.
617. If [it is said that] there is another
reality which is depended on, then this must have still another [reality to
depend on]; this is committing the fault of non-finality; may it not end in
reaching nowhere?
618. Depending on leaves, pieces of wood, etc.,
the magical charm is effected; in like manner, pluralities of objects depending
on some [other] objects are manifested to the people.
619. The magical net is neither the leaves nor
the pieces of wood, nor the pebbles; (342) it is owing to the magician that the
magic scene is perceived by the people.
620. Thus when something [of magic] depending on
some objects is destroyed, dualism ceases at the moment of seeing; how will
there be anything of discrimination?
621. The discriminated by discrimination exist
not, and discrimination itself does not obtain; discrimination being thus
unobtainable, there is neither transmigration nor Nirvana.
622. Discrimination now being unobtainable, it
is not aroused; discrimination not being aroused, how can a mind rise?
Mind-only then is not tenable.
623. When thought is divided into many, the
teaching lacks in validity; and owing to the absence of validity, there is no
emancipation, nor is there multitudinousness of objects.
624. There is no such objective world as is
discriminated by the ignorant; when the Mind goes astray on account of
habit-energy, it manifests itself like images.
625. All things are unborn and have nothing to
do with being and non-being: all is nothing but Mind and is delivered from
discrimination.
626. For the ignorant things are said to be
causal, but not for the wise; when the self-nature of Mind is liberated, it
becomes pure where the wise have their abode.
627. Thus, the Samkhya, the Vaiśeshika, the
naked philosophers, the Brahmin theologians, followers of Śiva, (343)
cherishing views based on being and non-being, are destitute of the truth of
solitude.
628. Having no self-nature, being unborn, being
empty, being like Māyā, being free from defilements—to whom is this taught by
the Buddhas as well as by yourself?
629. For the sake of the Yogins who are pure in
mind, spiritual discipline (yoga) is taught by the Buddhas who are free from
theories and speculations, and such is also proclaimed by me.
630. If all this is the Mind, where does the
world stand? Why are men seen coming and going on earth?
631. As a bird moves in the air according to its
fancy without abiding anywhere, without depending on anything, as if moving on
earth;
632. So people with all their discrimination
move along, walk about in the Mind itself like a bird moving in the air.1
633. Tell me how something looking like body,
property, and abode rises from the Mind. How does appearance take its rise? Why
is Mind-only? Pray tell me.
634. Body, property, and abode are appearances
and their rise is due to habit-energy; appearances are born of irrationality
(ayukta), their rise is due to discrimination.
635. Objectivity discriminated makes the world,
a mind takes its rise from [recognising] objectivity; when it is clearly
perceived that what is seen is the Mind itself, discrimination ceases.
(344) 636. When discrimination is seen [as to
its true nature, it is noticed that] name and sense are to be disjoined
(visaṁyukta),2 then both knowledge and knower will be discarded, and one is
released of the Saṁskṛita.
1 This means that in spite of our
discriminations and imaginings we cannot get away from the control of
Mind-only, which is, religiously expressed, Amitābha Buddha pursues sentient
beings, as is taught in Shin Buddhism, in spite of their struggle to run away
from his all-embracing love. Thus interpreted, this verse gives us a new
outlook in the philosophy of the Laṅkāvatāra.
2 This is the reading of T'ang.
637. To abandon both name and sense, this is the
way of all the Buddhas;1 those who wish to get enlightened in any other way
will not attain enlightenment for themselves, nor for others.
638. (Chapter VI, verse 5.)
639. When the world is seen detached from
knowledge and knowability, there is no meaning to it, and discrimination ceases
to go forth.
640. By seeing into [the nature of] Mind there
is the cessation of discrimination as regards works and words; by not seeing
into [the true nature of] Self-mind, discrimination evolves.
641. Four of the Skandhas are formless
(arūpiṇa), they cannot be numbered; the elements differ from one another, how
can they produce such pluralities of forms (rūpa)?
642. When [the notion of] individuality is
abandoned, we have no elements, primary and secondary; if [we say that] form is
produced by other qualities, why not by the Skandhas?2
643. When one is emancipated from the Āyatanas
and Skandhas, seeing them as free of individual signs, then the mind is
liberated because of seeing the egolessness of things.
(345) 644. From the differentiation of an
objective world and the senses, the Vijñāna is set in motion in eight ways;
thus the aspects [of self-nature]3 are three, but when imagelessness obtains
they all cease.
645. When dualism is cherished, the Ālaya sets
up in the Manas the consciousness of an ego and its belongings, and the
Vijñānas; when this is penetratingly perceived, they all subside.
646. When the immovable is seen, oneness and
otherness being discarded, then there will be no more discriminating of the
two, ego and its belongings.
1 Read after T'ang. The Sanskrit text is too
obscure for intelligent reading.
2 Not clear.
3 That is, Svabhāvalakshaṇa.
647. Nothing evolving, there is no growth, nor
is there any cause to set the Vijñānas in action; work and cause being removed,
there is cessation and nothing is aroused.
648. Pray tell me the why of discrimination, of Mind-only,
and of the world. Why is the world said to be disjoined from causes, discarding
qualified and qualifying?
649. The Mind is seen as manifold when visible
forms are discriminated; as it is not clearly perceived that what is seen is of
the Mind, there is something other than the Mind, because [the dualism of] a
mind and an external world is clung to.
650. When [the world] is not understood with
intelligence there is nihilism; [but] the Mind being asserted, how is it that
this does not give rise to realism (astitva-dṛishṭi)?
651. Discrimination is neither existent nor
nonexistent, therefore, realism does not arise; as it is clearly understood
that what is seen is of Mind-only, no discrimination is set to work.
652. Discrimination not rising, there is a
turning-back (parāvṛitti), and there is no dependence on anything; (346) when
things are regarded as subject to causation, the fourfold proposition obstructs
[the way of truth].
653. Different expressions are distinguished but
none is verifiable; in all these there is a necessary implication which rises
from the notion of a primary causal agency.1
654. By maintaining the combination of causes
and conditions, a primary causal agency is warded off; when a chain of causes
is held to be impermanent, the fault of permanency is avoided.
655. There is neither birth nor destruction
where the ignorant see impermanency; nothing is ever destroyed, what is seen
[as real] is due to [the idea of] a causal agency. 2 How is the unseen [born]?
By what does the impermanent world come into existence?
656. (Second line only, Chapter III, verse 62.)
1 Not quite clear.
2 In the Sanskrit text this line is made to
belong to the next verse, which is wrong.
657-662 (347). (Chapter III, verses 62-68.)
663. The gods, the Asuras, mankind, the animals,
hungry ghosts, and Yama's abode—these six paths of existence are enumerated,
where sentient beings are born.
664. According to one's karma, be it superior,
inferior, or middling, one is born in these [six] paths; guarding all that is
good, [one will attain] an excellent emancipation.
665. The company of the Bhikshus is taught by
you that there is birth and death at every moment; pray tell me its meaning.
666. As one form changes into another, so is the
mind born and broken up; thence I tell my disciples how uninterruptedly and
momentarily birth- [and-death] takes place.
667. In like manner discrimination also rises
and disappears with every single form; where there is discrimination, there are
living beings; outside of it there are no living beings.
668. At every moment there is a disjunction,
this is called causation; (348) when one is liberated from the notion of form
(rūpa), there is neither birth nor death.
669. When dualism is upheld, there rise
causation-born and no-causation-born, ignorance and suchness, etc.; not to be
dualistic is suchness.
670. When causation[-born] and no-causation-born
[are distinguished], things are differentiated, there are permanency, etc.,
there are effect, cause, and causation.
671. As long as the notion of cause and effect
is upheld, there is no difference between the philosophers; this is your
teaching as well as that of [other] Buddhas; O Mahāmuni, such are not the wise
ones.
672. Within the body, measuring one vyāna,1
there is a world; the cause of its rising, the attaining of cessation, and the
path (pratipad)—this I teach to sons of the Victor.
673. By clinging to the three Svabhāvas,
perceived [or grasped] and perceiving [or grasping] are manifested; the
simple-minded discriminate objects as belonging to the world and to the
super-world.
1 The measure of two extended arms.
674. From the viewpoint of relativity the notion
of Svabhāva has been upheld, but in order to ward off one-sided views the
Svabhāva is not to be discriminated.
675. As faults and defects are sought, the
principle is not established, nor is the mind [properly] set to work; this is
due to the rising of dualistic notions; non-duality is suchness.
(349) 676. [If one should think that] the
Vijñāna, etc. are originated by ignorance, desire, and karma, this is wrong,
for the fault of non-finality is committed; this being committed, the rise of
the world becomes impossible.
677. The fourfold destruction of things is told
by the unenlightened; discrimination is said to rise in two ways; [in fact,]
there is no existence, no non-existence. When one is released from the fourfold
proposition, one abandons dualism.
678. Discrimination may rise in two ways, but
when it is seen [in its true nature], it will never rise [again]; for in all
things not being born there is the awakening of intelligence; but1 where there
is the birth of things, this is owing to discrimination; let one not
discriminate.
679.2 Pray tell me, O Lord, about the truth in
order to check dualistic views, [so that] I and others may not cherish the
[dualism of] being and non-being.
680. And [thus] we may keep ourselves away from
the philosophers' teachings and also from the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas; for
it behoves the Bodhisattvas not to lose the life of enlightenment as realised
by the Buddhas.
681. To be delivered from [the notion of] cause
and no-cause, not to be born, and being one—these are synonyms; [the ignorant]
are bewildered by them, but the wise always rise above them.
1 That which follows forms the first half of
verse 678 in the Sanskrit text.
2 The verse 679 here is composed of the second
half of 679 and the first line of 680 in the Sanskrit text.
682. All things appear like a cloud, a multitude
of clouds, a rainbow; they are like a vision, a hair-net, Māyā, etc., they are
born of self-discrimination; and yet the philosophers discriminate the world as
born of a self-creating agency.
683. Not being born, suchness, reality, limit,
and emptiness, —these are other names for form (rūpa); one should not imagine
it to mean a nothing.
(350) 684. In the world [another name of] hasta
(hand) is kara; Indra [is also called] Śakra and Purandara; in the same way
[there are many synonyms] for this existence; and one should not imagine it to
mean a nothing.
685. Emptiness is no other than form, so is
no-birth; one should not imagine anything different from this; if one does,
faulty views will follow.
686. Because of objective appearances being
asserted, there is general discrimination (saṁkalpa) and particular
discrimination (vikalpa); because of imagination (parikalpa) there are long and
short, square and round, etc.
687. General discrimination belongs to the
Citta, imagination to the Manas, and particular discrimination to the
Manovijñāna; [but reality] is neither the qualified nor the qualifying.
688. What is regarded by the philosophers as
unborn is my own teaching wrongly viewed, and [the latter is] imagined to be
indistinguishable [from theirs], but this is submitting a faulty argument.
689. Those who have acquired the knowledge of
proper reasoning by making use of [the idea of] no-birth and its meaning, are
said to have an understanding of my doctrine.
690. In order to crush the philosophical views,
not being born is said to mean not having any abode; knowing what dualism
means, I teach the doctrine of no-birth.
691. Are all things to be regarded as unborn, or
not? Pray tell, O Mahāmuni. The doctrine of causelessness, no-birth, the rising
of existence, —all these are held by the philosophers.
(351) 692.1 I teach Mind-only which is removed
from [the dualism of] being and non-being. One should discard [the view of]
birth and no-birth which causes various philosophical theories.
1 The first half of this verse numbered 692 in
the Sanskrit text is evidently inserted here by mistake, and is not translated;
and the first half of the following verse is brought over here to complete 691.
The numbering, therefore, from 692 to 694 is altered in this translation.
693. In the doctrine of causelessness, of no-birth,
of birth, the notion of a causal agency [is involved] on which they depend.
Effortless deeds come from nothingness, and deeds [as ordinarily performed] are
mixed with motives.
694. Tell me the [right] view that goes with
skilful means, original vows, etc.; how does the society [of the holy ones]
come into existence when all things are not?
695. By separating oneself from [the dualism of]
perceived and perceiving, there is neither evolution nor cessation; the mind is
born as views are cherished as regards one existence or another.
696. Things are said to be unborn, how is this?
Pray tell me. Sentient beings do not understand it, so it ought to be
explained.
697. Pray explain to me, O Mahāmuni, all the
contradictions [involved in the statements made] before and after, to escape
the errors of the philosophers and to be released from the perverted theory of
causation.
698. Pray tell me, O Most Excellent of Teachers,
regarding cessation and coming back into existence, in order to be released
from being and non-being, and yet not to destroy cause and effect.
699. Pray tell me as to the graded succession of
the stages, O Lotus-eyed One;1 for the world cherishes dualism and is
bewildered with wrong views.
(352) 700. For on account of [the wrong views
concerning] birth, no-birth, etc., the cause of serenity is not recognised,
there is no society [of the holy ones] for me, and I have no chance to
discourse on the nature of being.
701. There is error where dualism is maintained,
but the Buddhas are thoroughly free from dualism; all things are empty,
momentary, have no self-nature, and have never been born.
1 Padma īkshaṇa! according to T'ang.
702. Discriminations are carried on by those who
are enveloped by evil theories and doctrines, but not by the Tathagatas; pray
tell me about the rise and cessation of discrimination.
703. Accumulated by false reasonings, there is a
combination of varieties of appearances [and Vijñānas], whereby [each Vijñāna]
takes in an objective field according to its class.
704. Recognising external forms, discrimination
is set in motion; as this is understood and the meaning of reality is seen as
it is, the mind conforms itself to the nature of the wise and is no more set in
motion.
705. The elements being rejected, there is no birth
of things, but as the elements as appearances are always the Mind, one
understands what is meant by no-birth.
706. Do not discriminate discrimination, the
wise are those who are free from discrimination; when discrimination is carried
on, there is dualism which does not lead to Nirvana.
707. By the statement of no-birth, Māyā is seen
and destroyed; when Māyā is made to be born of no-causation, this injures the
truth of the statement.
(353) 708. The mind is to be regarded as a
reflected image originating in the beginningless past; it is something of
reality but not reality itself; one should realise it truly as it is in itself.
709. The nature of birth [or existence] is like
an image appearing in a mirror, which, while it is devoid of oneness and otherness,
is not altogether non-existent.
710. Like the Gandharvas' city, Māyā, etc.,
which appear depending upon causes and conditions, the birth of all things is
not no-birth [in a relative sense].
711. It is on account of general usage that a
dualistic discrimination is set up as regards persons and things; but this is
not clearly understood by the ignorant so that [the thought of] an ego-soul and
individual objects is cherished.
712. There are five [classes of] Śrāvakas, the
Śrāvakas [that is, hearers] generally, those who are attached to the doctrine
of causation, those who are Arhats, those who are dependent upon their own
power, and those who are dependent upon [the power of] the Buddha.
713. Time-interruption, destruction, the highest
reality, and mutuality—these four are imagined as involved in the idea of
impermanency by the ignorant who are not endowed with intelligence.
714. The ignorant addicted to dualism cherish
[such thoughts as] dualities, atoms, original matter, and primary cause, and
fail to understand the means of emancipation, because they adhere to the
alternatives of being and non-being.
715. (Chapter VI, verse 3.)
(354) 716. The primary elements are of different
qualities, and how can they produce1 this world of matter (rūpa)? [Each of] the
elements has its own seat; what are [regarded as] secondary elements are not
made by them.
717. Fire burns matter (rūpa), the nature of
water is to wet, the wind scatters matter; how can matter be produced by the
elements [when they are of such contradicting natures]?
718. The Rūpa-skandha (matter) and the Vijñāna
(-Skandha)—there are these two Skandhas and not five; they are different names
for the Skandhas; of this I have talked in a hundred ways.
719. By the separation of mind from what belongs
to it, the present world evolves; [various] forms [of matter] are inseparably
conjoined with one another; matter is mind[-made], and is not element-made.
720. Blue, etc., are to be referred to white,
and white to blue; cause and effect being produced [in the same mutual way],
both being and non-being are emptiness.
721. Effect and effecting and effected, cold and
heat, qualified and qualifying, —such-like and all [other things] are not to be
explained away by theories.
722. The Citta, Manas and the six Vijñānas are
by nature united and removed from oneness and otherness; they are evolved from
the Ālaya.
1 After T'ang.
723. The Saṁkhya and the Vaiśeshika followers,
the naked philosophers, and the advocates of Iśvara the creator, are addicted
to the dualism of being and non-being, and do not know what solitary reality
is.1
(355) 724. Varieties of forms (sansthāna) and
figures (ākṛiti) are not produced by the primary elements; but the philosophers
declare them to originate from the elements primary and secondary.
725. As the philosophers imagine causes other
than the unborn, they do not understand, and because of stupidity they uphold
the dualism of being and non-being.
726. There is a truth (tattva) characterised by
purity; it is united with the Citta but disunited with the Manas, etc.; it
abides with knowledge.
727. If karma is form (rūpa), it will be the
cause of the Skandhas and the objective world; beings without attachment will
not be abiding [even] in the world of formlessness.
728. That egolessness is the true doctrine
follows from the non-existence of beings; the advocate of non-ego is a
destroyer,2 causing even the cessation of the Vijñāna.
729. There are four abodes of it, how does it
arise from the non-existence of form? As there is nothing existent innerly or
outwardly, no Vijñānas arise.
730. The theorisers wish to see the Skandhas in
the middle existence; likewise, [they wish,] a being born in the world of
formlessness is of no-form; what else is there?
731. [If one says that] emancipation is attained
without exerting oneself, as there are no beings, no Vijñānas, this is no doubt
a philosopher's theory; the theorisers do not understand.
732. If form is to be found in the world of
formlessness, it is not visible; (356) its non-existence contradicts the truth,
there is neither a vehicle nor a driver.3
1 A repetition of verse 627.
2 Literally, cutting off (chela).
3 The statements about form here are not quite
intelligible.
733. The Vijñāna, born of habit-energy, is
united with the senses; there are eight kinds of it, they do not grasp one
field all at once.1
734. When form is not evolved, the senses are
not the senses; therefore, the Blessed One declares that the senses, etc. are
characterised with momentariness.
735. How without determining form (rūpa) can the
Vijñāna take its rise? How without the rising of knowledge can transmigration
take place?
736. To pass away instantly after birth, —this
is not the teaching of the Buddhas; nor is there the uninterrupted-ness of all
things; as discrimination moves about, one is born in the various paths.
737. The senses and their objective worlds are
meant for the stupid but not for the wise; the ignorant grasp after names, the
wise comprehend the meaning.
738. The sixth [Vijñāna] is not to be understood
as non-attachment, or as attachment; the wise who are devoid of the fault of
being are not committed to a definite theory.
739. Those theorisers who are without knowledge
are frightened at eternalism and nihilism; (357) the ignorant are unable to
distinguish between the Saṁskṛita, the Asaṁskṛita, and the ego-soul.
740. [Some imagine the ego-soul] to be one with
the Citta, [others] to be different from the Manas, etc., attachment2 exists in
oneness as well as in otherness.3
741. If attachment is determined and mind and
what belongs to it are designated, how is it that on account of the attachment
there is the determination by oneness?4
1 Not clear.
2 Dāna evidently stands here for upadāna, as is
understood by T'ang. However, this and the following two or three stanzas are
difficult to understand very clearly as there are no references in the text to
the ideas discussed here. Probably they contain allusions to the Abhidharma
doctrines.
3 Read after T'ang.
4 This is not clear. A number of verses in these
pages that give no sense as far as we can see in their several connections are
not at all in cognation with the general thoughts of the Laṅkā. Are they later
additions taken from somewhere else?
742. By reason of attachment, attainment, karma,
birth, effect, etc., they are brought to the goal like fire; there is
resemblance and non-resemblance in the principle.1
743. As when fire burns, the burned and the
burning are simultaneously there, so is attachment to an ego-soul; what is it
that is not seized by the theorisers?
744. Whether there is birth or no-birth, the
mind shines forth all the time; what illustrations will the theorisers produce
to prove their notion of an ego-soul?
745. Those theorisers who are destitute of the
principle are lost in the forest of Vijñānas; seeking to establish the theory
of an ego-soul, they wander about here and there.
746. The ego (ātma) characterised with purity is
the state of self-realisation; this is the Tathagata's womb (garbha) which does
not belong to the realm of the theorisers.
747. When one thus knows what are the
characteristics of attached and attaching by the analysis of the Skandhas,
there rises the knowledge of the principle.
(358) 748. The Ālaya where the Garbha (womb) is
stationed is declared by the philosophers to be [the seat of] thought in union
with the ego; but this is not the doctrine approved [by the Buddhas].
749. By distinctly understanding it [i. e. the
doctrine] there is emancipation and insight into the truth, and purification
from the passions which are abandoned by means of contemplation and insight.
750. The Mind primarily pure is the Tathagata's
Garbha which is good but is attached to [as an ego-soul] by sentient beings; it
is free from limitation and non-limitation.
751. As the beautiful colour of gold and gold
among pebbles become visible by purification, so is the Ālaya among the
Skandhas of a being.
752. The Buddha is neither a soul nor the
Skandhas, he is knowledge free from evil outflows; clearly perceiving him to be
eternally serene, I take my refuge in him.
753. The Mind, primarily pure, is with the
secondary passions, with the Manas, etc., and in union with the ego-soul—this
is what is taught by the best of speakers.
1 Is this correct?
754. The Mind is primarily pure, but the Manas,
etc., are other than that; varieties of karma are accumulated by them, and thus
there are defilements giving rise to dualism.
755. The ego [primarily] pure has been defiled
on account of the external passions since the beginningless past, (359) and
what has been added from outside is like a [soiled] garment to be washed off.
756. As when a garment is cleansed of its dirt,
or when gold is removed from its impurities, they are not destroyed but remain
as they are; so is the ego freed from its defilements.
757. Imagining that a melodious sound obtains in
a lute, a conch-shell, or in a kettle-drum, the unintelligent thus seek
something of an ego-soul within the Skandhas.
758. As one tries to find precious stones in the
treasure-house, or in water, or underneath the ground, where they are
invisible, so do [they seek] a soul in the Skandhas.
759. As the unintelligent cannot take hold of a
mind and what belongs to it as a group, and their functions which are connected
with the Skandhas, so [they cannot find] an ego-soul in the Skandhas.
760. As the womb is not visible to the woman
herself who has it, so the ego-soul is not visible within the Skandhas to those
who have no wisdom.
761. Like the essence of the medicinal herb, or
like fire in the kindling, those who have no wisdom do not see the ego-soul
within the Skandhas.
762. Trying to find permanency and emptiness in
all things, the unenlightened cannot see them; so with the ego-soul within the
Skandhas.
763. When there is no true ego-soul, there are
no stages, no self-mastery, no psychic faculties, no highest anointing, no
excellent Samādhis.
(360) 764. If a destroyer should come around and
say, "If there is an ego, show it to me;" a sage would declare,
"Show me your own discrimination."1
1 The statements so far made here regarding an
ego-soul (ātman or pudgala) as they stand seem to contradict one another, and
some really violate the Buddhist doctrine of Non-ātman as far as we know.
765. Those who hold the theory of non-ego are
injurers of the Buddhist doctrines, they are given up to the dualistic views of
being and non-being; they are to be ejected by the convocation of the Bhikshus
and are never to be spoken to.1
766. The doctrine of an ego-soul shines
brilliantly like the rising of the world-end fire, wiping away the faults of
the philosophers, burning up the forest of egolessness.
767. Molasses, sugar-cane, sugar, and honey;
sour milk, sesame oil, and ghee—each has its own taste; but one who has not
tasted it will not know what it is.
768. Trying to seek in five ways for an ego-soul
in the accumulation of the Skandhas, the unintelligent fail to see it, but the
wise seeing it are liberated.
769. By means of illustrations furnished by the
sciences, etc., the mind is not accurately determined; as to the meaning
contained in it, how can one accurately determine it?
770. Things are differentiated but the Mind is
one— this is not perceived; the theorisers [imagine it] to be causeless and
not-functioning, which is a mistake.
771. When the Yogin reflects upon the mind, he
does not see the Mind in the mind; an insight comes forth from the perceived
[i. e. the world]; whence is the rising of this perceived [world]?
(361) 772. I belong to the Katyāyana family,
descending from the Śuddhāvāsa; I teach the Dharma in order to lead sentient
beings to the city of Nirvana.
773. This is the course of the past; I and those
Tathagatas have generally disclosed the meaning of Nirvana in three thousands
of the sutras.
1 This and the following verse again seem to
contradict the Buddhist doctrine of non-ego. It is not easy to determine the
purport of these verses as they stand all by themselves without any explanatory
prose. In fact these verses in the Sagāthakam which have no direct connection
with the main text, except those that are quite obvious in meaning, are mostly
difficult to know precisely what they intend to signify.
774. Not in the world of desire nor in [the
world of] no-form is Buddhahood attained; but at the Akanishtha in the world of
form one is awakened to Buddhahood by getting rid of greed.
775. The objective world is not the cause of
bondage; the cause is bound up in the objective world; the passions are
destroyed by knowledge, which is a sharp sword gained by discipline.
776. How is non-ego possible? How are things
like Māyā, etc.? How about being and non-being? If suchness reveals itself to
the ignorant, how is non-ego non-existent?1
777. Because of things done and of things not
done, the cause is not the producer; all is unborn, and this is not clearly
recognised by the ignorant.
778. The creating agencies are unborn; both the
created and the conditions of causality are unborn; why is imagination carried
on as regards creating agencies?
779. The theorisers explain a cause to consist
in the simultaneity of antecedent and consequent; the birth of all things is
told by means of a light, a jar, a disciple, etc.
780. The Buddhas are not Saṁskṛita-made, but are
endowed with the marks [of excellence]; (362) they belong to the nature of a Cakravartin;
the Buddhas are not so named because of these [marks].
781. What characterises the Buddhas is knowledge
(jñāna); it is devoid of the defects of intellection (dṛishti-dosha); it is an
insight attained by self-realisation, it is removed from all defects.
782. The religious life (brahmacarya) is not
found in those especially, who are deaf, blind, one-eyed, dumb, aged, young,
nor in those who are given up to the feeling of enmity.
783. The world-ruler is endowed with the
celestial marks and the secondary characteristics though not manifested. They
become, however, manifested in some of the homeless monks and not in anybody
else—so it is declared.
784. After the passing of the Leader of the
Śākyas, these will follow me: Vyāsa, Kaṇāda, Rishabha, Kapila, and others.
1 Is this correct reading?
785. Then one hundred years after my passing,
Vyāsa's Bhārata will appear, the Pāṇḍavas, the Kauravas, Rāma, and then the
Maurya.
786. The Maurya, the Nanda, the Gupta, and then
the Mleccha who are bad kings; after the Mleccha will rage a warfare, and then
the age of vice; (363) and after this age of vice, the good Dharma will no more
prevail in the world.
787. After passing through these ages the world
will be thrown into confusion like a wheel; fire and the sun being united, the
world of desire will be consumed.
788. The heavens will again be restituted and
therein the world will take its rise, together with its four castes, kings,
Rishis, and the Dharma.
789. The Vedas, worship, and charity will again
prevail with the revival of the Dharma; by narratives,1 histories,
prose-compositions, commentaries, annotations, thus-I-have-heard's, etc., the
world will [again] fall into confusion.
790. Preparing properly-coloured cloth, have it
further cleaned, have the cloth dyed with bluish mud and cow-dung making it
nondescript in colour, so that the body may be covered with robes in every way
different from the appearance of the philosophers.
791. Let the Yogin preach the doctrine, which is
the badge of the Buddhas; let him drink water filtered through a cloth and
carry the hip-string; in due time let him go about begging and keep away from
things vile.
(364) 792. He will be born in a heaven filled
with light, and the other two will appear among mankind; decorated with
precious stones he will be born as a god and a world-lord.
793. In the abode of light he enjoys the four
worlds by means of the teaching based on the Dharma; but after a long reign
over the worlds he will retrograde on account of desire.
794. Thus there are the golden age, the age of
triads, the age of two, and the age of vice; the Lion of the Śākyas will appear
in the age of vice, I and others in the golden age.
1 Literally, "So indeed it was."
795. Siddhartha of the Śākya family, Vishṇu,
Vyāsa, Maheśvara—such other philosophers will appear after my passing.
796. There will be the teaching of the Lion of
the Śākyas told in the thus-I-have-heard's, and that of Vyāsa in the narratives
(so-indeed-it-was), and the past events.
797. Vishṇu and Maheśvara will teach about the
creation of the world; things like this will take place after my passing.
798. My mother is Vasumati, my father is the
wise Prajāpati; I belong to the Kātyāyana family, and my name is Viraja the
Victor.
799. I was born in Campā, and as my father and
grandfather, being descendants of the lunar race (somavaṁśa), [my family name]
is "The Moon-Protected" (somagupta).
(365) 800. Making vows, I shall become a
homeless mendicant and teach the doctrine in a thousand ways; Mahāmati being
given assurance and anointed, I shall enter into Nirvana.
801. Mati will hand [the doctrine] over to
Dharma and Dharma to Mekhala; but Mekhala and his disciple being too weak [the
doctrine] will disappear at the end of the Kalpa.
802. Kāśyapa, Krakucchanda, and Kanaka, who are
the removers, and I, Viraja, and others—these Buddhas all belong to the golden
age.
803. After the golden age there will appear a
leader by the name of Mati, who is a great hero (mahāvīra) well acquainted with
the five forms of knowledge.
804. Not in the age of two, not in the age of
triads, not in the age of vice, which will come after, but in the golden age
world-teachers will appear, and attain Buddhahood.
805. Without removing the marks, without cutting
it into tens,1 have the upper garment patched with spots like the eyes in the
tail of a peacock.
806. Let the space between the eyes be two or
three fingers apart; if the patches are otherwise distributed it will excite in
the ignorant a desire to possess.
1 Is this right?
807. Let the Yogin always keep the fire of greed
under control, be bathed in the water of knowledge, and practise the triple
refuge, and exert himself diligently throughout the three periods.
(366) 808. When an arrow, or a stone, or a piece
of wood, is sent forth by means of a bow or sling, one hits and another falls;
so it is with good and bad.
809. The one cannot be the many, for then
nowhere would diversities be seen. Let all receivers be like the wind, and
donors be like the land.
810. If the one were the many, all would be
without a causal agency; this is the destruction of a causal agency, which is
the teaching of the theorisers.
811. [Their teaching] will be like a lamp, like
a seed, because of similitude; but where are the many? If the one becomes the many,
this is the teaching of the theorisers.
812. From sesame no beans grow, rice is not the
cause of barley, wheat does not produce corn; how can the one be the many?
813. There will be Pāṇini, author of the
Śabdanetṛi, Akshapāda, Vṛihaspati; Praṇetṛi the Lokāyata will be found in
Brahma-garbha.
814. Kātyāyana will be the author of a sutra,
and Yajñavalka will be like him; Bhuḍhuka will write astronomical works; they
will appear in the age of vice.
(367) 815. Balin will appear to promote the
welfare of the world, the happiness of mankind, he will be the protector of all
that is good; Balin the king will be a great ruler.
816. Vālmīka, Masurāksha, Kauṭilya, and
Āśvalāyana, who are highly virtuous Rishis, will appear in the future.
817. Siddhartha of the Śākya family, Bhūtānta,
Pañcacūḍaka, Vāgbaliratha, Medhāvin will appear in the times that follow.
818. When I take my abode in the forest-ground,
Brahma, chief of the gods, will give me the hairy skin of a deer, a staff made
of wood, a girdle, and a discus.
819. The great Yogin will be called Viraja the
Muni, the teacher and pointer of emancipation; he is the badge of all the
Munis.
820. Brahma with his retinues and many gods will
give me an antelope's skin from the sky, and then the ruler will vanish.
821. When I am in the forest-ground, Indra and
Virūḍhaka and others, accompanied by the celestial beings, will give me most
exquisite garments and a begging bowl.
(368) 822. Seeking for a cause in the doctrine
of no-birth, [one may say that] that which is unborn is born, too, [and imagine
that] the no-birth [theory] is [thereby] established; but this is done in words
only.
823-828. (Chapter VI, verses 12-17.)1
829. That the mind is set in motion by ignorance
which has been accumulated by thought since beginningless past, that it is
bound to birth and destruction—this is the imagination of the theorisers.
830. The Sāṁkhya philosophy is twofold. There is
transformation owing to primary matter; (369) in primary matter there is
action, and action is self-originating.
831. Primary matter is with all existing beings,
and qualities are regarded as differentiated, various are effects and causes,
no transformation takes place.
832. As quicksilver is pure and not soiled by
dirt, so is the Ālaya pure, being the seat of all sentient beings.
833. The onion-odour of onion, the womb of a
pregnant woman, the saltiness of salt, etc. —does not [each] evolve like the
seed?
834. Otherness is not otherness, so is bothness
not bothness; to be is not to be attached to, there is neither non-being nor
the Saṁskṛita.
835. [To say that] an ego is found in the
Skandhas is like saying that the horse-nature is in the cow-nature, which has
nothing to do with it; we may speak of the Saṁskṛita and the Asaṁskṛita, but
there is no self-nature.
1 It is noteworthy that the repetitions grow
less as we approach the end and that the subjects referred to are less
congruous with those of the text. The Sagāthakam may be an independent
collection.
836. Defiled by logic, by the traditional teachings
(āgama),1 by wrong views, by speculation, they are not able to ascertain
definitely about the ego, which they say is; but it does not exist in any way
other than clinging.
837. It is certainly their mistake to think that
the ego is perceivable along with the Skandhas by reason of oneness and
otherness; the theorisers are not enlightened.
838. As an image is seen in a mirror, in water,
or in an eye, (370) so is the soul in the Skandhas devoid of oneness and
otherness.
839. Let it be known that those who reflect and
practise meditation can be released from the evil theories by training
themselves in the three things: the path (mārga), the truth (satya), and the
insight (darśana).
840. As a flash of lightning is seen and unseen
as the sun passes through a slit of a door, so is the transformation of all
things; it is not as it is imagined by the ignorant.
841. Being confused in mind the ignorant view
Nirvana as the disappearance of the existent; but since the wise see into
reality (sadbhava) as it abides in itself, they have a truer insight.
842. Transformation [which is the actual state
of existence] is to be ascertained as removed from birth and destruction,
devoid of existence and non-existence, released from qualified and qualifying.
843. Transformation is to be ascertained as
having nothing to do with the philosophical doctrines, with names and forms,
and giving an abode2 to views of an inner ego.
844. With the [pleasant] touches of the gods and
the harassings of the hells, if it were not for the middle existence, no
Vijñānas would ever evolve.3
845. It should be known that the womb-born, the
egg-born, the moisture-born, and other various bodies of sentient beings are
born of the middle existence and descend into the [six] paths of existence.
1 After T'ang.
2 "Destroying", according to T'ang.
3 Read after T'ang.
846. To say that the passions are quieted and
destroyed apart from right reasoning and scriptural teaching, (371) is the view
and discourse of the philosophers, which is not to be practised by the
intelligent.
847. One should first examine into the nature of
an ego-soul and keep oneself away from attachment; to try to go beyond without
an examination is of no more worth than a barren-woman's child.
848. I observe with a divine eye which is of
transcendental wisdom and is removed from the flesh, [with this I observe]
sentient beings, the physical bodies of all living creatures as devoid of the
Saṁskāra and Skandhas.1
849. It is seen that [beings] are distinguished
as ugly-coloured and beautifully-coloured, as emancipated and un-emancipated,
as heavenly and free from the Saṁskāra, and as abiding with the Saṁskāra.
850. I have the body that goes about in the
[six] paths of existence; this does not belong to the realm of the theorisers;
it goes beyond the human world and is not the possession of the theorisers.
851. The ego-soul is not, and the mind is born;
how does this evolving come about? Is it not said that its appearing is like a
river, a lamp, and a seed?
852. The Vijñāna not being born there is no
ignorance; ignorance being absent, there is no Vijñāna, and how can succession
take place?
853. The three divisions of time and no-time,
and the fifth is beyond description; this is what is known to the Buddhas
[only, though] mentioned by the theorisers.
(372) 854. Knowledge that is the cause of the
Saṁskāra is not to be described by the Saṁskāra; knowledge that is known as the
Saṁskāra seizes the Saṁskāra-path.2
855. That being so, this is; causal conditions
[everywhere] but no causes; because of this absence there are no causal
agencies; they are [only] symbolically pointed out.
1 Read after T'ang.
2 Is this the right reading?
856. The wind, indeed, makes fire burn, but it
only incites and does not produce; further, incited by it the fire goes out;
how can [the ego of] a sentient being be established?
857. The Saṁskṛita and the Asaṁskṛita are spoken
of as devoid of attachment; how is fire imagined by the ignorant for the
establishment [of their ego]?
858. Fire comes to exist in this world supported
by the strength of mutuality; if it is imagined to be like fire, whence is the
rising of a sentient being [i. e. an ego-soul]?
859. By reason of the Manas, etc., there is the
accumulation of the Skandhas and Āyatanas; non-ego like a wealthy merchant
moves on with mentation (citta).
860. These two like the sun are always removed
from effect and cause; fire does not establish them, and the theorisers fail to
understand.
861. The mind, sentient beings, and
Nirvana—these are primarily pure, but defiled by faults of the beginningless
past; they are not differentiated, they are like space.
(373) 862. Defiled by the bad theories of the
philosophers, Hastiśayya, etc., are wrapped end enveloped with [the false
discriminations of] the Manovijñāna, they imagine fire, etc., are purifying.
863 Those who see [reality] as it is in itself
will see their passions burst asunder; leaving the forest of bad analogies
behind, they reach the realm of the wise.
864. Thus [reality] is imagined to be something
other than itself by the differentiation of knower and known; the dull-witted
do not understand it, and what is beyond description is talked about.
865. As the ignorant make a sandal-wood drum by
taking something else which appears like sandal-wood and aloe wood, so is
[true] knowledge [to be distinguished] from that of the theorisers.
866. Having eaten he will rise holding the bowl
empty; he will have his mouth well cleansed of offensive and injurious matter;
he is to conduct himself thus towards food.
867. He who reflects rationally on this truth
will attain serenity of mind, accomplish the most excellent discipline, and be
above imagination; he will be released from attachment and realise the highest
meaning; and thus he will light up the golden path of the Dharma.
868. When he who is possessed of stupidity and
imagination rising from his views of being and non-being is freed from the net
of bad theories tainted thereby, and from greed, vice, and anger, he is washed
of the pigment and besprinkled by the Buddhas [with their own] hands.
869. Some philosophers are confused about the
direction [of truth] because of their theory of causation; others are perturbed
over conditions of causality; (374) others who are not wise abide in nihilism
because of their negation of causation and reality.
870. There are transformations maturing from
[the activities of] the Manas and the Vijñānas; the Manas is born of the Ālaya,
and the Vijñāna comes from the Manas.
871. From the Ālaya all mental activities take
their rise like the waves; with habit-energy as cause all things are born in
accordance with conditions of causation.
872. [All things] momentarily divided but bound
up in a continuous chain, are taken hold of as real while they are of Mind
itself; they appear in varieties of forms and characters, but are the product
of Manas and the eye-Vijñāna, etc.
873. Bound up by the faults [of speculation]
since beginningless past, there is the growth of habit-energy which gives rise
to something like an external world; it is Mind which is seen as manifoldness
when it is hindered by wrong philosophical theories.
874. With that as cause and with that other as
condition, [the Vijñāna system] is evolved; when these philosophical views are
born, transformations take place.
875. All things are like Māyā and a dream and
the Gandharvas' city; they appear as a mirage, as a lunar reflection in water;
be it known that it is all due to self-discrimination.
876. From the splitting-up of moral conduct,
there is suchness and the right knowledge dependent on it; such Samādhis of
superior grade as the Māyā-like, the Śūraṅgama, etc. [are attained].
877. By entering into the [various] stages, the
psychic powers, and the self-masteries, the knowledge of the Māyā-likeness of
existence and the [will-]body [are obtained], and there is anointment by the
Buddhas.
(375) 878. When the world is seen as quiescent,
the mind ceases and the [first] stage of Joy is attained, and [finally] they
will reach Buddhahood.
879. A revulsion taking place at the seat [of
consciousness, a man becomes] like a multicoloured gem; he performs deeds [of
beneficence] for sentient beings in the same way as the moon reflects itself in
water.
880. When the dualism of being and non-being is
abandoned, there is neither bothness nor not-bothness; and going beyond
Śrāvakahood and Pratyekabuddhahood, one will even pass over the seventh stage.
881. [As he goes up through the stages] his
insight into the truth of self-realisation will be purified at every stage, and
releasing himself from externality as well as from the philosophers, he will
discourse on the Mahāyāna.
882. When there is a revulsion (parāvṛitti) from
discrimination, one is removed from death and destruction; let him discourse on
the truth of the emancipated ones, which is like a hare's horns,1 and a
[multicoloured] gem.
883. As the text [is completed] by reason, so is
reason [revealed] by the text; therefore, let there be reason [and the text];
let there be no other discrimination than reason.2
1 After Wei and T'ang. The text has "hare's
hair" which in this connection yields no sense. The truth of emptiness may
be in a manner compared to a hare's horns and not to its hair.
2 This is the reading of T'ang. By
"text" (教, grantha) is meant any literary production in
which a principle or reason, 理, (yukti) is expounded. Grantha is here
contrasted to yukti as deśanā or deśanā-pātha is to siddhānta or pratyātmagati,
or as ruta is to artha. This contrasting the letter to spirit or meaning has
been one of the main topics of the Laṅkāvatāra. Wei has 結 for grantha and 相應 for yukti, which does
not yield any sense in this connection. The two versions, Wei and T'ang, are
quoted in full:
Wei—如依結相應. 依法亦如是. 依相應相應. 莫分別於異.
T'ang—教由理故成. 理由教故顯. 當依此教理. 勿更餘分別.
884. Such are the eye, karma, desire, ignorance,
and the Yogins; such is the Manas in relation to the eye[-consciousness] and
form, such is the Manas in relation to the defiled.1
Here Ends "The Mahāyāna Sūtra Called the
Ārya-Saddharma-Laṅkāvatāra, Together with the Verses."
(376) All things are born of causation,
And their cause has been told by the Tathagata;
And the Great Muni tells
That their cessation takes place thus.
1 This is missing in T'ang. Wei further adds:
"When the Buddha preached this exquisite Sutra, the Holy Mahāmati the
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva, Rāvaṇa the King, Śuka, Sāraṇa, Kumbakarṇa, and other
Rākshasas, the Devas, the Nāgas, the Yakshas, the Gandharvas, the Asuras, the
gods, the Bhikshus were all delighted and accepted [the teaching]." This
addition shows that Wei as a whole may be a much later production even than
T'ang, for such a passage is ordinarily regarded as the regular conclusion for
a sutra; and when this was found missing in the earlier copy of the
Laṅkāvatāra, the writer of the Wei original added it to complete the form.
-----------------
In order to show how varied are the three
Chinese and one Tibetan translations, due to whatever causes textual or
personal, I have herewith appended a comparative table of these versions which
are accompanied with their respective English translations. The passage chosen
for this purpose is one of the most difficult and at the same time most
important sections (§LXIX) in the Laṅkā, chiefly from the point of doctrinal
interpretation. In the reading of the Tibetan version I have entirely relied
upon Professor Yenga Teramoto, of Otani Buddhist College.
One thing in this section, which is most
striking, is that the Laṅkā asserts the existence of a reality which is perceivable
only by the eye of transcendental knowledge, which is in the possession of a
wise man. The reality is here designated as āryabhāvavastu or
āryavastubhāvasvabhāva. It is the exalted ultimate self-nature of all things,
and as it can be recognised only when our spiritual eye looks beyond the realm
of discriminations which is ruled by laws of being and non-being, it is also to
be called the truth of Solitude, Viviktadharma, that is, the Absolute.
For āryabhāvavastu, Sung has 聖性事, Wei 聖人境界 and T'ang 諸聖法, while for
āryavastubhāvasvabhāva Sung has 聖事性自性, Wei 聖人境界如實法體, and T'ang 聖人所見法. The Sung and the Nanjo
text must have been the same as far as these two terms go, but Wei evidently
had vishaya for vastu and bhūta(?) for bhāva, while T'ang has one 法 probably for both vastu
and bhāva, though it has generally 事 for vastu and 法 for bhāva. For T'ang's 所見 (dṛiśya) there is
nothing corresponding in the Sanskrit.
The Tibetan for āryabhāvavastu and
āryavastubhāvasvabhāva is respectively འཕགས་པའི་ངོ་བོའ་དིངོས་པོ་ and འཕགས་པའི་དངོས་ངོ་བོའི་རང་བཞིན, whereas
āryajñānasvabhāvavastu is འཕགས་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་དངོས་པོ. Evidently in this case
the Tibetan equivalent for vastu is ངོ་བོ, and this is missing in the last combination. Generally in
the Laṅkā the Tibetan has དངོས་པོ་རང་བཞིན for bhāvasvabhāva, and དངོས་པ and ངོ་བོ are synonymously used as
is sometimes the case with the Chinese.
In paragraph 5, towards the end, there is
another reference to āryajñānasvabhāvavastu for which both Sung and T'ang have
quite literally 聖智自性事, whereas Wei gives 聖智法體. Ordinarily, vastu and
bhāva are used both to designate particular objects of discrimination, thus
making them interchangeable. But vastu is used in another sense in the Laṅkā,
that is, in the sense of absolute reality. We have on p. 147, line 6 (Nanjo):
Vidyate tathatāvastu āryānāṁ gocaro yathā, for which Sung has: 有事悉如如.如賢聖境界; Wei: 如眞如本有.彼見聖境界; and T'ang: 有眞如妙物.如諸聖所行. A Vastu to be
characterised as suchness and the realm where the wise have their abode, cannot
be a particular object of discriminating knowledge.
The following comparison will be I hope of some
interest to Chinese and Sanskrit students of Buddhism.
[If you can type in Sanskrit or Tibetan text,
please contact do1@yandex.ru]
Sanskrit (Nanjo, pp. 163-166) Sung—Guṇabhadra (縮刷. 黄六. 十—a) Wei—Bodhiruci (縮刷. 黄六. 五十三 a b) T'ang—Śikshānanda (縮刷. 黄六. 百一 a — 百二 b) Tibetan (Peking Red Ed., Kanj., mDo, fol.
132b-134a)
LXIX
1
Sanskrit text
Further, Mahāmati said: According to the Blessed
One, again, in all things that are variously discriminated by discrimination
there is no self-nature, as it is nothing but [the creation of] false
imagination; if, Blessed One, it is but [the creation of] false imagination and
there is nothing in the world which is to be conceived as indicative of
self-nature, does it not, Blessed One, come to this, according to your
statement, that there is neither defilement nor purification, because all
things are of the nature of false imagination?
LXIX
1
大慧復白佛言。如世尊所說。以彼彼妄想。 妄想彼彼性。非有彼自性。但妄想自性耳。 世尊。若但妄想自性。 非性自性相待者。 非為世尊如是說煩惱清淨無性過耶。一切法妄想自性。非性故。*
Mahāmati again addressing the Buddha, said: As
the World-honoured One teaches, because of such and such imaginations, such and
such objects are discriminated; but there is no such self-nature, only a
self-nature as is imagined. World-honoured One, if there is only a self-nature
as is imagined, there is no mutual reference among objects. According to this
teaching of the World-honoured One, is not this fault committed that [the
distinction between] evil passions and purity no more exists? Because all
objects are characterised with the self-nature of imagination, and have no
existence.
* Sung has 分別 for both vikalpa and
palikalpita; 性 for bhāva, 自性 for svabhāva.
LXIX
1
大慧菩薩復白佛言。如世尊說。 以何等何等分別心。分別何等何等法。 而彼彼法。無彼如是如是體相。唯自心分別。世尊。 若唯自心分別非彼法相者。如世尊說 一切諸法應無染淨。何以故。如來說言 一切諸法妄分別見。無實體故。*
Mahāmati the Bodhisattva again addressed the
Buddha, saying: As the World-honoured One teaches, because of what and what
discriminating minds, what and what objects are discriminated; and yet such and
such objects have no this or that essential nature, except that they are
discriminated by one's own mind. World-honoured One, if there are no such
objects except what is discriminated by one's own mind, according to the
teaching of the World-honoured One, in all things there will be no defilement,
no purity. Why? Because, teaches the Tathagata, all things are seen according
to false discrimination and there is no reality in them.
* Wei has 分別 for both vikalpa and
parikalpita, and 法 for bhāva, 體 or 實體 for svabhāva.
LXIX
1
爾時大慧菩薩摩訶薩復白佛言。世尊。 如世尊說。由種種心分別諸法。 非諸法有自性。此但妄計耳。世尊。若但妄計無諸法者。 染淨諸法將無悉壞。*
At that time Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-mahāsattva
again addressing the Buddha, said: World-honoured One, according to the
World-honoured One, on account of various minds, all things are discriminated,
and there is no self-nature in all things. They are no more than false
imaginations. World-honoured One, if there are only false imaginations and no
realities, things defiled and pure will all equally be destroyed.
* T'ang distinguishes between vikalpa 分別 and parikalpita 妄計.
LXIX
1
Tibetan text
Mahāmati again asked: According to the
World-honoured One, by such and such discriminations, such and such objects are
discriminated. They are falsely imagined and have no self-nature.
World-honoured One, if all things are of false imagination whose aspect of
self-nature is unknowable, as the World-honoured One says, they being falsely
imagined, there will be in them nothing defiled or pure.
Sanskrit Sung—Guṇabhadra Wei—Bodhiruci T'ang—Śikshānanda Tibetan
2
Sanskrit text
Said the Blessed One: Mahāmati, it is just as
you say. Mahāmati, the self-nature of things is not as it is discriminated by
the ignorant and simple-minded. Mahāmati, it is the creation of false imagination;
nothing indicative of self-nature is to be ascertained. But, Mahāmati, there is
the self-nature of things such as is ascertained by the wise, by their wise
knowledge, by their wise insight, by their wise transcendental vision.
2
佛告大慧。 如是如是。如汝所說。大慧。 非如愚夫性自性妄想眞實。此妄想自性。 非有性自性相然。大慧。如聖智有性自性。 聖知聖見聖慧眼。如是性自性知。
The Buddha said to Mahāmati; So it is, so it is
as you say, Mahāmati. It is not as is [imagined] by the ignorant who falsely
imagine self-nature and take it for reality. [For] it is a self-nature falsely
imagined and not the self-nature of things as it is. Mahāmati, as to a wise
man's knowledge, there is to him the self-nature of things. With his wise
knowledge, his wise insight, his wise eye of transcendental knowledge, he
perceives the self-nature of things [such as it is].
2
佛告大慧。 如是如是。如汝所說。大慧。而諸一切愚癡凡夫分別諸法。 而彼諸法無如是相。虛妄分別以為實有。 大慧。彼是凡夫。虛妄分別諸法體相。 虛妄覺知。非如實見。大慧。 如聖人知一切諸法自體性相。依聖人智。依聖人見。依聖慧眼。 是如實知諸法自體相。
The Buddha said to Mahāmati: So it is, so it is
as you say, Mahāmati. All the ignorant masses of people discriminate all
things, but in all these things there are no such marks (Lakshana). They take
the falsely discriminated for realities (svabhāva). Mahāmati, all these people
are falsely discriminating as regards the reality of all things, they falsely perceive
them and do not see them as they really are. Mahāmati, as to the wise, they
know the self-nature aspect of all things as it is, by means of their wise
wisdom, their wise insight, their wise eye of transcendental knowledge; they
thus perceive the self-nature aspect of all things as it really is.
2
佛言。大慧。 如是如是。如汝所說。一切凡愚分別諸法。 而諸法性非如是有。此但妄執。無有性相。 然諸聖者以聖慧眼。如實知見有諸法自性。
The Buddha said: Mahāmati, so it is, so it is as
you say. All ignorant people discriminate things, but the nature of things is
not such as it is, for it is no more, than false attachment, there is no such
nature of things. But the wise with their wise eye of transcendental knowledge
recognise the self-nature of all things as it truly is.
2
Tibetan text
The World-honoured One said: It is so, as you
say, Mahāmati. In whatever way the self-nature of things may be discriminated
by the ignorant masses of people, it is not so, for it is their false
imagination, and the aspect of self-nature is not to be ascertained in all
things. Mahāmati, there is the self-nature of things such as is ascertained by
the wise who discriminate the self-nature of things as it is by means of their
wise knowledge, their wise insight, their wise eye of transcendental knowledge.
Sanskrit Sung—Guṇabhadra Wei—Bodhiruci T'ang—Śikshānanda Tibetan
3
Sanskrit text
Said Mahāmati: Blessed One, if there is the
self-nature of things such as is ascertained by the wise, by their wise
knowledge, by their wise insight, by their wise transcendental vision which is
neither human nor celestial vision, and if there is no such self-nature as is
discriminated by the ignorant and simple-minded, how, Blessed One, can the
ignorant and simple-minded abandon their discriminations, as they have no way
to recognise the presence of an exalted reality? For they are neither perverted
nor unperverted, Blessed One, [that is, they are what they are]. Why? Because
they are unable to have an insight into the self-nature of exalted reality,
because they see the course of things in the aspect of being and non-being.
3
大慧白佛言。 若使如聖以聖知聖見聖慧眼。非天眼非肉眼。 性自性如是知。非如愚夫妄想。世尊。 云何愚夫離是妄想。不覺聖性事故。世尊。 彼亦非顚倒。非不顚倒。所以者何。 謂不覺聖事性自性故。不見離有無相故。世尊。 聖亦不如是見。如事妄想。 不以自相境界為境界故。*
Mahāmati addressing the Buddha, said: If the
self-nature of things is known to be such and not as is falsely imagined by the
ignorant, when [it is seen], as in the case with a wise man, with his wise
knowledge, with his wise insight, with his wise eye of transcendental
knowledge, which is neither a heavenly eye nor a fleshly one, O World-honoured
One, how can the ignorant part with their false imaginations? Because they are
not [yet] awakened to the reality of things, [which belongs to] the wise.
World-honoured One, they are neither perverted nor unperverted. Why? Because
they are not [yet] awakened to the reality belonging to the wise, which is the
self-nature of things; because they have not [yet] perceived that which is free
from being and non-being. World-honoured One, the wise too do not thus perceive
[reality], their reality is [also] falsely imagined, because their realm is not
the realm of self-aspect.
* 境界 = vishaya = gocara;
自相 = svalakshaṇa =
thing-in-itself?
聖性事 = āryabhāvavastu.
3
大慧菩薩言。世尊 世尊。如諸聖人等。依聖智。依聖見。依聖慧眼。 非肉眼天眼。 覺知一切諸法體相。無如是相。非如凡夫虛妄分別。世尊。 云何愚癡凡夫轉虛妄相。佛告大慧。 能知實覺知聖人境界。轉虛妄識。世尊。彼癡凡夫。非顚倒見。 非不顚倒見。何以故。 以不能見聖人境界如實法體故。以見轉變有無相故。 大慧白佛言。世尊。一切聖人亦有分別。 一切種種諸事無如是相。以自心見境界相故。*
Mahāmati the Bodhisattva said: World-honoured
One, as to the wise they recognise by means of their wise knowledge, their wise
insight, and their wise eye of transcendental knowledge, which is neither a
fleshly eye nor a heavenly eye, that in all things there is no such aspect of
reality as is falsely discriminated by the ignorant. World-honoured One, how
can the ignorant masses of people cause transformation in the aspect of
falsehood? The Buddha said to Mahāmati: When one recognises the realm of the
wise as it really is, there is a transformation in cognition of falsehood.
World-honoured One, those ignorant masses of people have neither a perverted
view nor an unperverted view. Why? Because they are unable to see into the
realm of the wise, into the reality of things as it really is, because they see
things in their aspect of change, of being and non-being. Mahāmati addressed
the Buddha, saying: World-honoured One, all wise men too have their
discrimination, [but] all various realities have no such aspect, because they
belong to a realm of what is seen of self-mind.
* 聖人境界如實法體 = āryabhāvavastu.
3
大慧白言。 若諸聖人以聖慧眼見有諸法性。 非天眼肉眼。不同凡愚之所分別。 云何凡愚得離分別。不能覺了諸聖法故。世尊。 彼非顚倒非不顚倒。何以故。不見聖人所見法故。 聖見遠離有無相故。 聖亦不如凡所分別如是得故。非自所行境界相故。*
Mahāmati addressing [the Buddha], said: If the
wise see the nature of things with their wise eye of transcendental knowledge
which is neither a heavenly eye nor a fleshly eye, and if [what they see] is
not the same as that which is discriminated by the ignorant, how can the
ignorant part with their discrimination? Because they do not know how to have
an understanding of things of wisdom. World-honoured One, they are neither
perverted nor unperverted. Why? Because they do not see things as are seen by
the wise, and because what is seen by the wise is free from the aspect of being
and non-being. [But] the wise too have their discrimination as the ignorant and
do not thus get [into the truth], because [the truth] does not belong to a realm
where one's own [discrimination] moves.
* 諸聖法 or 聖人所見法 = āryabhāvavastu.
所行 = gocara.
境界 = vishaya, = vastu.
3
Tibetan text
Mahāmati asked: World-honoured One, the nature
of all things may be such as is discriminated by the wise with their miraculous
power, their wise knowledge, their wise insight, their wise eye of
transcendental knowledge, and not as is discriminated by the ignorant masses of
people in regard to the self-nature of all things. World-honoured One, if so,
as the ignorant masses of people cannot ascertain the reality of self-nature
belonging to the wise their discrimination is perverted. But, World-honoured
One, they are neither perverted nor unperverted. Why? Because they do not
ascertain the reality of self-nature of things belonging to the wise, because
they see things in the course of being-and-non-being aspect. In whatever way
things may be discriminated by the wise the realm of self-aspect is not where
they move on.
Sanskrit Sung—Guṇabhadra Wei—Bodhiruci T'ang—Śikshānanda Tibetan
4
Sanskrit text
And Blessed One, the reality cannot be such as
is discriminated even by the wise, because the aspect of reality as it is in
itself cannot be an object [of discrimination by anybody]; because, Blessed
One, what appears to the wise as the self-nature of reality is no more than the
creation of their imagination, which is predicable with the notion of causation
and no-causation; that is, they also cherish in their own way the idea of a
being with self-nature. [And they would say] that this is a realm that belongs
to somebody else and is not that [of the ignorant]. This is committing the
fault of non-finality, for thus what constitutes the self-nature of reality
becomes impossible to know. Blessed One, what is derived from the imagination
cannot be the self-nature of reality. How is it that while things are said to
exist owing to the imagination [or discrimination], they are said again not to
be such as are imagined?
4
世尊。彼亦性自性相 妄想自性如是現。不說因無因故。謂墮性相見故。 異境界。非如彼等。如是無窮過。世尊。 不覺性自性相故。世尊。 亦非妄想自性因性自性相。彼云何妄想非妄想。如實知妄想。*
World-honoured One, the wise too imagine the
self-nature of things and [think] this self-nature is manifested in this way.
They do not talk about cause or no-cause, that is, they fall into the view that
things have their self-aspect. It is another realm, it is not such as is
[imagined] by them. Thus is the fault of non-finality [committed].
World-honoured One, because they do not understand the aspect of the
self-nature of things; because, World-honoured One, what is caused by the
self-nature of false imagination is not the aspect of self-nature of things.
How can they really know what is a false imagination when they do not regard
their imagination as imagination?
* 境界 = gocara.
4
世尊。 彼諸聖人。見有法體。分別法相。 以世尊不說有因。不說無因。何以故。 以墮有法相故。餘人見境不如是見。世尊。 如是說者有無窮過。何以故。 以不覺知所有法相無自體相故。世尊。 非因分別有法體相而有諸法。世尊。彼云何分別。不如彼分別。 應如彼分別。
World-honoured One, wise men seeing the reality
of things discriminate as to their aspect, because the World-honoured One does
not teach causation, does not teach no-causation. Why? Because one falls into
the aspect of being. Others may view the field, but not in this manner.
World-honoured One, those who talk thus commit the fault of non-finality. Why?
Because they do not recognise that in all things there is no aspect to be known
as their self-reality. World-honoured One, it is not due to discrimination that
there is the aspect of reality in all things, yet here are all things.
World-honoured One, while they may be discriminating [in their way], why do
[the wise tell us] that discrimination is to be done thus and not otherwise?
4
彼亦見有諸法性相。如妄執性而顯現故。 不說有因及無因故。墮於諸法性相見故。世尊。 其餘境界既不同此。如是則成無窮之失。 孰能於法了知性相。世尊。諸法性相不因分別。 云何而言以分別故而有諸法。
[The wise] too see the aspect of [self-]nature
in all things, for it manifests itself as if characterised with false
attachment. They do not talk about causation and no-causation, they fall into
the view of [self-]aspect in all things. World-honoured One, [thus they say
that] this belongs to, another realm, and is not like such [as is maintained by
others]. If so, this is the fault of non-finality. Who can then have a clear
understanding as regards the aspect of [self-]nature in all things?
World-honoured One, the aspect of [self-]nature in all things is not dependent
on discrimination; why do you say that all things are because of
discrimination?
4
Tibetan text
World-honoured One, what is manifested to them
as the aspect of self-nature in all things is the self-nature of their false
imagination; because they fall into the view by which the self-aspect of beings
is [maintained]. This is a realm where others move on. World-honoured One, as
the self-aspect of things is not ascertained, they are not as they are, and the
fault of non-finality is committed. World-honoured One, if the self-nature of
things is produced by the self-nature of false imagination and has thus no
existence, how are they separately discriminated by false imagination? However
discriminated they will not be such as they are.
Sanskrit Sung—Guṇabhadra Wei—Bodhiruci T'ang—Śikshānanda Tibetan
5
Sanskrit text
Blessed One, [it is true that] according to the
way the imagination is carried on, the aspect of self-nature conceived may
vary; for when the cause is not alike, the notion of reality that thus comes to
be cherished may not be alike. But according to you, Blessed One, while the
imagination is kept on going with the wise as well as with the ignorant, the
latter alone fail to see reality as it is; and yet you tell us that the reason
why it is said that things are not really such as are imagined by the
imagination is to make all beings discard their imagination. Now, Blessed One,
is it that in order to have all beings free from the notion of being [which is
realism] and of non-being [which is nihilism], you in turn make them cherish a
realistic view of existence by telling them to uphold the idea of the
self-nature of reality, whereby they are led to cling to the realm of noble
wisdom? Why do you deny the truth of solitude by teaching the doctrine of
reality whose self-nature is [according to you] noble wisdom?
5
世尊。 妄想異。自性相異。世尊。不相似因 妄想自性相。彼云何各各不妄想愚。而愚夫不如實知。 然為衆生離妄想故。說 如妄想相不如實有。世尊何故遮衆生有無見。事自性計著。 聖智所行境界計著。墮有見。說空法非性。 而說聖智自性事。*
World-honoured One, as imaginations differ, the
aspect of self-nature differs, because of dissimilitude of cause as regards the
self-aspect of imagination. Do they not each imagine [according to his own
way]? And yet the ignorant do not know it as it really is? But in order to keep
all beings away from imagination, it is taught that things are not really as
they appear to the imagination. World-honoured One, how is it that in order to
check the view of being and non-being as held by all beings [you] become
attached to the self-nature of realities, [you] become attached to the world in
which noble wisdom moves, thus falling into the view of being? [You] teach that
the truth of emptiness has no [self-]nature and yet [you] teach reality as the
self-nature of noble wisdom.
* Gocara
= 所行,
vastu = 事, vishaya = 境界
abhiniveśa = 計著, viviktadharma = 空法.
5
世尊。分別相異相。自體相異相。世尊。 而彼二種因不相似。彼彼分別法體相異。 云何凡夫如此分別。此因不成如彼所見。 世尊說言。 我為斷諸一切衆生虛妄分別心故。 作如是說。如彼凡夫虛妄分別無如是法。世尊何故遮諸衆生有無見事。 而執著實法聖智境界。世尊 復令一切衆生墮無見處。何以故。以言諸法寂靜無相。 聖智法體如是無相故。*
World-honoured One, as the aspect of
discrimination differs, the aspect of self-reality also differs. And,
World-honoured One, the two causes being dissimilar the reality of things
discriminated is not alike. How is it that things thus discriminated by the
ignorant do not thereby accomplish such as are seen by them? The World-honoured
One teaches that he teaches this doctrine in order to let all beings destroy
their falsifying discriminating minds, saying that such objects as they falsely
discriminated by the ignorant have no existence. World-honoured One, why are
you attached to the realm of noble wisdom where realities are, while you put a
stop to the existence of such objects as to make all beings cherish the view of
being and non-being? [Or,] World-honoured One, do you again make all beings
fall into the place where the view of non-being is? Why? Because you say that
all things are tranquil and formless, that realities belonging to noble wisdom
are thus formless.
* 諸法寂靜 = viviktadharma.
5
世尊。 分別相異。諸法相異。因不相似。 云何諸法而由分別。復以何故凡愚分別不如是有。 而作是言。為令衆生捨分別故。 說如分別所見法相無如是法。世尊 何故令諸衆生離有無見所執著法。 而復執著聖智境界墮於有見。何以故。不說寂靜空無之法。 而說聖智自性事故。
World-honoured One, as the aspect of
discrimination differs, the aspect of beings also differs; causes are
dissimilar. Why are all things dependent on discrimination? Why again is not
the discrimination by the ignorant such as it ought to be? And then it is said
that in order to make all beings abandon their discrimination there is no such
reality in things as seen by discrimination. World-honoured One, how is it that
in order to make all beings abandon the view of being and non-being and also
their object of attachment you make them again become attached to a realm of
noble wisdom and fall into the view of being? Why do you not teach the truth of
solitude and emptiness, instead of teaching reality which is the self-nature of
noble wisdom?
5
Tibetan text
World-honoured One, as the aspects of
discrimination differ, aspects of self-nature also differ. World-honoured One,
discrimination and the aspect of self-nature are dissimilarly caused. They are
not such as are revealed and discriminated by the ignorant masses of people.
Thus in order to remove the discrimination of all beings, is it told by you
that no such things are existent as are discriminated by their discrimination?
World-honoured One, how is it that you establish the view of being by putting
aside the view of being and non-being as held by all sentient beings and get
attached to the self-nature of things, to the realm where noble wisdom moves
on? By teaching the self-nature of things belonging to noble wisdom do you not
teach the truth of solitude?
Sanskrit Sung—Guṇabhadra Wei—Bodhiruci T'ang—Śikshānanda Tibetan
6
Sanskrit text
Said the Blessed One: Mahāmati, it is not true
that I deny truth of solitude, nor that I fall into a realistic view by
upholding the doctrine of noble self-existing reality. But in order to save all
beings from becoming frightened, who are addicted from beginningless past to
the notion of self-nature, it is told them that there is truth of solitude,
after making them realise by means of noble wisdom that reality in its
self-nature is made the subject of attachment [by the ignorant]. Mahāmati, the
doctrine of self-nature is not taught by me.
6
佛告大慧。 非我說空法非性。亦不墮有見。說聖智自性事。 然為令衆生性恐怖句故。衆生無始以來 計著性自離相。聖智事自性計著相見。說空法。大慧。 我不說性自性相。
The Buddha told Mahāmati: It is not that I teach
the truth of emptiness to be nonexistent, nor do I fall into the view of being.
I teach reality as the self-nature of noble wisdom. Yet in order to make all
beings become detached from fear-inspiring terms, I teach the truth of
emptiness—for all beings are attached since beginningless past to the aspect of
self-nature—[by means of] the view which seems to be attached to the aspect of
self-nature as reality belonging to noble wisdom. Mahāmati, I do not teach the
aspect of self-nature.
6
佛告大慧。 我不說言一切諸法寂靜無相。亦不說言諸法悉無。 亦不令其墮於無見。 亦令不著一切聖人境界如是。何以故。我為衆生離驚怖處故。 以諸衆生無始世來。執著實有諸法體相。 是故我說聖人知法體相實有。復說諸法寂靜無相。 大慧。我不說言法體有無。*
The Buddha told Mahāmati: I do not teach that
all things are tranquil and formless, nor do I teach that all things are
nonexistent, nor do I make them fall into the view of non-entity, nor do I make
them grow attached to the realm as it is of all wise men. Why? In order to free
all beings from fear-inspiring places, and as all beings are from beginningless
past attached to the reality of all things as really existing, I therefore
teach that the wise know what is meant by the real reality which is in all
things. I further teach that all things are tranquil and formless. Mahāmati, I
do not teach as to the existence and non-existence of the reality of things.
* 無相 = nirmitta.
6
佛言。大慧。 我非不說寂靜空法。墮於有見。何以故。已說聖智自性事故。 我為衆生無始時來計著於有。 於寂靜法以聖事說。今其聞已不生恐怖。
The Buddha said: Mahāmati, it is not that I do
not teach the truth of solitude and emptiness thereby falling into the view of
being. Why? Because I have already taught the existence of a reality which is
the self-nature of noble wisdom. For the sake of all beings who are attached to
[the idea of] being since beginningless past, I teach them that there is a
noble reality in the truth of solitude, so that they will not be frightened by
hearing it.
6
Tibetan text
Buddha said: Mahāmati, when the self-nature of
things belonging to noble wisdom is taught, this does not deny the truth of
solitude, nor does it establish the view of being. But, Mahāmati, in order to
free all sentient beings from the state of fright who are attached to the
aspect of the self-nature of things from beginningless past, I teach the truth
of solitude by means of the view which looks as if attached to the aspect of
self-nature as reality belonging to noble wisdom. Mahāmati, I do not teach the
aspect of self-nature.
Sanskrit Sung—Guṇabhadra Wei—Bodhiruci T'ang—Śikshānanda Tibetan
7
Sanskrit text
But, Mahāmati, those who have realised by
themselves truth of solitude as it really is and are abiding in it, will see
that [this existence of] error has no form; and thereby knowing that what is
seen is nothing but the Mind itself, they are kept away from [dualistically]
viewing an external world under the aspect of being and non-being; they are
stamped well with the stamp of suchness which is gained by the triple
emancipation; they will have an intuition into the self-nature of all things of
the wisdom which is acquired within themselves, and thus get away from such
ideas of reality as to lead themselves to realism and nihilism.
* Line 3: read mātra for matra.
7
大慧。 但我住自得如實空法。離惑亂相見。離自心現性非性見。 得三解脫。如實印所印。 於性自性得緣自覺觀察住。離有無事見相。*
But, Mahāmati, I abide in the truth of emptiness
as I have by myself attained it and as it is in itself; [I am] free from views
based on the aspect of error, free from views of being and non-being in regard
to the manifestation of self-mind, have attained the triple emancipation, am
stamped with the stamp of realness, have gained self-realisation in the
self-nature of things, and am abiding in the intuition, free from the views of
existence and. non-existence of realities.
* 性非性 = bhāvābhāva, 有無 = nāstyastitva,
觀察 = pratyaksha.
7
我說自身如實證法。 以聞我法。修行寂靜諸法無相。得見眞如無相境界。入自心見法。 遠離見外諸法有無。得三解脫門。 得已。以如實印善印諸法。自身內證智慧觀察。離有無見。
I teach the truth of self-realisation as it
really is, so that those who listen to my doctrine and discipline themselves in
the formlessness of all things that are tranquil, can see into the realm of
suchness and formlessness, enter into the things that are seen of one's own
mind, free themselves from the existence and non-existence of all external
objects, and attain to the triple emancipation; and having attained this, they
will well stamp all things with the stamp of realness, and viewing [the world]
with the insight which is gained within themselves by realisation, are free
from the view of being and non-being.
7
能如實證寂靜空法。離惑亂相入唯識理。 知其所見無有外法。悟三解脫門獲如實印。 見法自性了聖境界。遠離有無一切諸著。*
But they will really attain to the truth of
solitude and emptiness, free themselves from the aspect of error, enter into
the principle of representation-only, know that there is no existence beside
what is seen [of mind-only], understand the gate of the triple emancipation,
obtain the stamp of realness, see the self-nature of things, perceive the realm
of the wise, and keep themselves away from all the attachments as regards being
and non-being.
* 入唯識理 evidently corresponds
to svacitta-dṛiśya-mātram. T'ang has one or two other places where cittamātra
is rendered 唯識 and not 唯心.
7
Tibetan text
But, Mahāmati, they will abide in the truth of
solitude, who have by themselves and truly realised it. When they see it to be
formless they will enter into [the view that] there is nothing but what is seen
of Mind itself, reject the view of being and non-being in external existences,
understand [the truth] as it is by the triple emancipation, be stamped with the
stamp, free themselves from existence [subject to the view] of being and
non-being, and intuitively gain an entrance into the knowledge of
self-realisation in the self-nature of things.
-----------------
Translated for the first time from
Preface xi
Introduction xiii
CHAPTER
ONE. RAVANA, LORD OF LANKA, ASKS FOR INSTRUCTION 3 (1)*
CHAPTER
TWO. COLLECTION OF ALL THE DHARMAS 22 (22)
§
I. Mahāmati Praises the Buddha with
Verses 22 (22)
§
II. Mahāmati's "One Hundred and
Eight Questions" 23 (23)
§
III. "The One Hundred and Eight
Negations" 31 (34)
§
IV. Concerning the Vijñānas 33 (37)
§
V. Seven Kinds of Self-nature (svabhāva) 35 (39)
§
VI. Seven Kinds of First Principle
(paramārtha), and the Philosophers' Wrong Views regarding the Mind Rejected 35 (39)
§
VII. Erroneous Views held by Some
Brahmans and Śramanas Concerning Causation, Continuation, etc.; The Buddhist
Views Concerning Such Subjects as Alayavijñāna, Nirvana, Mind-only, etc.;
Attainments of the Bodhisattva 36 (40)
§
VIII. The Bodhisattva's Discipling
himself in Self-realisation 39 (43)
§
IX. The Evolution and Function of the
Vijñānas; The Spiritual Discipline of the Bodhisattva; Verses on the
Alaya-ocean and Vijñāna-waves 39 (43)
§
X. The Bodhisattva is to Understand the
Signification of Mind-only 44 (49)
§
XI(a). The Three Aspects of Noble
Wisdom (āryajñāna) 44 (49)
§
XI(b). The Attainment of the
Tathāgatakāya 45 (50)
§
XII. Logic on the Hare's Horns 46 (51)
§
XIII. Verses on the Alayavijñāna and
Mind-only 49 (54)
§
XIV. Purification of the Outflows,
Instantaneous and Gradual 49 (55)
§
XV. Nishyanda-Buddha,
Dharmatā-Buddha, and Nirmāṇa-Buddha 51 (56)
§
XVI. The Śrāvaka's Realisation and
Attachment to the Notion of Self-nature 52 (58)
§
XVII. The Eternal-Unthinkable 53 (59)
§
XVIII. Nirvana and Alayavijñāna 55 (61)
§
XIX. All Things are Unborn 55 (62)
§
XX. The Five Classes of Spiritual
Insight 56 (63)
§
XXI. Verses on the Triple Vehicle 58 (65)
§
XXII. Two Classes of the Icchantika 58 (65)
§
XXIII. The Three Forms of Svabhāva 59 (67)
§
XXIV. The Twofold Egolessness
(nairātmyadvaya-lakshaṇa) 60 (68)
§
XXV. Assertion and Refutation
(samāropāpavāda) 62 (70)
§
XXVI. The Bodhisattva Assumes Various
Personalities 64 (72)
§
XXVII. On Emptiness (śūnyatā), No-birth,
and Non-duality 65 (73)
§
XXVIII. The Tathagata-Garbha and the
Ego-soul 68 (77)
§
XXIX. A Verse on the Philosophers'
Discriminations 70 (79)
§
XXX. The Four Things Needed for the
Constitution of Bodhisattvahood 70 (79)
§
XXXI. On Causation (Six Kinds), and
the Rise of Existence 72 (82)
§
XXXII. Four Forms of Word-discrimination 75 (85)
§
XXXIII. On Word and Discrimination and
the Highest Reality 76 (86)
§
XXXIV. Verses on Reality and its
Representations 77 (88)
§
XXXV. Mind-only, Multitudinousness, and
Analogies, with an Interpolation on the Dualistic Notion of Existence 78 (88)
§
XXXVI. The Teaching (dharmadeśanā) of the
Tathagatas 84 (96)
§
XXXVII. Four Kinds of Dhyāna 85 (97)
§
XXXVIII. On Nirvana 86 (98)
§
XXXIX. Two Characteristics of Self-nature 87 (99)
§
XL. Two Kinds of the Buddha's
Sustaining Power (adhishṭhāna) 87 (100)
§
XLI. On the Chain of Causation
(pratityasamutpāda) 90 (103)
§
XLII. Words (abhilāpa) and Realities
(bhāva) 91 (104)
§
XLIII. On Eternality of Sound
(nityaśabda), the Nature of Error (bhrānta), and Perversion (viparyāsa) 92 (106)
§
XLIV. On the Nature of Māyā 95 (109)
§
XLV. That All Things are Unborn 96 (110)
§
XLVI. On Name, Sentence, Syllable, and
Their Meaning 97 (112)
§
XLVII. On Inexplicable Statements
(vyakṛitānī) 98 (114)
§
XLVIII. All Things are and are not
(Verses on Four Forms of Explanation) 99 (115)
§
XLIX. On the Śrāvakas, Srotaāpanna,
Sakṛidāgāmin, Anāgāmin, and Arhat; on the Three Knots (saṁyojāni) 100 (116)
§
L. The Intellect (buddhi), Examining and
Discrimnating 105 (122)
§
LI. The Elements, Primary and Secondary 106 (123)
§
LII. The Five Skandhas 107 (124)
§
LIII. Four Kinds of Nirvana and the
Eight Vijñānas 108 (126)
§
LIV. The False Imagination
Regarding Twelve Subjects 110 (127)
§
LV. Verses on the Citta,
Parikalpita, Paratantra, and Parinishpanna 112 (130)
§
LVI. The One Vehicle and the Triple
Vehicle 114 (133)
CHAPTER
THREE. ON IMPERMANENCY 118 (136)
§
LVII. Three Forms of the Will-body
(manomayakāya) 118 (136)
§
LVIII. The Five Immediacies
(pañcānantaryāṇi); Desire as Mother and Ignorance as Father 120 (138)
§
LIX. The Buddha-nature (buddhatā) 122 (140)
§
LX. The Identity (samatā) of
Buddhahood and its Four Aspects 122 (141)
§
LXI. Not a Word Uttered by the
Buddha; Self-realisation and an Eternally-abiding Reality 123 (142)
§
LXII. On Being and Non-Being; Realism
and Nihilism 125 (144)
§
LXIII. Realisation and Word-teaching 127 (147)
§
LXIV. Discrimination, an External
World, Dualism, and Attachment 129 (149)
§
LXV. The Relation between Words
(ruta) and Meaning (artha) 133 (154)
§
LXVI. On Knowledge, Absolute (jñāna)
and Relative (vijñāna) 135 (156)
§
LXVII. Nine Transformations (pariṇāma) 137 (158)
§
LXVIII. The Deep-seated Attachment to
Existence 138 (160)
§
LXIX. Self-nature, Reality,
Imagination, Truth of Solitude, etc 141 (163)
§
LXX. The Thesis of No-birth 144 (166)
§
LXXI. True Knowledge and Ignorance 146 (169)
§
LXXII. Self-realisation and the
Discoursing on it 148 (171)
§
LXXIII. On the Lokāyatika 149 (173)
§
LXXIV. Various Views of Nirvana 157 (182)
§
LXXV. Is Tathagatahood Something Made?
Its Relation to the Skandhas, to Emancipation, to Knowledge 161 (187)
§
LXXVI. The Tathagata Variously
Designated; Relation Between Words and Meaning; Not a Word Uttered by the
Buddha 164 (191)
§
LXXVII. Causation, No-birth, Self-mind,
Nirvana 170 (197)
§
LXXVIII. Verses on No-birth and
Causation 172 (200)
§
LXXIX. Various Views of Impermanency 176 (204)
CHAPTER
FOUR. ON INTUITIVE UNDERSTANDING 182 (211)
§
LXXX. Perfect Tranquillisation Attained
by Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas; Stages of Bodhisattvahood 182 (211)
CHAPTER
FIVE. ON THE DEDUCTION OF THE PERMANENCY OF TATHAGATAHOOD 187 (217)
§
LXXXI. Permanency of Tathagatahood 187 (217)
CHAPTER
SIX. ON MOMENTARINESS 190 (220)
§
LXXXII. The Tathāgata-garbha and the
Alayavijñāna 190 (220)
§
LXXXIII. The Five Dharmas, and
Their Relation to the Three Svabhāvas 193 (224)
§
LXXXIV. The Five Dharmas 197 (228)
§
LXXXV. Tathagata and Sands of the Gangā 198 (229)
§
LXXXVI. Momentariness; the Eight
Vijñānas 202 (234)
§
LXXXVII. Three Kinds of the
Pāramitās 204 (236)
§
LXXXVIII. Views on Momentariness;
Discrimination 206 (238)
CHAPTER
SEVEN. ON TRANSFORMATION 207 (240)
§
LXXXIX. On Transformation 207 (240)
CHAPTER
EIGHT. ON MEAT-EATING 211 (244)
CHAPTER
NINE. THE DHĀRANĪS 223 (260)
SAGĀTHAKAM 226 (264)
APPENDIX 297
Original
Edition Published in London in 1932.
Based
upon the Sanskrit edition of Bunyu Nanjo (1923).
Published
in Internet by © do1@yandex.ru, May 2004. (Rev. 2) For free distribution only.
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-----------------
Translated for the first time from
